ORDER : 1. This writ petition is under Article 226 of the Constitution of India whereby and whereunder the direction has been sought for quashing the office order as contained in Memo No.3667 dated 22.12.2011 issued under the signature of the Respondent No.3 whereunder the B.Sc. Trained Scale of Rs.1640-2900 granted to the petitioner with effect from 01.05.1991 vide office order dated 08.04.1991 has been cancelled. Further prayer has been made to declare and hold the petitioner entitled for B.Sc. Trained Scale of Rs.850 – 1360/- from the date of passing B.Ed examination which benefit has been provided to the similarly situated teachers including the teachers in W.P.(S) No.1555 of 2003, i.e., Arbind Bhushan Dey and Ors. v. State of Jharkhand and Ors. 2. The brief facts of the case as per the pleadings made in the writ petition which needs to be enumerated, read hereunder as :- It is the case of the petitioner that by an office order issued under Memo No. 895 dated 21st February 1983, the petitioner along with others were appointed on the post of Science Teacher in B. Sc. Untrained scale of Rs.680-995. The name of the petitioner figures at serial no. 2 of the said appointment letter for Middle School Bhuiyadih, Jamshedpur. 3. Accordingly, on 9th March 1983, the petitioner joined on the post of Science Teacher (trained) in Middle School, Bhuiyadih, Jamshedpur. 4. Thereafter, by an office order issued under Memo No. 3956 dated 7th October, 1987, the respondent no. 3 granted the B. Sc. Trained scale of Rs.730-1080 to the petitioner with effect from 03.01.1984, i.e. from the date of issuance of B. Ed. Certificate. 5. A gradation list of B. Sc. Trained Teachers was prepared by a Committee consisting of District Superintendent of Education, Singhbhum, District Superintendent of Education, Jamshedpur and Deputy Development Commissioner, Singhbhum. Thereafter, by letter no. 2421 dated 18th May 1987, the said gradation list of B. Sc. Trained Teachers was approved by the Regional Deputy Director of Education, South Chhotanagpur Division, Ranchi and communicated to the respondent No.3. In that list the name of the petitioner figures at serial no. 30. 6. Thereafter, by an office order issued under Memo No. 4522 dated 8th April 1991, in compliance to the direction as contained in judgment dated 18.01.1991 rendered in CWJC No. 837 of 1990(R), the respondent no. 3 granted B. Sc. In that list the name of the petitioner figures at serial no. 30. 6. Thereafter, by an office order issued under Memo No. 4522 dated 8th April 1991, in compliance to the direction as contained in judgment dated 18.01.1991 rendered in CWJC No. 837 of 1990(R), the respondent no. 3 granted B. Sc. Trained scale of Rs.1640-2900 to as many as 24 teachers including the petitioner. The name of the petitioner figures at serial no. 16 of the said list. 7. The fact with regard to grant of B. Sc. Trained Scale vide Office Order dated 8th April 1991 has also been entered into service book of the petitioner. 8. Thereafter, in view of Resolution No. 660 and letter dated 18th April 2009 issued by the Finance Department and by Office Order No. 1460 dated 01.08.2009 the petitioner has been granted senior scale of pay of Rs.6500-10,500. This fact has also been entered into service book of the petitioner on 03.12.2009. 9. The aforesaid senior scale of pay of Rs.6500-10,500 was also approved by the concerned authority being District Accounts Officer, East Singhbhum, Jamshedpur on behalf of the Finance Department. 10. It is the case of the petitioner that Resolution No. 6022 dated 18.12.1989 inter alia, provides that the teachers obtaining training up-to 31.12.1985 would be entitled to pay scale of Rs.1640-2900 and the teachers obtaining training after 31st December 1985 would be entitled to pay scale of Rs.1200-2040. 11. It is the further case of the petitioner that a series of writ petitions were preferred by some of the Science Teachers challenging the Office Order issued under Memo No. 1387 dated 01.09.1999 whereby the B. Sc. Trained scale given to them was cancelled on the ground that at the time of their appointment they were not the trained teachers rather they were possessing the qualification of B.Sc. Untrained. The aforesaid writ petition being CWJC No. 2521 of 2000(R) with analogous cases were disposed of by a common order dated 30.04.2009 granting liberty to those writ petitioners to move a representation before the appropriate forum who will consider the same on its own merit in accordance with law and dispose of the same within a period of three months. 12. 12. The petitioner’s case is that the petitioner does not fall within the zone of consideration in terms of the aforesaid order dated 30.04.2009 passed by this Court in CWJC No. 2521 of 2000(R). However, the respondent no. 3 issued a notice dated 07.12.2011 to the petitioner asking her to appear along with relevant documents on 09.12.2011 for the purpose of determination of actual scale of pay. In compliance thereto, the petitioner appeared before the respondent no. 3 on 09.12.2011 with relevant documents and submitted her show cause explaining therein that she was appointed on the post of Science Teacher on B. Sc. Untrained scale and after having passed B. Ed. Examination, she was granted the benefits of I.Sc. trained scale with effect from 03.01.1984 and the gradation list prepared for B. Sc. Trained teachers also included her name at serial no. 30 which was approved by the competent authority and in consequence thereto and in compliance to the judgment dated 18.01.1991 rendered in CWJC No. 837 of 1990(R), the petitioner along with others were granted the benefits of B. Sc. Trained scale vide Office Order dated 08.04.1991. She has also been granted senior scale of pay which was approved by the Finance Department. 