JUDGMENT : Venkata Jyothirmai Pratapa, J. 1. This Criminal Appeal is filed by the Appellant/Accused under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure,1973[Hereinafter, Cr.P.C.] (for short ‘the Code’) aggrieved by the impugned Judgment of conviction and sentence dated 28.07.2008 passed in C.C.No.9 of 2005 on the file of the Court of Special Judge for SPPE & ACB Cases, Vijayawada[Hereinafter, trial court] for the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. [Hereinafter ‘P.C.Act’] 2. Appellant was convicted under Section 248(2) of the Cr.P.C. and was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one year and to pay a fine of Rs.1000/- ,in default to suffer simple imprisonment for a period of three months for the offence punishable under Section 7 of the P.C. Act and further sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one year and to pay a fine of Rs.1000/-, in default to suffer simple for three months for the offence punishable under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the P.C. Act. The sentences were directed to run concurrently. 3. Appellant herein is the Accused Officer, respondent herein is the Complainant in C.C.No.9 of 2005. For the purpose of convenience, the parties are hereinafter referred to as they arrayed in C.C.No.9 of 2005. 4. During pendency of this Appeal, Accused Officer died and his legal representatives were brought on record as Appellant Nos., 2 to 5, vide order dated 23.01.2024 in I.A.No.3 of 2023. 5. The brief case of the prosecution is; a. At the relevant point of time i.e., 30.12.2002 to 12.12.2003, Accused Officer was working as Divisional Panchayat Officer, Kovcvuru, West Godavari District, the De facto Complainant(PW.1)/ Kadali Trimurthulu was the Sarpanch of Krishnampalem village, Devarapalli Mandal, West Godavari District and one Sankavarapu Krishna was the Village Secretary of Krishnampalem Village. Since the said Krishna mismanaged the work, members of Gram Panchayat passed a Resolution on 18.08.2003 and transferred him and then, De facto Complainant(P.W.1) locked the record room on 29.08.2003 to avoid tampering of records. b. On the next day, the Accused Officer, who is Divisional Panchayat Officer came to the Office and informed that he was asked to conduct an enquiry into the matter. b. On the next day, the Accused Officer, who is Divisional Panchayat Officer came to the Office and informed that he was asked to conduct an enquiry into the matter. De facto Complainant and the other office staff narrated the incident and while leaving, the Accused Officer took way the minutes book, cheque book and cash book along with him and Accused Officer submitted a report to P.W.2/District Panchayat Officer. c. Basing on the said report, a notice was issued to De facto Complainant by the District Panchayat Officer terminating his independent cheque power and he was ordered to get the counter signatures on the cheques by the Extension Officer, Devarapalli. A show cause notice was issued to De facto Complainant by the District Panchayat Officer directing him to give explanation for the irregularities in the Administration of the Grampanachayat. In turn, he submitted his explanation to District Panchayat Officer on 27.10.2003 through the Accused Officer. d. When P.W.1 approached the Accused Officer, he demanded De facto Complainant(P.W.1) an amount of Rs.3000/- as bribe to send a favourable report. When De facto Complainant expressed his inability, it was reduced to Rs.1000/-. e. De facto Complainant approached the ACB officials and gave a report and in the trap, the Accused Officer was trapped. During post trap Proceedings, the right and left hand fingers of the Accused Officer turned pink. f. Basing on Ex.P1/report of P.w.1, P.W.6 registered a case against Accused Officer and issued FIR No.17/RCT-EWG/2003 dated 11.12.2003. After due investigation, P.W.6 filed a Charge Sheet against the Accused Officer for the offence punishable under Sections 7 of the P.C.Act and Sections 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the P.C.Act. Procedural History 6. Accused Officer appeared before the trial Court, denied the charges, plead not guilty and claimed to be tried. 7. To substantiate its case before the Trial Court, prosecution examined PWs.1 to 6 and Exs.P1 to P18 documents were marked, apart from marking material objects M.Os.1 to 7. Ex.X.1-Authorisation Order in G.O.Rt.No.885 dated 21.06.2007 was marked through P.W.4. On behalf of the defence, D.W.1 was examined and no documents were marked. 8. After hearing both sides and on appreciation of the evidence on record, Learned Trial Judge came to the conclusion that the Accused Officer demanded and accepted the bribe amount for doing official favour to P.W.1. Ex.X.1-Authorisation Order in G.O.Rt.No.885 dated 21.06.2007 was marked through P.W.4. On behalf of the defence, D.W.1 was examined and no documents were marked. 