JUDGMENT : 1. Heard learned advocate Ms. Archana Amin for the appellant. Though served, none appeared for the respondent/s. Perused the record. 2. This appeal is filed under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, hereinafter referred to as `the Code’), whereby, a challenge is made against the judgment and order dated 30.3.2002 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Nadiad in Special Civil Suit No.59 of 1996. 3. The facts in brief are as under: * The appellant – original plaintiff filed a Special Civil Suit No.59 of 1996 before the learned Senior Civil Judge, Nadiad for recovery of Rs.15,54,588-84 Paisa towards damages from the respondent – original defendant. The defendant no.1 was a successful bidder and a contract was entered into for transfer of food products and fertilizers from Nadiad Railway Station to Hatani and Sundhana. A security deposit of Rs.60,000/- was deposited with the plaintiff. The period of contract was for 2 years commencing from 18.6.1985 to 17.6.1987. The period of contract was extended upto 11.8.1987. The defendant started transporting from 18.6.1985 but thereafter, the defendants failed to perform their part of contract. Resultantly, the plaintiff had incurred losses by way of demurrages, wharfage, re-booking charges etc. The liability of the defendant as per the terms of the tender agreement was fixed by the competent authority of the plaintiffs on 8.4.1993. * A letter dated 17.7.1993 was issued to the defendants calling upon the defendants to pay the amount of damages of Rs.15,54,588-84 Paisa. Defendants appeared and filed Written Statement at Exh.21. The learned trial Court framed issues vide Exh.28. The defendants resisted the suit on the ground of limitation. It was the case of the defendants that the suit of the plaintiffs is time barred. It is also the case of the defendants that the claim of Rs.15,54,588-84 Paisa towards damages etc. is unreasonable and unjustified. It was the case made out by the defendants that the contract was not terminated by the plaintiffs and the account was not settled though huge amount is due and payable by the plaintiffs to the defendants under the contract. * A counter claim was also raised by the defendants alongwith Written Statement Exh.21. The counter claim was replied to, by the plaintiffs vide Exh.26. * A counter claim was also raised by the defendants alongwith Written Statement Exh.21. The counter claim was replied to, by the plaintiffs vide Exh.26. Plaintiff had examined Ashokbhai Ramchandra Karnik at Exh.34 and also examined three witnesses namely; Aasardas Trikamdas Golani, Girishbhai Shantighar Bhatt and Sanjay Kuldev Prasad vide Exhs.60, 66 and 85 respectively. The plaintiff also produced various documentary evidence. Defendant examined Vijaybhai Natvarlal Dantani at Exh.95 and a witness Krishnakumar Anant Wade at Exh.123. Defendant also produced various documents in support of their contention. 4. Learned advocate for the appellant submitted that out of all the issues, only issue no.8 which pertains to the limitation was held against plaintiffs. However, other issues were decided in favour of the plaintiffs. It is submitted that the learned trial Court has committed an error by relying upon Articles 23 and 55 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short, hereinafter referred to as `the Act’). Learned advocate for the appellant submitted that Articles 23 and 55 of the Act are not applicable in the present set of facts. Article 112 of the Act is applicable. 5. Learned advocate for the appellant has referred and relied upon Article 112 of the Act which is reproduced hereunder for the sake of convenience. Description of Suit Period of Limitation Time from which period begins to run 112. Any suit (except a suit before the Supreme Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction) by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Thirty years. When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person. 6. Learned advocate for the appellant submitted that for transportation of food grains and fertilizers tenders were invited. The tender of defendant No.1 was accepted and a contract Exh.35 was executed between plaintiff and defendant No.1. The duration of the contract was for 2 years commencing from 18/6/1985 till 17/6/1987. The period of contract was extended up to 11/8/1987. Thereafter the contract was not extended. The defendant No.1 committed breach of the terms and conditions of the contract and failed to perform their part of the contract, which has resulted into heavy loss by way of demurrages, wharfage, re-booking charges. The period of contract was extended up to 11/8/1987. Thereafter the contract was not extended. The defendant No.1 committed breach of the terms and conditions of the contract and failed to perform their part of the contract, which has resulted into heavy loss by way of demurrages, wharfage, re-booking charges. The time was consumed in ascertaining the amount of expenses and cost to be recovered from the defendant and the Senior Regional Manager of appellant took the decision. 