JUDGMENT : HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE KAUSHIK GOSWAMI Heard Mr. C. Lalfakzuala, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Ms. Valentina Laldinpuii, learned counsel for the respondent. 2. This Second Appeal, i.e., RSA No. 1/2023 is preferred under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 against the impugned Judgment & Order dated 13.03.2023 passed by the learned Addl. District Judge, Aizawl in RFA No. 30/2019 arising out of Heirship Certificate Case No. 564/2002. 3. The facts of the case is that the appellant and the respondent are siblings, whose parents were Pu C. Kapthuama and Pi Hrangdailovi. Upon the death of their father, their mother i.e., Pi Hrangdailovi applied for Heirship Certificate over Land Settlement Certificate (LSC) No. 770/1984 and its adjacent LSC No. 771/1984. Accordingly, Heirship Certificate was issued to their mother. 4. On 04.03.2000, the appellant’s mother expired. Upon her death, the respondent applied for Heirship Certificate in respect of LSC No. 770/1984 and LSC No. 771/1984, before the Subordinate District Council Court (herein after referred to as ‘SDCC’), Aizawl on 05.11.2002. 5. The SDCC, Aizawl by Order dated 05.11.2022 issued Heirship Certificate notice for 45 days. 6. Thereafter, on 02.12.2002, the SDCC, Aizawl issued the Heirship Certificate No. 564/2002 to the respondent before the expiry of the stipulated period of 45 days in respect of LSC No. 770/1984 and LSC No. 771/1984. 7. The appellant after having knowledge of the said Heirship Certificate, preferred an appeal i.e., RFA No. 30/2019 against the said Order dated 02.12.2002 issued by the SDCC, Aizawl, alongwith an application i.e., CMA No. 575/2019 for condonation of delay of 17 years and 4 days in preferring the said appeal. 8. The learned Addl. District Judge vide Judgment and Order dated 12.11.2021 was pleased to allow the said application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. 9. That the First Appellate Court framed the following issues for determination:- i) whether the issuance of Certificate No. 564/2002 is questionable and liable to be set aside and quashed? ii) whether Heirship Certificate No. 1789/2019 issued in favour of the appellant is liable to be set aside and quashed? 10. Upon hearing the parties, the learned Addl. 9. That the First Appellate Court framed the following issues for determination:- i) whether the issuance of Certificate No. 564/2002 is questionable and liable to be set aside and quashed? ii) whether Heirship Certificate No. 1789/2019 issued in favour of the appellant is liable to be set aside and quashed? 10. Upon hearing the parties, the learned Addl. District Judge, Aizawl vide Judgment and Order dated 13.03.2023 disposed of the appeal, after coming to the finding that there are no reason to interfere with the impugned Heirship Certificate No 564/2002 issued in favour of the respondent by the SDCC, Aizawl by Order dated 02.12.2002. However, the Heirship Certificate No. 1789/2019 dated 04.10.2019 issued in favour of the appellant by the learned Senior Civil Judge-III, Aizawl was set aside and thereafter, remanded back to the Court of Senior Civil Judge-III for a de-novotrial by impleading the appellant as defendant. 11. The appellant being aggrieved by the said Judgment and Order to the extent of up-holding of the Heirship Certificate No. 564/ 2002 issued in favour of the respondent, preferred the instant Second Appeal. 12. This Court while admitting the Second Appeal by Order dated 29.09.2023, formulated the following substantial question of law:- i) whether the decision of the learned appellate court is perverse in not considering the alleged fact that the impugned Heirship Certificate was issued prior to the expiry of the notice period and ex parte against the appellant? ii) whether after condonation of delay in preferring the appeal, the learned appellate court committed error in dismissing the appeal only on the ground that the appeal was preferred at belated stage? 13. Mr. C. Lalfakzuala, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant and his family have been residing in the land and building covered under LSC No.770/1984 since 1998. The appellant came to know that the LSC No. 770/1984 was mutated on 08.06.2018 in the name of the respondent on the strength of Heirship Certificate No. 564/2002, when he approached the Land Revenue and Settlement Department, Government of Mizoram on 08.11.2019 to mutate the LSC No. 770/1984 on the strength of the Heirship Certificate No. 1784/2019 dated 04.10.2019 issued in his name. 14. 14. He further submits that the First Appellate Court committed manifest error by affirming the Order of the SDCC, Aizawl dated 02.12.2002, inasmuch as, the Heirship Certificate was granted before the expiry of the notice period and hence is totally perverse. 15. He further submits that the First Appellate Court ought not have dismissed the appeal on the grounds of delay after the said delay was condoned by the Appellate Court by its Order dated 12.11.2021. 16. He further submits that the order of remand in respect of the Heirship Certificate No. 179/2019 for de-novotrial would be a futile exercise, inasmuch as, the Heirship Certificate No. 564/2022 has not been set aside. 17. Ms. Valentina Laldinpuii, learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand submits that the appellant has been living separately with his family and it is the respondent who had been taking responsibility as head of the family and looked after their mother till her death. 