JUDGMENT : (Raja Vijayaraghavan, J.) The above appeal has been preferred by the sole accused in S.C.No. 630 of 2011 on the file of the Court of Session, Thalassery. In the above case, the appellant stood indicted for having committed the offence punishable under Sections 447 and 302 of the IPC. 2. Short facts: Pulikkal Kunjumon @ Thankappan, his wife Smt. Remani, and their two boys, aged 15 and 12 years respectively, were residents of a place called Pookundu within the limits of Kannur District. The appellant was their neighbor. They had a cordial relationship until about a month prior to October 12, 2008, the day on which the fateful incident that led to the death of Thankappan took place. The prosecution alleges that news doing the rounds in the locality reached the appellant, claiming that Thankappan had tried to molest his wife. This created a tremendous amount of ill feelings in the minds of the accused towards Thankappan. The prosecution further alleges that on October 12, 2008, at about 10:45 p.m., the accused trespassed into the front yard of the deceased's house, bearing Door No. II/446 of Kelakam Panchayat. He started abusing Thankappan and exhorted him to come out. Thankappan came out and told the accused that they should settle the issue the next morning and asked him to go back to his house. The accused is alleged to have pulled the deceased out to the tar road lying east-west right outside the house and pushed him down. While the deceased was lying face up, the accused is alleged to have sat on his legs, taken a rubber tapper’s knife from his hip, and inflicted a stab injury on the outer aspect of the left thigh, cutting the femoral vein. Though the injured was rushed to the hospital, he breathed his last. 3. Registration of the crime and investigation: Thomas (PW1), a neighbour, went to the Police Station on 13.10.2008 at 7.30 a.m. and lodged the FI Statement which was recorded by PW12, the Sub Inspector of Police, Kelakam Police Station. On the same day itself, the Circle Inspector of Police (PW13) took up the investigation. He conducted the inquest (Ext.P10) over the dead body at 10.30 a.m., and on 13.10.2008, he went to the scene of occurrence and prepared scene mahazar (Ext.P4). The accused was arrested at 10.10 p.m. on 13.10.2008. On the same day itself, the Circle Inspector of Police (PW13) took up the investigation. He conducted the inquest (Ext.P10) over the dead body at 10.30 a.m., and on 13.10.2008, he went to the scene of occurrence and prepared scene mahazar (Ext.P4). The accused was arrested at 10.10 p.m. on 13.10.2008. On the basis of the disclosure statement given by the accused, the true extract of which was marked as Ext.P12, the weapon of offence (MO1 - Rubber Tapper’s knife) and the lungi (MO4) and shirt (MO5) worn by the accused were seized. He concluded the investigation and laid the final report before court. 4. Proceedings before the Court: After complying with the procedure, the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, Koothuparamba, committed the case to the Court of Sessions, Thalassery. After hearing both sides, the learned Sessions Judge framed charges under Sections 447 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The accused pleaded not guilty to the charges and claimed to be tried. 5. Evidence tendered during trial: The prosecution examined PWs 1 to 13 to prove its case. Exts.P1 to P18 documents were exhibited and marked. MOs 1 to 5 were produced and identified. After the close of the prosecution evidence, the incriminating materials arising out of the prosecution evidence were put to the accused under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. He denied all the incriminating circumstances brought against him and maintained his innocence. According to him, he was falsely implicated by the wife and children of the deceased as they felt that their family suffered ignominy owing to the allegations of molesty levelled by the wife of the accused against him. On finding that the accused could not be acquitted under Section 232 of the Cr.P.C., he was called upon to enter upon his defence. No defence of evidence was adduced on his side. 6. Findings of the learned Sessions Judge: a) The evidence of PWs 2 and 3, the wife and son of the deceased, are natural witnesses and their presence throughout the incident was found to be established. b) The evidence of PWs 1, 4 and 5 shows the presence of the accused at the place of occurrence at or immediately after the occurrence. c) The evidence established that the deceased was called out and a stab injury was inflicted on a vital part of the body by pushing him down. b) The evidence of PWs 1, 4 and 5 shows the presence of the accused at the place of occurrence at or immediately after the occurrence. c) The evidence established that the deceased was called out and a stab injury was inflicted on a vital part of the body by pushing him down. The plea of self defense, even if taken by the accused, has not been established. d) The accused had a sound motive to attack the deceased. e) Though there has been some delay in questioning the ocular witnesses, sufficient explanation has been offered by the prosecution for the same. f) There is no reason to doubt the recovery of the weapon of offence and the clothes worn by the accused based on the disclosure statement given by him. g) The Chemical Analysis report has revealed the presence of human blood on the knife as well as the clothes of the accused. Failure to do the grouping of blood will not affect the veracity of the case of the prosecution. h) The evidence adduced by the prosecution convincingly shows that the accused had trespassed into the house of the deceased and had inflicted the fatal injury. 7. The sentence imposed: a) The accused was found guilty and was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.50,000/- for the offence under Section 302 of the IPC with a default sentence of rigorous imprisonment for six months. b) For offence under Section 447 of the IPC, the accused was convicted and sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for three months and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-. 