JUDGMENT : JOHNSON JOHN, J The appellant is the second defendant in O.S. No. 574 of 2011 on the file of the Additional Sub Judge, Irinjalakuda. 2. The suit is one for partition. As per the plaint averments, the plaint schedule properties belonged to Adv. Nanu Menon and his wife, Janaki Amma. The plaintiff, defendants 1 to 3 and deceased Leela are the children of Nanu Menon and Janaki Amma. The 4th defendant is the son of the third defendant. Since the 4th defendant was born prior to the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act, 1977 (Act 30 of 1976), he is also entitled for a share in items 1 and 2, the thavazhi property of the mother Janaki Amma. It is stated that items 1 to 10 are the intestate property of the parents of the plaintiff. The Mother, Janaki Amma, died on 20.07.1998 and the father, Nanu Menon, died 04.10.1995. The marriage of the plaintiff’s sister, Dr. Leela, was legally dissolved and she died issueless. She died on 14.05.2010. It is stated that the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 3 are the legal heirs of Dr. Leela. 3. Defendants 1, 3 and 4 filed written statement supporting the plaintiff. The second defendant contended that her parents, Nanu Menon and Janaki Amma, executed a joint Will on 01.03.1985 bequeathing items 8 and 10 properties in favour of her sister, Dr. Leela. It is stated that Dr. Leela was in possession and enjoyment of the said properties during her lifetime and that on 19.08.1999 Dr. Leela executed a Will deed with respect to the said properties and the same was registered on 14.09.1999. 4. As per the Will Deed executed by Dr. Leela, the said properties were bequeathed to the second defendant. Accordingly, the second defendant is in possession and enjoyment of items 8 and 10 properties. It is also contended by the second defendant that her sister Leela executed release deed No. 1433 of 2000 in favour of the second defendant and thereby, released her right over 1/5th share in plaint schedule items 3 to 7 properties in favour of the second defendant and therefore, the plaintiff’s claim over the plaint schedule properties are not legally sustainable. 5. The plaintiff filed replication denying the execution of any joint Will by the parents on 01.03.1985. 5. The plaintiff filed replication denying the execution of any joint Will by the parents on 01.03.1985. It is stated that all the children were equally beloved to the parents and under no circumstance, the parents would execute such a joint Will bequeathing the properties exclusively to Dr. Leela. It is stated that the plaintiff’s father, Adv. Nanu Menon, was an eminent civil lawyer and he will never execute an unregistered Will on a plain paper. It is stated that Dr. Leela was never in exclusive possession of any item of property and that she was bedridden due to various ailments for about 13 years prior to her death. 6. The contention of the second defendant that Dr. Leela executed a Will Deed on 19.08.1999 and registered the same on 14.09.1999 is false and hence, denied. It is stated that Dr. Leela was not having physical and mental capacity during 1999 to execute such a deed in favour of the second defendant. The averment in the written statement that Dr. Leela executed release deed No. 1433 of 2000 in favour of the second defendant, is also denied by the plaintiff. It is stated that Dr. Leela was not having any special love or affection towards the second defendant and that the second defendant, who is a law graduate, is attempting to get the properties by cheating her siblings. 7. In the trial court, from the side of the plaintiff PW1 was examined and Exhibits A1 to A4 were marked. From the side of the defendants, DWs 1 to 12 were examined and Exhibits B1 to B32 were marked. Exhibit C1 and X1 to X7 were also marked. 8. After considering the evidence on record and hearing both sides, the trial court found that the second defendant has not succeeded in proving the alleged Will dated 01.03.1985 of the parents and the alleged Will dated 19.08.1999 of Dr. Leela. The trial court also found that the second defendant has not proved the execution and genuineness of Release Deed No. 1433 of 2000 and therefore, the second defendant is entitled only for a share in the plaint schedule property along with her siblings. A preliminary decree was passed accordingly. 9. Heard Sri. T. Krishnanunni, the learned Senior counsel for the appellant and Sri. K. S. Rajesh and Sri. P. B. Subramanian, the learned counsel for the respondents. 10. A preliminary decree was passed accordingly. 9. Heard Sri. T. Krishnanunni, the learned Senior counsel for the appellant and Sri. K. S. Rajesh and Sri. P. B. Subramanian, the learned counsel for the respondents. 10. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that the trial court ought to have found that Exhibits X5, X6 and X7 copies of the joint Will Deed dated 01.03.1985 are admissible as secondary evidence. It is argued that the trial court ought to have found that Exhibits B1 and X5 Will Deeds are genuine and are properly proved. There is no suspicious circumstance surrounding the execution of the Will Deeds, it is contended. It is pointed out that there is valid consideration for Exhibit B2 release deed and that the trial court erred in attaching undue significance to the absence of thumb impression of late Leela in Exhibit B1 Will Deed and Exhibit B2, release deed. 11. The learned counsel for the first respondent/plaintiff argued that the second defendant has not produced the original of the alleged joint Will dated 01.03.1985, and that the non production of the original was not accounted for in the manner as provided under Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act. It is argued that the second defendant has not adduced foundational evidence to show that the alleged copy is a true copy of the original. It is pointed out that the second defendant practised as an advocate along with her father, an eminent civil lawyer and in spite of that, there was no attempt on her part to dispel the suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will by cogent and satisfactory evidence. 12. The points that arise for determination are the following: 1. Whether Exhibits X5, X6 and X7 can be received as secondary evidence of the Will dated 01.03.1985? 2. Whether the second defendant has proved the execution of a joint Will by her parents on 01.03.1985? 3. Whether the second defendant has proved the execution and genuineness of Exhibit B1 Will dated 19.08.1999? 4. Whether the second defendant has proved the execution and genuineness of Exhibit B2, release deed? 5. Whether the impugned judgment and decree are legally sustainable? Point Nos.1 and 2: 13. The second defendant was examined as DW11. She filed proof affidavit in lieu of chief examination, reiterating the averments in the written statement. It is not in dispute that Adv. Whether the second defendant has proved the execution and genuineness of Exhibit B2, release deed? 5. Whether the impugned judgment and decree are legally sustainable? Point Nos.1 and 2: 13. The second defendant was examined as DW11. She filed proof affidavit in lieu of chief examination, reiterating the averments in the written statement. It is not in dispute that Adv. Nanu Menon was an eminent civil lawyer, who actively practised as an advocate till his death. Exhibit B5, death certificate of Nanu Menon, shows that he died on 04.10.1995. Exhibit B4, death certificate of Janaki Amma, shows that she died on 20.07.1998. 14. It is not disputed that DW11 also practised as an advocate along with her father for about 15 years prior to the death of her father. DW11 has a case that after the death of Dr. Leela, the plaintiff and defendants 1, 3 and 4 stealthily removed the original Will dated 01.03.1985 and other documents kept inside a wooden almirah in the family house. The second defendant has no case that she had filed any complaint in this regard before any authority. In the petition filed by DW11 seeking production of the document, what is alleged is that the original Will was taken away by the plaintiff; she has no case that the original Will was taken away by defendants 1, 3 and 4. The second defendant has not taken any steps against defendants 1, 3 and 4 seeking production of the original Will dated 01.03.1985. Therefore, the second defendant has not complied with the mandate of Section 66 of the Indian Evidence Act against defendants 1, 3 and 4. 15. In this connection, it is pertinent to note that the plaintiff filed Exhibit B15 petition dated 26.09.2009 seeking partition of the plaint schedule properties before the Taluk Legal Service Authority, Mukundapuram and that Exhibit B14 is a notice in this connection dated 01.10.2009 addressed to the second defendant. 16. According to DW11, she produced copies of the Will dated 01.03.1985 before various authorities. DW3 is the Municipal Secretary and Exhibit X5 is a copy of the Will dated 01.03.1985. Exhibit X6 is the copy of the Will produced in E.P. No. 162 of 2009 in O.S. No. 121 of 1967 of Munsiff’s Court, Irinjalakuda. Exhibit X7 is another photocopy of the Will dated 01.03.1985. DW3 is the Municipal Secretary and Exhibit X5 is a copy of the Will dated 01.03.1985. Exhibit X6 is the copy of the Will produced in E.P. No. 162 of 2009 in O.S. No. 121 of 1967 of Munsiff’s Court, Irinjalakuda. Exhibit X7 is another photocopy of the Will dated 01.03.1985. According to DW11, she was the nominee of the savings bank account and bank locker of Dr. Leela and after the death of Dr. Leela, she obtained Exhibit B1 Will deed of Dr. Leela and other documents from the bank locker of Dr. Leela. DW11 has a case that Dr. Leela had handed over to her a copy of the joint Will executed by the parents prior to the death of Dr. Leela. It is worthwhile to note that, if Dr. Leela had taken precaution to keep Exhibit B1 Will deed in the bank locker, it is not forthcoming as to under what circumstance she kept the original of the Will deed dated 01.03.1985 in the wooden almirah in the family house. 