JUDGMENT Mr. Harkesh Manuja, J. By way of present appeal, challenge has been laid to the judgments and decrees dated 27.01.1983 and 01.12.1988 passed by the Courts below whereby a suit for permanent injunction filed at the instance of appellants-plaintiffs stood dismissed. 2. Briefly stating, appellants/plaintiffs filed a suit for permanent injunction with a prayer for restraining respondents-defendants from demanding/recovering any royalty against excavation of brick earth from land situated in Village Lalton Kalan, Tehsil and District Ludhiana, and also restraining them from interfering in the excavation of brick earth by the appellants-plaintiffs. As per pleadings in the suit, plaintiff No.1-firm was carrying business of manufacturing and sale of bricks and for the said purpose it had entered into an agreement/lease dated 15.09.1981 with Jagat Singh @ Jagjit Singh i.e the owner of the suit land measuring 70 K-14M situated in Village Lalton Kalan, Tehsil and District Ludhiana, as detailed in the head note of the plaint. The lease was for the purposes of excavation of brick earth, with the consent of the owner. Grievance of the appellants-plaintiffs was that the respondents/ defendants were demanding royalty against excavation of brick earth, hence the suit. The case set up in the plaint was that royalty could be claimed by an owner; whereas respondents were not the owner of brick earth in the given case, as it was never reserved in the name of State as per Sharait Wazib-ul-Arz, prepared during settlement operation of the village. 3. Upon notice, respondents-defendants filed written statement. Besides, raising objections qua the jurisdiction of Civil Court to entertain the suit, on merits it was stated that once brick earth was declared as minor mineral, the reservation of mines/quarries in favour of State was sufficient to justify the demand. It was also stated that vide notice dated 20.09.1985, demand of Rs. 17044/- was made from the Appellants-plaintiffs against royalty for 01.04.1982 to 31.03.1983. 4. The trial court, vide judgment and decree dated 01.12.1988 dismissed the suit filed by appellants-plaintiffs. Aggrieved thereof first appeal was filed which met the same fate been dismissed by the court of Additional District Judge, Ludhiana vide judgment and decree dated 27.01.1993. 5. No one has appeared on behalf of the appellants-plaintiffs. 6. 4. The trial court, vide judgment and decree dated 01.12.1988 dismissed the suit filed by appellants-plaintiffs. Aggrieved thereof first appeal was filed which met the same fate been dismissed by the court of Additional District Judge, Ludhiana vide judgment and decree dated 27.01.1993. 5. No one has appeared on behalf of the appellants-plaintiffs. 6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents-defendants submits that the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below being based upon proper appreciation of pleadings and the evidence available on record in the shape of Sharait Wazib-ul-Arz (Ex.D6) and also the statutory provisions in the form of Section 42 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 and the interpretations applicable thereto, the same does not warrants any interference. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the respondents-defendants and gone through the paper book, however, find substance in the present appeal. 8. There is no doubt that the "brick earth" comes under the ambit of minor mineral as notified/ declared by the Central Government vide notification dated 01.06.1958, issued in exercise of powers under Section 3 (c) of Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957, however, the question to be answered in the appeal in hand is- "As to whether the respondent State is entitled to claim royalty from the appellants-plaintiffs against excavation of brick earth from the land situated in Village Lalton Kalan, Tehsil and District Ludhiana, which was taken on lease by them from its original owner - Jagjit Singh." 9. Response to the aforesaid query revolves around Section 42 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887. For reference, Section 42 of the Act is reproduced hereunder:- "Section 42: Presumption as to ownership of forests, quarries and waste lands: -(1) when in any record-of-rights completed before the eighteenth day of November, 1871, it is not expressly provided that any forest, quarry, unclaimed, unoccupied, deserted or waste-land, spontaneous produce or other accessory interest in land belongs to the[Government]. (2) When in any record-of-rights completed after the date it is not expressly provided that any forest or quarry or any such land or interest belongs to the [Government], it shall be presumed to belong to the landowners. (2) When in any record-of-rights completed after the date it is not expressly provided that any forest or quarry or any such land or interest belongs to the [Government], it shall be presumed to belong to the landowners. (3) The presumption created by sub-section (1) may be rebutted by showing- (a) from the records or report made by the assessing officer at the time of assessment; or (b) if the record or report, is silent, then from a comparison between the assessment of villages in which there existed, and the assessment of villages of similar character in which there did not exist, any forest or quarry, or any such land or interest, that the forest, quarry, land or interest was taken into account in the assessment of the land-revenue. (4) Until the presumption is so rebutted, the forest, quarry, land or interest shall be held to belong to the [Government.]. " A plain reading of sub-section (1) and (2) of the aforementioned provision shows that while sub-section (1) raises a rebuttable presumption in favour of government about vesting of forest, quarry, unclaimed, unoccupied, deserted or waste land in case of no specific mention about it in the record of rights completed before 18.11.1871, whereas the succeeding sub-section raises a similar presumption in favour of landowners, provided there is no express entry made in the record of rights prepared after 18.11.1871, about the vesting of any forest or quarry or any such interest with the government. 