JUDGMENT : SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD, J. 1. The instant petition has been filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing the order taking cognizance dated 31.05.2002 passed in Complaint Case C. III 85 of 2002 corresponding to FERA/FEMA 2/02 by which the cognizance for the offence under Sections 56 r/w Sections 49(3) and (4) of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 for contravention of the provisions of Section 9(i)(i)(a) and 9(b)(i) r/w Section 64(2) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act has been taken including the order dated 06.04.2023 by which the application filed under Section 245(2) Cr.P.C. has been rejected with all subsequent proceeding holding it to be illegal and without jurisdiction. Factual Matrix: 2. The prosecution case, as it appears from the complaint filed by the prosecution stating therein that in pursuance to the orders passed by the Hon'ble High Court on 11.3.1996 and judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 19.3.1996, the CBI, Patna Branch took the investigation of Doranda P.S. Case No. 50/1996 (RC Case No. 55/96) under Sections 1208, 409, 420, 467, 468, 472, 471 and 420 IPC and Section 13 (2) read with Section 13 (1) and (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. It has been alleged that Dr. K.M. Prasad in conspiracy with others defrauded the government to the extent of Rs.7,09,92,000/- during the period 1980-1990 on the basis of fake allotment letters purportedly issued by the Director of Animal Husbandry, Govt. of Bihar for the purpose of medicines. As a matter of fact fake supplies were shown by the suppliers and the money was withdrawn on the basis of such fake allotment order was misappropriated by the accused persons. 3. It has further been stated that during the course of investigation, it was transpired that Dr. K.M. Prasad is also involved in RC Case No. 4A/96, which case is also under investigation and the amount defrauded in the above case is to the extent of Rs. 19,81,66,460 approx. as reported in the FIR. The investigation has also revealed that Dr. K.M. Prasad has acquired huge immovable and movable property in his own name and in the name of his children and other at different places. 4. On further enquiry, it was also revealed that Dr. 19,81,66,460 approx. as reported in the FIR. The investigation has also revealed that Dr. K.M. Prasad has acquired huge immovable and movable property in his own name and in the name of his children and other at different places. 4. On further enquiry, it was also revealed that Dr. K.M. Prasad and his son Kamlesh Kumar (petitioner herein) have been made accused in at least 14 and 8 cases respectively in the similar nature by the CBI and in most of the cases chargesheets have already been submitted by the CBI against Dr. K.M. Prasad and his son Kamlesh Kumar. 5. It has further been alleged that sons and daughter of Dr. K.M. Prasad had received certain foreign exchange remittances by way of foreign exchange instruments amounting in total US$ 3,15,000/- and pounds 1000 during the year 1991- 92 and on further information that the said remittances were not actually genuine gift amount but were suspected to be involved in violation of the provision of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1973 by certain persons involved in the animal husbandry scam of Bihar. 6. The Enforcement Directorate have made enquiry in connection with such remittances, the accused persons were examined by the ED under Section 40 of the Act and relevant documents of Income Tax Department in connection with the accused persons were verified. 7. On scrutiny, it was indicated that Kamlesh Kumar had received a total amount of US$ 75,000/ and 1,000 pounds in the form of five Drafts of US$ 15,000/-, US$ 20,000/-, US$20,000/- and US$ 5,000/-, Pounds 1,000 and US$ 8800 and US$ 1200, Two by way of travelers cheque 26,11.91, 21.12.91, 11.01.92, 23.01.92, 30.11.91 and 23.11.91 respectively which were deposited in to his Account with Punjab National Bank, Roshnara Road, New Delhi. 8. Similarly, Rajesh Kumar (petitioner no.2) had received amounts totaling to US$ 75000/- in the form of four cheques/drafts for US$ 25,000/-, US$25000/-, US$ 20,000/- and US$ 5000/- and it has been credited on 18.11.91, 21.12.91, 11.1.92 and 23.1.92 respectively. 9. On the basis of enquiry, it has been alleged in the complaint that Dr. 8. Similarly, Rajesh Kumar (petitioner no.2) had received amounts totaling to US$ 75000/- in the form of four cheques/drafts for US$ 25,000/-, US$25000/-, US$ 20,000/- and US$ 5000/- and it has been credited on 18.11.91, 21.12.91, 11.1.92 and 23.1.92 respectively. 9. On the basis of enquiry, it has been alleged in the complaint that Dr. K.M. Prasad arranged those foreign exchange remittances to be received from abroad in the names of the aforesaid persons by making payments equivalent to the said amount of foreign exchange out of the above referred amount during the said period, without the previous general or special exemption from the Reserve Bank of India. 10. It has further been alleged that Dr. K.M. Prasad appears to have contravened the provisions of Section 9 (1) (a) and 9(1) (f) (i) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 and thereby rendered himself liable to the prosecuted against under Section 56 of the said Act. 11. It has further been alleged that by receiving the foreign exchange remittances and assisting and aiding Dr. K.M. Prasad in making the payment in consideration of receipt of the said Foreign Exchange remittances in the aforesaid manner, the sons and daughter of Dr. K.M. Prasad appears to contravene the provisions of Section 9(1) (1) (a) and 9 (1) (b) (i) both read with Section 64 (2) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 to the extent of amounts received by them and have thereby rendered themselves liable to be prosecuted against under Section 56 of the said Act. 12. It has further been alleged that by receiving the foreign exchange remittances and assisting and aiding Dr. K.M. Prasad in making the payment in consideration of receipt of the said Foreign Exchange remittances in the aforesaid manner, the sons and daughter of Dr. K.M. Prasad appears to contravene the provisions of Section 9(1) (1) (a) and 9 (1) (b) (i) both read with Section 64 (2) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 to the extent of amounts received by them and have thereby rendered themselves liable to be prosecuted against under Section 56 of the said Act. 13. On the basis of the aforesaid allegations, a complaint Case C-III-85/2002 was registered. 14. 13. On the basis of the aforesaid allegations, a complaint Case C-III-85/2002 was registered. 14. Accordingly vide order dated 31.05.2002 cognizance was taken by the court concerned, consequently the petitioners preferred an application before this Court under section 482 Cr.P.C for quashing of the order taking cognizance but the same was dismissed in year 2003. 