8. After hearing both sides and on appreciation of the evidence on record, Learned Trial Judge came to the conclusion that the Accused Officer demanded and accepted the bribe amount for doing official favour to P.W.1. as he kept the work of P.W.1 pending with him till the demanded bribe was paid and thereby, found the Accused Officer guilty of the offence and convicted him and sentenced as stated supra. Grounds of Appeal 9. Feeling aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the impugned Judgment of conviction, Accused Officer preferred the present Criminal Appeal on the following grounds: a. From the evidence of P.W.1, it can be seen that there is no official favour pending with A.1. b. P.W.2 admitted that the Accused Officer has no right to restore the cheque power to the de facto Complainant/P.W.1. c. P.W.1 has submitted Ex.P3/explanation to P.W.2 as there is no need to submit explanation to the Accused Officer. d. Ex.P3/explanation of P.W.1 does not contain the signature of Accused Officer and even did not contain the request for restoration of the cheque power to P.W.1. e. Prosecution failed to place evidence on record in respect of the demand of bribe by the Accused Officer. The alleged money was paid to the Accused Officer for the personal satisfaction of P.W.1, but not for attending any official favour. f. There is no material to show that the Accused Officer received any amount of bribe or any illegal means. P.W.2/District Panchayat Officer, who is Superior Officer to the Accused Officer stated that no complaint was received against the Accused Officer. g. P.W.1 admitted that he felt ashamed on account of restriction of his cheque power and hence, he filed the present false criminal case against Accused officer. h. Accused Officer filed some documents along with the written statement to show his conduct and dedication to his service which was corroborated by the evidence of P.W.2. Arguments Advanced at the Bar 10. Heard Dr.Majji Suri Babu, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of Dr.J.V.S.H.Sastry for the Appellants and Smt. A.Gayatri Reddy, learned Special Public Prosecutor for ACB/respondent-State. 11. h. Accused Officer filed some documents along with the written statement to show his conduct and dedication to his service which was corroborated by the evidence of P.W.2. Arguments Advanced at the Bar 10. Heard Dr.Majji Suri Babu, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of Dr.J.V.S.H.Sastry for the Appellants and Smt. A.Gayatri Reddy, learned Special Public Prosecutor for ACB/respondent-State. 11. Learned counsel for the Appellants would submit that during the pendency of this Appeal, Accused Officer died and his legal Representatives were brought on record and they are pursuing this Appeal. It is vehemently submitted that the prosecution failed to establish the demand and acceptance of bribe by the Accused Officer. It is pointed out that an enquiry was conducted against P.W.1 by the Accused Officer. Learned counsel submits that Ex.P16/Post trap proceedings were completed by 3.50 p.m. on 12.12.2003 but the evidence of P.W.1 would indicate that the Accused Officer came to the office at 3.30 p.m. and met him at 4.00 or 4.30 p.m. Learned counsel further submits that the FIR is prepared before the alleged raid. Learned counsel submits that P.W.1 bore grudge and developed enmity against the Accused Officer under the impression that the Accused Officer has restricted his cheque power and the same was reiterated in his Section 164 Cr.P.C. statement. It is also pointed out that the FIR does not contain the signature of P.W.1. 12. Learned counsel submits that P.W.1 has got official work with P.W.2 but not with the Accused Officer and that the P.W.2, who is a Superior Officer to the Accused Officer, certified the character of the Accused Officer. It is argued that the when the P.W.1 says that he cannot read and write Telugu, there is no endorsement that the contents of the report and trap proceedings were read over him and the record would transpire that P.W.1 entered the chamber of the Accused Officer as unknown to him just before entry of the ACB officials and it has within the exclusive knowledge of the Accused Officer and P.W.1. It is submitted that in the evidence, P.W.1 categorically stated that because of restricting the cheque power, this false case is lodged against the Accused Officer. It is also argued that simply because, chemical test was proved and amount was recovered from the Accused Officer, it does not constitute the guilt of the Accused Officer. It is submitted that in the evidence, P.W.1 categorically stated that because of restricting the cheque power, this false case is lodged against the Accused Officer. It is also argued that simply because, chemical test was proved and amount was recovered from the Accused Officer, it does not constitute the guilt of the Accused Officer. It is pointed out that the P.W.1 was available at the office from 2.30 p.m. while the Accused Officer reached the office at 4.00 p.m. or 4.30 p.m. on the relevant day and therefore, there is every possibility to P.W.1 to keep the amount in the desk of the Accused Officer. Learned counsel further would submit that P.W.3 is the stock mediator. 