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2024 DIGILAW 909 (GAU)

Shyam Sundar Rasiwasia S/o. Lt. Gopiram Rasiwasia v. State Of Assam, Rep. by The PP, Assam

2024-06-21

MITALI THAKURIA

body2024
JUDGMENT : (Honourable Mrs. Justice Mitali Thakuria, J.) : Heard Mr. S. Chamaria, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. D. Das, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State respondent No. 1 and Mr. A. K. Bhuyan, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2. 2. This application filed under Section 397 of Cr.P.C. read with Sections 401/482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, praying for setting aside and quashing of the impugned Order dated 03.11.2023 passed in G.R. Case No.1407/2017 under Sections 120(B)/420/468/471 of IPC passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Tinsukia, whereby the learned Trial Court framed the charges against the present petitioner under Sections 120(B)/467 of IPC. 3. The brief facts of the case is that; the respondent No.2 is the owner and occupier of the property situated at 23/71, Punjabi Bagh West, New Delhi which comprises of land and building of 1322.22 sq. yard. The said respondent No.2 also permitted the petitioner along with one namely Mahesh Kumar Rasiwasia and their families to reside in the said property by way of permissive use. On 27.06.2017, the respondent No.2 came to know that the petitioner along with Mahesh Kumar Rasiwasia made a fraudulent claim in respect of the above-mentioned property and fabricated, manufactured and created one Irrevocable Power of Attorney dated 18.04.1982 and same was registered on 04.03.2017 in the Office of Sr. Sub-Registrar, Tinsukia with an intention to unlawfully grab the said property. Thereafter, the respondent No.2 lodged an FIR against the present petitioner and the other co-accused before the Officer-in-Charge, Tinsukia on 03.07.2017 which was registered on 12.07.2017 vide Tinsukia P.S. Case No. 835/2017 under Sections 120(B)/420/468/471 of IPC and the investigation was started accordingly. 4. During the course of investigation, the certified copy of the Irrevocable Power of Attorney dated 18.04.1982 was seized by the investigation officer. Further, the I.O. also recorded the statement of the complainant and other witnesses and finding materials against the present petitioner, the charge-sheet was filed vide C.S. No.575/2017 dated 02.12.2017. 4. During the course of investigation, the certified copy of the Irrevocable Power of Attorney dated 18.04.1982 was seized by the investigation officer. Further, the I.O. also recorded the statement of the complainant and other witnesses and finding materials against the present petitioner, the charge-sheet was filed vide C.S. No.575/2017 dated 02.12.2017. In the meantime, the respondent No.2 also filed an application before the learned Trial Court to send down the case for further investigation as the police failed to investigate the same, but, the petitioner’s side raised objection stating that no prayer has been made by the I.O for further investigation and thus, there is no scope left for sending the case for further investigation and thereby, the learned Trial Court after hearing both the parties at length rejected the prayer made by the respondent No.2 vide order dated 20.04.2019. Thereafter, upon perusal of the said charge-sheet and the written submissions submitted by the respondent No.2, the learned Trial Court framed the charges against the petitioner under Sections 120(B)/467 of IPC vide its impugned order dated 03.11.2023 passed in G.R. Case No.1407/2017. 5. On being dissatisfied and aggrieved by the impugned order dated 03.11.2023 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Tinsukia in G.R. Case No.1407/2017, the petitioner preferred the instant petition under Section 397 read with Sections 401/482 of Cr.P.C., praying for setting aside and quashing of the aforesaid impugned order. 6. Mr. Chamaria, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the learned Trial Court failed to consider the substantial issue i.e. “Registration of Deed” which is permissible under the law itself and for registration of such deed of power of attorney, it cannot be said that the person has committed an offence herein, more particularly the issue of ‘forgery of document’. He further submitted that the law regarding framing of charges is well settled and it is permissible for the Trial Judge to sift and weigh the evidence for a limited purpose for finding out whether there is a prima facie case against the accused/petitioner has been made out or not for framing the charge. But, in the instant case, the learned Trial Court arrived at erroneous and perverse decision and framed the charges against the petitioner despite of the fact that no prima facie material was available in the prosecution witnesses and without considering the statement of the witnesses in its true perspective. But, in the instant case, the learned Trial Court arrived at erroneous and perverse decision and framed the charges against the petitioner despite of the fact that no prima facie material was available in the prosecution witnesses and without considering the statement of the witnesses in its true perspective. Thus, the impugned order of framing the charges is not tenable in the eye of law and the same is liable to be set aside and quashed. 7. He further submitted that no materials prima facie was available to attract the Sections 120(B)/467 of IPC against the present petitioner and thus the impugned order passed by the learned Trial Court suffers from legal infirmities. More so, there was no authorised letter furnished to the respondent No.2 by the company to filed the FIR. Accordingly, he submits that in the facts and circumstances of the case, it is a fit case wherein, the Court by exercising its revisional jurisdiction to set aside the impugned order dated 03.11.2023 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Tinsukia in G. R. Case No. 1407/2017 and accordingly, the interference of this Court is necessary. 