18. She further submits that their mother executed a valid Will dated 09.11.1999 in favour of the respondent, bequeathing all her properties to the respondent. 19. She further submits that the Appellant Court has considered the issuance of Heirship Certificate no. 564/2002 prior to the expiry of the notice period which was reflected several times in the Order dated 13.03.2023. She further submits that at the time of issuance of the Heirship Certificate No. 564/2002, there was no hard and fast rule in the proceedings of the Court to strictly adhere to it. 20. She further submits that the appellant under the Mizo Customary Law has no right or claim whatsoever over the land covered under LSC No. 770/1984. In support of the aforesaid submission, she relies upon the Judgment of this Court in the case of Thansiami Vs. Lalruatkima and Ors. in RSA No. 10/2007, which has been affirmed by the Supreme Court in Kaithuami Vs. L. R. Rallianiani and Ors., reported in (2022) SCC Online SC 512. 21. By placing reliance in the aforementioned judgments, she submits that since the respondent has supported their mother till her last breath and the appellant lived separately and had done nothing to support their mother, it is the respondent alone who is entitled to be declared as the legal heir of their mother. She further submits that since their mother has left a valid Will dated 9. She further submits that since their mother has left a valid Will dated 9. 11.1999 executed in her favour with regard to the subject property which is not under challenge, the findings of the Appellate Court warrants no interference. 22. She further submits that the Appellate Court has committed no error in coming to a concurrent finding. She further submits that although the Heirship Certificate no. 564 of 2002 was issued before the expiry of the notice period and no reasons for such issuance was recorded or found in the record, however, since there was no definite rule for the Court to follow at the time of issuance of the Heirship Certificate No. 564/2002 and the Mizo Customary Law was in force at the time, and that, since the appellant had already separated from his family, and the respondent was the one who took care of the mother till her death, and that since the respondent has a valid Will, it is evident that the appellant was not entitled to the properties of the deceased mother based on the Mizo Customary Law and also on the strength of the Will which was not questioned or contested by the appellant. 23. She accordingly submits that there is no perversity or illegality in the decision of the Appellate Court with respect to the issuance of a Heirship Certificate No. 564/2002. 24. In respect to the substantial question No. 2, she submits that condonation of delay was allowed in favour of the appellant for justice and equity and to give an opportunity to the appellant to make her submissions and to state her claims with respect to the issuance of the Heirship Certificate No. 564/2002. She further submits that it is impossible for the appellant not to know about the issuance of the said Heirship Certificate as they have been battling over for many years with regard to the subject plot. Accordingly, she submits that there is no substance in the second substantial question of law framed by this Court. 25. I have heard the submissions made at the bar and have perused the materials available on record and have also considered the citations relied by both the parties in support of their respective stand. 26. It is a settled law that unless the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law, Second Appeal is not maintainable. 26. It is a settled law that unless the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law, Second Appeal is not maintainable. A question of law if affects the right of parties to the suit among others will be a substantial question of law. 27. Reference is made to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Boodireddy Chandraiah and Others Vs Arigela Laxmi and Others, reported in ( 2007) 8 SCC 155. Paragraph 4 is reproduced hereunder for ready reference: 4. “17. After the amendment a second appeal can be filed only if a substantial question of law is involved in the case. The memorandum of appeal must precisely state the substantial question of law involved and the High Court is obliged to satisfy itself regarding the existence of such a question. If satisfied, the High Court has to formulate the substantial question of law involved in the case. The appeal is required to be heard on the question so formulated. However, the respondent at the time of hearing of the appeal has a right to argue that the case in the Court did not involve any substantial question of law. The proviso to the section acknowledges the powers of the High Court to hear the appeal on a substantial point of law, though not formulated by it with the object of ensuring that no injustice is done to the litigant where such a question was not formulated at the time of admission either by mistake or by inadvertence. 