8. The contention of the appellant: a) Sri. Vinay, the learned counsel submitted that, though the incident had taken place at 10.45 p.m., on 12.10.2008, the information was furnished to the police by PW1 only at 7.30 a.m. on the next day. From the evidence of PW11, a member of the Grama Panchayat, it has come out that police had reached the spot on the previous day itself. If that be the case, Ext.P1 cannot be the statement on the basis of which the law was set in motion. b) There are glaring discrepancies in the evidence tendered by PW2 and PW3, the wife and son respectively of the accused. If that be the case, Ext.P1 cannot be the statement on the basis of which the law was set in motion. b) There are glaring discrepancies in the evidence tendered by PW2 and PW3, the wife and son respectively of the accused. It is pointed out that it has come out from the evidence of PW13, the investigating officer, that the wife and son were questioned and their statements recorded only on 19.10.2008, whereas the statement of PW4, the brother of the deceased, was recorded on 16.10.2008. The delay in recording the statement is fatal. There are concomitant circumstances to suggest that the investigating officer was deliberately marking time to decide about the shape to be given to the case and to introduce eye witnesses. For the above reason, the evidence tendered by PWs 1, 2 and 3 are liable to be rejected. In order to substantiate the above contention, reliance is placed on the observations made by the Apex Court in Ganesh Bhavan Patel v. State of Maharashtra, (1978) 4 SCC 371 and Shaheed Khan v. State of Rajasthan, (2016 ) 4 SCC 96. c) There is a long and inordinate delay in forwarding the material objects seized by the investigating officer. The records disclosed that Ext.P4 and P8, though sent on 14.10.2008, reached the court only on 18.10.2008. d) The failure of the prosecution to prove its certainty that the blood found on MO1 weapon and the clothes worn by the accused was that of the deceased is fatal to the prosecution. The learned Sessions Judge has seriously erred in concluding that a specific plea of self-defence has not been taken either during cross-examination or during the 313 examination. It is contended that it is by now settled that there is no requirement to tender evidence to prove self-defence but the same can be established by reference to the circumstances transparent from the prosecution evidence. In support, reliance is placed on Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab and Other, (2010) 2 SCC 333 ; Jacob @ Jaimon v. State of Kerala, (2012) KHC 313. In support, reliance is placed on Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab and Other, (2010) 2 SCC 333 ; Jacob @ Jaimon v. State of Kerala, (2012) KHC 313. e) Relying on the law laid down in Jagrup Singh v. State of Haryana, (1981) 3 SCC 616 , Sri.Vinay, the learned counsel contended that the evidence tendered would disclose that there was a scuffle between the accused and the deceased when the accused questioned the deceased with regard to an incident of molestation of his wife. Both the parties exchanged blows and they fell down. Both of them tried to wrest possession of a rubber tapper’s knife, which was actually in the hands of the deceased. In the melee that followed accidently an injury was sustained on the upper part of the thigh. The injury was sustained without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of fashion upon a sudden quarrel and without the accused having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. 9. Rebuttal by the Senior Public Prosecutor: a) Sri. Alex M. Thombra, the learned Public Prosecutor argued that the wife and son examined as PWs 2 and 3 are natural witnesses and they have no reason to falsely implicate the appellant and shield the actual offender. The evidence of PWs 1, 4, and 5 lend ample corroboration to their version. The omissions and embellishments pointed out by the defence will not make any dent in the core of the prosecution case. b) The head of the family was murdered leaving behind his wife and two minor children. The deceased was from the most financially backward section of the community. The wife and children suffered a huge mental breakdown and she had also stated in her evidence that she was admitted in the hospital as her pressure went down. The delay in recording the statement had occurred as the investigating officer had to give them some time to come back to normally. c) The recovery of weapon and clothes based on the disclosure statement given by the accused and the presence of human blood in them would corroborate the evidence of PWs 2 to 5. 10. Cause of death: Before adverting to the evidence, it needs to be analyzed as to whether the death of Thankappan was a case of homicide. c) The recovery of weapon and clothes based on the disclosure statement given by the accused and the presence of human blood in them would corroborate the evidence of PWs 2 to 5. 10. Cause of death: Before adverting to the evidence, it needs to be analyzed as to whether the death of Thankappan was a case of homicide. For one reason or the other, no evidence has been let in, to prove the exact time of death. The Doctor, who declared the death of the deceased has not been examined. However, in the FI statement lodged at 7:30 a.m. on 13.10.2008, it has been stated that the deceased died on the previous day. PW6 is the Doctor who conducted the autopsy. He has noted three injuries on the body of the deceased, two of which are superficial. The fatal injury is a boat-shaped incised puncture wound on the outer aspect of the left thigh at its middle; the horizontal limb measured 2.5 cm and the vertical limb measured 1 cm each. Active bleeding was seen from the wound. The wound was directed upwards and inwards to pass under the femoral artery and terminate by cutting the femoral vein into two. The total depth of the wound was 11 cm. In his evidence, the Doctor stated that injury No.1 is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. In cross-examination, he stated that injuries Nos. 2 and 3 can be caused by a scuffle or by a fall. He also stated that if medical treatment had been given with blood transfusion in time, the victim could have been saved. The Doctor also opined that MO1 weapon can cause the fatal injury noted by the Doctor. In view of the evidence tendered by the Doctor, there cannot be any doubt that the death of Thankappan was a case of homicide. 