15. Further, it requires to refer herein that petitioners had also filed an application u/s 245 (2) Cr.PC before the learned court below for discharging them from their criminal liabilities which is stood rejected vide order dated 06/04/2023. 16. Thereafter, this instant petition has been preferred under section 482 Cr.P.C for quashing of the same cognizance order 31/05/2002 on the ground that the other persons arrayed as accused preferred criminal misc. petition being CRMP No. 2323 of 2015 and the co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the said case has quashed the entire criminal proceeding vide order dated 04.02.2016 by taking consideration of the fact that the entire prosecution get vitiated as all the remittances are within the specified period. 17. It is evident from the prosecution version that Dr. K.M. Prasad in conspiracy with other defrauded the Government to the extent of Rs. 7,09,92,000/- during the period 1980-1990 on the basis of the fake allotment letters issued by the Director of Animal Husbandry, Govt. of Bihar for the purpose of medicines. It had surfaced, in course of investigation, that Dr. K.M. Prasad is also involved in R.C. Case No. 4A/96 which case is also under investigation and the amount defrauded in the above case is to the extent of Rs.19,81,66,460 approx. The material has also been surfaced that the Dr. K.M. Prasad had received certain foreign exchange remittances by way of foreign exchange instruments amount in total US$ 3,15,00/- and pounds 1000 during the year 1991-92 and as such, it was suspected that the concerned person is involved in violation of the provision of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973. The chargesheet has been submitted and based upon the same, the cognizance has been taken vide order dated 31.05.2002 by Additional Judicial Commissioner-cum-Special Judge, Ranchi. 18. The chargesheet has been submitted and based upon the same, the cognizance has been taken vide order dated 31.05.2002 by Additional Judicial Commissioner-cum-Special Judge, Ranchi. 18. It appears from the record that earlier, the application has been filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing the order dated 31.05.2002, the order taking cognizance of the offence punishable under Section 56 of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 read with Section 49(3)(4) of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999. 19. The co-ordinate Bench of this Court has declined to quash the order taking cognizance in year 2003. 20. The present application has been filed by taking the ground that in the meanwhile, the other persons arrayed as accused preferred criminal misc. petition being CRMP No. 2323 of 2015 and the co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the said case has quashed the entire criminal proceeding vide order dated 04.02.2016. 21. It is evident that the pretext of filing the instant application under the inherent jurisdiction of this Court as conferred under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is that even though earlier to the present petition, the order taking cognizance has been refused to be interfered with by the order passed by this Court in year 2003 but since with respect to other persons arrayed as accused, the criminal proceeding has been quashed, hence, claiming parity with those persons, the present petition has been filed. Arguments on behalf of the Petitioners: 22. Mr. Jitendra S. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners assisted by Mr. Abhishek Kumar, learned counsel has submitted by referring to the provision of remittances of the Foreign Exchange and Investment in Foreign Exchange Bonds (Immunities and Exemptions) Act, 1991 (hereinafter referred to as the Act, 1991) which contains a provision of immunities as under Section 3 thereof, whereby and whereunder, in view of the aforesaid specific provision the petitioners are to be given immunities and thereby, no prosecution case can be said to be established. 23. It has been contended that herein also the remittances are within the specified period and as such, in view of the provision as contained under Section 3(1) of the Act, 1991, the immunities are statutorily to be availed and in view of the matter, no prosecution case can be said to be made out. 24. 23. It has been contended that herein also the remittances are within the specified period and as such, in view of the provision as contained under Section 3(1) of the Act, 1991, the immunities are statutorily to be availed and in view of the matter, no prosecution case can be said to be made out. 24. Submission has been made, considering the aforesaid statutory provision, the co-ordinate Bench of this Court while deciding the issue in Cr.M.P. No. 2323 of 2015 has quashed the entire criminal proceeding and hence, it is also a fit case where the criminal proceeding is fit to be quashed on the basis of principle of parity. Arguments on behalf of the Respondent-ED: 25. Per contra, Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel for the respondent-ED has vehemently opposed such prayer. 26. It has been contended by responding to the main ground that the criminal proceeding with respect to other persons arrayed as accused has been quashed by the co-ordinate Bench of this Court as per the order passed in Cr.M.P. No. 2323 of 2015 but the said order will not be applicable on the principle of parity since while quashing the criminal proceeding, this Court has not appreciated the provision of Section 3(2) of the Act, 1991 by which the exemption has been carved out with respect to the applicability of the immunities as provided under Section 3(1) of the Act, 1991 so far as the violation of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 is concerned. 27. It has been contended that the aforesaid statutory provision has not been taken into consideration by the co-ordinate Bench, since there is no finding to that effect rather the order has been passed by taking into consideration the provision of Section 3(1) of the Act, 1991 hence, the said order is not applicable on the principle of parity. 28. The second ground which has been taken by the learned counsel for the respondent-ED is that earlier to the present petition, the order taking cognizance has been sought to be quashed by filing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. but the same was rejected in year 2003 by this Court, hence, the second consecutive quashing application under the provision of Section 482 Cr.P.C. is not maintainable. 29. Mr. 29. Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel for the respondent-ED, in order to strengthen his argument, has relied upon a judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Bisham Lal Verma vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1399. Analysis: 30. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties, gone through the order taking cognizance dated 31.05.2002 which is impugned in this petition. 31. Learned counsel for the respondent-ED in opposition has raised two grounds, first is non-applicability of the order passed by the co-ordinate Bench of this Court on account of non-consideration of the provision of Section 3(2) of the Act, 1991 and second ground is about maintainability of the successive petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for the same cause of action. 32. So far as the first ground is concerned, the argument has been advanced on behalf of the learned counsel for the petitioner that exactly on the same issue, with respect to the persons arrayed in that case has been given benefit of quashing and as such, in this case also, the entire criminal proceeding is to be quashed applying the principle of parity. 33. This Court, in order to deal with the aforesaid arguments, deems it fit and proper to refer with respect to the issue of applicability of parity in the criminal cases. 34. There is no dispute with the position of law that the principle of parity is also to be followed in the matter of criminal prosecution but the parameter which is to be followed is that if the case of one accused person is exactly on the similar footing on consideration of facts in entirety, i.e., both on fact and on law. 35. The Hon’ble Apex Court while dealing with the principle of parity in the matter of bail has held that Court cannot exercise its powers in a capricious manner and has to consider the totality of circumstances before granting bail and by simply saying that another accused has been granted bail is not sufficient to determine whether a case for the grant of bail on the basis of parity has been established. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ramesh Bhavan Rathod vs. Vishanbhai Hirabhai Makwana , reported in ( 2021) 6 SCC 230 , wherein, it has been held as under : "25. We are constrained to observe that the orders passed by the High Court granting bail fail to pass muster under the law. They are oblivious to, and innocent of, the nature and gravity of the alleged offences and to the severity of the punishment in the event of conviction. In Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. [Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508 :], this Court has held that while applying the principle of parity, the High Court cannot exercise its powers in a capricious manner and has to consider the totality of circumstances before granting bail. This Court observed : (SCC p. 515, para 17) "17. Coming to the case at hand, it is found that when a stand was taken that the second respondent was a history-sheeter, it was imperative on the part of the High Court to scrutinise every aspect and not capriciously record that the second respondent is entitled to be admitted to bail on the ground of parity. It can be stated with absolute certitude that it was not a case of parity and, therefore, the impugned order [Mitthan Yadav v. State of U.P., 2014 SCC OnLine All 16031] clearly exposes the non-application of mind. That apart, as a matter of fact it has been brought on record that the second respondent has been charge-sheeted in respect of number of other heinous offences. The High Court has failed to take note of the same. Therefore, the order has to pave the path of extinction, for its approval by this Court would tantamount to travesty of justice, and accordingly we set it aside. 26. Another aspect of the case which needs emphasis is the manner in which the High Court has applied the principle of parity. By its two orders both dated 21-12- 2020 [Pravinbhai Hirabhai Koli v. State of Gujarat, 2020 SCC OnLine Guj 2986], [Khetabhai Parbatbhai Makwana v. State of Gujarat, 2020 SCC OnLine Guj 2988], the High Court granted bail to Pravin Koli (A-10) and Kheta Parbat Koli (A-15). By its two orders both dated 21-12- 2020 [Pravinbhai Hirabhai Koli v. State of Gujarat, 2020 SCC OnLine Guj 2986], [Khetabhai Parbatbhai Makwana v. State of Gujarat, 2020 SCC OnLine Guj 2988], the High Court granted bail to Pravin Koli (A-10) and Kheta Parbat Koli (A-15). Parity was sought with Sidhdhrajsinh Bhagubha Vaghela (A-13) to whom bail was granted on 22-10-2020 [Siddhrajsinh Bhagubha Vaghela v. State of Gujarat, 2020 SCC OnLine Guj 2985] on the ground (as the High Court recorded) that he was "assigned similar role of armed with stick (sic)". Again, bail was granted to Vanraj Koli (A-16) on the ground that he was armed with a wooden stick and on the ground that Pravin (A-10), Kheta (A- 15) and Sidhdhrajsinh (A-13) who were armed with sticks had been granted bail. The High Court has evidently misunderstood the central aspect of what is meant by parity. Parity while granting bail must focus upon the role of the accused. Merely observing that another accused who was granted bail was armed with a similar weapon is not sufficient to determine whether a case for the grant of bail on the basis of parity has been established. In deciding the aspect of parity, the role attached to the accused, their position in relation to the incident and to the victims is of utmost importance. The High Court has proceeded on the basis of parity on a simplistic assessment as noted above, which again cannot pass muster under the law." 36. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of in Tarun Kumar Vs. Assistant Director Directorate of Enforcement (2023) SCC OnLine SC 1486 wherein at paragraph- 18, it has been held that parity is not the law and while applying the principle of parity, the Court is required to focus upon the role attached to the accused whose application is under consideration. 37. Assistant Director Directorate of Enforcement (2023) SCC OnLine SC 1486 wherein at paragraph- 18, it has been held that parity is not the law and while applying the principle of parity, the Court is required to focus upon the role attached to the accused whose application is under consideration. 37. It has further been held at paragraph-19 of the said judgment that the principle of parity is to be applied in the matter of bail but equally it has been laid down therein that there cannot be any negative equality, meaning thereby, that if a co-accused person has been granted bail without consideration of the factual aspect or on the ground said to be not proper, then, merely because the co-accused person has been directed to be released on bail, the same will not attract the principle of parity on the principle that Article 14 envisages positive equality and not negative equality. For ready reference, relevant paragraph, i.e., paragraph-19, of the aforesaid judgment reads as under: "19. It is axiomatic that the principle of parity is based on the guarantee of positive equality before law enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. However, if any illegality or irregularity has been committed in favour of any individual or a group of individuals, or a wrong order has been passed by a judicial forum, others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the higher or superior court for repeating or multiplying the same irregularity or illegality or for passing similar wrong order. Article 14 is not meant to perpetuate the illegality or irregularity. If there has been a benefit or advantage conferred on one or a set of people by any authority or by the court, without legal basis or justification, other persons could not claim as a matter of right the benefit on the basis of such wrong decision." 