ORDER : V. Srinivas, J. Assailing the judgment dated 06.08.2008 in G.S.C.No.112 of 2007 on the file of the Court of learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge at Visakhapatnam, convicted the accused, on his admission, for the offence under Section 307 of Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”), the petitioner/accused filed the present criminal revision case under Section 397 r/w.401 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. 2. The revision case was admitted on 18.08.2008 and the sentence of imprisonment imposed against the petitioner was suspended, vide orders in Crl.R.C.M.P.No.1667 of 2008. 3. The shorn of necessary facts are that : (i). On 19.05.2006, when the de facto complainant attending bundo-bust duty at Steel Plant, Vishakapatnam, the accused with an intention to kill him stabbed with a knife on the abdomen, resulted, he sustained injury to the left armpit and also near left wrist. Then the accused escaped from the spot on his motorcycle. (ii). Based on the complaint of de facto complainant, Gajuwaka police register a case in Cr.No.262 of 2006 for the offences under Section 307 of IPC and investigated into. 4. After completion of investigation, police laid charge sheet and the same was numbered as P.R.C.No.8 of 2007 on the file of the Court of learned III Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate at Visakhapatnam, and committed to the Court of Sessions, numbered as G.S.C.No.112 of 2007 on the file of the Court of learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge at Visakhapatnam, on admission of accused, under Section 240(2) Cr.P.C. examination, convicted him for the offence under Section 307 of IPC, sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment of three (3) years and to pay fine of Rs.100/-, in default to suffer simple imprisonment of one month. 5. Aggrieved by the same, the present criminal revision case was preferred by the petitioner/accused. 6. Heard Sri Md. Ismail, learned counsel representing Sri C. Sharan Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri S. Dheera Kanishk, learned Special Assistant Public Prosecutor for the respondent-State. 7. Now the point that arises for determination in this revision is “whether there is any manifest error of law or flagrant miscarriage of justice in convicting the petitioner on admission by the Trial Court?” 8. Sri Md. 7. Now the point that arises for determination in this revision is “whether there is any manifest error of law or flagrant miscarriage of justice in convicting the petitioner on admission by the Trial Court?” 8. Sri Md. Ismail, learned counsel representing Sri C.Sharan Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the trial Court erred in convicting the petitioner for the alleged offence; that the judgment of the trail Court itself shows that the accused mental condition was not good, thereby, the conviction passed against the accused on the admission is liable to the set aside. 9. Against the same, Sri S. Dheera Kanishk, learned Special Assistant Public Prosecutor for the respondent-State submits that the trail court on the categorical admission made by the accused at the time of initial examination itself, convicted him for the said offence, as such, there are no grounds urged by the petitioner to interfere with the conviction and sentence passed by the trial court. In support of the above contention, he relied on a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Prem Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 3 SCC 372 . 10. In view of the above rival contentions, this Court perused the material available on record. It is not in dispute that on the very first examination of the accused, under Section 240(2) CR.P.C., he admitted the guilt by stating that “as he was not in good mental condition, he stabbed the complainant underneath the stomach with an intention to kill him.” On the said admission, the trial Court convicted him for the said offence. 11. Now, it is relevant to refer the pronouncement of Apex Court, which is relied upon by the learned Special Assistant Public Prosecutor, in Prem Singh case (referred to supra), wherein at paragraph Nos.71 to 76 held as follows : 71. In the relied upon passage in the decision of Gujarat High Court cited on behalf of the appellant in case of Manjuben (supra), the Court had explained the basics relating to the operation of Section 329 CrPC and its distinction from Section 84 IPC in following terms: - “43…….. 23. Section 329 of the Cr.P.C. on the other hand, provides for a procedure in case of a person of unsound mind tried before the Court. 23. Section 329 of the Cr.P.C. on the other hand, provides for a procedure in case of a person of unsound mind tried before the Court. Section makes it clear that in a trial before the Magistrate or Court of Sessions, if the accused appears to be of unsound mind and consequently incapable of making his defence, then the Court shall, in the first instance, try the fact of such unsoundness of mind and incapacity and if satisfied in this regard, shall record a finding to that effect and shall postpone the further proceedings. This Section is similar to Section 328 of the Cr.P.C. with this difference that the latter relates to an enquiry before a Magistrate, while this Section relates to the trial before the Magistrate or Court of Sessions. However, both the Sections relate to unsoundness of mind at the time of inquiry or trial ……that the accused is of unsound mind. A Magistrate cannot act on his own opinion. He must have before him a statement of medical officer, who must be examined. Where the Court decides that the accused is of unsound mind and consequently incapable of making his defence, the trial is to be postponed. As provided in Section 330 of the Cr.P.C. such a person may be released on sufficient security being given that he shall be properly taken care of and shall be prevented from doing injury to himself or to any other person or for his appearance when required before Magistrate or the Court. The Court or the Magistrate is also entitled to direct the accused to be detained in safe custody in such a place and manner as it may think fit if it is of the view that the bail should not be taken or sufficient security is not given. Section 331 of the Cr.P.C. thereafter talks of resumption of enquiry or trial, when the concerned persons cease to be of unsound mind. Section 332 of the Cr.P.C. prescribes a procedure to proceed with the trial or enquiry as the case may be.’” 72. The aforesaid expositions on the scope of the provisions relating to accused person of unsound mind are not of much debate. Section 332 of the Cr.P.C. prescribes a procedure to proceed with the trial or enquiry as the case may be.’” 72. The aforesaid expositions on the scope of the provisions relating to accused person of unsound mind are not of much debate. However, nothing of the aforesaid principles could apply to the present case, for there had been no material on record and no other reason appeared during trial for which, the Trial Court would have been obliged to take recourse of the procedure contemplated by Section 329 CrPC. 73. Similarly, the suggestions about defect in trial or failure on the part of the investigating agency to get the appellant examined through psychiatrist with reference to the decision of the Bombay HC in case of Ajay Ram Pandit (supra) remain too far stretched. In the said case, it was noticed that the investigating officer became aware of the fact after apprehending the accused that he was mentally unstable and in fact, the people in his locality used to consider him as a mad man. The fact situation of the present case is entirely different. 