13. Again by letter no. 3610 dated 13.12.2011, the respondent no. 3 directed the petitioner to explain her case as the pay scale of Rs.1640-2900 was not legally payable to her. 14. The petitioner submitted her explanation before the respondent no. 3 explaining the facts and circumstances distinguishing her case from the other teachers. 15. Thereafter, by impugned office order issued under Memo No. 3667 dated 22.12.2011 the respondent no. 3 passed an order wherein the B.Sc. Trained Scale of Rs.1640-2900 granted to the petitioner with effect from 01.05.1991 vide office order dated 08.04.1991 has been cancelled, against which the present writ petition has been filed. 16. Mr. Rupesh Singh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, has submitted that it is a case where the writ petitioner has been granted the benefit of B.Sc. Trained Scale based upon the circular which was in vogue on the day when such benefit was granted. 16. Mr. Rupesh Singh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, has submitted that it is a case where the writ petitioner has been granted the benefit of B.Sc. Trained Scale based upon the circular which was in vogue on the day when such benefit was granted. But, in highly arbitrary and illegal manner, the respondent authorities, based upon a Rule which has come subsequent to such decision, i.e., Bihar Taken Over Elementary School Teachers’ Promotion Rules, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules, 1993), has taken decision by cancelling the aforesaid benefit. 17. It has been contended that once the right has been accrued based upon the circular issued by the State in exercise of power conferred under Article 166(3) of the Constitution of India, the same cannot be taken away by virtue of enforcement of any statutory Rule, if such Rule has been enacted subsequent to such decision. 18. Further contention has been made by referred to Rule 15 of the Rules, 1993 wherein it has been provided that whatever circulars/instructions were prevalent prior to coming into effect of Rules, 1993, they will stand superseded but whatever decision taken prior to coming into effect Rules, 1993 has been saved by making specific stipulation in the said provision that such action will be said to be taken in terms of Rules, 1993. 19. The further contention has been made that on the similar circumstance, the learned Single Judge of this Court has passed an order whereby and whereunder the rights have been adjudicated and in terms thereof the benefits have also been granted. 20. In order to strengthen his argument, a list of the cases, Annexure-14 appended to the supplementary affidavit filed on 16.01.2023, has been furnished wherein the case of the writ petitioner is mentioned at Sl. No.8. 21. It has further been submitted that the grievance of all the litigants whose reference has been made in Annexure-14 has already been redressed, except the writ petitioner. 22. No.8. 21. It has further been submitted that the grievance of all the litigants whose reference has been made in Annexure-14 has already been redressed, except the writ petitioner. 22. The further submission has been made by putting reliance upon the judgment passed by the Coordinate Division Bench of this Court in L.P.A. No. 346 of 2022 [Idris Ansari v. The State of Jharkhand and Others] along with other analogous cases wherein the issue of snatching away right on the ground of enforcement of Rules, 1993 has been dealt with and the Coordinate Division Bench has come to the conclusive finding that no rule can be said to be applicable with retrospective effect. It has been held therein that once the right has been accrued said to be vested, the same cannot be taken away by virtue of its enforcement with retrospective effect. 23. Submission has also been made that in the said judgment the Division Bench of this Court has taken into consideration the implication of the Rule 15 of the Rules, 1993. 24. Further, learned counsel has also placed reliance upon the judgment rendered by this Court in the case of Arbind Bhushan Dey and Ors. v. State of Jharkhand and Ors. reported in 2009 (1) JLJR 338 wherein similarly situated teachers have been allowed the Graduate Trained Science Teachers Pay Scale with effect from their respective dates on which they acquired teachers training. 25. Learned counsel for the petitioner, based upon the aforesaid argument has submitted that the impugned order, therefore, is not sustainable in the eyes of law, hence, it is fit to be quashed and set aside so as to extend the consequential benefits in consequence of the quashing of the said decision. 26. Per contra, Mr. Rahul Saboo, learned counsel appearing for the State, has not disputed the fact so far as the list appended as Annexure-14 to the supplementary affidavit since there is no rebuttal reply to that effect, although copy of the said supplementary affidavit has been served way back. 27. It has also not been disputed that the legal issue has already been decided by the Division Bench of this court in L.P.A. No.346 of 2022. 