11. Analysis of evidence: a) PW1 is the immediate neighbor, who lodged the FI statement. He stated before the Court that on 12.10.2008 at about 10.30 p.m., he heard the cries of the deceased, his wife, and children. He rushed to the house and found the deceased lying by the side of the road. His wife and children and the accused were standing near to the deceased. Thankappan was lying in a pool of blood. He stated before the Court that on 12.10.2008 at about 10.30 p.m., he heard the cries of the deceased, his wife, and children. He rushed to the house and found the deceased lying by the side of the road. His wife and children and the accused were standing near to the deceased. Thankappan was lying in a pool of blood. The injured was initially rushed to the Peravoor Government Hospital, from where he was shifted to the Thalassery Government Hospital, where he was pronounced dead. In his evidence, he stated that he had a torch light with him and he added that there was a lamp emitting light in Thankappan’s house. However, he did not fully support the prosecution version. He mentioned, however, that PWs 4, 5 and others had come to the scene and it was with their assistance that the body was shifted to the hospital. He stated that he had given the First Information on the next day. He was made to give an additional statement after the receipt of the Post Mortem Certificate to explain the trajectory of the knife as it was felt that such an injury could not have happened if the accused was sitting on the leg. b) PW2 is the widow and PW3 is the son of the deceased. In their evidence, they vividly described the sequence of events that occurred. PW2 stated that, after dinner on 12.10.2008, while the family consisting of the deceased and her two minor children, were sitting inside the house at about 10:30 p.m., the accused stood outside the house and called her husband. He started abusing her husband. Her husband went out into the courtyard and asked the accused to leave. He told him that the issues could be settled in the morning. The accused pulled her husband outside and pushed him down to the road. Though she and her two minor children tried to intervene, they could not resist the acts of the accused. The accused sat on the legs of her husband, who was lying face up, and took out a rubber tapper’s knife from his hip and stabbed her husband above the left knee. When they cried, the accused withdrew the knife and left the place. By that time, PWs 4 and 1 came to the spot. She stated that she did not go to the hospital. When they cried, the accused withdrew the knife and left the place. By that time, PWs 4 and 1 came to the spot. She stated that she did not go to the hospital. She stated that there was ample light in the vicinity enabling her to view the gory incident. She identified the accused, the weapon used, and the clothes worn by the accused. The tenor of the cross-examination was to bring out some embellishments and omissions in her evidence. However, the defence has not been able to shake her testimony. She was also cross-examined to bring out that there was a scuffle and when she had furnished her statement to the police, she had stated so. She also stated that during the incident, neither she nor her children touched the accused. She also spoke about the presence of light. c) PW3 is the son of the deceased, who was aged about 15 years when the incident had taken place. He reiterated the version given by his mother. However, in his evidence, he stated that a scuffle had ensued when the accused tried to pull the deceased out of the house. He also stated that he tried to push away the deceased, but did not succeed. Both the witnesses stated that they had witnessed the incident from start to end. d) PW4 is the brother of the deceased who came to the spot on hearing the hue and cry. He stated that when he reached the spot he found the deceased lying on the ground and the accused was sitting on top. When the accused saw the neighbors assembling, he left the place carrying his weapons. He stated that his brother told him that he was stabbed by Jose, who is the accused herein. In his cross-examination, he stated that the statement was recorded 4 days after the incident. It was brought out that he had seen the police, while he was at the hospital, and on the subsequent days of the incident, the CI of police had come to the spot. However, he did not think it necessary to volunteer and to give a statement. e) PW5 is a close neighbor of the deceased. It was brought out that he had seen the police, while he was at the hospital, and on the subsequent days of the incident, the CI of police had come to the spot. However, he did not think it necessary to volunteer and to give a statement. e) PW5 is a close neighbor of the deceased. He stated that on hearing the cries from the house of the deceased, he rushed to the said place and found Thankappan lying on the road and the accused walking toward his house with a knife in his hand. He also stated that the deceased told him that he was stabbed by Jose. f) The analysis of the evidence of PWs 1 to 5 would reveal that PWs 2 and 3 had occasion to witness the incident from start to finish. Though PW1 was also cited to prove the initial part of the incident, he did not support the prosecution case. However, PWs 4 and 5 stated about what had transpired immediately after the incident and the presence of the accused. We have tested the evidence of PWs2 and 3 for its consistency and the inherent probability of the story. We have also considered the evidence of PW 4 and 5 for its