74. In the given set of facts and circumstances, we are not dilating on the other decisions cited by the learned counsel for the appellant for being not relevant for the present purpose. Fact of the matter in the present case remains that there is nothing on record to show that the appellant was a person of unsound mind, whether at the time of commission of crimes or during the course of trial. 75. Fact of the matter in the present case remains that there is nothing on record to show that the appellant was a person of unsound mind, whether at the time of commission of crimes or during the course of trial. 75. Apart that there was no fault on the part of the Trial Court or the investigating agency, it is also noteworthy that contrary to even a trace of want of mental capacity of the appellant at the time of commission of the crimes in question, the manner of commission, with strangulation of the children one by one; throwing of their dead bodies into the canal; appellant himself swimming in the canal and coming out; and immediately thereafter, stating before several persons that the children had accidentally slipped into the canal so as to project it as a case of accidental drowning, if at all, show an alert and calculative mind, which had worked with specific intent to cause the death of the children and to cause disappearance of evidence by throwing dead bodies into the canal and thereafter, to mislead by giving a false narrative. By no logic and by no measure of assessment, the appellant, who is found to have carried all the aforesaid misdeeds, could be said to be a person of unsound mind. 76. Thus, we are clearly of the view that the appellant was neither suffering from any medically determined mental illness nor could be said to be a person under a legal disability of unsound mind. Hence, neither Section 84 IPC applies to the present case nor Section 329 CrPC would come to the rescue of the appellant.” 12. In view of the above categorical observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the present case also, this Court is of the considered opinion that, the trial Court did not commit any error in convicting the petitioner for the said offence on the admission made by him. It is required to be noted that there is nothing on record to say that the petitioner was a person of unsound mind at the time of his admission of offence. Thereby, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the trial Court erred in convicting the petitioner on the ground that his mental health condition was not good has no legs to stand. Thereby, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the trial Court erred in convicting the petitioner on the ground that his mental health condition was not good has no legs to stand. As such, in view of the gravity of the offence committed by the accused, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the judgment of the trial Court in convicting the accused for the said offence. 13. However, while arguing the matter, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused submits that the accident had occurred on 19.05.2006 and there are mitigating circumstances to reduce the sentence imposed against the petitioner by the trial Court, which was confirmed by the Sessions Court. He also brought to the notice of this Court a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in Nand Ballabh Pant v. State (Union Territory of Delhi), AIR 1977 SC 892 , wherein the APEX Court considered the facts and reduced the period of sentence of imprisonment imposed on the appellate from two (2) months to one (1) month rigorous imprisonment. 14. He also brought to the notice of this Court another judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in Jagdish Chander v. State of Delhi, AIR 1973 SC 2127 , wherein also the APEX Court considered the relevant circumstances and reduced the sentence of imprisonment to that of already undergone but increased the sentence of fine from Rs.500/- to Rs.700/-. 15. In this connection, it is relevant to make a mention a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Nagaraj v. Union of India, 2019 (1) ALT (Crl.) 209, wherein at paragraph Nos.18 and 19 held that “the appellant/accused has already undergone one month jail sentence; second, the offence in question neither against the society nor it involves any moral turpitude and nor it has resulted in causing any harm or injury to any human being except causing some damage to the railway property, viz., one railway crossing gate; and lastly, the offence is now 13 years old. In view of the aforementioned three reasons and in the interest of justice, therefore of the considered opinion that the six months jail sentence awarded to the appellate by the three Courts below deserves to be altered to what he has already undergone by the appellant till date.” 16. In view of the aforementioned three reasons and in the interest of justice, therefore of the considered opinion that the six months jail sentence awarded to the appellate by the three Courts below deserves to be altered to what he has already undergone by the appellant till date.” 16. As well in Mohinder Singh v. State of Haryana, 2019 (3) Crimes 89, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held at paragraph No.2 that “they are not inclined to interfere on the merits of the case and at the same time, they cannot lose sight of fact that the occurrence took place more than a quarter of century back and to send the accused in prison after 25 years, would be travesty of justice.” 17. No doubt, in the present case also the incident was said to have happened on 19.05.2006 and by this time seventeen (17) years have already lapsed. 18. Having regard to the above discussion and in view of the above pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, this Court is of the considered opinion that the conviction is upheld, however, to meet the ends of justice, the sentence of imprisonment is reduced to one year from three (3) years for the offence under Section 307 of IPC. 19. In the result, the Criminal Revision Case is allowed in part, modifying the sentence of imprisonment imposed against the petitioner/accused to that of one-year rigorous imprisonment instead of three (3) years for the offence under Section 307 of IPC. The rest of the judgment dated 06.08.2008 in G.S.C.No.112 of 2007 on the file of the Court of learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge at Visakhapatnam, shall stands confirmed. The period of sentence, if any, already undergone by the petitioner/accused, shall be given set off under Section 428 Cr.P.C. The petitioner/accused is directed to surrender before the Court of learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge at Visakhapatnam to serve the remaining sentence, if not, the learned Sessions Judge concerned shall take steps against the petitioner. Interim orders granted earlier if any, stand vacated. As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.