17. A perusal of Exhibit X5 would show that the original of the same was attested in the first page by Adv. C.K. Rajan, who is now no more. The evidence of DW4, Adv. K. J. Thomas, shows that Exhibit X5 was notarised by him on 11.03.2009 and at that time, he had no occasion to compare the original. According to DW4, on 09.11.2001, he had notarised another copy of the Will dated 01.03.1985 and on 11.03.2009, he notarised the copy of a copy notarised on 09.11.2001. According to DW4, he cannot remember as to who produced the document for notarisation and he would say that the notarial register will be retained only for one year. 18. It is well settled that the law requires the best evidence to be adduced i.e., primary evidence. In this case, there is no explanation for not producing the copy of the Will said to have been notarised by DW4 on 09.11.2001. DW11 has also not given any satisfactory explanation for not producing the copy of the Will deed claimed to have been handed over to her by Dr. Leela prior to her death. In this case, there is no explanation for not producing the copy of the Will said to have been notarised by DW4 on 09.11.2001. DW11 has also not given any satisfactory explanation for not producing the copy of the Will deed claimed to have been handed over to her by Dr. Leela prior to her death. The documents mentioned in Section 63 of the Indian Evidence Act is admissible as secondary evidence only in the absence of primary evidence, as held by the Honourable Supreme Court in J. Yashoda v. K. Shobha Rani [ (2007) 5 SCC 730 ]. 19. The decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in Neeraj Dutta v. State (NCT of Delhi) [ (2023) 4 SCC 731 ] shows that only when the non availability of a document is sufficiently and properly explained, the party can be allowed to adduce secondary evidence. It is for the party seeking production of the secondary evidence to properly explain the non availability of the original document for any reason not arising from his default or neglect. When copies are produced in the absence of the original document, there must be foundational evidence that the alleged copy is a true copy of the original, as held by the Honourable Supreme Court in H. Siddiqui v. A. Ramalingam [ (2011) 4 SCC 240 ]. 20. Section 65(a) of the Indian Evidence Act shows that secondary evidence can be given when the original is shown or appears to be in the possession or power of the person against whom the document is sought to be proved and when such person refuses to produce the document even after due notice. 21. As noticed earlier, DW11 has not adduced any satisfactory evidence for the non production of the original joint Will dated 01.03.1985 and there is also no satisfactory explanation for the non production of the copy of the Will Deed said to be notarised by DW4 on 09.11.2001. DW11 has also not given any satisfactory explanation for not producing the copy of the joint Will dated 01.03.1985 said to be handed over to her by Dr. Leela. DW11 has also not given any satisfactory explanation for not producing the copy of the joint Will dated 01.03.1985 said to be handed over to her by Dr. Leela. In the aforesaid circumstances, we find no reason to disagree with the finding of the trial court that Exhibits X5, X6 and X7 cannot be accepted as secondary evidence and that DW11 has not adduced foundational evidence to satisfy the conditions required under Sections 63 and 65 of the Indian Evidence Act for admitting Exhibits X5, X6 and X7 as secondary evidence. 22. As noticed earlier, Adv. Nanu Menon was an eminent civil lawyer of Irinjalakuda and he continued his practice till his death on 04.10.1995. Exhibit X5, the copy of the Will dated 01.03.1985 shows that the same is prepared in Malayalam on a plain paper. Even though, DW11 practised as an advocate along with her father for about 15 years in the same office, she cannot remember the name of the advocate clerks in the office during that period. DW11 has also not produced any document containing the admitted signature of Adv. Nanu Menon for comparison with the signature in Exhibit X5. 23. The first defendant, the only son of Adv. Nanu Menon and Janaki Amma, was examined as DW12. According to DW12, he was very much beloved to his father and there was regular communication with the father and mother while he was working in Bombay and Gulf countries. He also produced Exhibits B27 to B31 containing the signature of his father and mother. The trial court elaborately analysed Exhibit X5 and highlighted various suspicious circumstances including the manner in which the same was written so as to adjust the space when it is coming close to the name and signature of the executants. 