18. It has been noted time and again that without insisting for the statement of such a substantial question of law in the memorandum of appeal and formulating the same at the time of admission, the High Courts have been issuing notices and generally deciding the second appeals without adhering to the procedure prescribed under Section 100 CPC. It has further been found in a number of cases that no efforts are made to distinguish between a question of law and a substantial question of law. In exercise of the powers under this section in several cases, the findings of fact of the first appellate court are found to have been disturbed. It has to be kept in mind that the right of appeal is neither a natural nor an inherent right attached to the litigation. In exercise of the powers under this section in several cases, the findings of fact of the first appellate court are found to have been disturbed. It has to be kept in mind that the right of appeal is neither a natural nor an inherent right attached to the litigation. Being a substantive statutory right, it has to be regulated in accordance with law in force at the relevant time. The conditions mentioned in the section must be strictly fulfilled before a second appeal can be maintained and no court has the power to add or to enlarge those grounds. The second appeal cannot be decided on merely equitable grounds. The concurrent findings of facts will not be disturbed by the High Court in exercise of the powers under this section. Further, a substantial question of law has to be distinguished from a substantial question of fact. This Court in Chunilal V. Mehta and Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd. [ AIR 1962 SC 1314 ] held that : (AIR p. 1318, para 6) ‘6. … The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law.’ 19. It is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds on which the findings were arrived at, by the last court of fact, being the first appellate court. It is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds on which the findings were arrived at, by the last court of fact, being the first appellate court. It is true that the lower appellate court should not ordinarily reject witnesses accepted by the trial court in respect of credibility but even where it has rejected the witnesses accepted by the trial court, the same is no ground for interference in second appeal when it is found that the appellate court has given satisfactory reasons for doing so. In a case where from a given set of circumstances two inferences of fact are possible, the one drawn by the lower appellate court will not be interfered by the High Court in second appeal. Adopting any other approach is not permissible. The High Court will, however, interfere where it is found that the conclusions drawn by the lower appellate court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable or its settled position on the basis of pronouncements made by the Apex Court, or was based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at by ignoring material evidence. 20. The question of law raised will not be considered as a substantial question of law, if it stands already decided by a larger Bench of the High Court concerned or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or by the Supreme Court. Where the facts required for a point of law have not been pleaded, a litigant should not be allowed to raise that question as a substantial question of law in second appeal. The mere appreciation of facts, the documentary evidence or the meaning of entries and the contents of the documents cannot be held to be raising a substantial question of law. But where it is found that the first appellate court has assumed jurisdiction which did not vest in it, the same can be adjudicated in the second appeal, treating it as a substantial question of law. Where the first appellate court is shown to have exercised its discretion in a judicial manner, it cannot be termed to be an error either of law or of procedure requiring interference in second appeal. Where the first appellate court is shown to have exercised its discretion in a judicial manner, it cannot be termed to be an error either of law or of procedure requiring interference in second appeal. This Court in Reserve Bank of India v. Ramkrishna Govind Morey [ (1976) 1 SCC 803 ] held that whether the trial court should not have exercised its jurisdiction differently is not a question of law justifying interference. (See Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar [ (1999) 3 SCC 722 ] .) 21. The phrase ‘substantial question of law’, as occurring in the amended Section 100 CPC is not defined in the Code. The word substantial, as qualifying ‘question of law’, means—of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with—technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of ‘substantial question of law’ by suffixing the words ‘of general importance’ as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code or Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution. The substantial question of law on which a second appeal shall be heard need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general importance. In Guran Ditta v. T. Ram Ditta [(1927-28) 55 IA 235 : AIR 1928 PC 172 ] the phrase ‘substantial question of law’ as it was employed in the last clause of the then existing Section 100 CPC (since omitted by the Amendment Act, 1973) came up for consideration and Their Lordships held that it did not mean a substantial question of general importance but a substantial question of law which was involved in the case. In Chunilal case [ AIR 1962 SC 1314 ] the Constitution Bench expressed agreement with the following view taken by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Rimmalapudi Subba Rao v. Noony Veeraju [ AIR 1951 Mad 969 ] : (Chunilal case [ AIR 1962 SC 1314 ] , AIR p. 1318, para 5) ‘5. … when a question of law is fairly arguable, where there is room for difference of opinion on it or where the court thought it necessary to deal with that question at some length and discuss alternative views, then the question would be a substantial question of law. … when a question of law is fairly arguable, where there is room for difference of opinion on it or where the court thought it necessary to deal with that question at some length and discuss alternative views, then the question would be a substantial question of law. On the other hand if the question was practically covered by the decision of the highest court or if the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and the only question was of applying those principles to the particular facts of the case it would not be a substantial question of law.’ This Court laid down the following test as proper test, for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial : (Chunilal case [ AIR 1962 SC 1314 ] , AIR p. 1318, para 6) ‘6. … The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law.’ 22. In Dy. Commr. v. Rama Krishna Narain [(1953) 2 SCC 319 : AIR 1953 SC 521 ] also it was held that a question of law of importance to the parties was a substantial question of law entitling the appellant to a certificate under (the then) Section 100 CPC. 23. To be ‘substantial’ a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, insofar as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. 23. To be ‘substantial’ a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, insofar as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law ‘involving in the case’ there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. An entirely new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstance of each case whether a question of law is a substantial one and involved in the case or not, the paramount overall consideration being the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis. (See Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari [ (2001) 3 SCC 179 ] .) 24. The principles relating to Section 100 CPC relevant for this case may be summarised thus: (i) An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a document is a question of fact. But the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question of law. Construction of a document involving the application of any principle of law, is also a question of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law. (ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. A question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a question, answer to which affects the rights of parties to the suit) will be a substantial question of law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from binding precedents, and, involves a debatable legal issue. A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal position is clear, either on account of express provisions of law or binding precedents, but the court below has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of cases, the substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable, but because the decision rendered on a material question, violates the settled position of law. (iii) The general rule is that the High Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well-recognised exceptions are where (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. When we refer to ‘decision based on no evidence’, it not only refers to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding.” 28. In the present case, the questions framed has a bearing on the decision of the case, answers to the question affects the substantial rights of the parties to the suit and involves a debatable legal issue. Therefore, the two questions framed are substantial questions of law. 29. I shall now decide the substantial question of law No. 1 as whether the decision of the learned Appellate Court is perverse in not considering the alleged fact that the impugned Heirship Certificate was issued prior to the expiry of the notice period and ex-parte against the appellant. 30. It appears that the appellant and respondent are children of C. Kapthuma (L) and Hrangdailovi (L) and after the death of their father, their mother i.e., Hrangdailovi (L) applied for Heirship Certificate over LSC No. 770/1984 and its adjacent LSC No. 771/1984 and the same were issued to her. Thereafter, their mother expired on 04.03.2000 and after her death, respondent applied for Heirship Certificate in respect of LSC No. 770/1984 and LSC No. 771/1984 before the SDCC, Aizawl on 05.11.2002. The said SDCC, Aizawl on 05.11.2002 was pleased to issue notice for 45 days. The said 45 days notice period would expire on 20.12.2002. Thereafter, their mother expired on 04.03.2000 and after her death, respondent applied for Heirship Certificate in respect of LSC No. 770/1984 and LSC No. 771/1984 before the SDCC, Aizawl on 05.11.2002. The said SDCC, Aizawl on 05.11.2002 was pleased to issue notice for 45 days. The said 45 days notice period would expire on 20.12.2002. However, it appears that before the expiry of the said 45 days notice period, the said SDCC, Aizawl on 02.12.2002, without hearing the appellant, issued the Heirship Certificate No. 564/2002 to the respondent in respect to the said Land Settlement Certificates over the subject land. The said order of the SDCC, Aizawl on the face of it appears to be illegal. A copy of the order sheet of the said SDCC, Aizawl is reproduced hereunder for ready reference: IN THE COURT OF SDCC CASE NO.H/C-564/2002 C. Lalrinkimi VERSUS Zemabawk Date of order of proceeding 5-11-02 No.5558-60 5.11.02 2-11-02 No.5147-9 2-12-02 ORDER : OF OTHER PROCEEDING H/C notices for 45 days Notice Period is over. No Counter Claim is received. H/C maybe issued as prayed for. Signature of Court Sd/- Sd/- 31. Perusal of the SDCC, Aizawl Order dated 2.12.2002 indicates that the said Court issued the said Heirship Certificate exparte before expiry of the notice period, thereby, depriving the appellant the right of hearing and opportunity before granting the said Heirship Certificate, which is adverse to his poential right over the subject land as admittedly, he is one of the legal heir of the deceased, i.e, Hrangdailovi (L) /Land Settlement holder. Further the said Heirship Certificate was issued on the basis of “no evidence” whatsoever. 