13. Learned counsel submits that when P.W.1 himself deposed before the Court that because his cheque power was restricted only on the instructions of the Accused Officer to P.W.2/District Panchayat Officer, this false case has been lodged against the Accused Officer nothing more is required to the trial Court to rule regarding the innocence of the Accused Officer. It is argued that ignoring these material aspects and contrary to the evidence on record, learned Special Judge found the accused guilty of the charges framed against him and erroneously convicted him. Learned counsel finally would submit that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused and that the indulgence of this Court is required to interfere in the impugned Judgment in this Appeal. 14. In support of the contentions, learned counsel for the Petitioner placed reliance on the decision in P.Satyanarayana Murthy V.The District Inspector of Police and Anr. 2015(6) Supreme 744 , B.Jayaraj v. State of A.P., 2014(5) SCC (Cri) 543 and M.Narsinga Rao v.State of Andhra Pradesh 2000(8) Supreme 498 . 15. Per contra, learned Special Public Prosecutor would submit that P.W.3 deposed that Ex.P1/Report was explained to P.W.1 and that official favour is pending with the Accused Officer by the time of trap, as per Ex.P3/Explanation submitted by P.W.1. Learned Special Public Prosecutor further would submit that both the hands of the Accused Officer turned to pink in chemical test, which establishes that he accepted bribe. Learned Prosecutor would submit that the judgment passed by the Trial Court is a reasoned one based on the facts and circumstances of the case and does not warrant any interference of this Court. POINT FOR DETERMINATION 16. Learned Prosecutor would submit that the judgment passed by the Trial Court is a reasoned one based on the facts and circumstances of the case and does not warrant any interference of this Court. POINT FOR DETERMINATION 16. Having heard the submissions on both sides and on keen perusal of the material on record, the point that would emerge for determination is: Whether the impugned Judgment of conviction and sentence passed against the Accused Officer for the offences punishable under Section 7 and Sections 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of P.C. Act is sustainable on facts and law ? Determination by the Court 17. This is an appeal against conviction. Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chetram and another v. Ranjeet and others, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 592 while reiterating the importance of the appellate jurisdiction vested with the High Court to independently apply its mind, under Section 374 of Cr.P.C., observed as follows; “5. The High Court was exercising jurisdiction under Section 374 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 .While adjudicating an appeal against conviction and sentence, the appellate court is required to consider all the points dealt with by the trial court by independently applying its mind and reappreciating the evidence.” (emphasis supplied) 18. It is beneficial to extract the unamended versions of the Sections of law alleged against the Accused Officer, which are; “Section 7. Public servant taking gratification other than legal remuneration in respect of an official act. —Whoever, being, or expecting to be a public servant, accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any person, for himself or for any other person, any gratification whatever, other than legal remuneration, as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act or for showing or forbearing to show, in the exercise of his official functions, favour or disfavour to any person or for rendering or attempting to render any service or disservice to any person, with the Central Government or any State Government or Parliament or the Legislature of any State or with any local authority, corporation or Government company referred to in clause (c) of Section 2, or with any public servant, whether named or otherwise, shall be punishable with imprisonment which shall be not less than three years but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanations.—(a) “Expecting to be a public servant.” If a person not expecting to be in office obtains a gratification by deceiving others into a belief that he is about to be in office, and that he will then serve them, he may be guilty of cheating, but he is not guilty of the offence defined in this section. (b) “Gratification.” The word “gratification” is not restricted to pecuniary gratifications or to gratifications estimable in money. (c) “Legal remuneration.” The words “legal remuneration” are not restricted to remuneration which a public servant can lawfully demand, but include all remuneration which he is permitted by the Government or the organisation, which he serves, to accept. (d) “A motive or reward for doing.” A person who receives a gratification as a motive or reward for doing what he does not intend or is not in a position to do, or has not done, comes within this expression. (e) Where a public servant induces a person erroneously to believe that his influence with the Government has obtained a title for that person and thus induces that person to give the public servant, money or any other gratification as a reward for this service, the public servant has committed an offence under this section.” Section 13 – Criminal misconduct by a public servant. - “(1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct,— (a)…..