consistency with the account of PW2 and 3, whom we found to be credit-worthy. We do not think that there is any reason to doubt their version of the incident. g) The first contention is with regard to the absence of light. All the witnesses including PW1 have spoken about the presence of ample light in the area, which enabled them to clearly identify the accused. Furthermore, all these witnesses and the accused are residing in a 50 metres radius. They have been seeing each other for the past several years and being villagers, they would be in an easy position to identify their neighbors. h) The second contention is with regard to the discrepancy in evidence tendered by PWs 2 and 3. The discrepancy is that when the son says there was a scuffle, the mother does not speak about any such incident. While the son says that they tried to push away the accused, the mother would say that no such attempt was made. The discrepancy is that when the son says there was a scuffle, the mother does not speak about any such incident. While the son says that they tried to push away the accused, the mother would say that no such attempt was made. It is trite that while appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is necessary for the court to scrutinize the evidence more carefully, considering the deficiencies, drawbacks, and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole. The court must evaluate whether these issues contradict the general tenor of the witness's testimony and whether the initial evaluation of the evidence is shaken enough to render it unworthy of belief. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters that do not touch the core of the case, or a hyper-technical approach that takes sentences out of context or focuses on some technical error by the investigating officer that does not go to the root of the matter, would not ordinarily justify rejecting the evidence as a whole. Even honest and truthful witnesses may differ in some details unrelated to the main incident because the power of observation, retention, and reproduction differs among individuals. The powers of observation differ from person to person; what one may notice, another may not. In regard to the exact time of an incident or the duration of an occurrence, people usually make their estimates by guesswork on the spur of the moment during interrogation. Ordinarily, a witness cannot be expected to recall accurately the sequence of events that takes place in rapid succession or a short time span. A wholly truthful witness may be overawed by the court atmosphere and the piercing cross-examination by the counsel. Out of nervousness, they may mix up facts, get confused about the sequence of events, or fill in details from imagination on the spur of the moment. (See State of U.P. v. M.K. Anthony, (1985) 1 SCC 505 , Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat, (1983) 3 SCC 217 . Having tested the evidence of the witnesses, we are of the view that the discrepancies pointed out by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant will not make any dent on their version before Court. (See State of U.P. v. M.K. Anthony, (1985) 1 SCC 505 , Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat, (1983) 3 SCC 217 . Having tested the evidence of the witnesses, we are of the view that the discrepancies pointed out by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant will not make any dent on their version before Court. Furthermore, as held by the Apex Court in Dalip Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab, AIR 1953 SC 364 , ordinarily a close relative would be the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person. It is true, when feelings run high and there is personal cause for enmity, that there is a tendency to drag in an innocent person against whom a witness has a grudge along with the guilty, but foundation must be laid for such a criticism and the mere fact of relationship far from being a foundation is often a sure guarantee of truth (See also Masalti and Ors. v. State of U.P., AIR 1965 SC 202 ). i) The next contention is with regard to the delay in the material objects reaching Court, in view of the evidence tendered by the eyewitnesses and the supporting evidence, we do not think that any elaboration of the said contention is warranted in the facts and circumstances. The recovery evidence based on the disclosure statement given by the accused also corroborates the direct ocular evidence. 12. The offence made out against the accused: a) The next question which falls for consideration of this Court is whether, on consideration of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of the IPC should be upheld or the conviction be converted to one under Section 304 of the IPC. This is because appropriate sentencing is a very vital function and obligation of the court. b) There are significant features of the case that are required to be taken into consideration in awarding the appropriate sentence to the accused: i) The relationship between the family of the accused and the deceased was cordial until about a month prior to the incident. ii) There was an allegation doing the rounds that the deceased had molested the wife of the accused and this was obviously simmering in his mind. ii) There was an allegation doing the rounds that the deceased had molested the wife of the accused and this was obviously simmering in his mind. iii) The accused wanted to talk to the deceased and he was called outside his house. iv) There was a scuffle between the accused and the deceased as spoken to by PW3 and it was consequent to the same that the deceased had fallen down. v) Only a single stab injury was inflicted and that too on the upper part of the leg, which proved fatal. vi) There was loss of blood as the injury cut the femoral vein and not the femoral artery. The statement of the doctor that the life could have been saved if expert medical care was provided. vii) The offence was without premeditation upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. c) The