7. As per the terms of the tender agreement, on 8/4/1993 the liability of the defendant was fixed to the tune of Rs.15,54,588=84 Paisa. The defendant was informed by way of a communication dated 17/7/1993 by calling upon the defendants to pay the amount with 18% interest. It is submitted that cause of action to file the suit arose on 8/4/1993, when a decision was taken and communicated to the respondents. It is therefore submitted that the suit of the plaintiff is well within the period of limitation as per Article 113 of the Act. The decision was taken on 8/4/1993 and the suit was filed on 6/4/1996 and hence the suit is well within the period of limitation. It is further submitted that the respondents – defendants committed breach of the terms and conditions of the contract and did not carry out and completed the work as per the tender agreement Exh.35. It is further submitted that the time consumed in taking decision was not properly appreciated by the learned trial Court and the learned trial Court has wrongly dismissed the suit on the ground of limitation. 8. Learning advocate for the appellant submitted that the plaintiff – Food Corporation of India was established under the Food Corporation Act, 1964 and which is undertaking of Central Government. By making such submission, learned advocate for the appellant has submitted that Article 112 of the Act would be applicable and the period of limitation is 30 years. It is submitted that the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person. Thus, as per the submission of learned advocate for the appellant, the period of limitation would be 30 years instead of 3 years for filing the suit. 9. It is submitted that the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person. Thus, as per the submission of learned advocate for the appellant, the period of limitation would be 30 years instead of 3 years for filing the suit. 9. Having considered the submissions canvassed by the learned advocate for the appellant and in view of the facts narrated hereinabove of the present case, it is clear that the learned trial Court has, while deciding issue no.8 considered Articles 23 and 55 of the Act. Such Articles are reproduced hereinbelow for the sake of convenience: Description of Suit Period of Limitation Time from which period begins to run 23. For money payable to the plaintiff for money paid for the defendant. Three years When the money is paid. 55. For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for. Three years. When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) when it ceases. 10. The undisputed fact which is on record is that the contract was for a period of 2 years commencing from 18.6.1985 to 17.6.1987 which was extended upto 11.8.1987. It has also surfaced on the record of the case that after 11.8.1987, the period of contract was not extended and the plaintiffs waited to fix the liability of damages till 8.4.1993 on which date, the clause 10(c) of agreement was put into service and the liability of damages was fixed on the defendants. Thereafter, a notice dated 17.7.1993 was issued to the defendants calling upon to pay the amount of damages to the tune of Rs.15,54,588-84 Paisa. The suit is admittedly for claim of damages. The suit contract was never extended after 11.8.1987. As per the say of plaintiff, the account of defendant was not settled. The plaintiff took nearly 6 years in fixing the liability. And also took almost 9 years from 11.8.1987 for filing the suit against defendant. The contract came to an end on 11.8.1987. The letters issued by plaintiff to defendant Exhs.99 and 100 and 101 dated 22.9.1987, 23.9.1987 and 31.12.1987 respectively demonstrate that the liability was fixed by plaintiff. However, the suit was not filed within a period of limitation of 3 years from 31.12.1987. The contract came to an end on 11.8.1987. The letters issued by plaintiff to defendant Exhs.99 and 100 and 101 dated 22.9.1987, 23.9.1987 and 31.12.1987 respectively demonstrate that the liability was fixed by plaintiff. However, the suit was not filed within a period of limitation of 3 years from 31.12.1987. 11. The cause of action for claiming damages could be said to have arisen from the last date of extended period of contract i.e. 11.8.1987 or at most from 31.12.1987, the day when the liability of defendant was fixed. The cause of action cannot be said to be extended upto 8.4.1993. There is nothing on record explaining the period between 31.12.1987 till 8.4.1993. By fixing a liability of damages on 8.4.1993, the cause of action cannot be said to have been extended. When the liability of damages was fixed on 8.4.1993, the period of limitation has already been expired. 