(c) (d) if he,— (i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or (ii) by abusing his position as a public servant, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or (iii) while holding office as a public servant, obtains for any person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage without any public interest; or (e) if he or any person on his behalf, is in possession or has, at any time during the period of his office, been in possession for which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account, of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “known sources of income” means income received from any lawful source and such receipt has been intimated in accordance with the provisions of any law, rules or orders for the time being applicable to a public servant. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “known sources of income” means income received from any lawful source and such receipt has been intimated in accordance with the provisions of any law, rules or orders for the time being applicable to a public servant. Section 20 - Presumption where public servant accepts gratification other than legal remuneration. - (1) Where, in any trial of an offence punishable under section 7 or section 11 or clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 13 it is proved that an accused person has accepted or obtained or has agreed to accept or attempted to obtain for himself, or for any other person, any gratification (other than legal remuneration) or any valuable thing from any person, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that he accepted or obtained or agreed to accept or attempted to obtain that gratification or that valuable thing, as the case may be, as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in section 7 or, as the case may be, without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate. (2) Where in any trial of an offence punishable under section 12 or under clause (b) of section 14, it is proved that any gratification (other than legal remuneration) or any valuable thing has been given or offered to be given or attempted to be given by an accused person, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that he gave or offered to give or attempted to give that gratification or that valuable thing, as the case may be, as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in section 7, or as the case may be, without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (1) and (2), the court may decline to draw the presumption referred to in either of the said sub-sections, if the gratification or thing aforesaid is, in its opinion, so trivial that no inference of corruption may fairly be drawn.” 19. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (1) and (2), the court may decline to draw the presumption referred to in either of the said sub-sections, if the gratification or thing aforesaid is, in its opinion, so trivial that no inference of corruption may fairly be drawn.” 19. A Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Neeraj Dutta v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 4 SCC 731 while answering a reference relating to the nature and quality of proof necessary to sustain a conviction under Section 7 and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the P.C. Act when the primary evidence of the complainant is unavailable, had enunciated the ingredients involved in Section 7 and 13 (1) (d) of the P.C. Act, as follows; “4. The following are the ingredients of Section 7 of the Act: i) the accused must be a public servant or expecting to be a public servant; ii) he should accept or obtain or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any person; iii) for himself or for any other person; iv) any gratification other than legal remuneration; v) as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act or to show any favour or disfavour. 5. Section 13(1)(d) of the Act has the following ingredients which have to be proved before bringing home the guilt of a public servant, namely, - (i) the accused must be a public servant; (ii) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or by abusing his position as public servant, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or while holding office as public servant, obtains for any person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage without any public interest. iii) to make out an offence under Section 13(1)(d), there is no requirement that the valuable thing or pecuniary advantage should have been received as a motive or reward. iv) an agreement to accept or an attempt to obtain does not fall within Section 13(1)(d). vi) mere acceptance of any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage is not an offence under this provision. vii) therefore, to make out an offence under this provision, there has to be actual obtainment. iv) an agreement to accept or an attempt to obtain does not fall within Section 13(1)(d). vi) mere acceptance of any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage is not an offence under this provision. vii) therefore, to make out an offence under this provision, there has to be actual obtainment. viii) since the legislature has used two different expressions namely “obtains” or “accepts”, the difference