8. In addition to his submission, Mr. Chamaria, learned counsel for the petitioner relies on the decision passed by the Apex Court in Criminal Appeal No.1695/2009 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.6211/2007) wherein, he emphasized on paragraph No.10 of the said judgment wherein, “an analysis of Section 464 of IPC shows that it divides false documents into three categories. He further relies on paragraph 12 of the said judgment which read as under; “Para. No.12. ……………When a document is executed by a person claiming a property which is not his, he is not claiming that he is someone else nor is he claiming that he is authorised by someone else. Therefore, execution of such document (purporting to convey some property of which he is not the owner) is not execution of a false document as defined under Section 464 of the Code. If what is executed is not a false document, there is no forgery. If there is no forgery, then neither Section 467 nor Section 471 of the Code are attracted.” 9. If what is executed is not a false document, there is no forgery. If there is no forgery, then neither Section 467 nor Section 471 of the Code are attracted.” 9. He further submitted that the primary consideration at the stage of framing the charge is the test of existence of a prima facie case, and at this stage, the probative value of materials on record need not be gone into. In this regard, he relies on the decision passed by the Apex Court passed in Criminal Appeal CaseNo.2504/2023(State of Gujrat vs. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao) and emphasised on paragraph No.12 of the said judgment which read as under; “Para-12; The primary consideration at the stage of framing of charge is the test of existence of a prima-facie case, and at this stage, the probative value of materials on record need not be gone into. This Court by referring to its earlier decisions in the State of Maharashtra Vs. Som Nath Thapa (1996) 4 SCC 659 and the State of MP Vs. Mohan Lal Soni (2000) 6 SCC 338 has held the nature of evaluation to be made by the court at the stage of framing of the charge is to test the existence of prima-facie case. It is also held at the stage of framing of charge, the court has to form a presumptive opinion to the existence of factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged and it is not expected to go deep into probative value of the material on record and to check whether the material on record would certainly lead to conviction at the conclusion of trial.” 10. He further submitted that the present respondent No.2 is not the authorised person to lodge the FIR against the present petitioner. In support of his submission, he cited another decision reported in 2004(7) Supreme 209 (M/s Dale & Carrington Invt. (P) Ltd. & Anr. Vs. P. K. Prathapan & Ors.)passed in Civil Appeal Nos.5915-16/2002. 11. Per contra, Mr. Bhuyan, learned counsel for the respondent No.2 has submitted that the informant has already been authorized by the company as an authorized signatory, and to file the FIR on behalf of the company for which a separate authorization letter is not required. More so, there was no resolution at any point of time for executing the power of attorney on behalf of the company. More so, there was no resolution at any point of time for executing the power of attorney on behalf of the company. He further submitted that the power of attorney has been executed back dated 18.04.1982 and the same was registered in the office of the Sub-Registrar, Tinsukia, dated 04.03.2017, when no document after four months can be registered by the Sub-Registrar. He also submitted that the petitioner along with one Mahesh Kumar Rasiwasia have prepared a forged and fraudulent document and the same has been registered illegally with an intention only to grab the property in unlawful manner which was provided to them to reside in the said property by way of permissive use. 12. He further submitted that the learned Trial Court had discussed the matter in detailed; perused the Case Diary; perused the statement of the witnesses and documents seized by the I.O. during investigation of the case, while framing the charges against the present petitioner. He also submitted that during the investigation, the respondent No.2 had produced all the documents and materials to substantiate the plea that the deed of power of attorney was forged. But, the petitioner could not place any materials or documents at the time of investigation to substantiate the defense plea that the power of attorney was genuinely executed. 13. Mr. Bhuyan learned counsel for the respondent No.2 has submitted that at the stage of framing of charge under Section 228 of Cr.P.C. or while considering the discharge petition filed under Section 227 of Cr.P.C, it is not for the Magistrate or a Judge concerned to analyses all the materials including pros and cons, reliability and acceptability. In this contention, he relies on the decision passed by the Apex Court reported in 2011(0)AIR(SC)(Cri)1573[Sajjan Kumar Vs Central Bureau of Investigation], and relied on Paragraph No. 18 of the said judgment, wherein it has been stated that; Para-18. “At the stage of framing of charge under Section 228 of the Cr.P.C. or while considering the discharge petition filed under Section 227, it is not for the Magistrate or a Judge concerned to analyse all the materials including pros and cons, reliability or acceptability etc. It is at the trial, the Judge concerned has to appreciate their evidentiary value, credibility or otherwise of the statement, veracity of various documents and free to take a decision one way or the other”. 14. It is at the trial, the Judge concerned has to appreciate their evidentiary value, credibility or otherwise of the statement, veracity of various documents and free to take a decision one way or the other”. 14. He further submitted that the power of attorney has been executed by the present petitioner in connivance with one Mahesh Kumar Rasiwasia without any resolution to that effect. The power of attorney is shown to be executed in the year 2017 only with a view to grab the property, where, they were allowed to reside only as a permissive possessor. Accordingly, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent No.2 that the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Tinsukia, committed no error or mistake while passing the impugned order dated 03.11.2023 warranting any interference of this Court. 15. On the other hand, Mr. Das, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor has submitted that the I.O. has collected sufficient materials during the investigation of the case and also seized several documents on the basis of which finding, the charge sheet was filed against the accused petitioner. He further submitted that the learned Trial Court had passed the impugned order dated 03.11.2023, after considering the materials collected by the I.O. during the investigation and accordingly, framed the charges against the accused petitioner under Section 120(B)/467 IPC and thus, interference of this Court is not at all required. 