24. In Exhibit X5, instead of what is written is OTHER LANGUAGE and instead of the word , what is written is It can be seen that the schedule of the properties are also not correctly recorded in Exhibit X5 and one of the schedules is not numbered. The area of the property is shown in ’Dhandu’. There are mistakes in the boundaries and the said fact is admitted by DW11. DW11 has also admitted in cross examination that her father, Adv. Nanu Menon, was capable of drafting Will Deeds and other documents in his own handwriting. The area of the property is shown in ’Dhandu’. There are mistakes in the boundaries and the said fact is admitted by DW11. DW11 has also admitted in cross examination that her father, Adv. Nanu Menon, was capable of drafting Will Deeds and other documents in his own handwriting. On a careful perusal of Exhibit X5, we find no reason to disagree with the finding of the trial court that an eminent civil lawyer like Adv. Nanu Menon will never draft such a Will Deed in Malayalam with so many mistakes. 25. As noticed earlier, Adv. Nanu Menon died only on 04.10.1995 and Exhibit X5 is dated 01.03.1985. Therefore there was sufficient time for him to correct the mistakes if it was his Will. There are many suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of Exhibit X5. It is for the propounder of the Will to prove the due and valid execution of the Will and when there are suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will, the propounder must dispel the said suspicions from the mind of the court by cogent and satisfactory evidence. The presence of such suspicious circumstances as noted above tends to make the onus very heavy. 26. In Shivakumar v. Sharanabasappa [ (2021) 11 SCC 277 ], the Honourable Supreme Court laid down the relevant principles governing the adjudicatory process concerning proof of the Will as follows: (i) Ordinarily, a Will has to be proved like any other document; the test to be applied being the usual test of the satisfaction of the prudent mind and proof with mathematical accuracy is not to be insisted upon. (ii) Since as per Section 63 of the Succession Act, a Will is required to be attested, it cannot be used as evidence until at least one attesting witness has been called for the purpose of proving its execution, if there be an attesting witness alive and capable of giving evidence. (iii) The unique feature of a Will is that it speaks from the death of the testator and, therefore, the maker thereof is not available for deposing about the circumstances in which the same was executed. This introduces an element of solemnity in the decision of the question as to whether the document propounded is the last Will of the testator. This introduces an element of solemnity in the decision of the question as to whether the document propounded is the last Will of the testator. The initial onus, naturally, lies on the propounder but the same can be taken to have been primarily discharged on proof of the essential facts which go into the making of a Will. (iv) The case in which the execution of the Will is surrounded by suspicious circumstances stands on a different footing and makes the onus heavier on the propounder. The propounder must remove all legitimate suspicions before the document can be accepted as the last Will of the testator. (v) If a person challenging the Will alleges fabrication or alleges fraud, undue influence, coercion et cetera in regard to the execution of the Will, such pleas have to be proved by him, but even in the absence of such pleas, the very circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will may give rise to the doubt or as to whether the Will had indeed been executed by the testator and/or as to whether the testator was acting of his own free will. In such eventuality, it is again a part of the initial onus of the propounder to remove all reasonable doubts in the matter. (vi) A circumstance is “suspicious” when it is not normal or is ''not normally expected in a normal situation or is not expected of a normal person''. The suspicious features must be ‘'real, germane and valid'’ and not merely the '‘fantasy of the doubting mind''. (vii) As to whether any particular feature or a set of features qualify as “suspicious” would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. A shaky or doubtful signature; a feeble or uncertain mind of the testator; an unfair disposition of property; an unjust exclusion of the legal heirs and particularly the dependants; an active or leading part in making of the Will by the beneficiary thereunder et cetera are some of the circumstances which may give rise to suspicion. The circumstances above-noted are only illustrative and by no means exhaustive because there could be any circumstance or set of circumstances which may give rise to legitimate suspicion about