28. This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties and gone across the pleading made in the affidavits filed on behalf of respective parties. 29. 27. It has also not been disputed that the legal issue has already been decided by the Division Bench of this court in L.P.A. No.346 of 2022. 28. This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties and gone across the pleading made in the affidavits filed on behalf of respective parties. 29. The issue involved in this writ petition is as to whether the benefit which has been granted in favour of the writ petitioner based upon the executive instruction or circular, said to be policy decision of the State prior to the coming into effect of the statutory rule, can be taken away by retrospectively applying the statutory rule, as the case of the writ petitioner is. 30. Herein, the admitted fact is that the writ petitioner has been granted the benefit of B.Sc Trained Scale vide order dated 08.04.1991 based upon the Government policy decision which was issued by virtue of executive instruction as issued in view of power conferred under Article 166(3) of the Constitution of India. 31. The settled position of law is that once the right has been accrued, the subsequent rule framed carving out the eligibility criteria will not be considered to be a reason to recall the benefit already granted due to the reason that a vested right has been created. Here, it is relevant to refer the definition of vested right as has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court in MGB Gramin Bank v. Chakrawarti Singh [ (2014) 13 SCC 583 ] at paragraph 11, 12 and 13, which read hereunder as:- “11.The word “vested” is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (6th Edn.) at p. 1563, as: “Vested.—fixed; accrued; settled; absolute; complete. Having the character or given in the rights of absolute ownership; not contingent; not subject to be defeated by a condition precedent. Rights are ‘vested’ when right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has become property of some particular person or persons as present interest; mere expectancy of future benefits, or contingent interest in property founded on anticipated continuance of existing laws, does not constitute ‘vested rights’.” 12.In Webster's Comprehensive Dictionary (International Edition) at p. 1397, “vested” is defined as law held by a tenure subject to no contingency; complete; established by law as a permanent right; vested interest. 13. 13. Thus, vested right is a right independent of any contingency and it cannot be taken away without consent of the person concerned. Vested right can arise from contract, statute or by operation of law. Unless an accrued or vested right has been derived by a party, the policy decision/scheme could be changed. 32. Further, so far as the question of taking away the vested right is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has laid down the proposition in the case of Chairman, Railway Board and Others v. C.R. Rangadhamaiah and Others reported in (1997) 6 SCC 623 at paragraph 24 which reads hereunder as :- “24. In many of these decisions the expressions “vested rights” or “accrued rights” have been used while striking down the impugned provisions which had been given retrospective operation so as to have an adverse effect in the matter of promotion, seniority, substantive appointment, etc., of the employees. The said expressions have been used in the context of a right flowing under the relevant rule which was sought to be altered with effect from an anterior date and thereby taking away the benefits available under the rule in force at that time. It has been held that such an amendment having retrospective operation which has the effect of taking away a benefit already available to the employee under the existing rule is arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of the rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. We are unable to hold that these decisions are not in consonance with the decisions in Roshan Lal Tandon [ AIR 1967 SC 1889 ], B.S. Vedera [ AIR 1969 SC 118 ] and Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni [ (1983) 2 SCC 33 ]. 33. It is evident from the aforesaid interpretation of the Hon’ble Apex Court regarding the right will be said to be vested if conferred upon the party concerned legally and once, it has been created, the same cannot be taken away without following the legal remedies. 34. Further, the law has also been settled by taking note of the implication of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act wherein at the time of repealment of statute, the requirement of saving is also there for the purpose of saving the right which has been accrued by virtue of the enactment or the policy decision which has already been taken. 35. 