16. Considering the submissions made by the learned Advocates of both sides, I have perused the case record, statement of the witnesses and the impugned order passed by the learned Trial Court, wherein, the charges were framed against the present petitioner along with others. It is the case of the respondent No.2, that as per the FIR the present petitioner along with one Mahesh Kumar Rasiwasia had manufactured a forged power of attorney which was executed in the year 1982 and the same was registered in the year 2017 i.e. after a long gap of 25 years, only with an intention to grab the said property wherein, the petitioner along with other co-accused were asked to reside with their families for permissive use. Further, it is seen that the petitioner could not produce any documents regarding any resolution authorized by the Company to the petitioner to execute the power of attorney. Further, it is seen that the petitioner could not produce any documents regarding any resolution authorized by the Company to the petitioner to execute the power of attorney. From the order passed by the learned Trial Court, it is seen that the said Court had discussed in detail the submissions of both the parties and came to a conclusion that there is a prima-facie case against the present petitioner along with others and accordingly, the charges were framed under Sections 120(B)/467 IPC against them. 17. It is a fact that the Court while framing the charges had observed that the case can be tried by the Court and can be adequately punished by the Court. But the word “adequately punished by this Court” cannot be considered that that the learned Trial Court had already framed an opinion that the accused petitioner will be convicted on the basis of the materials available in the Case Diary at the time of framing charge. It has been observed by this Court that the case is triable by the Court means that the Court has the jurisdiction to pass the order of conviction and is under jurisdiction of the Trial Court, but, it does not mean that the Court had pre-determined mind to convict the accused petitioner under the said Section of law under which the charge was framed against the accused petitioner. It is only a prima-facie satisfaction of the Court while framing the charge against the accused petitioner and it is a settled law that at the time of framing of the charge, every pros and cons or evidence of the petitioner, statement of the witnesses is not necessarily be evaluated or assessed and the charge can be framed, if there is a prima facie satisfaction of any Magistrate or Judge, on the basis of available material before the Court. From the order itself, it is seen that the learned Trial Court had recorded the entire submissions made by both the parties at the time of considering the charge. 18. In the judgment relied by the petitioner in the case of Dilipsinh(Supra) wherein, in paragraph 14 of the said judgment it has been held that; 14. From the order itself, it is seen that the learned Trial Court had recorded the entire submissions made by both the parties at the time of considering the charge. 18. In the judgment relied by the petitioner in the case of Dilipsinh(Supra) wherein, in paragraph 14 of the said judgment it has been held that; 14. This Court in the aforesaid judgement has also laid down principles to be considered for exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 particularly in the context of prayer for quashing of charge framed under Section 228 Cr.P.C. is sought for as under: “27. Having discussed the scope of jurisdiction under these two provisions i.e. Section 397 and Section 482 of the Code and the fine line of jurisdictional distinction, now it will be appropriate for us to enlist the principles with reference to which the courts should exercise such jurisdiction. However, it is not only difficult but is inherently impossible to state with precision such principles. At best and upon objective analysis of various judgments of this Court, we are able to cull out some of the principles to be considered for proper exercise of jurisdiction, particularly, with regard to quashing of charge either in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 or Section 482 of the Code or together, as the case may be: 27.1. Though there are no limits of the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. 27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere. 27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. 27.9. 27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. 27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice. 27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie.” 19. The petitioner also relied on another decision passed by the Apex Court in the case of Amit Kapoor Vs. Ramesh Chandra (2012) 9 SCC 460 , wherein, some the scope of Section 397 of Cr.P.C. has been considered and succinctly explained as under; “12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which upon the face of it bears a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits. 13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even framing of charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under the Cr.PC.” 20. In the instant case, a prima-facie offence is found to be established even from the statement made in the FIR. Moreso, the learned Trial Court framed charge against the petitioner finding a prima-facie case to his satisfaction considering the material available in the Case Diary as well statement made by the witnesses and a detailed order has been passed. 21. So, from the entire discussions made above, I am of the opinion that the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Tinsukia, committed no illegality or mistake while passing the impugned order dated 03.11.2023 passed in G.R. Case No.1407/2017 under Sections 120(B)/420/468/471 of IPC and hence, I find that the impugned order 03.11.2023, against which the present revision petition has been filed by the petitioner, do not suffer from any illegality or impropriety or correctness for any interference of this Court. 22. In the result, I find no merit in this petition and accordingly, the same stands dismissed. The parties have to bear their own cost.