between these two must be noted.” (emphasis supplied) 20. To answer the reference, the Constitution Bench in Neeraj Dutta (referred supra) had summarized the key points as follows; “68…… (a) Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by a public servant as a fact in issue by the prosecution is a sine qua non in order to establish the guilt of the accused public servant under Sections 7 and 13 (1)(d) (i) and(ii) of the Act. (b) In order to bring home the guilt of the accused, the prosecution has to first prove the demand of illegal gratification and the subsequent acceptance as a matter of fact. This fact in issue can be proved either by direct evidence which can be in the nature of oral evidence or documentary evidence. (c) Further, the fact in issue, namely, the proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification can also be proved by circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct oral and documentary evidence. (d) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely, the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the public servant, the following aspects have to be borne in mind: (i) if there is an offer to pay by the bribe giver without there being any demand from the public servant and the latter simply accepts the offer and receives the illegal A gratification, it is a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of the Act. In such a case, there need not be a prior demand by the public servant. (ii) On the other hand, if the public servant makes a demand and the bribe giver accepts the demand and B tenders the demanded gratification which in turn is received by the public servant, it is a case of obtainment. In the case of obtainment, the prior demand for illegal gratification emanates from the public servant. This is an offence under Section 13 (1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. In the case of obtainment, the prior demand for illegal gratification emanates from the public servant. This is an offence under Section 13 (1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. (iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer by the bribe giver and the demand by the public servant respectively have to be proved by the prosecution as a fact in issue. In other words, mere acceptance or receipt of an illegal gratification without anything more would not make it an offence under Section 7 or Section 13 (1)(d), (i) and (ii) respectively of the Act. Therefore, under Section 7 of the Act, in order to bring home the offence, there must be an offer which emanates from the bribe giver which is accepted by the public servant which would make it an offence. Similarly, a prior demand by the public servant when accepted by the bribe giver and in turn there is a payment made which is received by the public servant, would be an offence of obtainment under Section 13 (1)(d) and (i) and (ii) of the Act. (e) The presumption of fact with regard to the demand and acceptance or obtainment of an illegal gratification may be made by a court of law by way of an inference only when the foundational facts have been proved by relevant oral and documentary evidence and not in the absence thereof. On the basis of the material on record, the Court has the discretion to raise a presumption of fact while considering whether the fact of demand has been proved by the prosecution or not. Of course, a presumption of fact is subject to rebuttal by the accused and in the absence of rebuttal presumption stands. (f) In the event the complainant turns ‘hostile’, or has died or is unavailable to let in his evidence during trial, demand of illegal gratification can be proved by letting in the evidence of any other witness who can again let in evidence, either orally or by documentary evidence or the prosecution can prove the case by circumstantial evidence. The trial does not abate nor does it result in an order of acquittal of the accused public servant. The trial does not abate nor does it result in an order of acquittal of the accused public servant. (g) In so far as Section 7 of the Act is concerned, on the proof of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates the court to raise a presumption that the illegal gratification was for the purpose of a motive or reward as mentioned in the said Section. The said presumption has to be raised by the court as a legal presumption or a presumption in law. Of course, the said presumption is also subject to rebuttal. Section 20 does not apply to Section 13 (1) (d) (i) and (ii) of the Act. (h) We clarify that the presumption in law under Section 20 of the Act is distinct from presumption of fact referred to above in point (e) as the former is a mandatory presumption while the latter is discretionary in nature.” (emphasis supplied) 21. On the point that mere recovery of tainted amount from the possession of the accused officer by itself does not constitute the offences under the Act, it is essential to refer to some precedents. 