32. Against the aforesaid Order dated 02.12.2002 passed by the SDCC, Aizawl, a Regular First Appeal being RFA No. 30/2019 was filed by the appellant before the Addl. District Judge, Aizawl. 33. The learned Addl. District Judge, Aizawl vide the impugned Judgment and Order dated 13.03.2023 came to a finding that when the Heirship Certificate filed by the appellant and his brother was dismissed on default, an application for probate was filed by the respondent on the same day. The fact that the application for probate of Will of appellant’s mother was filed by the respondent on the same day the application for Heirship Certificate filed by the appellant and his brother was dismissed on default, it would be impossible for the appellant not to have knowledge of it. The fact that the application for probate of Will of appellant’s mother was filed by the respondent on the same day the application for Heirship Certificate filed by the appellant and his brother was dismissed on default, it would be impossible for the appellant not to have knowledge of it. It is the further finding of the Court below that notices were issued in two different newspapers and none filed objection till date Heirship Certificate No. 564/2002 was issued on 02.12.2002, which was three days before the expiry of the notice period or even during the stipulated notice period, further no objection or appeal was filed by appellant after the impugned Heirship Certificate No. 564/2002 was issued till the instant appeal is filed after the lapse of 17 years. Accordingly, the Addl. District Judge, Aizawl Judicial District found no reason to interfere with the impugned Heirship Certificate No. 564/2002 issued by the SDCC, Aizawl on 02.12.2002. 34. Pertinent, that the appellant was granted Heirship Certificate No. 1789/2019 by the Court of Senior Civil Judge No.3 in respect of the same Land Settlement Certificate i.e., LSC No. 770/1984 and LSC No. 771/1984. The Addl. District Judge, Aizawl Judicial District by the impugned Judgment and Order dated 13.03.2023 held that with respect to the Heirship Certificate No. 1789/2019, the record shows that it was issued on the date of its application without issuing a notice inviting possible objection and there was a clear violation of doctrine of natural justice and therefore, the impugned Heirship Certificate No. 1789/2019 issued by the learned Senior Judge No. 3, Aizawl on 04.10.2019 is liable to be set aside and quashed. The operating portion of the aforesaid impugned order is reproduced hereunder for ready reference:- “15. Therefore, with the above reasons and finding, the appeal against the order and Heirship Certificate No. 564 of 2002 passed by the Magistrate First Class, SDCC, Aizawl on 2nd December, 2002 is not allowed. However, Heirship Certificate No. 1789 of 2019 issued and passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge-III, Aizawl District on 4th October, 2019 is hereby set aside and quashed. 16. The case of Heirship Certificate No. 1789 of 2019 is therefore remanded back to the learned court of Senior Civil Judge –III, Aizawl District, Aizawl for a de novo trial to implead the respondent as party/defendant (respondent) by giving an opportunity to contest the case.” 35. 16. The case of Heirship Certificate No. 1789 of 2019 is therefore remanded back to the learned court of Senior Civil Judge –III, Aizawl District, Aizawl for a de novo trial to implead the respondent as party/defendant (respondent) by giving an opportunity to contest the case.” 35. Reading of the aforesaid impugned Judgment and Order makes it abundantly clear that the First Appellate Court concurred with the finding of the SDCC, Aizawl which was based on no evidence. 36. It further appears that the SDCC, Aizawl had issued the subject Land Settlement Certificate to the respondent before the expiry of the notice period. Therefore, the same is granted without hearing the appellant. 37. Pertinent that Section 7 of the Mizo District (Land & Revenue) Act, 1956 as applicable then, provides that the settlement holder shall have heritable and transferable right over the land settled with oneself under the provisions of the said Act. Therefore, the subject Land Settlement Cetificate in respect to the appellant’s mother being heritable and transferable, upon the expiry of the appellant’s mother, he being one of her male heir, had a potential right of inheriting the subject Land Settlement Cetificate over the subject land. 38. Therefore, the appellant had a right to be heard, before issuance of the Heirship Certificate in favour of the respondent over the subject land. As such, it was imperative upon the SDCC, Aizawl to wait for the notice period to expire, before issuing the impugned Heirship Certificate. Issuance