Apex Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya and Another, (1976) 4 SCC 382 has delineated the principles to be borne in mind when the court is confronted with the question whether the offence is murder or culpable homicide not amounting to murder. After referring to Virsa Singh v State of Punjab, (1958) SCR 1495, the locus classicus, it was held as follows: “21. From the above conspectus, it emerges that whenever a court is confronted with the question whether the offence is “murder” or “culpable homicide not amounting to murder”, on the facts of a case, it will be convenient for it to approach the problem in three stages. The question to be considered at the first stage would be, whether the accused has done an act by doing which he has caused the death of another. Proof of such a causal connection between the act of the accused and the death leads to the second stage for considering whether that act of the accused amounts to “culpable homicide” as defined in Section 299. If the answer to this question is prima facie found in the affirmative, the stage for considering the operation of Section 300 of the Penal Code, is reached. This is the stage at which the court should determine whether the facts proved by the prosecution bring the case within the ambit of any of the four clauses of the definition of “murder” contained in Section 300. This is the stage at which the court should determine whether the facts proved by the prosecution bring the case within the ambit of any of the four clauses of the definition of “murder” contained in Section 300. If the answer to this question is in the negative the offence would be “culpable homicide not amounting to murder”, punishable under the first or the second part of Section 304, depending, respectively, on whether the second or the third clause of Section 299 is applicable. If this question is found in the positive, but the case comes within any of the exceptions enumerated in Section 300, the offence would still be “culpable homicide not amounting to murder”, punishable under the first part of Section 304, of the Penal Code.” d) In Rajwant Singh v. State of Kerala, AIR 1966 SC 1874 , the Apex Court referring to Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab (supra), observed: “11. ...............As was laid down in Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab [(1958) SCR 1495] for the application of this clause it must be first established that an injury is caused, next it must be established objectively what the nature of that injury in the ordinary course of nature is. If the injury is found to be sufficient to cause death one test is satisfied. Then it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that very injury and not some other injury and that it was not accidental or unintentional. If this is also held against the offender the offence of murder is satisfied.” (emphasis supplied) e) In Anda v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1966 SC 148 , the Apex Court had occasion to delve upon the subtle differences in the interpretation of Section 299 and Section 300 of the IPC. It was observed as under in paragraph No. 7 of the judgment: 7. The offence of culpable homicide involves the doing of an act (which term includes illegal omissions) (a) with the intention of causing death, or (b) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death or (c) with the knowledge that the act is likely to cause death. The offence of culpable homicide involves the doing of an act (which term includes illegal omissions) (a) with the intention of causing death, or (b) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death or (c) with the knowledge that the act is likely to cause death. If the death is caused in any of these three circumstances, the offence of culpable homicide is said to be committed…………….Intention and knowledge in the ingredients of the section postulate the existence of a positive mental attitude and this mental condition is the special mens rea necessary for the offence. The guilty intention in the first two conditions contemplates the intended death of the person harmed or the intentional causing of an injury likely to cause his death. The knowledge in the third condition contemplates knowledge of the death of the person. Sec. 300 tells us when the offence is murder and when it is culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Sec. 300 begins by setting out the circumstances when culpable homicide turns out into murder which is punishable under sec. 302 and the exceptions in the same section tell us when offence is not murder but culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under sec. 304. Murder is an aggravated form of culpable homicide. The existence of one of four conditions turns culpable homicide into murder while the special exceptions reduce the offence of murder again to culpable homicide not amounting to murder.” f) In Kulwant Rai v. State of Punjab, (1981) 4 SCC 245 , the accused, without any prior enmity or premeditation, pursuant to an abrupt quarrel gave a single blow with a dagger which later proved to be fatal. The Apex Court observed that since there was no premeditation, Part 3 of Section 300 of the Penal Code would not be attracted as it cannot be said that the accused intended to inflict that particular injury which was ultimately found to have been inflicted. In the facts and circumstances of that case, the conviction of the accused was altered from Section 302 to that under Section 304 Part II IPC and the accused was sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for five years. g) In Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1983) 2 SCC 342 , the accused on the spur of the moment inflicted a knife-blow on the chest of the deceased. g) In Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1983) 2 SCC 342 , the accused on the spur of the moment inflicted a knife-blow on the chest of the deceased. The injury proved to be fatal. The doctor opined that the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The Apex Court held as under in paragraph No. 