38. This Court, before adverting to the legal position as has been emphasized while arguing the case by the learned counsel for the petitioners regarding the applicability of Section 3(1) of the Act, 1991, is of the view that the statutory provision as formulated under the aforesaid statute needs to be referred herein which has been inserted by way of Act No. 41 of 1991 notified on 18 th September, 1991, the date of enforcement. 39. 39. The aforesaid act has been inserted to provide for certain immunities to persons receiving remittances or Foreign Exchange and to persons owning foreign exchange bonds and certain exemptions from direct taxes in relation to such remittances and bonds for matter connected therewith or incidental thereto. 40. The “remittance” has been defined under Section 2(b) of the Act, 1991 which reads as under: “2(b) “remittance” means remittance made in foreign exchange by any person resident outside India to a person resident in India on or after the date of commencement of this Act but before the specified date, in the form of draft, traveller’s cheques, cheques drawn on banks situated outside India telegraphic transfers, mail transfers, money orders or by way of transfer from Non-resident (External) Account, Foreign Currency Non-resident Account or Foreign Currency Non- resident Special Deposit Account maintained in India under the rules made under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (46 of 1973).” 41. The provision of immunities has been provided under Section 3 which comprises of three substantive provisions. For ready reference, Section 3 is being reproduced as under: “ 3. Immunities. —(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force,— (a) no recipient, who claims immunity under this Chapter in accordance with such scheme as the Reserve Bank of India may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify for the purposes of receiving remittances under this Chapter, shall be required to disclose, for any purpose whatsoever, the nature and source of the remittance made to him; (b) no inquiry or investigation shall be commenced against the recipient under any such law on the ground that he has received such remittance; (c) the fact that the recipient has received a remittance shall not be taken into account and shall be inadmissible as evidence in any proceedings relating to any offence or the imposition of any penalty under any such law. (2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply— (a) to any foreign exchange which is required to be brought into India under any of the provisions of— (i) the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (46 of 1973); or (ii) the Income-tax Act, 1961 (43 of 1961), read with the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (46 of 1973), if the period within which such foreign exchange is to be brought into India has not expired or where such period has been extended, in any manner, by the Central Government or the Reserve Bank of India or any other authority, such extended period has not expired on the date of commencement of this Act; (b) in relation to prosecution for any offence punishable under Chapter IX or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (28 of 1987), the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988) or for the purpose of enforcement of any civil liability. (3) The Central Government shall cause the scheme notified under clause (a) of sub-section (1) to be laid, as soon as may be after it is notified, before each House of Parliament.” 42. It is evident from the provision of Section 3(1)(a) that no recipient, who claims immunity under this Chapter in accordance with such scheme as the Reserve Bank of India may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify for the purposes of receiving remittances under this Chapter, shall be required to disclose, for any purpose whatsoever, the nature and source of the remittance made to him. Sub-Section (b) of Section 3(1) provides that no inquiry or investigation shall be commenced against the recipient under any such law on the ground that he has received such remittance. Sub-Section (c) of Section 3(1) provides that the fact that the recipient has received a remittance shall not be taken into account and shall be inadmissible as evidence in any proceedings relating to any offence or the imposition of any penalty under any such law. Sub-Section (c) of Section 3(1) provides that the fact that the recipient has received a remittance shall not be taken into account and shall be inadmissible as evidence in any proceedings relating to any offence or the imposition of any penalty under any such law. Sub-Section (2) of Section 3 provides that nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply— (a) to any foreign exchange which is required to be brought into India under any of the provisions of— (i) the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (46 of 1973); or (ii) the Income-tax Act, 1961 (43 of 1961), read with the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (46 of 1973), if the period within which such foreign exchange is to be brought into India has not expired or where such period has been extended, in any manner, by the Central Government or the Reserve Bank of India or any other authority, such extended period has not expired on the date of commencement of this Act 43. Learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that since the remittance is under specified period, as such, by virtue of the protection carved out under the Act, 1973 in view of the provision of Section 3(1) of the Act, 1991, the present case will also come under the fold of remittance, therefore, there cannot be any prosecution and that is the reason the co-ordinate Bench of this Court has decided the issue with respect to persons who have been arrayed as accused by taking into consideration the provision of Section 3(1) of the Act, 1991. 44. Admittedly herein, the Act, 1991 has come into being on 18.09.1991 and extended up till 29.02.1992. Remittance on the basis of the document available has been referred by the learned counsel for the petitioner is dated 29.01.1992, as such, it is admitted that the remittance is within the period when the Act, 1991 was in vogue since the remittance is prior to 29.02.1991, i.e., 29.01.1991. 45. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the Act, 1991 will be applicable and that is also the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner and that is the reason the immunities is being sought for in view of the provision as contained under Section 3(1) of the Act, 1991. 46. 45. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the Act, 1991 will be applicable and that is also the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner and that is the reason the immunities is being sought for in view of the provision as contained under Section 3(1) of the Act, 1991. 46. However, it is settled position of law that that if any statutory command is there, the Act is to be read out in entirety and not in piece-mill. Herein, the remittance is being sought for in view of the provision of Section 3(1) of the Act, 1991 which consists of altogether three provisions as under Section 3(1)(2)(3) of the Act, 1991. Admittedly, Section 3(1) of the Act, 1991 stipulates about remittance but the specific embargo has been put under the Section 3(2) with respect to no immunities to be granted by statutorily provided that the Act, 1991 will not be applicable so far as it relates to Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973. 47. Therefore, this Court is of the view that while considering the provision of Section 3(1), the consideration is also required to be given with respect to the provision of Section 3(2) of the Act, 1991 then only the question of consideration of statutory provision in entirety will be there. 48. This Court has also considered the order passed by the co-ordinate Bench of this Court dated 04.02.2016 which had been preferred by other persons who had been arrayed as accused. 49. It is evident as per the said order as appended as Annexure-7 that the ground taken on behalf of the petitioners of the said case was based upon the provision of Section 3(1) of the Act, 1991 while on the other hand, the ground was taken on behalf of the ED regarding the non- applicability of Section 3(1) of the Act, 1991 on the basis that remittances which is not permitted under the FERA can be subject matter of prosecution. Specific ground had been taken by the ED as would appear from the aforesaid order. For ready reference the relevant part of the ground so taken by the ED along with the other relevant paragraphs of the order dated 04.02.2016 are being reproduced as under: As against this, Mr. Specific ground had been taken by the ED as would appear from the aforesaid order. For ready reference the relevant part of the ground so taken by the ED along with the other relevant paragraphs of the order dated 04.02.2016 are being reproduced as under: As against this, Mr. Das, learned counsel appearing for the Enforcement Directorate, submits that only those remittances permitted under the provisions of FERA, have been saved under that Act called ‘Remittances of Foreign Exchange and Investment in Foreign Exchange Bonds (Immunities and Exemptions) Act, 1991’. In other words the remittances, which is not permitted under the FERA can be subject matter of prosecution and, therefore, when it was found that the remittances were there in contravention of FERA, the petitioners are being prosecuted. In this regard, learned counsel has placed reliance of Clause-6 of the Scheme named as “Remittances of Foreign Exchange (Immunities) Scheme, 1991/India Development Bonds Scheme, 1991”, which reads as follows:- “6. The immunities and exemptions, referred to above, are however not available with regard to any foreign exchange which is required to be brought into India under any provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 or the Income-tax Act, 1961 read with that Act and the period (including extended period, if any) within which such foreign exchange to be brought into India has not expired as on 18 th September, 1991. These immunities are also not available to in relation to any prosecution under the Penal Code, 1860 for offences relating to public servants and offences against property (theft, robbery, etc.); offences under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, Prevention of Corruption Act and for enforcement of any civil liability.” Mr. Das, by placing reliance on the said Clause, submits that remittances from outside of the country was received by the petitioners, which was found to be in contravention of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 and, thereby, the petitioners are being rightly prosecuted. Further, it was submitted that earlier the petitioners had challenged the order taking cognizance though not on the ground on which it is being assailed presently but on other grounds, still it would not be available to the petitioners as earlier this point had never been taken by the petitioners. As against this, Mr. Further, it was submitted that earlier the petitioners had challenged the order taking cognizance though not on the ground on which it is being assailed presently but on other grounds, still it would not be available to the petitioners as earlier this point had never been taken by the petitioners. As against this, Mr. Anil Kr., learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that if the plea advanced on behalf of the Enforcement Directorate is accepted that will render the entire Act namely “Remittances of Foreign Exchange and Investment in Foreign Exchange Bonds (Immunities and Exemptions) Act, 1991” as nugatory and, thereby, the remittances of foreign exchange could not be made even under the aforesaid Act and, therefore, the purport under Clause-6 of the Scheme is never there that if the remittances is in contravention of the provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, it would be punishable under the FERA, rather the purport is that if the remittances is not within the period fixed under the Scheme that remittances can be taken to be in contravention to the provisions of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act and in that event, if this interpretation of Clause-6 is accepted by the Court, no prosecution would lie against the petitioners. In the context of the rival submissions advanced on behalf of the parties, one needs to take notice of the provision of the Remittances of Foreign Exchange and Investment in Foreign Exchange Bonds (Immunities and Exemptions) Act, 1991. The object and purpose of this Act is there in its Preamble, which reads as follows:- “To mean a person, who receives any remittance under Chapter-II Clause (b) defines remittance as in the manner to mean inter alia remittances made in foreign exchange by any person resident outside India to a person resident in India inter alia by way of transfer from Non-resident (External) Account maintained in India under the rules made under the Act." Section 3 provides for certain immunities to a recipient of foreign exchange, which reads as follows:- “3. Immunities (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force- (a) no recipient, who claims immunity under this Chapter in accordance with such Scheme as the Reserve Bank of India may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify for the purposes of receiving remittances under this Chapter, shall be required to disclose, for nay purpose whatsoever, the nature and source of the remittance made to him; (b) no inquiry or investigation shall be commenced against the recipient under any such law on the ground that he has received such remittance; (c) the fact that the recipient has received a remittance shall not be taken into account and shall be inadmissible as evidence in any proceedings relating to any offence or the imposition of any penalty under any such law.” In view of these provisions, one can come to the conclusion from its Preamble that the Immunities Act was enacted by the Parliament with the object of attracting large inflow of foreign exchange and to achieve that objective it was considered expedient to provide for certain Immunities and exemptions to render it possible for persons to receive the said remittances in foreign exchange. It would therefore follow that Parliament while enacting the law was conscious of the fact that but for the immunities to be provided under the Act the receipt of remittances of foreign exchange sought to be secured may not be legal. Hence the Immunities Act seems to have been enacted. Further, it be stated that in pursuance of the provision of Section 3(1)(a) the RBI formulated the scheme known as the Remittances in Foreign Exchange (Immunities) Scheme, 1991. It appears that to reassure the general public in regard to the immunities and exemptions provided under the Immunities Act and the Scheme made thereunder the RBI issued a Press Release No. 1991-92/103 dated 21/09/1991 to declare inter alia that the source of funds out of which remittances are made purpose and nature of remittances would not be subjected to scrutiny under the Exchange Regulation. It was further declared inter alia that remittances under the Scheme can be received through authorised dealer by debiting to NRE accounts. The recipients are required to file a declaration in a specified from with the authorised dealer through whom the remittance is received. It was further declared inter alia that remittances under the Scheme can be received through authorised dealer by debiting to NRE accounts. The recipients are required to file a declaration in a specified from with the authorised dealer through whom the remittance is received. The declaration authenticated by authorised dealer would serve as a proof for having received the remittance under this Scheme. The Scheme formulated by the RBI provided for the issue of certificate of remittances by the authorised dealer. The authorised dealer was required to furnish a copy of the certificate to the recipient and to send another copy of the certificate to the RBI. It be reiterated that in respect of the matters contained in Section 3 the provisions of that Section shall operate and the related provisions of the Act shall not apply and shall be of no effect. Thus, it is clear that under the legislative Scheme of Section 3(1) the immunities provided thereunder are directly not only against all authorities seeking to inquire and investigate a matter under any law but also against the adjudicating and judicial authorities. Having regard to the provisions of the Immunities Act and the Scheme made thereunder and the object and purpose for which that law was enacted by Parliament it has been rightly contended by Mr. Anil Kumar Sinha, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners that the entire prosecution gets vitiated as all the remittances are within the specified period from 27/11/1991 to 29 th February, 1992. In that view of the matter, the interpretation given by the learned counsel appearing for the Enforcement Directorate of Clause-6 of the Scheme, is not acceptable. Thus, I do find that the Court below committed illegality in taking cognizance of the offences, as aforesaid, against all the petitioners, which is hereby set aside. In the result, this application stands allowed. 50. This Court has considered the finding part of the said order so as to apply the said judgment on the basis of principle of parity as per the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners is concerned but this Court has not found the consideration given with respect to the statutory provision as contained under Section 3(2) of the Act, 1991 rather only on the basis of Section 3(1) of the Act, 1991, the criminal prosecution has been quashed. 51. 51. As discussed above, the principle of parity is to be made applicable when the facts and circumstances is at par on both fact and on law but the question which is being raised to follow the order passed by the co- ordinate Bench of this Court is not acceptable to this Court reason being that the said order cannot be said to have the binding effect even on the principle of judicial discipline and such observation is being made that there is no consideration of Section 3(2) of the Act, 1991. 52. This Court also needs to refer herein that this Court is not exercising the power of appellate court for the order passed by the co-ordinate Bench but the question of its acceptance by way of binding effect on the principle of judicial discipline since is being considered and only for such observation is being made. 53. Judicial discipline is the requirement to maintain consistency in the judicial proceeding and passing of the order passed by the Court of law righty from the bottom to the highest forum under the judicial system of the country so as to maintain the faith upon the system of the people in general. But the principle of judicial discipline is to be maintained if there is order having been passed on consideration of the fact and law as applicable. 54. This Court also needs to refer herein that the principle of per-incuriam which has been defined to be an order passed by the court of law due to non-placing of the fact on casualness. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Bihar v. Kalika Kuer, (2003) 5 SCC 448 has extensively dealt with the issue of per-incuriam as to in what circumstances a decision can be considered to have been rendered per incuriam. For ready reference the relevant paragraphs are being quoted as under: 5. At this juncture we may examine as to in what circumstances a decision can be considered to have been rendered per incuriam. In Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Edn.) Vol. 26: Judgment and Orders: Judicial Decisions as Authorities (pp. For ready reference the relevant paragraphs are being quoted as under: 5. At this juncture we may examine as to in what circumstances a decision can be considered to have been rendered per incuriam. In Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Edn.) Vol. 26: Judgment and Orders: Judicial Decisions as Authorities (pp. 297-98, para 578) we find it observed about per incuriam as follows: “A decision is given per incuriam when the court has acted in ignorance of a previous decision of its own or of a court of coordinate jurisdiction which covered the case before it, in which case it must decide which case to follow [Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd., 1944 KB 718 at 729 : (1944) 2 All ER 293 at 300. In Huddersfield Police Authority v. Watson, 1947 KB 842 : (1947) 2 All ER 193.] ; or when it has acted in ignorance of a House of Lords decision, in which case it must follow that decision; or when the decision is given in ignorance of the terms of a statute or rule having statutory force [Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd., 1944 KB 718 at 729 : (1944) 2 All ER 293 at 300. see also Lancaster Motor Co. (London) Ltd. v. Bremith Ltd., (1941) 1 KB 675 : (1941) 2 All ER 11. For a Divisional Court decision disregarded by that court as being per incuriam, see Nicholas v. Penny, (1950) 2 KB 466 : (1950) 2 All ER 89.] . see also Lancaster Motor Co. (London) Ltd. v. Bremith Ltd., (1941) 1 KB 675 : (1941) 2 All ER 11. For a Divisional Court decision disregarded by that court as being per incuriam, see Nicholas v. Penny, (1950) 2 KB 466 : (1950) 2 All ER 89.] . A decision should not be treated as given per incuriam, however, simply because of a deficiency of parties [Morelle Ltd. v. Wakeling, (1955) 2 QB 379 : (1955) 1 All ER 708 (CA)] , or because the court had not the benefit of the best argument [Bryers v. Canadian Pacific Steamships Ltd., (1957) 1 QB 134 : (1956) 3 All ER 560 (CA) Per Singleton, L.J., affirmed in Canadian Pacific Steamships Ltd. v. Bryers 1958 AC 485 : (1957) 3 All ER 572.] , and, as a general rule, the only cases in which decisions should be held to be given per incuriam are those given in ignorance of some inconsistent statute or binding authority [A. and J. Mucklow Ltd. v. IRC, 1954 Ch 615 : (1954) 2 All ER 508 (CA), Morelle Ltd. v. Wakeling, (1955) 2 QB 379 : (1955) 1 All ER 708 (CA), see also Bonsor v. Musicians' Union, 1954 Ch 479 : (1954) 1 All ER 822 (CA), where the per incuriam contention was rejected and, on appeal to the House of Lords although the House overruled the case which bound the Court of Appeal, the House agreed that that court had been bound by it; see Bonsor v. Musicians' Union, 1956 AC 104 : (1955) 3 All ER 518 (HL).] . Even if a decision of the Court of Appeal has misinterpreted a previous decision of the House of Lords, the Court of Appeal must follow its previous decision and leave the House of Lords to rectify the mistake.” [Williams v. Glasbrook Bros. Ltd., (1947) 2 All ER 884 (CA)] Lord Godard, C.J. in Huddersfield Police Authorities case [Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd., 1944 KB 718 at 729 : (1944) 2 All ER 293 at 300. In Huddersfield Police Authority v. Watson, 1947 KB 842 : (1947) 2 All ER 193.] observed that where a case or statute had not been brought to the court's attention and the court gave the decision in ignorance or forgetfulness of the existence of the case or statute, it would be a decision rendered in per incuriam. 6. In Huddersfield Police Authority v. Watson, 1947 KB 842 : (1947) 2 All ER 193.] observed that where a case or statute had not been brought to the court's attention and the court gave the decision in ignorance or forgetfulness of the existence of the case or statute, it would be a decision rendered in per incuriam. 6. In a decision of this Court reported in Govt. of A.P. v. B. Satyanarayana Rao [ (2000) 4 SCC 262 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 486] it has been held as follows: (SCC pp. 264-65, para 8) “The rule of per incuriam can be applied where a court omits to consider a binding precedent of the same court or the superior court rendered on the same issue or where a court omits to consider any statute while deciding that issue. …We, therefore, find that the rule of per incuriam cannot be invoked in the present case. Moreover, a case cannot be referred to a larger Bench on mere asking of a party. A decision by two Judges has a binding effect on another coordinate Bench of two Judges, unless it is demonstrated that the said decision by any subsequent change in law or decision ceases to laying down a correct law.” 55. Further, the decision or the Judgement can be per-incuriam any provision in statute, rule or regulation, even if the same was not brought to the notice of the Court, reference in this regard may be taken from the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sandip Kumar Bafna v. State of Maharashtra , reported in (2014) 16 SCC 623 wherein it has been observed which reads as under: “19. It cannot be overemphasised that the discipline demanded by a precedent or the disqualification or diminution of a decision on the application of the per incuriam rule is of great importance, since without it, certainty of law, consistency of rulings and comity of courts would become a costly casualty. A decision or judgment can be per incuriam any provision in a statute, rule or regulation, which was not brought to the notice of the court. A decision or judgment can be per incuriam any provision in a statute, rule or regulation, which was not brought to the notice of the court. A decision or judgment can also be per incuriam if it is not possible to reconcile its ratio with that of a previously pronounced judgment of a co-equal or larger Bench; or if the decision of a High Court is not in consonance with the views of this Court. It must immediately be clarified that the per incuriam rule is strictly and correctly applicable to the ratio decidendi and not to obiter dicta. It is often encountered in High Courts that two or more mutually irreconcilable decisions of the Supreme Court are cited at the Bar. We think that the inviolable recourse is to apply the earliest view as the succeeding ones would fall in the category of per incuriam.” 56. This Court has observed hereinabove that the statutory provision as available under Section 3(2) of the Act, 1991 has not been taken note by the Court in the order dated 04.02.2016. 57. It has been argued on behalf of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the submission so made with respect to the applicability of Section 3(2) of the Act, 1991 which can be construed to be considered made by the court of law but this Court is not in agreement with such submission reason being that the consideration always means active application of mind by the Adjudicator or the Court of Law. 58. 