of the impugned Heirship Certificate exparte prior to the expiry of the notice period affects the appellant’s potential statutory right over the subject land. The appellant’s potential right over the subject land is not only a constitutional and statutory right but also a human right. Therefore, the appellant’s potential constitutional, statutory and human right has been totally infringed. Further, there has been gross violation of the principles of natural justice. As such, the order of the SDCC, Aizawl is absolutely illegal, null and void. Reference is made to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of TukaramKanna Joshi Vs. MIDC, reported in (2013) 1 SCC 353 . Paragraph 9 of the said judgment is reproduced hereunder for ready reference:- “9. The right to property is now considered to be not only a constitutional or a statutory right but also a human right. Reference is made to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of TukaramKanna Joshi Vs. MIDC, reported in (2013) 1 SCC 353 . Paragraph 9 of the said judgment is reproduced hereunder for ready reference:- “9. The right to property is now considered to be not only a constitutional or a statutory right but also a human right. Though, it is not a basic feature of the Constitution or a fundamental right. Human rights are considered to be in realm of individual rights, such as the right to health, the right to livelihood, the right to shelter and employment, etc. Now however, human rights are gaining an even greater multifaceted dimension. The right to property is considered very much to be a part of such new dimension.” 39. Reference is also made to paragraph 77, 214, 215, 241 of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of A.R. Antule vs. R.S. Naik, reported in (1988) 2 SCC 602 , which are reproduced hereunder for ready reference: Top of Form Bottom of Form Top of Form 77. The directions given by the order of 16-2-1984 [ (1984) 2 SCC 183 , 243 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 172 : (1984) 2 SCR 495 , 557] at page 557 (SCC p. 243) were certainly without hearing though in the presence of the parties. Again consequential upon directions these were challenged ultimately in this Court and finally this Court reserved the right to challenge these by an appropriate application. 214. The appellant's contention that the impugned direction issued by this Court on 16-2-1984 was in violation of the principles of natural justice appears to be well founded. It is really not in dispute before us that there was no whisper or suggestion in the proceedings before this Court that the venue of the trial should be shifted to the High Court. This direction was issued suo motu by the learned Judges without putting it to the counsel for the parties that this was what they proposed to do. The difficulties created by observations or directions on issues not debated before the court have been highlighted by Lord Diplock in Hadmor Productions Ltd. v. Hamilton [(1983) 1 AC 191] . This direction was issued suo motu by the learned Judges without putting it to the counsel for the parties that this was what they proposed to do. The difficulties created by observations or directions on issues not debated before the court have been highlighted by Lord Diplock in Hadmor Productions Ltd. v. Hamilton [(1983) 1 AC 191] . In that case, Lord Denning, in the Court of Appeal, had in his judgment, relied on a certain passage from the speech of Lord Wedderburn in Parliament as reported in Hansard (Parliamentary Reports) in support of the view taken by him. The counsel for the parties had had no inkling or information that recourse was likely to be had by the judge to this source, as it had been authoritatively held by the House of Lords in Davis v. Johnson [ 1979 AC 264 : (1978) 1 All ER 1132 (HL)] that these reports should not be referred to by counsel or relied upon by the court for any purpose. Commenting on this aspect, Lord Diplock observed: (AC p. 233) “Under our adversary system of procedure, for a judge to disregard the rule by which counsel are bound has the effect of depriving the parties to the action of the benefit of one of the most fundamental rules of natural justice: the right of each to be informed of any point adverse to him that is going to be relied upon by the judge and to be given an opportunity of stating what his answer to it is. In the instant case, counsel for Hamilton and Bould complained that Lord Denning, M.R. had selected one speech alone to rely upon out of many that had been made ... and that if he, as counsel, had known that the Master of the Rolls (Lord Denning) was going to do that, not only would he have wished to criticize what Lord Wedderburn had said in his speech. ... but he would also have wished to rely on other speeches disagreeing with Lord Wedderburn if he, as counsel, had been entitled to refer to Hansard. The position is somewhat worse in the present case. ... but he would also have wished to rely on other speeches disagreeing with Lord Wedderburn if he, as counsel, had been entitled to refer to Hansard. The position is somewhat worse in the present case. Unlike the Hamilton case [(1983) 1 AC 191] where the judge had only used Hansard to deal with an issue that arose in the appeal, the direction in the present case was something totally alien to the scope of the appeal, on an issue that was neither raised nor debated in the course of the hearing and completely unexpected. 215. Shri Jethmalani submitted that, when the judgment was announced, counsel for the complainant (present respondent) had made an oral request that the trial be transferred to the High Court and that the judges replied that they had already done that. He submitted that, at that time and subsequently, the appellant could have protested and put forward his objections but did not and had thus acquiesced in a direction which was, in truth, beneficial to him as this Court had only directed that he should be tried by a High Court judge, a direction against which no one can reasonably complain. This aspect of the respondent's arguments will be dealt with later but, for the present, all that is necessary is to say that the direction must have come as a surprise to the appellant and had been issued without hearing him on the course proposed to be adopted. 241. The only question that has been bothering me is that the appellant had been given no chance of being heard before the impugned direction was given and one cannot say whether the Bench would have acted in the same way even if he had been given such opportunity. However, in the circumstances of the case, I have come to the conclusion that this is not a fit case to interfere with the earlier order on that ground. It is true that the audi alteram partem rule is a basic requirement of the rule of law. But judicial decisions also show that the degree of compliance with this rule and the extent of consequences flowing from failure to do so will vary from case to case. It is true that the audi alteram partem rule is a basic requirement of the rule of law. But judicial decisions also show that the degree of compliance with this rule and the extent of consequences flowing from failure to do so will vary from case to case. Krishna lyer, J. observed thus in Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat [ (1974) 2 SCC 121 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 467 : (1974) 3 SCR 427 : 1974 Cri LJ 1054] thus: (SCR p. 427, headnote) “an order which infringed a fundamental freedom passed in violation of the audi alteram partem rule was a nullity. A determination is no determination if it is contrary to the constitutional mandate of Article 19. On this footing the externment order was of no effect and its violation was no offence. Any order made without hearing the party affected is void and ineffectual to bind parties from the beginning if the injury is to a constitutionally guaranteed right. May be that in ordinary legislation or at common law a Tribunal having jurisdiction and failing to hear the parties may commit an illegality which may render the proceedings voidable when a direct attack was made thereon by way of appeal, revision or review, but nullity is the consequence of unconstitutionality and so the order of an administrative authority charged with the duty of complying with natural justice in the exercise of power before restricting the fundamental right of a citizen is void ab initio and of no legal efficacy. The duty to hear manacles his jurisdictional exercise and any act is, in its inception, void except when performed in accordance with the conditions laid down in regard to hearing.”…….” 40. Thus, the settled position that emerges out from reading the aforesaid decision of the Apex Court is that any order made without hearing the parties whose Fundamental or Constitutional Right has been affected, is totally null and void. 41. There is no doubt that under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the jurisdiction of this Court is very limited and I am bound by the concurrent finding of facts recorded by the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court. 41. There is no doubt that under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the jurisdiction of this Court is very limited and I am bound by the concurrent finding of facts recorded by the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court. Reference is made to the decision of the Apex Court in the cases of Keshab and others vs Gianchand & Others decided on 28.08.2017 in Civil Appeal No. (S) 11059/2017 and Kashmir Singh vs Harnam Singh decided on 03.03.2008 in Appeal (C) No. 1036/2002, wherein the Apex Court has held that though the general rule is that High Court will not interfere with the concurrent finding of the Court below, the said is not an absolute rule; some of the well recognized exceptions are: (i) the Courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the Courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the Courts have wrongly caste the burden of truth. 42. In the case of Keshav & Others Vs. Gian Chand & Others (supra)the Apex Court emphasized that the Second Appellate Court can reverse the findings of the Trial Court and Appellate Court only if the findings of such Courts are perverse or some gross illegality has been committed in arriving at the findings. The Apex Court further held that the reversal can only be done by assessing the evidence and dealing with reasons employed by the two Courts below and recording specific reason for dissent and only in cases where the findings were found to be perverse, only then reversal of findings could have been made. 43. Thus, the Second Appellant Court in a given case, if the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court are based on no evidence or are perverse, may reverse the findings. 