8 of the judgment: “8. ……..The quarrel was of a trivial nature and even in such a trivial quarrel the appellant wielded a weapon like a knife and landed a blow in the chest. In these circumstances, it is a permissible inference that the appellant at least could be imputed with a knowledge that he was likely to cause an injury which was likely to cause death.” This Apex Court altered the conviction of the appellant from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part II IPC and sentenced the accused to suffer rigorous imprisonment for five years. h) In Hem Raj v. The State (Delhi Admn.), 1990 SCC (Cri) 713, the accused inflicted a single stab injury landing on the chest of the deceased. The occurrence admittedly had taken place on the spur of the moment and in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel. According to the doctor the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The Apex Court observed as under: 14. The question is whether the appellant could be said to have caused that particular injury with the intention of causing death of the deceased. As the totality of the established facts and circumstances do show that the occurrence had happened most unexpectedly in a sudden quarrel and without premeditation during the course of which the appellant caused a solitary injury, he could not be imputed with the intention to cause death of the deceased or with the intention to cause that particular fatal injury; but he could be imputed with the knowledge that he was likely to cause an injury which was likely to cause death. Because in the absence of any positive proof that the appellant caused the death of the deceased with the intention of causing death or intentionally inflicted that particular injury which in the ordinary course of nature was sufficient to cause death, neither clause I nor clause III of Section 300 IPC will be attracted.” The Apex Court while setting aside the conviction under Section 302 convicted the accused under Section 304 Part II and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years. i) In Harjinder Singh Alias Jinda v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1968 SC 867 , the evidence indicated that while the accused was trying to attack another person and the deceased intervened. The accused, finding himself one against two, took out the knife and stabbed the deceased. The evidence indicated that the deceased at that stage was in a crouching position presumably to intervene and separate the two. The Apex Court held that it cannot be said with any definiteness that the appellant aimed the blow at this particular part of the thigh knowing that it would cut the artery. It was held by the Apex Court that it cannot be said that it has been proved that it was the intention of the appellant to inflict the particular injury on that particular place and therefore not possible to apply clause thirdly of Section 300 to the act of the accused. However, as the accused struck the deceased with the knife with the intention to cause an injury likely to cause death, the case fell under Section 304 Part I. Reference to paragraph Nos. 7 to 9 of the judgment would be apposite. 7. In Rajwant singh v. State of Kerala, AIR 1966 SC 1874 , 1878, Hidayatullah, J., referring to Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, (1958) SCR 1495 , observed: “As was laid down in Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab [(1958) SCR 1495] for the application of this clause it must be first established that an injury is caused, next it must be established objectively what the nature of that injury in the ordinary course of nature is. If the injury is found to be sufficient to cause death one test is satisfied. Then it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that very injury and not some other injury and that it was not accidental or unintentional. If the injury is found to be sufficient to cause death one test is satisfied. Then it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that very injury and not some other injury and that it was not accidental or unintentional. If this is also held against the offender the offence of murder is satisfied.” 8. It seems to us that the High Court has not considered whether the third ingredient laid down by Bose, J., in Virsa Singh v. State Punjab [(1958) SCR 1495] has been proved in this case or not. In our opinion the circumstances justify the inference that the accused did not intend to cause an injury on this particular portion of the thigh. The evidence indicates that while the appellant was trying to assault Dalip Kumar and the deceased intervened, the appellant timing himself one against two took out the knife and stabbed the deceased. It also indicates that the deceased at that stage was in a crouching position presumably to intervene and separate the two. It cannot, therefore, be said with any definiteness that the appellant aimed the blow that this particular part of the thigh knowing that it would cut the artery. It may be observed that the appellant had not used the knife while he was engaged in the fight with Dalip Kumar. It was only when he felt that the deceased also came up against him that he whipped out the knife. In these circumstances it cannot be said that it has been proved that it was the intention of the appellant to inflict this particular injury on this particular place. It is, therefore, not possible to apply clause 3 of Section 300 to the act of the accused. 