the execution of the Will. On the other hand, any of the circumstances qualifying as being suspicious could be legitimately explained by the propounder. The circumstances above-noted are only illustrative and by no means exhaustive because there could be any circumstance or set of circumstances which may give rise to legitimate suspicion about the execution of the Will. On the other hand, any of the circumstances qualifying as being suspicious could be legitimately explained by the propounder. However, such suspicion or suspicions cannot be removed by mere proof of sound and disposing state of mind of the testator and his signature coupled with the proof of attestation. (viii) The test of satisfaction of the judicial conscience comes into operation when a document propounded as the Will of the testator is surrounded by suspicious circumstance(s). While applying such test, the Court would address itself to the solemn questions as to whether the testator had signed the Will while being aware of its contents and after understanding the nature and effect of the dispositions in the Will? (ix) In the ultimate analysis, where the execution of a Will is shrouded in suspicion, it is a matter essentially of the judicial conscience of the Court and the party which sets up the Will has to offer cogent and convincing explanation of the suspicious circumstances surrounding the Will. 27. In Exhibit X5, the attesting witnesses are Adv. P. Narayanan Namboodiri and one Achutha Pisharadi. Both of them are no more. DW5 is the grandson of Adv. P. Narayanan Namboodiri. The evidence of DW5 shows that he is an advocate and that he knows the second defendant. According to DW5, the second defendant informed him regarding the necessity to prove the signature of Narayanan Namboodiri. When Exhibit X5 was shown to DW5, he stated that the signature in Exhibit X5 is that of his grandfather. However, a perusal of Exhibit X5 would show that the notary has affixed his seal over the signature of Narayanan Namboodiri and therefore, the nature of the said signature is not at all visible. 28. DW7 is the son of Achutha Pisharadi, the other witness in Exhibit X5. He identified the signature in Exhibit X5 as that of his father, Achutha Pisharadi. It is in evidence that Exhibit X5 is the copy of another copy of the Will Deed. 28. DW7 is the son of Achutha Pisharadi, the other witness in Exhibit X5. He identified the signature in Exhibit X5 as that of his father, Achutha Pisharadi. It is in evidence that Exhibit X5 is the copy of another copy of the Will Deed. DW11, the propounder of the Will, has no case that she ever had any occasion to see the original of Exhibit X5 and she has not adduced any foundational evidence to show that Exhibit X5 is a copy made from the original by mechanical process to ensure the accuracy of the copy. 29. One of the important features which distinguishes Will from other documents is that, unlike other documents, the Will speaks from the death of the testator and therefore, the testator who has already departed the world cannot say whether it is his will or not. Therefore, on a careful re appreciation of the available evidence, we find no reason to disagree with the finding of the trial court that the second defendant has not succeeded in proving the execution of a joint Will by her parents on 01.03.1985. Points 1 and 2 are answered against the appellant. Points 3, 4 and 5: 30. The plaintiff is examined as PW1 and the first defendant as DW12. According to the plaintiff and the first defendant, their sister Dr. Leela was bedridden due to various ailments for about 13 years prior to her death and the contention of the second defendant that Dr. Leela executed Exhibit B1 Will deed and Exhibit B2 Release Deed in favour of the second defendant is false. The second defendant, when examined as DW11, stated that after the death of Dr. Leela, she obtained Exhibit B1 Will Deed and other documents from the bank locker of Dr. Leela. The attesting witnesses in Exhibit B1 are one Alice and her husband Paulson. The attesting witness Alice is examined as DW9. According to DW9, she was assisting Dr. Leela in the house and her husband was doing all the works in the property. 31. In the chief affidavit of DW9, it is stated that she saw Leela signing the Will Deed and that Leela also saw the attestation of the Will Deed by DW9 and her husband. According to DW9, a few days later, she also went to the Sub Registrar’s office. 31. In the chief affidavit of DW9, it is stated that she saw Leela signing the Will Deed and that Leela also saw the attestation of the Will Deed by DW9 and her husband. According to DW9, a few days later, she also went to the Sub Registrar’s office. She would say that she signed Exhibit B1 Will Deed in the month of August and thereafter, went to the Sub Registrar’s office in the month of September. 