22. The Hon’ble Apex Court in C.M. Sharma vs. State of A.P. (2010) 15 SCC 1 , has held as under; “23. We do not have the slightest hesitation in accepting the broad submission of Mr Rai that demand of illegal gratification is a sine qua non to constitute the offence under the Act. Further mere recovery of currency notes itself does not constitute the offence under the Act, unless it is proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be bribe. In the facts of the present case, we are of the opinion that both the ingredients to bring the Act within the mischief of Sections 7 and 13(1) (d)(ii) of the Act are satisfied.” (emphasis supplied) 23. In State of Punjab vs. Madan Mohan Lal Verma, (2013) 14 SCC 153 , it was held by the Hon’ble Apex Court as follows; “11. The law on the issue is well settled that demand of illegal gratification is sine qua non for constituting an offence under the 1988 Act. In State of Punjab vs. Madan Mohan Lal Verma, (2013) 14 SCC 153 , it was held by the Hon’ble Apex Court as follows; “11. The law on the issue is well settled that demand of illegal gratification is sine qua non for constituting an offence under the 1988 Act. Mere recovery of tainted money is not sufficient to convict the accused when substantive evidence in the case is not reliable, unless there is evidence to prove payment of bribe or to show that the money was taken voluntarily as a bribe. Mere receipt of the amount by the accused is not sufficient to fasten guilt, in the absence of any evidence with regard to demand and acceptance of the amount as illegal gratification. Hence, the burden rests on the accused to displace the statutory presumption raised under Section 20 of the 1988 Act, by bringing on record evidence, either direct or circumstantial, to establish with reasonable probability, that the money was accepted by him, other than as a motive or reward as referred to in Section 7 of the 1988 Act. While invoking the provisions of Section 20 of the Act, the court is required to consider the explanation offered by the accused, if any, only on the touchstone of preponderance of probability and not on the touchstone of proof beyond all reasonable doubt. However, before the accused is called upon to explain how the amount in question was found in his possession, the foundational facts must be established by the prosecution. The complainant is an interested and partisan witness concerned with the success of the trap and his evidence must be tested in the same way as that of any other interested witness. In a proper case, the court may look for independent corroboration before convicting the accused person. (Vide Ram Prakash Arora v. State of Punjab, T. Subramanian v. State of T.N., State of Kerala v. C.P. Rao and Mukut Bihari v. State of Rajasthan.)” (emphasis supplied) 24. In Mukhtiar Singh (d) v. The State Of Punjab (2017) 8 SCC 136 , similar to the present case, the heirs of the accused officer carried the matter to the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The settled position concerning the requirement of the dual conditions of proof of demand and illegal gratification to sustain conviction under Section 7 and 13 was reiterated as follows; “14. The settled position concerning the requirement of the dual conditions of proof of demand and illegal gratification to sustain conviction under Section 7 and 13 was reiterated as follows; “14. The indispensability of the proof of demand and illegal gratification in establishing a charge under Sections 7 and 13 of the Act, has by now engaged the attention of this Court on umpteen occasions. In A. Subair v. State of Kerala, this Court propounded that the prosecution in order to prove the charge under the above provisions has to establish by proper proof, the demand and acceptance of the illegal gratification and till that is accomplished, the accused should be considered to be innocent. Carrying this enunciation further, it was exposited in State of Kerala v. C.P.Rao that mere recovery by itself of the amount said to have been paid by way of illegal gratification would not prove the charge against the accused and in absence of any evidence to prove payment of bribe or to show that the accused had voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be bribe, conviction cannot be sustained. 15. In P. Satyanarayana Murthy (supra), this Court took note of its verdict in B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P. underlining that mere possession and recovery of currency notes from an accused without proof of demand would not establish an offence under Section 7 as well as Section 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. It was recounted as well that in the absence of any proof of demand for illegal gratification, the use of corrupt or illegal means or abuse of position as a public servant to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage cannot be held to be proved. Not only the proof of demand thus was held to be an indispensable essentiality and an inflexible statutory mandate for an offence under Sections 7 and 13 of the Act, it was held as well qua Section 20 of the Act, that any presumption thereunder would arise only on such proof of demand. This Court thus in P. Satyanarayana Murthy (supra) on a survey of its earlier decisions on the pre-requisites of Sections 7 and 13 and the proof thereof summed up its conclusions as hereunder: “23. This Court thus in P. Satyanarayana Murthy (supra) on a survey of its earlier decisions on