35. The effect of repealment has been discussed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. vs. Hirendra Pal Singh and Ors., reported in (2011) 5 SCC 305 wherein their Lordships have held at paragraphs-22 & 24 which are being quoted hereinbelow:- “22. It is a settled legal proposition that whenever an Act is repealed, it must be considered as if it had never existed. The object of repeal is to obliterate the Act from the statutory books, except for certain purposes as provided under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Repeal is not a matter of mere form but is of substance. Therefore, on repeal, the earlier provisions stand obliterated/abrogated/wiped out wholly, i.e., pro tanto repeal. 24. Thus, there is a clear distinction between repeal and suspension of the statutory provisions and the material difference between both is that repeal removes the law entirely; when suspended, it still exists and has operation in other respects except wherein it has been suspended. Thus, a repeal puts an end to the law. A suspension holds it in abeyance.” 36. In the case of Board of Control for Cricket in India vs. Kochi Cricket Private Limited and Ors., reported in (2018) 6 SCC 287 wherein their Lordships have held at paragraph-43 which is being quoted hereinbelow:- “43. Shri Sundaram’s submission is also not in consonance with the law laid down in some of our judgments. The approach to statutes, which amend a statute by way of repeal, was put most felicitously by B.K. Mukherjea, J. in State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh, SCR at pp. 899-900, thus: (AIR p.99 para 8). “In our opinion the approach of the High Court to the question is not quite correct. Whenever there is a repeal of an enactment, the consequences laid down in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act will follow unless, as the section itself says, a different intention appears. In the case of a simple repeal there is scarcely any room for expression of a contrary opinion. But when the repeal is followed by fresh legislation on the same subject we would undoubtedly have to look to the provisions of the new Act, but only for the purpose of determining whether they indicate a different intention. In the case of a simple repeal there is scarcely any room for expression of a contrary opinion. But when the repeal is followed by fresh legislation on the same subject we would undoubtedly have to look to the provisions of the new Act, but only for the purpose of determining whether they indicate a different intention. The line of enquiry would be, not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities but whether it manifests an intention to destroy them. We cannot therefore subscribe to the broad proposition that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act is ruled out when there is repeal of an enactment followed by a fresh legislation. Section 6 would be applicable in such cases also unless the new legislation manifests an intention incompatible with or contrary to the provisions of the section. Such incompatibility would have to be ascertained from a consideration of all the relevant provisions of the new law and the mere absence of a saving clause is by itself not material. It is in the light of these principles that we now proceed to examine the facts of the present case.” This statement of the law has subsequently been followed in Transport and Dock Workers’ Union & Ors. v. New Dholera Steamships Ltd., at para 6 and T.S. Baliah v. ITO, SCR at pp. 71-72.” 37. The Coordinate Division Bench of this Court in the case of Idris Ansari v. The State of Jharkhand and Others (Supra) has also considered the aforesaid issues and has quashed and set aside the impugned orders vide judgment dated 25.07.2023 and has directed for consequential reliefs to be paid in favour of the teachers (appellants in that appeal). 38. In addition to the aforesaid ratio upon which the reliance has been placed, learned counsel for the petitioner has also taken the ground that the benefits which were granted in favour of several teachers have already been extended and in order to fortify his argument he has appended the list showing number of writ petitions along with the names of the writ petitioners as available in Annexure-14 appended to the supplementary affidavit filed on 16.01.2023. 39. There is no rebuttal reply to the said supplementary affidavit although the said supplementary affidavit was filed way back on 16.01.2023. 40. 39. There is no rebuttal reply to the said supplementary affidavit although the said supplementary affidavit was filed way back on 16.01.2023. 40. This Court, considering the aforesaid fact that the State has already extended the aforesaid benefit of B.Sc Trained Scale to other similarly situated teachers, is of the view that there cannot be any adverse decision by virtue of enactment of subseque006Et rule once the right has been created. 41. As such, this Court, by putting reliance upon the judgment passed by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Idris Ansari v. The State of Jharkhand and Others (Supra) and analogous cases as also in the case of Arbind Bhushan Dey and Ors. v. State of Jharkhand and Ors. (Supra) coupled with the fact that the similar benefit has already been extended in favour of the other co-employees/teachers, is of the view that the impugned order needs to be interfered with. 42. Accordingly, the impugned order as contained in Memo No.3667 dated 22.12.2011 issued under the signature of the Respondent No.3, is hereby quashed and set aside. 43. In the result, the writ petition stands allowed. 44. Consequence to follow.