32. In the chief affidavit of DW9, it is stated that Leela had assigned all her movable and immovable properties. But, in cross examination, she admitted that she does not know what is meant by that. The evidence of DW9 in cross examination shows that as per the direction of the second defendant, she went to the office of the advocate of the second defendant and thereafter she came to the court for giving evidence. Even though, DW9 claimed close acquaintance with Dr. Leela for a long period, her evidence in cross examination shows that she cannot say the name of the husband of Dr. Leela and as to what happened to the married life of Dr. Leela. DW9 also cannot say the name of the mother of Dr. Leela. 33. According to DW9, one Pylan from Pottah introduced her to Dr. Leela. In cross examination, DW9 admitted that the second defendant came to her house two days before and informed her about the case. The evidence of DW9 shows that the second defendant also requested her to give evidence as a witness in the case and that the second defendant also accompanied her to the advocate’s office for preparing the chief affidavit. As noticed earlier, Paulson, the other attesting witness in Exhibit B1 is not examined as a witness in this case. 34. In Lalitaben Jayantilal Popat v. Pragnaben Jamnadas Kataria, [ (2008) 15 SCC 365 ], the Honourable Supreme Court held that for proving a Will, mere fulfilment of statutory requirements is not sufficient and when the evidence of the attesting witnesses is vague or doubtful, the court may take into consideration the circumstances of the case and judge from them collectively whether the requirements of the statute were complied with. It was also held that in such situation, the court may, on consideration of other evidence or of the whole circumstances of the case, come to the conclusion that their recollection is at fault or that their evidence is of a suspicious character, or that they were wilfully misleading the court. 35. Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act provides as to how a document required by law to be attested can be proved. As per the said Section, a document required by law to be attested shall not be used as evidence until one attesting witness at least has been called for, for proving its execution. A combined reading of Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act with Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act shows that a person propounding the Will has to prove that the Will was duly and validly executed. That cannot be done by simply proving that the signature on the Will was that of the testator. It is for the propounder to prove that the attestations were made properly as required under clause (c) of Section 63 of the Succession Act. 36. It is true that Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act does not say that both or all the attesting witnesses must be examined. In Lalitaben Jayantilal Popat’s case (supra), the Honourable Supreme Court held thus: “In a way, Section 68 gives a concession to those who want to prove and establish a will in a court of law by examining at least one attesting witness even though the will has to be attested at least by two witnesses mandatorily under Section 63 of the Succession Act. But what is significant and to be noted is that one attesting witness examined should be in a position to prove the execution of a will. To put in other words, if one attesting witness can prove execution of the will in terms of clause (c) of Section 63 viz. attestation by two attesting witnesses in the manner contemplated therein, the examination of the other attesting witness can be dispensed with. The one attesting witness examined, in his evidence has to satisfy the attestation of a will by him and the other attesting witness in order to prove there was due execution of the will.” 37. attestation by two attesting witnesses in the manner contemplated therein, the examination of the other attesting witness can be dispensed with. The one attesting witness examined, in his evidence has to satisfy the attestation of a will by him and the other attesting witness in order to prove there was due execution of the will.” 37. It is well settled that where one attesting witness examined to prove the Will under Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act fails to prove the due execution of the Will, then the other available attesting witness has to be called to supplement his evidence to make it complete in all respects. In this case it can be seen that the evidence of DW9 regarding the attestation of Exhibit B1 Will, does not inspire confidence and in that circumstance, the non examination of the other attesting witness has created a deficiency in meeting the mandatory requirements of Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act. 38. According to Dws 1 and 12, their sister Dr. Leela was laid up due to various ailments for a period of 13 years prior to her death and she was not having the physical and mental capacity to voluntarily exercise her free will to execute a Will Deed. However, apart from Exhibit B18 series photographs, no other document is produced to prove the physical and mental condition of Dr. Leela during the relevant period. The then Sub Registrar of Irinjalakuda was examined as DW6. It is pertinent to note that Exhibit B1 Will Deed said to have been executed by Dr. Leela on 19.08.1999 was registered only on 14.09.1999. 