9. Nevertheless, the deceased was in a crouching position when the appellant struck him with the knife. Though the knife was ?5 to 6? in length including the handle it was nonetheless a dangerous weapon. When the appellant struck the deceased with the knife, he must have known that the deceased then being in a bent position the blow would land in the abdomen or near it a vulnerable part of the human body and that such a blow was likely to result in his death. When the appellant struck the deceased with the knife, he must have known that the deceased then being in a bent position the blow would land in the abdomen or near it a vulnerable part of the human body and that such a blow was likely to result in his death. In these circumstances it would be quite legitimate to hold that he struck the deceased with the knife with the intention to cause an injury likely to cause death. We are, therefore, of the-opinion that the offence falls under Section 304 Part 1. j) In Anpazhagan v State Represented by the Inspector of Police, 2023 SCC Online SC 857, the Apex Court, after having surveyed all the past precedents on the subject outlined the circumstances under which the offence under the twin parts would only be attracted instead of clause Thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC. The principles were summed up as under: (1) When the court is confronted with the question, what offence the accused could be said to have committed, the true test is to find out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the act. If the intention or knowledge was such as is described in Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act will be murder even though only a single injury was caused. To illustrate: ‘A’ is bound hand and foot. ‘B’ comes and placing his revolver against the head of ‘A’, shoots ‘A’ in his head killing him instantaneously. Here, there will be no difficulty in holding that the intention of ‘B’ in shooting ‘A’ was to kill him, though only single injury was caused. The case would, therefore, be of murder falling within Clause (1) of Section 300 of the IPC. Taking another instance, ‘B’ sneaks into the bed room of his enemy ‘A’ while the latter is asleep on his bed. Taking aim at the left chest of ‘A’, ‘B’ forcibly plunges a sword in the left chest of ‘A’ and runs away. ‘A’ dies shortly thereafter. The injury to ‘A’ was found to be sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. There may be no difficulty in holding that ‘B’ intentionally inflicted the particular injury found to be caused and that the said injury was objectively sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. ‘A’ dies shortly thereafter. The injury to ‘A’ was found to be sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. There may be no difficulty in holding that ‘B’ intentionally inflicted the particular injury found to be caused and that the said injury was objectively sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. This would bring the act of ‘B’ within Clause (3) of Section 300 of the IPC and render him guilty of the offence of murder although only single injury was caused. (2) Even when the intention or knowledge of the accused may fall within Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act of the accused which would otherwise be murder, will be taken out of the purview of murder, if the accused's case attracts any one of the five exceptions enumerated in that section. In the event of the case falling within any of those exceptions, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder, falling within Part 1 of Section 304 of the IPC, if the case of the accused is such as to fall within Clauses (1) to (3) of Section 300 of the IPC. It would be offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case is such as to fall within Clause (4) of Section 300 of the IPC. Again, the intention or knowledge of the accused may be such that only 2nd or 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC, may be attracted but not any of the clauses of Section 300 of the IPC. In that situation also, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 of the IPC. It would be an offence under Part I of that section, if the case fall within 2nd part of Section 299, while it would be an offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case fall within 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC. (3) To put it in other words, if the act of an accused person falls within the first two clauses of cases of culpable homicide as described in Section 299 of the IPC it is punishable under the first part of Section 304. If, however, it falls within the third clause, it is punishable under the second part of Section 304. If, however, it falls within the third clause, it is punishable under the second part of Section 304. In effect, therefore, the first part of this section would apply when there is ‘guilty intention,’ whereas the second part would apply when there is no such intention, but there is ‘guilty knowledge’. (4) Even if single injury is inflicted, if that particular injury was intended, and objectively that injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the requirements of Clause 3rdly to Section 300 of the IPC, are fulfilled and the offence would be murder. (5) Section 304 of the IPC will apply to the following classes of cases : (i) when the case falls under one or the other of the clauses of Section 300, but it is covered by one of the exceptions to that Section, (ii) when the injury caused is not of the higher degree of likelihood which is covered by the expression ‘sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death’ but is of a lower degree of likelihood which is generally spoken of as an injury ‘likely to cause death’ and the case does not fall under Clause (2) of Section 300 of the IPC, (iii) when the act is done with the knowledge that death is likely to ensue but without intention to cause death or an injury likely to cause death. To put it more succinctly, the difference between the two parts of Section 304 of the IPC is that under the first part, the crime of murder is first established and the accused is then given the benefit of one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC, while under the second part, the crime of murder is never established at all. Therefore, for the purpose of holding an accused guilty of the offence punishable under the second part of Section 304 of the IPC, the accused need not bring his case within one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC. (6) The word ‘likely’ means probably and it is distinguished from more ‘possibly’. When chances of happening are even or greater than its