12. By writing letters or communications or by fixing a liability for compensation / damages, period of limitation cannot be extended. 13. In the present case as observed hereinabove, the cause of action for filing suit of damages arose on 11.8.1987 and the suit is filed on 6.4.1996. Even after fixing a so called liability of damages in the year 8.4.1993, plaintiffs waited till 6.4.1993 for filing a suit. There is no explanation in the plaint or in oral evidence regarding such lapse. 14. The next question which requires consideration is whether the appellant having its separate & distinct identity and not being a Central Government, can be said to have filed this suit on behalf of the Central Government. On the facts of the case, there is no controversy that plaintiff had entered into a contract with the defendant on its own account and not on behalf of the Central Government. There is no dispute that the contract was to be performed by the defendant for the purposes of plaintiff - appellant and not for the purpose of Central Government. There is also no dispute that the payment to be made or payment was to have been made would come from the funds of the plaintiff and not from the funds of the Central Government. It is also clear from the averments made in the plaint that the plaintiff has suffered damages on account of breach being committed by defendants. There is also no dispute that the payment to be made or payment was to have been made would come from the funds of the plaintiff and not from the funds of the Central Government. It is also clear from the averments made in the plaint that the plaintiff has suffered damages on account of breach being committed by defendants. Losses and damages have not been suffered to the central government. It is also not the case of the plaintiff that the suit has been filed for and on behalf of the Central Government. Even otherwise, this submission on behalf of the appellant would not bear scrutiny, inasmuch as the plaintiff has not even indirectly mentioned in the plaint the suit is filed for and on behalf of the Central Government. Even if such an averment or assertion found place in the plaint, that by itself would not have served the purpose, inasmuch as, no legal action can be taken by any agency purporting to act for and on behalf of the Central Government, unless such agency has been specifically authorized in fact or in law. No such authorization is proffered or purported to have been granted in favour of the plaintiff. On these facts, I can only find that the appellant – plaintiff had not filed the suit for and on behalf of the Central Government. I am of the view that the fact situation of even the situation in law would not necessarily confer upon the appellant the status of the "Central Government" within the meaning of Article 112 of the Act. 15. The plaintiff has specifically averred in the plaint that the contract was not extended after 11.8.1987. When the suit is filed for damages arising from the breach of contract, the day on which breach is specifically identified by the plaintiff, limitation would obviously begin to run from that date i.e. from 11.8.1987. Thus, the suit is clearly time barred. 16. Article 112 of the Act has no application to the facts of the present case in view of above discussions. Instead, Article 113 of the Act would be applicable which reads as under: Description of Suit Period of Limitation Time from which period begins to run 113. Any suit for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this Schedule. Three years. When the right to sue accrues. 17. Instead, Article 113 of the Act would be applicable which reads as under: Description of Suit Period of Limitation Time from which period begins to run 113. Any suit for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this Schedule. Three years. When the right to sue accrues. 17. The aforesaid Article prescribes period of limitation of three years from the date on which the right to sue accrues. 18. As observed hereinabove, the right to sue accrues on 11.8.1987 and the suit ought to have been filed within a period of three years from that date. 19. In view of the above set of facts, I do not find any reason to interfere in the observations and the findings arrived at by the learned trial Court in the order impugned. 20. In view of above, the appeal is merit less and deserves to be dismissed and accordingly, it is dismissed with no order as to costs. 21. The Record and Proceedings, if lying with this Court, may be sent back to the Court below, forthwith.