the pre-requisites of Sections 7 and 13 and the proof thereof summed up its conclusions as hereunder: “23. The proof of demand of illegal gratification, thus, is the gravamen of the offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i)and (ii) of the Act and in absence thereof, unmistakably the charge therefor, would fail. Mere acceptance of any amount allegedly by way of illegal gratification or recovery thereof, dehors the proof of demand, ipso facto, would thus not be sufficient to bring home the charge under these two sections of the Act. As a corollary, failure of the prosecution to prove the demand for illegal gratification would be fatal and mere recovery of the amount from the person accused of the offence under Sections 7 and 13 of the Act would not entail his conviction thereunder.” (emphasis supplied) 25. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 232 having reiterated the position of law laid down in Neeraj Dutta (referred supra), had held that the High Court ought not pass its judgment on the basis of the assumption that money has been recovered from the accused, when there is a specific finding from the trial court that there was no demand of illegal gratification. 26. To summarize the position of law from the decisions referred supra, to prove the guilt of the accused, for the offences alleged, the prosecution has to establish the proof of demand, which is a sine qua non and an indispensable essential ingredient. Proof of acceptance of illegal gratification would follow only when there was a proof of demand of bribe. It is vivid that unless there is a proof of demand of illegal gratification and in the absence of it, Charges under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the P.C. Act fall to ground. This means acceptance of amount by way of illegal gratification or recovery of such amount from such accused does not ipso facto bring home the guilt of the accused for the offences for which the Accused Officer was charged. 27. Needless to say, in the absence of proving acceptance of illegal gratification, the question of taking aid or the legal presumption under Section 20 of the P.C.Act does not arise. 27. Needless to say, in the absence of proving acceptance of illegal gratification, the question of taking aid or the legal presumption under Section 20 of the P.C.Act does not arise. As discussed supra, in the absence of direct evidence to prove demand and acceptance of the alleged bribe, the Court can place reliance on the circumstantial evidence. With this precedential guidance in mind, it is essential to determine the instant case. 28. This is a case where just before the alleged trap, Accused Officer has submitted adverse report against P.W.1. Based on that report or instructions, P.W.2 has restricted the cheque power of P.W.1. The factual aspects of the present case have to be scrutinized keeping in mind the previous animosity between the parties. P.W.2/District Panchayat Officer never deposed anything against the Accused Officer. P.W.2 is the Superior Officer of the Accused Officer. According to him, he never received any complaint against the Accused Officer with regard to demand and collection of any amount for attending any official favour. 29. There is no dispute about the fact that P.W.1 being the Sarpanch, faced some problems with the previous Village Secretary, who faced some allegations against him. There exist disputes between the previous Village Secretary and P.W.1. In that view, P.W.1 locked the office and then the Accused Officer was deputed to enquire into the matter. In that regard, Accused Officer visited Krishnampalem Grampanchayat and enquired into the matter and sent a report to P.W.2/District Panchayat Officer and on his report, P.W.2 acted and restricted the cheque power of P.W.1. Hence, P.W.1 had grudge against the Accused Officer. 30. It is the case of the prosecution that for doing official favour to P.W.1, Accused Officer demanded bribe of Rs.3000/- and when P.W.1 expressed his inability, it was reduced to Rs.1000/-. At the time of trap, Accused Officer took the amount given by P.W.1 and he kept it in the table drawer. As can be seen from the spontaneous explanation of the Accused Officer, according to him, while he was sitting in the office, P.W.1 came to him and informed him that the Assistant i.e., the Secretary has been transferred and due to that happiness, he is offering the some amount to him, for which, the Accused Officer refused to take the amount. Later, P.W.1 kept that amount in the desk and he did not observe the same. Later, P.W.1 kept that amount in the desk and he did not observe the same. When he want to take some while papers from the desk, the desk is very hard and then he used both his hands to push the same. In that way, his right hand and left hand fingers turned to pink, but he never demanded or received any bribe from P.W.1. 31. Coming to the evidence of P.W.2, according to him, no official favour is pending with the Accused Officer and the Accused officer is subordinate to him. He further clarified that the Accused Officer has no right to recommend to P.W.2 for restoration of the cheque power of P.W.1. 