10. The aforesaid presumption came to be discussed by a Full Bench of this Court in M/s Subhash Chander v. State of Punjab and others, 1982 AIR (Punjab and Haryana) 397, and relevant portion therefrom is extracted hereunder:- "Now a plain reading of su-sections (12) and (2) aforesaid makes its manifest that the presumption raised thereby is a rebuttable one. Whilst sub-section (1) raises a rebuttable presumption in favour of the Government, the succeeding sub section raises a similar presumption in favour of the landowners provided that there is no express entry in the record-of rights. This presumption is raised in identical terms in both the sub-sections. It is axiomatic that the presumptions aforesaid are not absolute and can be rebutted by evidence. Indeed this was the common stand of the learned counsel for the parties themselves. This presumption is raised in identical terms in both the sub-sections. It is axiomatic that the presumptions aforesaid are not absolute and can be rebutted by evidence. Indeed this was the common stand of the learned counsel for the parties themselves. However, any doubt on this aspect is conclusively repelled by sub-sections (3) and (4), which provide in terms for the nature of evidence by which the same is to be repelled. It is obvious that as regards the presumption under sub-section (2) no limitation or specific mode for the 'rebuttal thereof has been provided by the statute and is thus left entirely to the parties. " 11. In the present case, the findings have been recorded by the Courts below in favour of respondents/ defendants while holding them entitled for recovering royalty from the appellants/ plaintiffs against excavation of brick earth by treating it to be vested with Government, in the wake of certified copy of 'Sharait Wazib-ul-Arz' in Urdu language been produced on record as Ex.D6. May be, the certified copy of Sharait Wazib-ul-Arz was admissible in evidence, however, it may be relevant to point out here that the said document was produced on record by DW1 Mohinderpal Singh, Mining Officer, Ludhiana during his examination as witness on 12.10.1988. The said Wazib-ul-Arz, pertaining to year 1852-53, in Urdu was taken on record as Ex.D-6, which was objected to by the appellants/ plaintiffs. Even in the cross-examination, DW1 admitted that he was not in a position to read or write Urdu and was not even knowing the contents of Ex.D6. The relevant portion from the cross-examination of DW1 is extracted hereunder:- "I have not seen the site of the brick kilon. I do not know what is the extent of area from which the brick earth is being excavated. I cannot read write Urdu. I do not know what are the contents of Ex.D-6, but there is no entry regarding vesting of mines and minerals in it, later portion volunteered. I do not know the name of the person who read-over the contents of D-6 to me. There might be some persian word in Ex.D-6. It is wrong to suggest that this paper was not read out to me by any person and I am deposing falsely. I do not remember how many paragraph Ex.D-6 contains. I cannot specifically point out the signatures of Settlement Officer. There might be some persian word in Ex.D-6. It is wrong to suggest that this paper was not read out to me by any person and I am deposing falsely. I do not remember how many paragraph Ex.D-6 contains. I cannot specifically point out the signatures of Settlement Officer. I have seen Ex.D-6 and I have read the Hindi portion of signatures 'Harnam Patwari'. It is wrong to suggest that Ex.D-6 is not at all copy of the Wazb Ul Arz of settlement. I had obtained certain other copies besides Ex.D-6 relating to that settlement. It is wrong to suggest that brick earth is not subject matter of royalty (sic royality) recoverable by the State. " 12. Moreover, as per law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Ramji Dayawala & Sons (P) Ltd. v. Invest Import, (1981) 1 SCC 80 , the contents of the documents are also to be proved by admissible evidence. Relevant portion from para 16 thereof is reproduced here under:- " .... Undoubtedly, mere proof of the handwriting of a document would not tantamount to proof of all the contents or the facts stated in the document. If the truth of the facts stated in a document is in issue mere proof of the handwriting and execution of the document would not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the document. The truth or otherwise of the facts or contents so stated would have to be proved by admissible evidence i.e. by the evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue." Similarly, in case of Kaliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2013) 10 SCC 758 , it has been held that mere admission of document in evidence does not amount to its proof, nor, mere marking of exhibit on a document does not dispense with its proof, which is otherwise required to be done in accordance with law. 13. 13. Considering the aforesaid, once the contents from the Sharait Wazib-ul-Arz, pertaining to year 1852-53 though admitted on record in Urdu as Ex.D6, were never proved on record, the same could not have been relied upon by the Courts below for the purpose of non-suiting the appellants/ defendants, as the said document was neither translated in Hindi; nor even anyone conversant with Urdu language was ever produced as witness from the side of respondents/ defendants, further, even the Courts below did not record that they were conversant with the Urdu language. Thus, unless the contents of Sharait Wazib-ul-Arz (ExD6) were proved on record in the language known to the parties or the Courts, those could not have been relied upon. 14. Accordingly, in the absence of there being any proof of record-of-rights completed after 18.11.1871, with express provision about vesting of forests or quarries or any such land or interest with the government, the presumption that the same were belonging to the landowners remained un-rebutted and therefore, it can be safely held that the respondents/ defendants were not entitled for charging of any royalty from the appellants/ plaintiffs on account of excavation of brick earth being lessee, from the land situated in the revenue estate of Village Lalton Kalan, Tehsil and District Ludhiana and was owned by Jagjit Singh. The question of law formulated is thus answered accordingly. 15. In view of the detailed discussion made herein above, the present Regular Second Appeal is allowed and judgments and decrees dated 27.01.1983 and 01.12.1988 passed by the Courts below are hereby set aside. 16. Pending misc. application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.