58. Further, it is well settled proposition of law that consideration does not mean a mere formality, rather, if any document or stand has been taken in defence, it is the bounden duty of the authority/ or the Court of Law concerned to discuss and while accepting or refusing, the same must be based upon the well assigned reason, otherwise, it cannot be said to be a consideration in the eyes of law since consideration means active application of mind which can only be said to be there if the document/defence will be well considered by the authority concerned, reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Chairman, Life Insurance Corporation of India v. A. Masilamani, (2013) 6 SCC 530 wherein at paragraph 19 it has been held that the term “consider” postulates consideration of all relevant aspects of a matter. Thus, formation of opinion by the statutory authority should reflect intense application of mind with reference to the material available on record. The relevant paragraph of the aforesaid judgment is being quoted and referred hereunder as:— “19. The word “consider” is of great significance. The dictionary meaning of the same is, “to think over”, “to regard as”, or “deem to be”. Hence, there is a clear connotation to the effect that there must be active application of mind. In other words, the term “consider” postulates consideration of all relevant aspects of a matter. Thus, formation of opinion by the statutory authority should reflect intense application of mind with reference to the material available on record. The order of the authority itself should reveal such application of mind. The appellate authority cannot simply adopt the language employed by the disciplinary authority and proceed to affirm its order (Vide Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. v. Santosh Kumar [ (2006) 11 SCC 147 ] and Bhikhubhai Vithlabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat [ (2008) 4 SCC 144 ].” 59. In the instant case there is no dispute that the issue of applicability of Section 3(2) of the Act, 1991 has not been considered and by considering the applicability of Section 3(1) of the Act, 1991 the prosecution has been quashed. In the instant case there is no dispute that the issue of applicability of Section 3(2) of the Act, 1991 has not been considered and by considering the applicability of Section 3(1) of the Act, 1991 the prosecution has been quashed. This Court is not making any comment upon the order passed by the co-ordinate Bench since this Court is not exercising the power of appellate court rather the same has been relied upon as such, the same is the bounden duty of this Cour to discuss the same. 60. This Court is of the view on the basis of the aforesaid discussion that the issue of parity is not applicable herein. 61. So far as the second ground is concerned which has been raised on behalf of ED that the consecutive second application under section 482 Cr.P.C for quashing of the same cognizance order is not maintainable. In this context the law is well settled that if a view has already been expressed by the Court of Law in exercise of inherent power conferred under Section 482 Cr.P.C. then there cannot be any subsequent application in the garb of second appeal. 62. The Hon'ble Apex Court has considered the said aspect of the matter in the case of Bisham Lal Verma vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr. (supra) wherein it has been observed that though it is clear that there can be no blanket rule that a second petition under Section 482 Cr. P.C. would not lie in any situation and it would depend upon the facts and circumstances of the individual case but it is not open to a person aggrieved to raise one plea after the other, by invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 Cr. P.C., though all such pleas were very much available even at the first instance. Permitting the filing of successive petitions under Section 482 Cr. P.C. ignoring this principle would enable an ingenious accused to effectively stall the proceedings against him to suit his own interest and convenience, by filing one petition after another under Section 482 Cr. P.C., irrespective of when the cause therefor arose. Such abuse of process cannot be permitted. Relevant paragraphs of the said judgment are being reproduced as under: “ 11. We are in complete agreement with these observations of the Madras High Court. P.C., irrespective of when the cause therefor arose. Such abuse of process cannot be permitted. Relevant paragraphs of the said judgment are being reproduced as under: “ 11. We are in complete agreement with these observations of the Madras High Court. Though it is clear that there can be no blanket rule that a second petition under Section 482 Cr. P.C. would not lie in any situation and it would depend upon the facts and circumstances of the individual case, it is not open to a person aggrieved to raise one plea after the other, by invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 Cr. P.C., though all such pleas were very much available even at the first instance. Permitting the filing of successive petitions under Section 482 Cr. P.C. ignoring this principle would enable an ingenious accused to effectively stall the proceedings against him to suit his own interest and convenience, by filing one petition after another under Section 482 Cr. P.C., irrespective of when the cause therefor arose. Such abuse of process cannot be permitted. 12. In the case on hand, the filing of the charge sheet and the cognizance thereof by the Court concerned were well before the filing of the first petition under Section 482 Cr. P.C., wherein challenge was made only to the sanction order. That being so, the petitioner was not at liberty to again invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court in relation to the charge sheet and the cognizance order at a later point of time. The impugned order passed by the Allahabad High Court holding to this effect is, therefore, incontrovertible on all counts and does not warrant interference.” 63. Herein also, the order taking cognizance dated 31.05.2002 was the subject matter of earlier quashing petition filed under section 482 Cr.P.C which was declined to be interfered with by the co-ordinate Bench of this Court in year 2003 and again after lapse of 20 years, the second petition for the similar cause has been filed. 64. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the instant petition in the light of judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Bisham Lal Verma vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr(supra) , also is not fit to be entertained. 65. 64. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the instant petition in the light of judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Bisham Lal Verma vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr(supra) , also is not fit to be entertained. 65. This Court, in the entirety of facts and circumstances and on the basis of discussion made hereinabove is of the view that the instant petition deserves to be dismissed. 66. Accordingly, the instant petition stands dismissed. 67. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.