32. P.W.3, who acted as a mediator in pre and post trap proceedings, deposed that Accused Officer came to the Office between 3.00 p.m. and 3.0 p.m. on the relevant date and they received signal from P.W.1, who waited for arrival of the Accused Officer, and P.W.1 met him in the office for five minutes and thereafter, P.W.1 gave signal to the trap party. Thereafter, they met the Accused Officer. 33. P.W.1 testified that P.W.1 came to the office at about at the relevant day, and at that time, the Watchman told that Accused Officer went on camp. Accused Officer came back to the office at 4.00 or 4.30 p.m. on the same day. There is some force in his contention that by 3.30 p.m. P.W.3 reached the office. P.W.4, who is the Section Officer, Panchayat Raj and Rural Development, Secretariat, Hyderabad, deposed about Ex.P17/Sanction Order. 34. The evidence of P.W.5/Inspector of Police, ACB, Eluru Range is crucial to the case of the prosecution. He participated in Ex.P6 and P16/Pre and Post Trap Proceedings. According to P.W.6/ Dy. Superintendent of Police, he instructed P.W.1 not to touch the amount and pay it to Accused Officer on his further demand only and then give signal. P.W.1 came out from the office of the Accused Officer indicated the demand and acceptance of bribe amount by the Accused Officer. P.W.6 stated before the Court that on giving signal by P.w.1, he went inside the office room of the Accused officer and ascertained his identity and conducted S.C. Solution test to both hand fingers of the Accused Officer and seized the tainted amount and documents from the Accused officer. P.W.6 stated before the Court that on giving signal by P.w.1, he went inside the office room of the Accused officer and ascertained his identity and conducted S.C. Solution test to both hand fingers of the Accused Officer and seized the tainted amount and documents from the Accused officer. He deposed that he prepared Ex.P15/ rough sketch and registration of Ex.P16/FIR. 35. As per P.W.6, again P.W.6 proceeded to the office of the Accused Officer at about 3.30 p.m. after receipt of signal from P.W.1. The view that alleged trap and post trap proceedings were concluded by 3.30 p.m. creates some suspicion. It was elicited in the cross-examination of P.W.6 that he got verified the antecedents of the Accused Officer and there are no complaints against the Accused Officer. P.W.6 further admits that they did not obtain any endorsement of P.W.1 in Ex.P1/report. 36. A perusal of the evidence of P.W.3, who acted as Mediator for pre and post trap proceedings, would show that P.W.6 asked P.W.1 to wait till the arrival of the Accused officer and at about 3.30 p.m. after receiving the signal from P.W.1 they went inside the room of the Accused Officer and deposed that P.W.6 handed over the copy of the FIR to the another mediator David, who read over the contents of FIR to P.W.1 and accordingly, the said David read over the contents to P.W.1. After hearing that P.W.1 confirmed that those facts are true and correct and then P.W.3 and other mediator/David signed on the copy of the FIR. 37. It is apt to mention here that the signature of another mediator /David is not present on Ex.P5/FIR. In the absence of the signature of the said David, his presence at that place and reading over the contents of FIR to P.W.1 cannot be accepted particularly, in the light of the evidence of P.W.1 that the contents of FIR were not read over to him. Even this Court did not find the signature of another mediator/David on the pre and post trap proceedings. According to P.W.3, both have signed on the pre and post trap proceedings. The prosecution kept silent on this aspect. 38. To sum-up, the prosecution has failed to prove that there is a demand and acceptance of bribe by the Accused Officer. Even this Court did not find the signature of another mediator/David on the pre and post trap proceedings. According to P.W.3, both have signed on the pre and post trap proceedings. The prosecution kept silent on this aspect. 38. To sum-up, the prosecution has failed to prove that there is a demand and acceptance of bribe by the Accused Officer. In the absence the same, mere recovery of the amount from the table of the Accused Officer in the office is not sufficient to prove the offence alleged against the Accused Officer as has been referred in the precedents supra. Accordingly the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the Accused Officer. In view of the aforementioned premises, the legal heirs of the Accused Officer are able to prove the innocence of the Accused Officer (deceased) and they therefore succeed in the appeal. This Court find merits in the Criminal Appeal and the same is liable to be allowed. 39. In the result, the Criminal Appeal is allowed in the following terms; a. The conviction and sentence recorded against the Appellant/ Accused Officer(deceased) in the impugned Judgment dated 28.07.2008 passed in CC No.9 of 2005 on the file of the Court of Special Judge for SPPE & ACB Cases, Vijayawada for the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, are set aside and he is acquitted for the said offences. b. The fine amount if any, paid shall be returned to the Appellants 2 to 5 /legal heirs of the Accused officer. As a sequel, pending Interlocutory Applications, if any, shall also stand closed.