39. In cross examination, DW6 admitted that usually the thumb impression of the executant will be taken. However, he admitted that the thumb impression of the executant is not there in Exhibit B1 Will Deed and Exhibit B2 release deed. Initially, DW6 stated that since the executant was a doctor, he has not taken the thumb impression of the executant. But, thereafter he admitted that he was not having any personal acquaintance with Dr. Leela and that Dr. Leela was not personally known to him. DW6 further admitted that the witness who identified Dr. Leela to him was also not personally known to him. But, thereafter he admitted that he was not having any personal acquaintance with Dr. Leela and that Dr. Leela was not personally known to him. DW6 further admitted that the witness who identified Dr. Leela to him was also not personally known to him. Rule 73(i) and (ii) of the Registration Rules (Kerala) provides thus: (I) A Registering Officer shall require any executant or claimant regarding whose identity he has to satisfy himself, but who is not personally known to him to affix, in his presence, whether such person can write his name or not, the impression of the bulb of his left thumb both in the register of thumb impression maintained in each Registration Office as well as on the document presented for registration provided, however, that such impressions may at the discretion of the Registering Officer, be dispensed with in cases where he is fully satisfied otherwise that the person appearing before him is the real person he professes himself to be identifying or other witnesses may also be required to affix similar impressions if the Registering Officer considers it necessary for their proper identification. (ii) A messenger presenting a document under Rule 29(i) shall not be required to prove his identity, but shall be required to sign and if necessary affix the thumb impression to the endorsement of presentation. 40. The evidence of DW6 in cross examination clearly shows that Dr. Leela, the executant of Exhibit B1 Will Deed and Exhibit B2 release deed, is not personally known to him and the party who identified the executant at the time of registration was also not personally known to him. Therefore, it can be seen that DW6, Sub Registrar, has not complied the requirements of Rule 73 of the Registration Rules (Kerala) regarding the identity of the executant before effecting registration of Exhibits B1 and B2. 41. The specific case of PW1 is that Dr. Leela was suffering from various ailments and she was bedridden for 13 years prior to her death. As per Section 67 of the Indian Evidence Act, if a document is alleged to be signed by any person, evidence is required to be adduced to prove that the signature in the document is that of the said person. It is true that the presumption available to registered documents would provide a prima facie proof of execution under Section 67 of the Indian Evidence Act. It is true that the presumption available to registered documents would provide a prima facie proof of execution under Section 67 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, if the circumstances brought out in the case cast doubt regarding due execution, the burden would be on the propounder to prove its due execution notwithstanding the presumption available to the registered document. In Sumathi Amma v. Kunjulekshmi [1964 KHC 256], this Court observed that in cases where better evidence is available, the court can insist on bringing in such evidence. It is well settled that a litigant is required to produce the best available evidence and if the best evidence is withheld, it will be a matter for legitimate comment against the proof offered, as held in Vijayben Vashram v. State of Gujarat and others [AIR 1989 Gujarat 75]. 42. Therefore, on a careful of re-appreciation of the entire evidence, we find no reason to disagree with the finding of the trial court that the second defendant has not adduced reliable evidence to prove Exhibit B1 Will Deed and Exhibit B2 release deed. The second defendant has also failed to offer cogent and convincing explanation regarding the suspicious circumstances surrounding Exhibits B1 and B2 documents. Therefore we find that this appeal is devoid of any merit and is liable to be dismissed. In the result, this appeal is dismissed. Interlocutory applications, if any pending, shall stand closed.