not happening, we may say that the thing will ‘probably happen’. (6) The word ‘likely’ means probably and it is distinguished from more ‘possibly’. When chances of happening are even or greater than its not happening, we may say that the thing will ‘probably happen’. In reaching the conclusion, the court has to place itself in the situation of the accused and then judge whether the accused had the knowledge that by the act he was likely to cause death. (7) The distinction between culpable homicide (Section 299 of the IPC) and murder (Section 300 of the IPC) has always to be carefully borne in mind while dealing with a charge under Section 302 of the IPC. Under the category of unlawful homicides, both, the cases of culpable homicide amounting to murder and those not amounting to murder would fall. Culpable homicide is not murder when the case is brought within the five exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC. But, even though none of the said five exceptions are pleaded or prima facie established on the evidence on record, the prosecution must still be required under the law to bring the case under any of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC to sustain the charge of murder. If the prosecution fails to discharge this onus in establishing any one of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC, namely, 1stly to 4thly, the charge of murder would not be made out and the case may be one of culpable homicide not amounting to murder as described under Section 299 of the IPC. (8) The court must address itself to the question of mens rea. If Clause thirdly of Section 300 is to be applied, the assailant must intend the particular injury inflicted on the deceased. This ingredient could rarely be proved by direct evidence. Inevitably, it is a matter of inference to be drawn from the proved circumstances of the case. The court must necessarily have regard to the nature of the weapon used, part of the body injured, extent of the injury, degree of force used in causing the injury, the manner of attack, the circumstances preceding and attendant on the attack. (9) Intention to kill is not the only intention that makes a culpable homicide a murder. The court must necessarily have regard to the nature of the weapon used, part of the body injured, extent of the injury, degree of force used in causing the injury, the manner of attack, the circumstances preceding and attendant on the attack. (9) Intention to kill is not the only intention that makes a culpable homicide a murder. The intention to cause injury or injuries sufficient in the ordinary cause of nature to cause death also makes a culpable homicide a murder if death has actually been caused and intention to cause such injury or injuries is to be inferred from the act or acts resulting in the injury or injuries. (10) When single injury inflicted by the accused results in the death of the victim, no inference, as a general principle, can be drawn that the accused did not have the intention to cause the death or that particular injury which resulted in the death of the victim. Whether an accused had the required guilty intention or not, is a question of fact which has to be determined on the facts of each case. (11) Where the prosecution proves that the accused had the intention to cause death of any person or to cause bodily injury to him and the intended injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, then, even if he inflicts a single injury which results in the death of the victim, the offence squarely falls under Clause thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC unless one of the exceptions applies. (12) In determining the question, whether an accused had guilty intention or guilty knowledge in a case where only a single injury is inflicted by him and that injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the fact that the act is done without premeditation in a sudden fight or quarrel, or that the circumstances justify that the injury was accidental or unintentional, or that he only intended a simple injury, would lead to the inference of guilty knowledge, and the offence would be one under Section 304 Part II of the IPC. k) In the case on hand, we find that the incident had occurred in the spur of the moment. There was a scuffle between the accused and the deceased as spoken to by PW3. k) In the case on hand, we find that the incident had occurred in the spur of the moment. There was a scuffle between the accused and the deceased as spoken to by PW3. It was after the deceased had fallen down that the accused had inflicted a single injury on the upper part of the left thigh which cut the femoral vein. We find it difficult to come to the conclusion that when the appellant struck the deceased with the weapon of offence, a rubber tapper’s knife, which is an agricultural implement, he intended to cause such bodily injury as was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. As noted by the doctor, the Femoral vein was cut and if prompt treatment was provided with blood transfusion his life could have been saved. We are of the view that the appellant could only be attributed with the knowledge that by his acts, he was likely to cause an injury which was likely to cause the death. In such circumstances, we are inclined to take the view that the case on hand does not fall within clause thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC and he could have been found guilty only under Part II of Section 304. Conclusion: In the result, we allow this appeal but only to the extent that instead of Section 302 IPC the appellant shall stand convicted for the offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 Part II IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of five years. The conviction passed for the offence under Section 447 of the IPC is upheld. The fine imposed upon the appellant and the default sentence awarded to him shall remain unaltered. The appeal is disposed of in the above terms in modification of the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge.