JUDGMENT : Hon'ble J.J. Munir, J.-The petitioners, who are 21 in number, are tube-well operators, serving under Department of Irrigation, Government of Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow. A number of them have retired pending this petition, but that fact does not merit a detailed statement for nothing turns on it, so far as the issue involved in this petition is concerned. The State Government, with the help of financial assistance extended by the World Bank, established tube-wells across the State for the purpose of providing effective sources of irrigation in rural areas and reducing dependence on natural sources, such as rain. After these tube-wells were established, they were handed over to the Irrigation Department of the Government for the purpose of operation and maintenance. The Irrigation Department, in order to operate and maintain the tube-wells, employed two categories of employees, to wit, the operational staff and the maintenance staff. So far as the operational staff is concerned, the Irrigation Department employed persons, designated as tube-well operators at the entry level. The petitioners began their journey as tube-well operators, appointed on a fixed pay of Rs. 299/- between the years 1987 and 1990. The petitioners were not paid salary in the regular pay scale with a basic pay plus allowances. This was for the reason that they were part-time employees working on a fixed pay and not regulars in the establishment. After lapse of a considerable period of time, in the year 1997, the part-time tube-well operators association filed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 46247 of 1992 before this Court, claiming the following material reliefs: ''i. issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to pay salary to the petitioners at the basic of Rs. 950/- alongwith other dearness allowance, house rent allowance and other allowance as are being paid to regular tube well operators similarly situated within one month of production of the order of this Hon'ble Court. ii. issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to pay arrears of salary and other allowances to the petitioner within one month of production of order of this Hon'ble Court.'' 2. In the aforesaid writ petition, an interim mandamus was issued by this Court on 22.12.1992 in the following terms: ''Put up on the date fixed for admission. In the aforesaid writ petition, an interim mandamus was issued by this Court on 22.12.1992 in the following terms: ''Put up on the date fixed for admission. Mean while the 3rd respondent, (Executive Engineer, Irrigation Department, Rajkiya Parichalan Evam Anurakshan Khand Moradabad) is directed to ensure payment of salary to the petitioner at the rate of Rs. 950/- (Rupees Nine hundred fifty only) alongwith admissible allowances on the basis of the principle of equal pay for equal work as alleged in the writ petition or to show-cause by filing counter-affidavit within six weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order.'' 3. It is the petitioners' case that the aforesaid interim order was not challenged before any superior Court and attained finality, but that by itself it has nothing to do with the issue involved here. It is also the petitioners' assertion that they are discharging their duties with diligence and sincerity and their service records have been exemplary. In the exercise of powers under the Uttar Pradesh Tubewell Operators (First Amendment) Rules, 2008, the petitioners' claim was considered and all of them have been regularized on the post of tube-well operators with effect from 27.12.2008. Some years later, on the 28th of December, 2013, by an order of that date passed by the Executive Engineer, Tubewell Division, Amroha, the petitioners alongwith other similarly circumstanced tube-well operators, whose services had been regularized with effect from 27.12.2008, were declared 'permanent'. 4. What has now brought the petitioners to this Court through the present writ petition is the fact that their services being regularized with effect from 27.12.2008, the entire period of service which they have rendered on the post of tube-well operators, will not be counted for the purpose of pensionary and other post retiral benefits. Their services for the purpose of grant of pension and other post retiral benefits would be reckoned w.e.f. 27.12.2008; not earlier. The petitioners, on the other hand, claim that they have been discharging duties of tube-well operators right from their initial appointment between the years 1987 to 1990, as the case may be, and, therefore, are entitled to the grant of all post retiral benefits, taking into account the entire period of their service - including the one before their services were regularized. At the time, the writ petition was instituted, it was averred in paragraph No. 16 of the writ petition that some of the petitioners were going to retire within the period of 4-5 years. By time, this petition has come up for hearing, the period has gone by and a number of the petitioners, may be the majority of them, would have superannuated. 5. It is the petitioners' case that once their services were regularized, they became part of the cadre of tube-well operators, and, therefore, their entire service is to be reckoned for the purpose of pension and the grant of other post retiral benefits under the Rules, to wit, GPF, HRA, annual increment, which are admissible to their counterparts in the regular establishment, much before the petitioners became part of it. The orders dated 27.12.2008 and 28.12.2013, that seek to reckon the petitioners' services for the purpose of grant of post retiral benefits from the date of their regularization, are impugned as discriminatory and arbitrary. The petitioners say that these ought to be quashed, which would mean quashed to the extent that the two orders under reference peg down the date of the petitioners regularization to 27.12.2008. A mandamus has also been sought to the effect that the respondents be directed to consider the petitioners' claim for grant of post retiral benefits, including assured career progression, annual increments, general provident fund and house rent allowance. 6. A counter-affidavit dated 5.12.2014 has been filed on behalf of the respondents, to which the petitioners have filed a rejoinder. 7. This petition was admitted to hearing on 13.7.2023 and heard across a number of dates until judgment was reserved. 8. Heard Mr. Siddharth Khare, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Ms. Monika Arya, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel on behalf of the State. 9. Mr. Siddharth Khare, learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that the petitioners are entitled to the reckoning of their past services for the purpose of pension, if not from the dates of their initial appointment, at least from January, 1993, when in compliance with the interim mandamus dated 22.12.1992, they were treated as regular employees, paid a basic salary and given the benefits of general provident fund, house rent allowance, annual increments etc., like any other regular employee. 10. 10. It is next submitted that the petitioners' case is squarely covered by the principle in Prem Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, (2019) 10 SCC 516 , inasmuch as it is laid down there by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that an employee who has worked for a substantial length of time, without being regularized, is entitled to the computation of his past services for the purposes of pension. The petitioners have been regularized in the year 2008 after serving for eighteen to twenty years, entitling them to reckon their past services, prior to regularization, for the purpose of payment of pension and other post retiral benefits. Quite apart from the said contention, the Court's attention has been drawn by Mr. Siddharth Khare to the decision of this Court in Dr. Shyam Kumar v. State of U.P. and another, 2023(3) ADJ 138 (LB). He submits, on the strength of Dr. Shyam Kumar (supra), that the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Qualifying Service for Pension and Validation Act, 2021 (for short, 'the Act of 2021), particularly Section 2 of the said Act, have been read down in order to save it from the vice of arbitrariness. The word 'post', occurring in Section 2 of the Act of 2021, be it temporary or permanent, has been read down to mean 'services rendered by a Government employee, be it of temporary or permanent nature'. It is, particularly, pointed out by Mr. Khare that in Dr. Shyam Kumar, even seasonal employees have been held entitled to reckon their past services for the purpose of grant of pension, whereas in the petitioners' case they were treated to be regular employees, much before they were actually regularized in service. 11. The attention of the Court is further drawn to the decision of this Court in Awadhesh Kumar Srivastava v. State of U.P. and others, 2023 SCC OnLine All 360, which virtually holds the Act of 2021 to have failed the test of a validating statute, which may competently overcome the effect of the judgment of a Constitutional Court, striking down or reading down an earlier statute. It has been held, according to learned Counsel, that in Prem Singh (supra), the Supreme Court read down the provisions of Rule 3(8) of the Uttar Pradesh Retirement Benefit Rules, 1961 (for short 'the Rules of 1961) and struck down the provisions carried in Regulation 370 of the Civil Services Regulations of Uttar Pradesh and Paragraph No. 669 of the Financial Handbook. It is submitted that Awadhesh Kumar Srivastava (supra) holds that the Act of 2021 is a validating Act to restore to the Statute Book, the provisions of Rule 3(8) of the Rules of 1961, as these were before the judgment in Prem Singh, reading down the said provisions and the provisions of Regulation 370 of the Civil Service Regulations and Paragraph 669 of the Financial Handbook struck down by the said decision. It is submitted, therefore, by Mr. Khare that the decision of this Court in Awadhesh Kumar Srivastava holds that the Act of 2021 fails to overcome the effect of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Prem Singh. The submission is that in view of the law laid down in Awadhesh Kumar Srivastava, the Act of 2021 cannot be given effect to. 12. The next submission, which has been advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioners, is that the reliance placed upon the decision of this Court in Sajeevan Lal and others v. State of U.P. and others, 2023(2) ADJ 324 (LB), by the respondents is of no consequence in view of the later pronouncement of this Court in Dr. Shyam Kumar and Awadhesh Kumar Srivastava, which have read down the Act of 2021. It is also urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioners, in answer to the respondents' submission that a reading down of the provisions of the Act of 2021 is not permissible in the absence of a challenge to its vires by saying that it can very well be done. In this connection, the learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that there is no prohibition on the Court reading down the provisions of a statute in the absence of a challenge to its vires. He draws support for the principle from a Bench decision of the Gujarat High Court in Shivangiben Chetankumar Patel v. State of Gujarat, R/Letters Patent Appeal No. 543 of 2017, decided on 9.5.2018. To the same end and for the same proposition, Mr. He draws support for the principle from a Bench decision of the Gujarat High Court in Shivangiben Chetankumar Patel v. State of Gujarat, R/Letters Patent Appeal No. 543 of 2017, decided on 9.5.2018. To the same end and for the same proposition, Mr. Khare further places reliance upon the decision of this Court in Jai Prakash Pal v. State of U.P. through Chief Secretary, Civil Secretariat, Lucknow and others, 2019 SCC OnLine All 5322. 13. It is in the last submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that a look at the Act of 2021 would show that past services cannot be counted for the grant of pension and other post retiral benefits in case an ad hoc/temporary appointment is not made in accordance with the prevalent Rules. It is urged that in the petitioners' case there were no rules at the point of time, when they were appointed as part-time tube-well operators. The submission, therefore, is that the provisions of the Act of 2021 are not workable, at least in a case like the petitioners'. The Act of 2021 has been introduced for the sole purpose of overcoming the effect of the decision in Prem Singh and ignoring services like those of the petitioners, where there were no rules to appoint the Government servant on a temporary, ad hoc or part-time basis, when appointments were made. 14. Ms. Monika Arya, learned Additional Chief Standing has refuted the submissions advanced by Mr. Khare and submits that by dint of the Act of 2021, particularly, Section 2, services rendered as part-time employees, even though placed in a regular pay scale, cannot be reckoned for the purpose of grant of pension or other post retiral benefits. She submits that a statute, enacted by a competent legislature, has to be given effect to by a Court, even a Constitutional Court. It is submitted that the effect of a legislative enactment cannot be whittled down 'by the way', relying on an earlier judgment, the statutory context of which has been lost in view of the supervening legislation; here, the Act of 2021. So far as the principle laid down in Dr. Shyam Kumar and Awadhesh Kumar Srivastava is concerned, Ms. Arya submits that the reading down of the provisions of an Act is impermissible unless the relevant provisions are challenged about their vires before the Court. So far as the principle laid down in Dr. Shyam Kumar and Awadhesh Kumar Srivastava is concerned, Ms. Arya submits that the reading down of the provisions of an Act is impermissible unless the relevant provisions are challenged about their vires before the Court. The learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel has placed reliance upon the decision of this Court in Bali Ram Singh v. State of U.P. and others, 2022(2) ADJ 5 and Sajeevan Lal (supra) to submit that the Act of 2021 is squarely attracted to the present case, disentitling the petitioners to relief. 15. This Court has considered the submissions advanced by learned Counsel on behalf of both parties keenly. 16. The genesis of the cause in this petition has roots in the decision of the Supreme Court in Prem Singh, where the issue had arisen in the context of a welder appointed to the work-charged establishment in the Ram Ganga River Valley Project, Kalagarh. He was transferred to different places and on the recommendations of a Selection Committee, his services were regularised. He was regularised on 13.3.2002 and posted as a pump operator in the pay scale of Rs. 3050/- to 4590/- in the regular establishment. He retired on 31.1.2007. He petitioned this Court to count the period of his service spent in the work-charged establishment as qualifying service under the Rules of 1961. This Court directed him to submit a representation to the respondents, officials of the State Government, which was rejected on 12.12.2008. He made another representation, which too came to be rejected on 23.3.2009. His writ petition against those orders was dismissed and so was his appeal to the Division Bench. The result was that services rendered in the work-charged establishment, prior to regularisation, were not treated to be qualifying service under Rule 3(8) of the Rules of 1961 by this Court. He moved the Supreme Court by special leave. It may not be of much relevance as to what was the initial basis of challenge in Prem Singh, but suffice it to say that the constitutional validity of Rule 3(8) of the Rules of 1961, defining qualifying service, besides Regulation 370 of the Civil Services Regulations of U.P. and instructions carried in Paragraph No. 669 of the Financial Handbook, were the subject-matter of challenge before the Supreme Court. It would be apposite to refer to the provisions of Rule 3(8) of the Rules of 1961, which read: ''3. In these rules, unless is anything repugnant in the subject or context- (1) * * * * * (2) * * * * * (3) * * * * * (4) * * * * * (5) * * * * * (6) * * * * * (7) * * * * * (8) ''Qualifying service'' means service which qualifies for pension in accordance with the provisions of Article 368 of the Civil Services Regulations: Provided that continuous temporary or officiating service under the Government of Uttar Pradesh followed without interruption by confirmation in the same or any other post except- (i) periods of temporary or officiating service in a non-pensionable establishment; (ii) periods of service in a work-charged establishment; and (iii) periods of service in a post paid from contingencies shall also count as qualifying service. Note.-If service rendered in a non-pensionable establishment work-charged establishment or in a post paid from contingencies falls between two periods of temporary service in a pensionable establishment or between a period of temporary service and permanent service in a pensionable establishment, it will not constitute an interruption of service.'' 17. Regulations 361, 368 and 370 of the Uttar Pradesh Civil Services Regulations, that fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Prem Singh, may also be noticed. These read: ''361. The service of an officer does not qualify for pension unless it conforms to the following three conditions: First - The service must be under Government. Second - The employment must be substantive and permanent.'' 368. Service does not qualify unless the officer holds a substantive office on a permanent establishment. 370. Continuous temporary or officiating service under the Government of Uttar Pradesh followed without interruption by confirmation in the same or any other post shall qualify, except- (i) periods of temporary or officiating service in non-pensionable establishment; (ii) periods of service in work-charged establishment; and (iii) periods of service in a post paid from contingencies.'' 18. Also, considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Prem Singh were the instructions contained in Paragraph Nos. 667, 668 and 669 of the Financial Handbook, Volume VI, which relate to work-charged employees. These provide: ''667. Also, considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Prem Singh were the instructions contained in Paragraph Nos. 667, 668 and 669 of the Financial Handbook, Volume VI, which relate to work-charged employees. These provide: ''667. Work-charged establishment will include such establishment as is employed upon the actual execution, as distinct from the general supervision, of a specific work or sub-works of a specific project or upon the subordinate supervision of departmental labour, stores, and machinery in connection with such work or sub-works. When employees borne on the temporary establishment are employed on work of this nature their pay should, for the time being, be charged direct to the work. Notes.- (1) Persons who actually do the work with their hands, such as, beldars, masons, carpenters, fitters, mechanics, drivers, etc., should be engaged only when works are carried out departmentally, and charged to works. In cases in which it is considered necessary, as a safeguard against damage to the Government Tools and Plant, such as road-rollers, concrete-mixture, pumping-sets, and other machinery, mechanics, drivers, etc., may be engaged by the department or alternatively, if engaged by the contractor must be subject to approval by the department, whether the work is done departmentally or by contract. (2) Mistries and work agent should, in all circumstances, whether they are employed on works executed departmentally or on contract, be charged to ''works''. (3) Subject to the general principles stated in Paras 665 to 667 being observed, the classes of establishment not covered by these definitions may be classified as ''work-charged, or temporary'', as the case may be, and the rule which prescribes that work-charged establishment must be employed upon a specific work waived, with the previous sanction of the Government and concurrence of the Accountant General. In such cases, the Government shall also determine in consultation with the Accountant General, the proportions in which the cost of such establishment shall be allocated between the works concerned. 668. In all the cases previous sanction of the competent authority as laid down in Vol. I of the Handbook or in the departmental manuals of orders is necessary, which should specify in respect of each appointment (1) the consolidated rate of pay, (2) the period of sanction, and (3) the full name (as given in the estimate) of the work and the nature of the duties on which the person engaged would be employed. 669. I of the Handbook or in the departmental manuals of orders is necessary, which should specify in respect of each appointment (1) the consolidated rate of pay, (2) the period of sanction, and (3) the full name (as given in the estimate) of the work and the nature of the duties on which the person engaged would be employed. 669. Members of the work-charged establishment are not entitled to any pension or to leave salary or allowances except in the following cases: (a) Wound and other extraordinary pensions and gratuities are in certain cases admissible in accordance with the rules in Part VI of the Civil Services Regulations. (b) Travelling and daily allowance may be allowed by divisional officers for journeys performed within the State in the interest of work on which the persons are employed on the following conditions: (i) The journey should be sanctioned by the divisional officer or the sub-divisional officer/assistant engineer specifically authorised for the purpose by the divisional officer; (ii) the officer concerned while sanctioning the journey should also certify that the journey is actually necessary and unavoidable in the interest of the work on which the person is employed: (iii) for the journeys so performed the work-charged employee may be allowed travelling and daily allowance at the same rates and on the same conditions as are applicable to a regular Government servant of equivalent status. 4. All facilities and concessions admissible to workmen of factories registered under the Factories Act, 1948, are also admissible to the employees of the registered State workshops and factories.'' 19. In pronouncing upon the validity of Rule 3(8) of the Rules of 1961, Regulation 370 of the U.P. Civil services Regulations and Paragraph No. 669 of the Financial Handbook, it was held in Prem Singh: ''28. It is apparent from the aforesaid discussion that it would depend upon the service rules or schemes whether the period of work-charged service has to be counted for ACP, in case provision has been made under a particular statute, rule or scheme, service rendered as work-charged employees can be counted. It would depend upon the relevant provision of which benefit is claimed. Again, this Court has emphasised that by its very nature of employment work-charged employees have not to continue for long, employment comes to an end with the project. 29. It would depend upon the relevant provision of which benefit is claimed. Again, this Court has emphasised that by its very nature of employment work-charged employees have not to continue for long, employment comes to an end with the project. 29. The submission has been urged on behalf of the State of Uttar Pradesh to differentiate the case between work-charged employees and regular employees on the ground that due procedure is not followed for appointment of work-charged employees, they do not have that much work pressure, they are unequal and cannot be treated equally, work-charged employees form a totally different class, their work is materially and qualitatively different, there cannot be any clubbing of the services of the work-charged employees with the regular service and vice versa, if a work-charged employee is treated as in the regular service it will dilute the basic concept of giving incentive and reward to a permanent and responsible regular employee. 30. We are not impressed by the aforesaid submissions. The appointment of the work-charged employee in question had been made on monthly salary and they were required to cross the efficiency bar also. How their services are qualitatively different from regular employees? No material indicating qualitative difference has been pointed out except making bald statement. The appointment was not made for a particular project which is the basic concept of the work-charged employees. Rather, the very concept of work-charged employment has been misused by offering the employment on exploitative terms for the work which is regular and perennial in nature. The work-charged employees had been subjected to transfer from one place to another like regular employees as apparent from documents placed on record. In Narain Dutt Sharma v. State of U.P. [CA No. ______2019 arising out of SLP (C) No. 5775 of 2018] the appellants were allowed to cross efficiency bar, after 8' years of continuous service, even during the period of work-charged services. Narain Dutt Sharma, the appellant, was appointed as a work-charged employee as Gej Mapak with effect from 15-9-1978. Payment used to be made monthly but the appointment was made in the pay scale of Rs 200-320. Initially, he was appointed in the year 1978 on a fixed monthly salary of Rs 205 per month. Narain Dutt Sharma, the appellant, was appointed as a work-charged employee as Gej Mapak with effect from 15-9-1978. Payment used to be made monthly but the appointment was made in the pay scale of Rs 200-320. Initially, he was appointed in the year 1978 on a fixed monthly salary of Rs 205 per month. They were allowed to cross efficiency bar also as the benefit of pay scale was granted to them during the period they served as work-charged employees they served for three to four decades and later on services have been regularised time to time by different orders. However, the services of some of the appellants in few petitions/appeals have not been regularised even though they had served for several decades and ultimately reached the age of superannuation. 31. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it was unfair on the part of the State Government and its officials to take work from the employees on the work-charged basis. They ought to have resorted to an appointment on regular basis. The taking of work on the work-charged basis for long amounts to adopting the exploitative device. Later on, though their services have been regularised. However, the period spent by them in the work-charged establishment has not been counted towards the qualifying service. Thus, they have not only been deprived of their due emoluments during the period they served on less salary in work-charged establishment but have also been deprived of counting of the period for pensionary benefits as if no services had been rendered by them. The State has been benefitted by the services rendered by them in the heydays of their life on less salary in work-charged establishment. 32. In view of the Note appended to Rule 3(8) of the 1961 Rules, there is a provision to count service spent on work-charged, contingencies or non-pensionable service, in case, a person has rendered such service in a given between period of two temporary appointments in the pensionable establishment or has rendered such service in the interregnum two periods of temporary and permanent employment. The work-charged service can be counted as qualifying service for pension in the aforesaid exigencies. 33. The question arises whether the imposition of rider that such service to be counted has to be rendered in-between two spells of temporary or temporary and permanent service is legal and proper. The work-charged service can be counted as qualifying service for pension in the aforesaid exigencies. 33. The question arises whether the imposition of rider that such service to be counted has to be rendered in-between two spells of temporary or temporary and permanent service is legal and proper. We find that once regularisation had been made on vacant posts, though the employee had not served prior to that on temporary basis, considering the nature of appointment, though it was not a regular appointment it was made on monthly salary and thereafter in the pay scale of work-charged establishment the efficiency bar was permitted to be crossed. It would be highly discriminatory and irrational because of the rider contained in the Note to Rule 3(8) of the 1961 Rules, not to count such service particularly, when it can be counted, in case such service is sandwiched between two temporary or in-between temporary and permanent services. There is no rhyme or reason not to count the service of work-charged period in case it has been rendered before regularisation. In our opinion, an impermissible classification has been made under Rule 3(8). It would be highly unjust, impermissible and irrational to deprive such employees benefit of the qualifying service. Service of work-charged period remains the same for all the employees, once it is to be counted for one class, it has to be counted for all to prevent discrimination. The classification cannot be done on the irrational basis and when respondents are themselves counting period spent in such service, it would be highly discriminatory not to count the service on the basis of flimsy classification. The rider put on that work-charged service should have preceded by temporary capacity is discriminatory and irrational and creates an impermissible classification. 34. As it would be unjust, illegal and impermissible to make aforesaid classification to make Rule 3(8) valid and non-discriminatory, we have to read down the provisions of Rule 3(8) and hold that services rendered even prior to regularisation in the capacity of work-charged employees, contingency paid fund employees or non-pensionable establishment shall also be counted towards the qualifying service even if such service is not preceded by temporary or regular appointment in a pensionable establishment. 35. 35. In view of the Note appended to Rule 3(8), which we have read down, the provision contained in Regulation 370 of the Civil Services Regulations has to be struck down as also the instructions contained in Para 669 of the Financial Handbook. 36. There are some of the employees who have not been regularised in spite of having rendered the services for 30-40 or more years whereas they have been superannuated. As they have worked in the work-charged establishment, not against any particular project, their services ought to have been regularised under the Government instructions and even as per the decision of this Court in State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753]. This Court in the said decision has laid down that in case services have been rendered for more than ten years without the cover of the Court's order, as one-time measure, the services be regularised of such employees. In the facts of the case, those employees who have worked for ten years or more should have been regularised. It would not be proper to regulate them for consideration of regularisation as others have been regularised, we direct that their services be treated as a regular one. However, it is made clear that they shall not be entitled to claiming any dues of difference in wages had they been continued in service regularly before attaining the age of superannuation. They shall be entitled to receive the pension as if they have retired from the regular establishment and the services rendered by them right from the day they entered the work-charged establishment shall be counted as qualifying service for purpose of pension. 37. In view of reading down Rule 3(8) of the U.P. Retirement Benefits Rules, 1961, we hold that services rendered in the work-charged establishment shall be treated as qualifying service under the aforesaid rule for grant of pension. The arrears of pension shall be confined to three years only before the date of the order. Let the admissible benefits be paid accordingly within three months. Resultantly, the appeals filed by the employees are allowed and filed by the State are dismissed.'' 20. The State of Uttar Pradesh, in order to overcome the effect of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Prem Singh, enacted the Act of 2021. Let the admissible benefits be paid accordingly within three months. Resultantly, the appeals filed by the employees are allowed and filed by the State are dismissed.'' 20. The State of Uttar Pradesh, in order to overcome the effect of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Prem Singh, enacted the Act of 2021. The Act of 2021, which is a statute, cast in few words, reads: ''THE UTTAR PRADESH QUALIFYING SERVICE FOR PENSION AND VALIDATION ACT, 2021 (U.P. Act No. 1 of 2021) [As passed by the Uttar Pradesh Legislative] AN ACT to provide for qualifying service for pension and to validate certain actions taken in this behalf and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. IT IS HEREBY enacted in the Seventy-second Year of the Republic of India as follows :- 1.Short title, extent and commencement.-(1) This Act may be called the Uttar Pradesh Qualifying Service for Pension and Validation Act, 2021. (2) It shall extend to the whole of the State of Uttar Pradesh. (3) It shall be deemed to have come into force on April 1, 1961. 2. Qualifying Service of Pension.-Notwithstanding anything contained in any rule, regulation or Government order for the purposes of entitlement of pension to an officer, ''Qualifying Service'' means the services rendered by an officer appointed on a temporary or permanent post in accordance with the provisions of the service rules prescribed by the Government for the post. Qualifying Service for Pension 3. Validation.-Notwithstanding any Judgment, decree or order of any Court, anything done or purporting to have been done and may action taken or purporting to have been taken under or in relation to sub-rule (8) of Rule 3 of the Uttar Pradesh Retirement Benefit Rules, 1961 before the commencement of this Act, shall be deemed to be and always to have been done or taken under the provisions of this Act and to be and always to have been valid as if the provisions of this Act were in force at all material times with effect from April 1, 1961. 4. Overriding effect.-Save as otherwise provided, the provisions of this Act shall have effect, notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law for the time being in force other than this Act. 5. 4. Overriding effect.-Save as otherwise provided, the provisions of this Act shall have effect, notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law for the time being in force other than this Act. 5. Repeal and saving.-(1) The Uttar Pradesh Qualifying Service for Pension and Validation Ordinance, 2020 is hereby repealed. (2) Notwithstanding such repeal, anything done or any action taken under the provisions of the principal Act as amended by the Ordinance referred to in sub-section (1) shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions of the principal Act as amended by this Act as if the provisions of this Act were in force at all material times.'' 21. It is not in dispute that in the present writ petition, the vires of the Act of 2021 is not under challenge at all; not even on the ground that it amounts to brazen overruling of the Court's judgment without removing the underlying defects, that led the Court to read down the provisions of Rule 3(8) of the Rules of 1961 and nullify Regulation 370 of the U.P. Civil Services Regulations and Paragraph No. 669 of the Financial Handbook. What the petitioners say, is that the provisions of Section 2 of the Act of 2021 are to be read down, because these constitute a brazen overruling of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Prem Singh. They go a step further to say that the provisions of Section 2 of the Act of 2021 have already been read down by this Court in Dr. Shyam Kumar, and further, in Awadhesh Kumar Srivastava. Therefore, according to the petitioners, this Court has simply to understand the 'read down' provisions of Section 2 of the Act of 2021, going by the principle in Dr. Shyam Kumar and Awadhesh Kumar Srivastava. Like the present petition, Dr. Shyam Kumar as well as Awadhesh Kumar Srivastava were cases, where the vires of Section 2 of the Act of 2021 was not under challenge. Nevertheless, the learned Single Judge of this Court, before whom Dr. Shyam Kumar came up, read down Section 2 of the Act of 2021, holding: ''10. …... Like the present petition, Dr. Shyam Kumar as well as Awadhesh Kumar Srivastava were cases, where the vires of Section 2 of the Act of 2021 was not under challenge. Nevertheless, the learned Single Judge of this Court, before whom Dr. Shyam Kumar came up, read down Section 2 of the Act of 2021, holding: ''10. …... Thus, again to save Section 2 of the Act of 2021 from the vice/arbitrariness, in the spirit of the judgment of Prem Singh (supra), the word 'post' is required to be diluted to save it from arbitrariness and hence, the word 'post' used in Section 2 of the Act of 2021, be it temporary or permanent, has to be read down as 'services rendered by a Government employee, be it of temporary or permanent nature'. 11. The other case laws cited by learned counsel for the petitioners as well as by learned Standing Counsel, as noted above, are not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present cases, as in none of the above cited cases, interpretation of Section 2 of the Act of 2021 is considered. 12. In the light of aforesaid, since Section 2 of the Act of 2021 also suffers from the vice pointed out by the Supreme Court in the case of Prem Singh (supra), hence, to be brought out of arbitrariness, it is read down and services rendered on temporary or permanent post is read as services rendered by a Government employee, be it of temporary or permanent nature. Therefore, it is held that the petitioners are also entitled for the benefit of the judgment of Prem Singh (supra). All the impugned orders are set aside.'' 22. In Awadhesh Kumar Srivastava, the learned Single Judge did not precisely employ the expression 'reading down' the provisions of Section 2, but virtually tested the vires thereof and held it unenforceable, if this Court may dare use this expression, on grounds that the said provision did not remove the defect pointed out in Prem Singh and that the statute (Section 2 of the Act of 2021), was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. In Awadhesh Kumar Srivastava, it was held by His Lordship: ''34. In Awadhesh Kumar Srivastava, it was held by His Lordship: ''34. The following principles have been postulated in the aforesaid case by the Apex Court which the validating Act has to satisfy to validate the past transaction declared by the Court to be unconstitutional:- (i) whether the legislature enacting the Validating Acts has competence over the subject-matter; (ii) whether by validation, the legislature has removed the defect which the Court had found in previous law; (iii) whether the validating law is in consonance with Chapter III of the Constitution. 35. This Court now proceeds to analyse in the light of the principles laid down by the Apex Court whether the U.P. Act No. 1 of 2021 satisfies the parameters laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid case to negate the benefit of the judgment of Prem Singh (supra) to the petitioner. 36. As regards the competence of the State Government to legislate U.P. Act No. 1 of 2021 is concerned, it is pertinent to note that the State Government has the competence to legislate U.P. Act No. 1 of 2021. 37. But, whether the U.P. Act No. 1 of 2021 also satisfies the other two conditions to deny the benefit of the judgment of Prem Singh (supra) to the petitioner is a crucial issue in the present case. This Court concludes for the reasons recorded below that the U.P. Act No. 1 of 2021 does not satisfy the other two tests, namely, it does not eliminate the vice pointed out by the Apex Court in the case of Prem Singh (supra) nor the said Act is in consonance with part-III of the Constitution of India. 38. The Apex Court in the case of Prem Singh (supra) (SCC pg. 540 para 30, 31) has pointed out that the work-charged employees were allowed to continue for years and there was no qualitative difference between them and the regular employees. Further, the concept of work-charged employee has been misused and exploited by the State Government to its advantage, inasmuch as the appointment was not made for a particular project which is the basic concept of the work-charged employee, rather such employees were allowed to work on exploitative terms for the work which was regular and perennial in nature. 39. Further, the concept of work-charged employee has been misused and exploited by the State Government to its advantage, inasmuch as the appointment was not made for a particular project which is the basic concept of the work-charged employee, rather such employees were allowed to work on exploitative terms for the work which was regular and perennial in nature. 39. It further noted that work-charged employees have been allowed to work on low wages for long before regularization, and their services have benefited the State Government. The practice of taking work of permanent and perennial in nature from the employees engaged as daily-wager or under work-charged establishment has been deprecated by the Apex Court in the case of Prem Singh (supra), consequently, it held that it would be unjust to exclude the period rendered by the work-charged employee with regular service to determine the qualifying service for pension. The respondents have not placed any material on record to demonstrate that the U.P. Act No. 1 of 2021 wipes out the vice pointed out by the Apex Court in the case of Prem Singh (supra). 40. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that the Coordinate Bench of this Court in a bunch of writ petitions, leading of which is Writ-A No. 8968 of 2022, after noticing that the U.P. Act No. 1 of 2021 does not remove the vice pointed out by the Apex Court in Prem Singh Case held in para 12 of the judgment as under:- ''12. In the light of aforesaid, since Section 2 of the Act of 2021 also suffers from the vice pointed out by the Supreme Court in the case of Prem Singh (supra), hence, to be brought out of arbitrariness, it is read down and services rendered on temporary or permanent post is read as services rendered by a Government employee, be it of temporary or permanent nature. Therefore, it is held that the petitioners are also entitled for the benefit of the judgment of Prem Singh (supra). All the impugned orders are set aside. Daily-wager:'' 41. Now, the Court proceeds to consider whether U.P. Act No. 1 of 2021 is in conformity with the Part III of the Constitution of India. Therefore, it is held that the petitioners are also entitled for the benefit of the judgment of Prem Singh (supra). All the impugned orders are set aside. Daily-wager:'' 41. Now, the Court proceeds to consider whether U.P. Act No. 1 of 2021 is in conformity with the Part III of the Constitution of India. The Apex Court in the case of Prem Singh (supra) took note of its judgment in Bachan Singh's case which upheld the judgment of Punjab & Haryana High Court in Kesar Chand's case wherein Punjab & Haryana High Court held that any Rule which excludes the counting of work-charged service of an employee whose services have been regularized subsequently must be held to be bad in law as such distinction is not based on any intelligible criteria. 42. It also noted in para-33 of the judgment noted that it would be discriminatory and irrational in not counting the period of service spent as work charged employee with regular service though the period of such service could be counted where it had been rendered between two temporary appointments in the pensionable establishment or interregnum two periods of temporary and permanent employment. Consequently, it held that there is no rationale in not counting the service of the work-charged period rendered before regularization for determining 'qualifying service' for the purpose of pension. Consequently, it read down Rule 3(8) of Pension Rule, 1961. 43. This Court is of the view that the action of the State in excluding the service rendered by an employee on the work-charged establishment or daily wager from Section 2 of the U.P. Act No. 1 of 2021 is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India for the reason that the Apex Court has held that the exclusion of service rendered by an employee on the work-charged establishment from the regular service would amount to treating equals as unequal. Further, there is no rationale in excluding the service of an employee as work-charged or daily-wager from regular service for determining the qualifying service for pension whereas the period of service rendered by an employee as temporary or permanent post is liable to be counted for the purpose of qualifying service when the nature of duties performed by a person appointed as daily wager or on work-charged establishment or temporary or permanent post are similar and identical. 44. 44. The other reason to conclude that Section 2 of the U.P. Act No. 1 of 2021 is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India is that the State cannot by its arbitrary action put the employee working on work charge establishment or daily wager to disadvantage by taking work of perpetual nature from such employee on low wages for years and excluding the period of service rendered by such employee under work charge establishment or as daily-wager from regular service for counting qualifying service for pension when the nature of duties performed by such employees are akin and similar to the nature of duties performed by the employee appointed on a temporary and permanent post in accordance with the provisions of service rules framed by the State Government and their services are liable to be counted for determining qualifying service. 45. It is settled in law that the accrued or vested right cannot be taken away by an amendment. The law on the point that the pension is not a bounty and is earned by the employee by the dint of his long service is no more res Integra. The right of work charge employee or daily wager to include their service rendered under work charge establishment or daily-wager with regular service for determining qualifying service for pension has been recognized by the Apex Court in Prem Singh's case, therefore, such a right of an employee cannot be taken away by enacting a law which is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 46. In such view of the fact, this Court finds that U.P. Act No. 1 of 2021 does not qualify the three tests laid down by the Apex Court in the judgments referred above to negate the benefit of the judgment of the Apex Court in Prem Singh's case (supra).'' 23. The moot question in this matter, therefore, is if in the absence of a challenge to the vires of a statute, can it be read down or virtually declared unconstitutional, without being formally struck down. Before embarking on the enterprise to find an answer to this question, it would be apposite to refer to a matter of determination and cognizance by Single Judges and Benches of this Court, where the issue of vires of a statute is involved. 24. Before embarking on the enterprise to find an answer to this question, it would be apposite to refer to a matter of determination and cognizance by Single Judges and Benches of this Court, where the issue of vires of a statute is involved. 24. The Hon'ble the Chief Justice's circulars dated 1.8.2016, 19.11.2018, 18.4.2023 and 1.1.2024 provide regarding the cognizance of cases by Single Judge and Division Bench thus: ''All cases where the vires of Central or State legislation will be cognizable by the Division Bench. Sd./ illegible CHIEF JUSTICE 1.8.2016'' ''All cases where the vires of Central or State Legislation is challenged be listed before the appropriate Division Bench having jurisdiction over the matter falling under the legislation in issue. This order shall be effective with the commencement of new roster. Sd./ illegible CHIEF JUSTICE 19.11.2018'' ''In supersession of the previous orders, all cases (filed at Allahabad) where the vires of Central or State Legislation (including delegated/subordinate legislation) is challenged shall be listed before the Division Bench-1. This order shall be effective from 21st of April, 2023. CHIEF JUSTICE 18.4.2023'' ''All cases where the vires of Central or State Legislation is challenged be listed before the appropriate Division Bench having jurisdiction over the matter falling under the legislation in issue. This order shall be effective with the commencement of new roster. Sd./ illegible Acting Chief Justice 1.1.2024'' 25. A reading of this circular makes it clear that if the vires of an Act, Central or the State, is challenged, or otherwise up for test before a Court, a learned Judge of the Court, sitting singly, may not be in competent quorum to examine the question at all. It is not in dispute that neither in the present writ petition nor the decisions of this Court in Dr. Shyam Kumar or Awadhesh Kumar Srivastava, the vires of Section 2 of the Act of 2021, was directly under challenge. The petitions, giving rise to the above-mentioned decisions, were not framed as ones questioning the vires of Section 2(1) of the Act of 2021. The Court went into the issue of vires while judging the petitioners' case, for whatever relief as to pensionary or post retiral benefits and read down the provision in one case, whereas in the other, virtually held the provision unenforceable for failing to pass the muster of constitutional validity on two counts. 26. The Court went into the issue of vires while judging the petitioners' case, for whatever relief as to pensionary or post retiral benefits and read down the provision in one case, whereas in the other, virtually held the provision unenforceable for failing to pass the muster of constitutional validity on two counts. 26. The question if the Court can read down the provisions of a statute, even though, its validity is not under challenge, is a subtle issue. This question arose before the Supreme Court in Coal India Limited and another v. Competition Commission of India and another, (2023) 10 SCC 345 . The pointed submission is tucked away in paragraph No. 16 of the report in Coal India Limited (supra), where it is noted by their Lordships in the following words: ''16. He would point out that there is no challenge mounted to the vires of the Act. There is no scope for reading down the law in the absence of the challenge......'' 27. The question is answered by their Lordships in the following words: ''128. There are certain salient features to be noticed. In the first place, there is no challenge to the Act. Secondly, taking the Act as it plainly reads, the power to order division and, what is more, all the things enumerated in Section 28(2), are clearly conferred on CCI. Apart from the general non obstante clause contained in Section 60 of the Act, a noticeable feature about Section 28 of the Act is that it is made even more clear, apparently, by way of abundant caution in Section 28(1), that all that CCI could order would be notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force. Parliament has authored both the Nationalisation Act as also the Act. There is no question of lack of legislative competence. We are not called upon to pronounce on the vires of the Act. There is absolutely no scope, at any rate, for reading down the provision even proceeding on the basis that an attempt can be made even in the absence of the challenge. The words of the provision do not admit of reading down the same. What follows is, therefore, Parliament has intended, in order to ensure the proper implementation of the Act, confer power to order division of an enterprise enjoying dominant power. This would include the appellants as well. The words of the provision do not admit of reading down the same. What follows is, therefore, Parliament has intended, in order to ensure the proper implementation of the Act, confer power to order division of an enterprise enjoying dominant power. This would include the appellants as well. We must, no doubt, understand the provision to mean that it is not a power to be exercised lightly. It is a special power intended to ensure prevention of abuse of dominant position. The generality of the power is revealed in Section 27. We incidentally notice that though there can be abuse of dominant position by an enterprise and a group, which is sought to be prohibited, Section 28 speaks about the division of an enterprise. Having regard to the discussion above, we find no merit in the case sought to be made for escaping from the net of the Act.'' (emphasis by Court) 28. Though not laid down by their Lordships in unequivocal terms that the doctrine of reading down cannot be invoked, where there is no challenge raised to the vires of a statute, but that could be an inference from the remarks. This Court would be inclined to think that the doctrine of reading down is an option of less intrusion available to the Court, where the offending provisions properly challenged through a petition questioning the vires are found indeed, in the words couched, to be ultra vires. If the words employed by the legislature are then capable of two interpretations, the one that saves the vires by reading it in a different way, may be adapted by 'adding' a word, 'subtracting' one, or reading it with a few and minor changes to salvage the statute from being declared ultra vires, it ought be done. That is the essence of reading down. In that sense, reading down is a facet of the Court's power of declaring a statute ultra vires. It is a power to be exercised when the Court is called upon to judge the vires of a statute. 29. This question fell for consideration before the Delhi High Court and in the same vein as this Court thinks about the issue, Sanjeev Narula, J. in Johney Reberio v. Union of India and others, (2022) 6 HCC (Del) 310, held: ''16. 29. This question fell for consideration before the Delhi High Court and in the same vein as this Court thinks about the issue, Sanjeev Narula, J. in Johney Reberio v. Union of India and others, (2022) 6 HCC (Del) 310, held: ''16. A successful challenge to the vires of Rule 7(6), before the Division Bench, would have entitled the petitioner to be represented through a legal practitioner, or a dilution thereof would have allowed for a next friend. The Division Bench, having contemplated on the interpretation and relevance of Rule 7(6), would have been able to provide the consequential relief as sought for. However, in the instant petition, this Court is bound to respect the law as it stands today vis-à-vis Rule 7(6). Petitioner's insistence to be represented through a friend, amounts to a reading down the expression of Rule 7(6), which could only have been done in the earlier proceeding at the stage of examining the vires of Rule 7(6). It is not for this Court to interpret or dilute the mandate of the statute when no challenge has been made before it. 17. Next, this prayer is being insisted upon as a matter of right, in sheer absence of any enabling provision. The intent of Rule 7(6) is to disallow a legal practitioner from representing the parties at any stage of the proceedings. It has to be given its due meaning, and cannot be construed in the manner the petitioner is seeking to do. For this Court to allow such a request, by ignoring the bar under Rule 7(6), it would have to be restrictively interpreted and the word ''legal practitioner'' would have to be read in such a manner that it only includes an ''advocate'' registered under the Advocates Act, 1961 and not a law graduate. This construction again amounts to interpretation and dilution of Rule 7(6), which the Court can only consider when reading down the provision in a challenge to the vires of Rule 7(6), which is not the case before the undersigned. ……..'' (emphasis by Court) 30. It is for this reason that this Court is not inclined to agree with the approach of the learned Single Judge in Dr. Shyam Kumar, reading down the provisions of Section 2 of the Act of 2021 in the absence of a challenge to the Act being raised through a duly constituted writ petition. ……..'' (emphasis by Court) 30. It is for this reason that this Court is not inclined to agree with the approach of the learned Single Judge in Dr. Shyam Kumar, reading down the provisions of Section 2 of the Act of 2021 in the absence of a challenge to the Act being raised through a duly constituted writ petition. It must be remarked here that if indeed a challenge were raised to the vires of the said Act, the cause would have been heard by a Division Bench. 31. We have quoted in extenso the holding of this Court in Awadhesh Kumar Srivastava, where virtually the learned Single Judge has held the provisions of Section 2 of the Act of 2021 to be unenforceable, just stopping short of saying that these are unconstitutional. The provisions have been condemned as a brazen overruling of the decision of the Supreme Court in Prem Singh, without removing the defect pointed out in the law, that was read down and struck down. The other premise, on which the learned Judge held Section 2(1) to be bad, is its conflict with Article 14 of the Constitution, of which the provision was held to fall foul of. It would hardly require a few formal words to say, with utmost respect, that the provision is unconstitutional. 32. There is another and a completely different application of the doctrine of reading down. And that other is a situation, when the words employed in a statute are vague or ambiguous. If that be so, the Court may invoke the doctrine of reading down to give effect to the legislative intent, gathered from the context in which the particular words have been employed and the mischief the statute is enacted to remedy. The latter kind of the exercise of power of reading down is a principle of statutory interpretation available to Courts, but not the former. In this connection, reference may be made to the remarks of Sawant, J. in Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress and others, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 600, where His Lordship observed: ''255. It is thus clear that the doctrine of reading down or of recasting the statute can be applied in limited situations. It is essentially used, firstly, for saving a statute from being struck down on account of its unconstitutionality. It is thus clear that the doctrine of reading down or of recasting the statute can be applied in limited situations. It is essentially used, firstly, for saving a statute from being struck down on account of its unconstitutionality. It is an extension of the principle that when two interpretations are possible - one rendering it constitutional and the other making it unconstitutional, the former should be preferred. The unconstitutionality may spring from either the incompetence of the legislature to enact the statute or from its violation of any of the provisions of the Constitution. The second situation which summons its aid is where the provisions of the statute are vague and ambiguous and it is possible to gather the intentions of the legislature from the object of the statute, the context in which the provision occurs and the purpose for which it is made. However, when the provision is cast in a definite and unambiguous language and its intention is clear, it is not permissible either to mend or bend it even if such recasting is in accord with good reason and conscience. In such circumstances, it is not possible for the Court to remake the statute. Its only duty is to strike it down and leave it to the legislature if it so desires, to amend it. What is further, if the remaking of the statute by the Courts is to lead to its distortion that course is to be scrupulously avoided. One of the situations further where the doctrine can never be called into play is where the statute requires extensive additions and deletions. Not only it is no part of the Court's duty to undertake such exercise, but it is beyond its jurisdiction to do so.'' 33. The two distinct situations, referred to hereinabove, where the doctrine may be invoked, have been clearly delineated by His Lordship in Delhi Transport Corporation (supra). The reliance placed by Mr. Khare to submit that even in the absence of a challenge raised to the constitutionality of the provision, the Court can read down the provisions of a statute, draws upon the holding of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Jai Prakash Pal (supra). The relevant question involved has been stated thus in Jai Prakash Pal: ''26. Khare to submit that even in the absence of a challenge raised to the constitutionality of the provision, the Court can read down the provisions of a statute, draws upon the holding of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Jai Prakash Pal (supra). The relevant question involved has been stated thus in Jai Prakash Pal: ''26. The third question is to be considered is that if any rule has not been assailed but it appears that its interpretation is not harmonious with other rules, so for making that particular rule workable and to bring it in harmony with other provisions of statute/statutes, the said provisions can be read down.'' 34. After an elaborate reference to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Rapti Commission Agency v. State of U.P. and others, (2006) 6 SCC 522 ; Union of India and others v. Ind-Swift Laboratories Limited, (2011) 4 SCC 635 ; and, Subramanian Swamy and others v. Raju through Member, Juvenile Justice Board and another, (2014) 8 SCC 390 , my esteemed Brother Rajesh Singh Chauhan opined in Jai Prakash Pal thus: ''35. In view of the aforesaid dictums of Hon'ble Apex Court, I find that Rule 5 of the Rules, 1983 is not harmonious with the specific provisions of the Probation Rules, 2013 and Confirmation Rules, 1991. Further, the application of Rule 5 of Rules, 1983 is not properly workable which restricts the duly promoted Deputy Secretary to get the benefit of promotion on the post of Joint Secretary without having plausible and fruitful purpose, therefore, such rule i.e. Rule 5 of Rules, 1983 is hereby read down. 36. It is made clear that reading down Rule 5 of the Rules, 1983 shall be applied only for the present case so as to make the particular provision of law workable and harmonious with other provisions of law.'' 35. Now, the holding of this Court in Jai Prakash Pal is not in the context of invoking the doctrine of reading down to save a statute from unconstitutionality. It is in the second sense or the second situation, where the power may be exercised, as explained in Delhi Transport Corporation that Jai Prakash Pal, that the doctrine of reading down has been invoked. It was done to harmoniously construe a particular rule and give effect to the vague words of the framers of the rule. It is in the second sense or the second situation, where the power may be exercised, as explained in Delhi Transport Corporation that Jai Prakash Pal, that the doctrine of reading down has been invoked. It was done to harmoniously construe a particular rule and give effect to the vague words of the framers of the rule. There was absolutely no question about the constitutional validity of the rule involved in Jai Prakash Pal and, a fortiori, saving it from unconstitutionality by a reading down. The reliance placed on the said decision is, therefore, besides the point. 36. The other decision, which the learned Counsel for the petitioners calls in aid, is Shivangiben Chetankumar Patel (supra), a Bench decision of the Gujarat High Court. There are remarks in the said decision that would support the contention of Mr. Khare. In Shivangiben Chetankumar Patel, it was observed: ''36. Referring to aforesaid case law on the subject and in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary v. Gujarat Co-operative Milk Marketing Federation Limited and others, (2015) 8 SCC 1 , it is the case of the appellant that looking to the objective of 73rd Constitutional Amendment that the stability and continuity of the Panchayat is intended and further Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993 is enacted only to bring law of Panchayat in tune with the constitutional amendment. Unless reasonable time for prohibiting moving of no confidence motion is read into Section 56 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993, it will run contrary to the object and spirit of the constitutional amendment. It is also the case of the appellant that if composite scheme of the Panchayat Act is looked into, it is clear that unless elected Sarpanch is allowed to work for reasonable time after election, it is not open to the members of the Panchayat to move no confidence motion immediately after election. It is submitted that if same is allowed, it will destroy the object and spirit of 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992. 37. Learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the State and learned Senior Counsel Mr. It is submitted that if same is allowed, it will destroy the object and spirit of 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992. 37. Learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the State and learned Senior Counsel Mr. D.C. Dave appearing for the respondents by placing reliance on the judgments in the case of Union of India v. Namit Sharma, (2013) 10 SCC 359 and Bharat Aluminium Company v. Kaiser Aluminum Technical Service Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 have submitted that in view of clear language under Section 56 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, which is unambiguous, it is not open to interpret the provisions of Section 56 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, but at the same time, in view of the judgment in the case of Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary v. Gujarat Co-operative Milk Marketing Federation Limited and others, (2015) 8 SCC 1 , provisions of the statute are to be interpreted keeping in mind object and spirit of Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992. By applying aforesaid principle, it is always open for the Courts to interpret provisions keeping in mind object and reasons of the statute and also constitutional background. We are unable to accede to submission made by learned Senior Counsel Mr. D.C. Dave that principle of reading into or reading down is to be applied only in cases where vires is challenged. Even in case, where vires is not challenged, if any provision of statute falls for interpretation, it is always open for the Court to interpret such provision having regard to object and reasons of the statute and constitutional background for such statute.'' (emphasis by Court) 37. It is true that in Shivangiben Chetankumar Patel, there is no challenge to the vires of the statute and what was in question was the validity of consideration of a motion of no-confidence under the Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1993 with no constitutional challenge mounted to the provisions of Section 56 of the said legislation. The remarks in paragraph No. 37 of Shivangiben Chetankumar Patel do say that 'reading into' or 'reading down' can be invoked where the vires is not challenged, but the said remark appears to be more in the context of interpreting the provisions of the statute, consistent with its object and reasons and the constitutional background. To this extent, there is no difficulty. To this extent, there is no difficulty. However, this Court, with utmost respect, is unable to subscribe to the widely worded remark that reading down is not limited to cases where the vires is challenged. We have pointed out above that there are two distinct and different facets of the power of reading down. One is in the context of judging the constitutional validity of a statute and the other to overcome ambiguity or vagueness in the statute and give effect to the true intent of the legislature. The former kind of power, in our opinion, cannot be invoked unless there is a challenge raised to the vires of a statute. 38. This Court may notice that there is contrary holding by another learned Judge of this Court in Sajeevan Lal, where it is held much contrary to what has been laid down in Dr. Shyam Kumar and Awadhesh Kumar Srivastava, that the Act of 2021 has to be enforced as it is, and it forbids from taking into account any service rendered de hors the rules, after appointment on a temporary or permanent post in accordance with rules as qualifying service within the meaning of Section 3(8) of the Rules of 1961. In Sajeevan Lal, it was observed: ''Uttar Pradesh Qualifying Service for Pension & Validation Act, 2021 71. Further, in Prem Singh case (supra) the services of work charged employees were directed to be included for the purpose of qualifying service for pension. However, subsequently Government of U.P. has proclaimed Ordinance No. 19 of 2020 which has now become U.P. Act No. 1 of 2021 after it was notified in U.P. Gazette (Extraordinary) dated 21.10.2020. The effect of Prem Singh (supra) and U.P. Act No. 1 of 2021 has been considered in detail by a Division Bench of this Court in State of U.P. and others v. Raj Bahadur Pastor, 2022(3) ADJ 5 . This Court also cannot be oblivious to the fact that Supreme Court in the case of Prem Singh (supra) was examining the question of inclusion of services rendered by a work charge employee towards qualifying service under Rule 3(8) of the U.P. Retirement Benefit Rules, 1961, in light of the previous judgment of the Court in Habib Khan v. State of Uttarakhand and others, (2019) 10 SCC 542 , wherein the petitioners were regularized before the period of 1.4.2005. However, after the aforesaid judgment was delivered by the Supreme Court, the State has promulgated U.P. Ordinance No. 19 of 2020 specifying the 'qualifying service' to mean the services rendered by an officer appointed on a temporary or permanent post, in accordance with the provisions of service rules prescribed by the Government for the post. Clause 3 of the Ordinance also amended sub-rule (8) of Rule 3 of the U.P. Retirement Benefit Rules, 1961 retrospectively w.e.f. 1st April, 1961. Clauses 2 and 3 of the Ordinance are reproduced hereinafter: ''2. Notwithstanding anything contained in any rule, regulation or Government order for the purposes of entitlement of pension to an officer, ''Qualifying Service'' means the services rendered by an officer appointed on a temporary or permanent post in accordance with the provisions of the service rules prescribed by the Government for the post. 3. Notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any Court, anything done or purporting to have been done and may action taken or purporting to have been taken under or in relation to sub-rule (8) of Rule 3 of the Uttar Pradesh Retirement Benefit Rules, 1961 before the commencement of this Ordinance, shall be deemed to be and always to have been done or taken under the provisions of this Ordinance and to be and always to have been valid as if the provisions of this Ordinance were in force at all material times with effect from April 1,1961.'' 72. The above ordinance was followed with the promulgation of the Uttar Pradesh Qualifying Service for Pension and Validation Act, 2021 (U.P. Act No. 1 of 2021). Thus, on account of the above amendment in the U.P. Retirement Benefit Rules, 1961, the definition of 'qualifying service' hitherto contained in Rule 3(8) of 1961 Rules, stands retrospectively modified in terms of the Sections 2 and 3 of the U.P. Act No. 1 of 2021. This amendment has been made applicable w.e.f. 1st April, 1961, notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any Court. 73. This Court note that the Ordinance of 2020 substituted by U.P. Act No. 1 of 2021 is not under challenge in this bunch of writ petitions. This amendment has been made applicable w.e.f. 1st April, 1961, notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any Court. 73. This Court note that the Ordinance of 2020 substituted by U.P. Act No. 1 of 2021 is not under challenge in this bunch of writ petitions. Once the statute has been amended retrospectively, the writ Court would not be justified in ignoring the provisions of the statute, particularly when they are not under challenge and have otherwise not been read down by having recourse to any of the principles of interpretation of statute. In any case, since the legislative enactment binds us to proceed on the basis that the aforesaid definition of qualifying service existed and held the field since 1 April 1961, all pensioanry claims would have to be necessarily evaluated and examined accordingly. This conclusion would necessarily be subject to any challenge that may be laid to the provisions of the Validating Act. 74. Thus, this Court is of the view that the expression ''qualifying service'' would now have to be interpreted in accordance with the provisions made in the Validating Act notwithstanding anything to the contrary that may be contained in any other act, rule or regulation. The Validating Act introduces provisions with retrospective effect from 1 April 1961. As per Clause 2 of the validating Act, ''Qualifying Service'' means the services rendered by an officer appointed on a temporary or permanent post in accordance with the provisions of the service rules prescribed by the Government for the post. Thus, the right to claim pensionary benefits has now to be interpreted in terms of the said qualifying service, which entails three things (i) officer appointed on a temporary or (ii) permanent post and (iii) in accordance with the provisions of the service rules prescribed by the Government for the post. 75. Admittedly, the writ petitioners were appointed and continued to be part time tube well operators before their respective regularization. They neither held nor were appointed on a temporary or a permanent post prior to their regularization. They came to be appointed on a substantive post only after their regularization and as such there service cannot be reckoned from the date of their appointment as part time tube well operators, but it has to be from their respective date of regularization. They came to be appointed on a substantive post only after their regularization and as such there service cannot be reckoned from the date of their appointment as part time tube well operators, but it has to be from their respective date of regularization. Moreover, the validating act significantly mentions that it is not necessary that the officer should be merely appointed on a temporary or a permanent post, but it also ensues that the said temporary or permanent appointment should be in accordance with the provisions of the service rules. As far as the present writ petitioners are concerned, although the Irrigation Department Tube Well Operators Service Rules 1953 existed and regular tube well operators were appointed under the said service rules, however these ''Part time tube well operators'' were appointed under 'executive instructions' vide order dated 22.12.1981 issued by Sinchai Anubhag, Government of U.P. Thus, these part time tube well operators not having been appointed as per the service rules, came to be only recognized and being appointed as per the service rules when their services were regularized. Thus, the qualifying service for pensionary benefits cannot be reckoned from a date, when these writ petitioners were not even appointed as per the service rules. 76. So far as the judgment of the Division Bench in the case of Bhanu Pratap Sharma is concerned argued by Learned Senior counsel for the writ petitioners are concerned, it may be noted that the judgment of the Court was on the facts of the case, inasmuch as, the petitioner therein was regularized from work charge basis to regular establishment and it was not the case of the State that his appointment was not in accordance with the provisions of service rules. However, in the present case, this Court finds on fact that neither engagement of petitioners are in a work charge establishment, nor is it admitted anywhere that engagement/appointment of petitioner was in accordance with the service rules. However, in the present case, this Court finds on fact that neither engagement of petitioners are in a work charge establishment, nor is it admitted anywhere that engagement/appointment of petitioner was in accordance with the service rules. In any case, this Court finds on the other hand that the state has relied on two judgments of the Division bench passed vide (i) Order dated 22.4.2022 in Special Appeal No. 398 of 2021(Shri Chandra Singh's case) and (ii) Order dated 16.5.2022 in Special Appeal No. 240 of 2021(Jangpal's case), wherein the Hon'ble Division Bench of Lucknow and Allahabad respectively after framing question relating to entitlement of the benefit of the judgment of the Prem Singh in view of the U.P. qualifying service for pension and validation Act, 2019 was negated.'' 39. I had occasion to consider the provisions of the Act of 2021 in the absence of a challenge to its vires being raised by the petitioner, who was claiming benefit of his service rendered as a Lekhpal prior to regularization in service for the purpose of reckoning these towards qualifying service under Rule 3(8) of the Rules of 1961. This question arose before me in Bali Ram Singh, where it was held: ''14. It is apparent that the ad hoc appointment of the Assistant Teacher in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Kamlesh Babu Gaur was found to be in accordance with the relevant Service Rules, when initially made, and against a substantive post. Here, what this Court finds, from a reading of the letter of appointment dated 7.5.1978, that the petitioner was appointed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate (n), Varanasi as a temporary Lekhpal, on the basis of a report submitted by the Tehsildar, Sadar, Varanasi. The appointment letter does not reflect at all that the petitioner was appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Service Rules governing recruitment, selection or appointment. The mere fact that the appointment has been labelled or dubbed as temporary, does not implicitly mean that it is one made in accordance with the Service Rules. Ex-facie, the petitioner's appointment is dehors the Rules. 15. This Court has also gone through the petitioner's service book, which reflects that the petitioner has continued in service uninterruptedly since 7.5.1987, until regularisation on 13.9.2006, with his status being reflected earlier as temporary. Ex-facie, the petitioner's appointment is dehors the Rules. 15. This Court has also gone through the petitioner's service book, which reflects that the petitioner has continued in service uninterruptedly since 7.5.1987, until regularisation on 13.9.2006, with his status being reflected earlier as temporary. There is no hint in the service book to show that the petitioner's appointment prior to his regularisation granted after requisite training was one made in accordance with the Service Rules. It also needs to be remarked that during the entire period of service rendered as a temporary Lekhpal, the petitioner has received recurring increments, pay revisions and Assured Career Promotion, but all that does not show that the petitioner was selected and appointed in accordance with the Service Rules. Rather, the fact that the petitioner had to undergo training for three months from 1.5.2006 to 31.7.2006, before he was granted regularisation by the Appointing Authority, shows that the service rendered by him earlier, though uninterrupted and in a regular pay scale, was one on the basis of an appointment dehors the rules. Therefore, the learned Counsel for the petitioner is not correct in his submission, that the principle in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Kamlesh Babu Gaur (supra) would be attracted to the petitioner's case. Section 2 of the Act that is pari materia with Section 2 of the predecessor ordinance, would bear differently upon the petitioner's rights, and not the way it did in the case before the Division Bench under reference. The reason is that in the case before the Division Bench, the initial ad hoc appointment of the writ petitioner was found to be in accordance with the relevant Service rules, whereas, in this case, the petitioner's appointment, though labelled as temporary and in its turn, uninterrupted, is not found to be one made in accordance with the Service Rules. 16. Learned Counsel for the petitioner further relied on the decision of the Division Bench in State of U.P. v. Bhanu Pratap Sharma, decided on 9.6.2021. In the said decision also, it was held that it is not the State-appellant's case that the respondent was not appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Service Rules. 16. Learned Counsel for the petitioner further relied on the decision of the Division Bench in State of U.P. v. Bhanu Pratap Sharma, decided on 9.6.2021. In the said decision also, it was held that it is not the State-appellant's case that the respondent was not appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Service Rules. Here, it is a case where the petitioner has not been able to show that he was appointed at any time before his regularisation in accordance with the Service Rules, though he was appointed against a sanctioned post on a temporary basis. The appointment, nevertheless, was dehors the rules. Thus, the decision in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Kamlesh Babu Gaur (supra) would also be of no help to the petitioner. The rights of the petitioner judged under the shadow of Section 2 and 3 of the Act cannot be regarded as ones entitling him to qualifying service. The reason is that the petitioner's retention in service, though dubbed as temporary, was not made in accordance with the relevant Service Rules. The appointment between 7.5.1987 and 13.1.2006, until he was regularised in service, was one dehors the Rules. Post regularisation, the petitioner has admittedly not completed 10 years of qualifying service to entitle him to pension, gratuity and other post-retiral benefits that he seeks. As such, the petitioner is not entitled to relief.'' 40. In the opinion of this Court, therefore, there is absolutely no scope for the Court to read down the provisions of Section 2 of the Act of 2021, or much more than that as in Awadhesh Kumar Srivastava to hold the provisions unenforceable on ground that it amounts to direct overruling of a judgment without removing the defect, or still more, for a violation of Part III of the Constitution. This can only be done in a duly constituted petition, where the vires of the provisions of Section 2 are challenged. 41. The submission in regard to the decision in Sajeevan Lal on behalf of the petitioners would apply with equal force to my holding in Bali Ram Singh that the decisions were rendered before the provisions of Section 2(1) were read down in Dr. Shyam Kumar, and declared unenforceable in Awadhesh Kumar Srivastava. For a fact, the said submission is well-founded. The submission in regard to the decision in Sajeevan Lal on behalf of the petitioners would apply with equal force to my holding in Bali Ram Singh that the decisions were rendered before the provisions of Section 2(1) were read down in Dr. Shyam Kumar, and declared unenforceable in Awadhesh Kumar Srivastava. For a fact, the said submission is well-founded. But, the submission does not overcome the basic principle of which we have spoken hereinabove, that is to say, that in the absence of a challenge to the vires of a statute raised through a duly constituted petition, the provisions of a statute cannot be read down as violative of Part III of the Constitution or on ground that these amount to brazen overruling of a judgment of the Court, striking down or reading down an earlier law, without removing the vice or the flaw through the amended or new legislation. To read down a statute on these grounds, the Court must have before it a challenge to the vires of the statute through a petition framed for the purpose, with all necessary pleas raised. Sitting singly, it would not be appropriate for me, notwithstanding the views that I have expressed to enter judgment contrary to two earlier decisions rendered by the learned Single Judges in Dr. Shyam Kumar and Awadhesh Kumar Srivastava. The only course open for this Court is to refer the matter to His Lordship the Hon'ble the Chief Justice to lay the questions framed here for consideration by a larger Bench. The questions that would require consideration by a larger Bench are: (I) Whether in the absence of a challenge to the vires of an Act of the State Legislature, is it open to the Court to read down a provision thereof on ground that it violates an earlier judgment of the Court, reading down or invalidating an earlier statute as violative of the Constitution, without removing the defects pointed out in the earlier Legislation or on the ground that the offending provisions violate Part III of the Constitution? (II) Whether is it open to the Court to declare an Act of the State Legislature inoperative, in the absence of a challenge to its vires on ground that it amounts to brazen overruling of an earlier judgment or a violation of Part III of the Constitution? (II) Whether is it open to the Court to declare an Act of the State Legislature inoperative, in the absence of a challenge to its vires on ground that it amounts to brazen overruling of an earlier judgment or a violation of Part III of the Constitution? (III) Whether a Judge sitting singly, in view of the determination of jurisdiction of Division Benches and Single Judges can go into the question of the vires of a State Enactment by reading down its provisions or declaring them inoperative? (IV) Whether the judgments of the learned Single Judges in Dr. Shyam Kumar and Awadhesh Kumar Srivastava, in one case reading down, and, in the other, holding inoperative the provisions of Section 2 of the Act of 2021 in the absence of a challenge to its vires lay down the correct law? 42. Let the papers be placed by the Registry before His Lordship the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for constitution of a larger Bench.