44. In the present case, the SDCC, Aizawl issued the impugned Heirship Certificate without any evidence whatsoever. Further, the said Certificate was issued exparte before the expiry of the notice period, depriving the appellant opportunity of being heard, which amounts to total infringement of his potential statutory right over the subject land guaranteed to him by the Constitution of India. The First Appellate Court by upholding the said Heirship Certificate has therefore committed gross illegality. Further, the said Certificate was issued exparte before the expiry of the notice period, depriving the appellant opportunity of being heard, which amounts to total infringement of his potential statutory right over the subject land guaranteed to him by the Constitution of India. The First Appellate Court by upholding the said Heirship Certificate has therefore committed gross illegality. Therefore, the decision of the SDCC, Aizawl and the First Appellate Court are based on no evidence and perverse and have also committed gross illegality in arriving at the impugned findings. As such, the said decisions are palpably erroneous and contrary to the settled position of law and liable to be reversed. Accordingly, the first substantial question of law is answered in favour of the appellant/defendant No.1. 45. I shall now decide the substantial question of law No. 2 as whether after condonation of delay in preferring the appeal, the learned Appellate Court committed error in dismissing the appeal only on the ground that the appeal was preferred at belated stage. 46. Pertinent that in filing the RFA No. 30/2019 against the impugned Judgment and Order dated 02.12.2002 of the SDCC, Aizawl, an application for condonation of 17 years and 4 days was preferred vide CMA No. 575/2019 in the connected First Appeal before the learned Additional District Judge, Aizawl Judicial District. The Additional District Judge vide its Order dated 12.11.2021 allowed the application for condonation with the following observation:- “above being the position, discussion held based on principle of law, it is crystal clear that the delay of 17 years and 4 days in filing the appeal petition was not due to negligence or lapses on the part of the applicant. The issues raised by the applicant required a proper adjudication which was not done in the present case. Hence, it is considered view of the court that their existed a reasonable ground for granting the application and thus the delay of 17 years and 4 days in filing the connected appeal is hereby condoned.” 47. A reading of the aforesaid order of the Addl. District Judge abundantly clarifies that the Court after hearing the parties held that there was no negligence or lapses on the part of the appellant and accordingly, condoned the delay of 17 years and 4 days in filing the connected appeal. A reading of the aforesaid order of the Addl. District Judge abundantly clarifies that the Court after hearing the parties held that there was no negligence or lapses on the part of the appellant and accordingly, condoned the delay of 17 years and 4 days in filing the connected appeal. The findings of the First Appellate Court“ even after the issuance of Heriship Certificate No. 564/2002 to the respondent, the appellant continued to reside in the building over LAC No. 770/1984 without possessing any pass over it and without paying any taxes for the same for more than 16 years during which it would be impossible for any prudent man not to know the existence of the impugned airship certificate No. 564/2002 in the name of the respondent” and “ the inaction of filing objection to the application for Heirship Certificate No. 564/2002 by the appellant before it was issued or after it was issued, without waiting 17 years to pass by, also gives weight to the possibility of him having full knowledge of the existence of the impugned Heirship Certificate No. 564/2002” are totally against the findings of the Court, whereby the delay was condoned in the connected appeal. The first Appellate Court ought not to have dismissed the RFA No. 30/2019 on the ground of delay, inasmuch as, the Appellate Court has found reasonable ground to condone the delay of 17 years and 4 days in filing the connected appeal. Therefore, the Appellate Court appears to have sat on appeal and taken a different view over the order which had attained finality. The said recourse appears to be palpably unreasonable and erroneous. Therefore, the said finding of the Appellate Court is totally perverse. Therefore, I answer the second substantial question of law also in favour of the appellant. 48. In view of the above, the Judgment and Order dated 13.03.2023 passed by the Court of Addl. District Judge, Aizawl Judicial District in RFA No. 30/2019 arising out of Heirship Certificate No. 564/2002 shall be set aside and quashed, to the extent that it has declined to interfere and set aside the impugned Order dated 02.12.2002 and connected Heirship Certificate No. 564/2022 issued by the SDCC, Aizawl. 49. Consequently, the Order dated 02.12.2002 stands reversed and connected Heirship Certificate No. 564/2002 issued by the SDCC, Aizawl stands set aside and quashed. 50. 49. Consequently, the Order dated 02.12.2002 stands reversed and connected Heirship Certificate No. 564/2002 issued by the SDCC, Aizawl stands set aside and quashed. 50. Resultantly, the matter relating to issue of Heirship Certificate No. 564/2002 in respect of LSC No. 770/1984 & LSC No. 771/1984 is remanded back to the Court of Civil Judge, Junior Division, Aizawl for deciding the matter afresh, by giving due opportunity to the appellant in accordance with law. 51. Accordingly, the appeal stands allowed. 52. Send back the LCR.