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2024 DIGILAW 936 (ALL)

Sushil Kumar Vig v. Union Bank of India

2024-04-01

J.J.MUNIR

body2024
JUDGMENT : J.J. Munir, J. This writ petition is directed against an order dated 15.6.2023, passed by the General Manager (Human Resource), Central Office E.R.D., Union Bank of India, Mumbai, declining to pay increment due to the petitioner for the period 1st Feb, 2012 to 31st Jan, 2013. The petitioner has further prayed that a mandamus be issued to the respondents ordering them to pay notional annual increment for the period 1.2.2012 to 31.1.2013 that fell due on 1st Feb, 2013 in accordance with law. 2. The brief facts giving rise to this petition are that the petitioner is a retired Senior Manager who retired from the service of the respondent-Union Bank of India (for short, 'the Bank') on 31.1.2013 upon attaining the age of superannuation. It is not in dispute that he has received all terminal benefits upon his retirement. The petitioner's date of birth is 1.2.1953 and he has, therefore, retired on 31st Jan, 2013. 3. The petitioner's case is that the annual increment due to the petitioner for the period 1st Feb, 2012 to 31st Jan, 2013 falls due on the 1st of February of each year. The petitioner has always been paid his regular increment while in service on the 1st of February every year for every completed full one year of service, to wit, from the 1st of February of the previous year to the 31st January of the following year. Here also the petitioner was entitled to the increment payable on the 1st of February, 2013 which was denied to him on the pretext that he had retired on 31st January, a day earlier. 4. It is the petitioner's case that denying him the annual increment, that he had earned for the whole year, merely because on the day it became due he had retired, is arbitrary and unreasonable. The said increment cannot be excluded for the purpose of reckoning the petitioner's pensionary benefits, merely because the petitioner was not in service on 1st February, 2013. The petitioner says that he raised this issue, time and again, with superior functionaries of the Bank, but in vain. The issue has long been decided by the Madras High Court in P. Ayammperumal v. The Registrar, Central Administrative Tribunal and others, in Writ Petition No. 15732 of 2017 decided on 15.9.2017. 5. The petitioner says that he raised this issue, time and again, with superior functionaries of the Bank, but in vain. The issue has long been decided by the Madras High Court in P. Ayammperumal v. The Registrar, Central Administrative Tribunal and others, in Writ Petition No. 15732 of 2017 decided on 15.9.2017. 5. The decision of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in P. Ayammperumal (supra) was challenged by the Union of India before the Supreme Court by means of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 22008 of 2018 which was dismissed. The petitioner, accordingly, represented his case to the Bank's functionaries in order to eschew litigation, but to no avail. The petitioner, as a last resort, approached this Court by instituting Writ-A No. 8559 of 2020 claiming the following material relief: ''Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of Mandamus Commanding and directing the respondent No. 2/The General Manager (Human Resource] to include in the pensionary benefits the notional annual increment for the period 1' Feb, 2012 to 31' Jan 2013, which was due on 1' Feb, 2013 in the light of resent settled position of law by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.'' 6. The said writ petition was disposed by this Court vide order dated 28.3.2023 with a direction to the respondents to decide the petitioner's claim within a period of two months, in accordance with law by a reasoned and speaking order. 7. The petitioner's case is that the Supreme Court has decided the issue finally on 11.4.2023 vide its judgment rendered in Director (Admin. HR) KPTCL and others v. C.P. Mundinamani, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 401. This decision was rendered on 11.4.2023 holding the employees entitled to one annual increment earned for the services rendered over a year, subject to good behaviour. The petitioner, therefore, made a representation to the respondents to decide in terms of the Supreme Court's judgment in C.P. Mundinamani (supra). It was at this stage that the second respondent, the General Manager (Human Resource), Central Office E.R.D., Union Bank Bhawan, Mumbai, passed the order impugned dated 15.6.2023 rejecting the petitioner's representation, distinguishing the principle in C.P. Mundinamani. 8. Aggrieved by the order dated 15.6.2023, the petitioner has instituted the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. 9. It was at this stage that the second respondent, the General Manager (Human Resource), Central Office E.R.D., Union Bank Bhawan, Mumbai, passed the order impugned dated 15.6.2023 rejecting the petitioner's representation, distinguishing the principle in C.P. Mundinamani. 8. Aggrieved by the order dated 15.6.2023, the petitioner has instituted the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. 9. When the matter first came up before this Court for admission on 28.8.2023, this Court made the following order: ''The grievance of the petitioner is that he has been denied his annual increments. He claims notional annual increments from 1st Feb, 2012 to 31st Jan, 2013 which was due on 1st Feb, 2013 and denied to the petitioner on ground that he retired from service on 31st Jan, 2013. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that he has earned the increment due on 1st Feb as he has worked up to 31st Jan and has placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Director (Admn. HR) KPTCL and others v. C.P. Mundinamani and others, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 401. Prima facie, the impugned order dated 15.6.2023 passed by the General Manger (Human Resource), Central Office, E.R.D. Union Bank Bhawan, 239, Vidhan Bhawan Marg, Nariman Point, Mumbai is manifestly illegal and in teeth of the holding of the Supreme Court. Let the General Manger (Human Resource), Central Office, E.R.D. file his affidavit within ten days indicating how he has denied the petitioner's increments in the teeth of the holding of the Supreme Court in Re: C.P. Mundinamani (supra). Lay this writ petition as fresh on 4.9.2023. Let this order be communicated to the General Manger (Human Resource), Central Office, E.R.D. Union Bank Bhawan, 239, Vidhan Bhawan Marg, Nariman Point, Mumbai by the Registrar General through the Registrar General of the Bombay High Court within 48 hours.'' 10. The matter was adjourned on the next two dates, that is, 4.9.2023 and 14.9.2023 with the parties not appearing and the General Manager (Human Resource), Central Office E.R.D., Union Bank Bhawan, Mumbai also not filing his personal affidavit, answering the petitioner's case as directed. 11. The matter was then taken up on 3.10.2023 and the personal affidavit of the General Manager was filed in Court. It was treated to be a counter-affidavit. Mr. 11. The matter was then taken up on 3.10.2023 and the personal affidavit of the General Manager was filed in Court. It was treated to be a counter-affidavit. Mr. Vivek Ratan Agrawal, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents made a statement that he does not want to file any further affidavits. The learned Counsel for the petitioner also made a statement that he does not intend to file a rejoinder. The petition was, therefore, admitted to hearing on the last mentioned date and hearing proceeded forthwith. Judgement was reserved. 12. Heard Mr. Manoj Kumar Tewari, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Vivek Ratan Agrawal, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents. 13. The submission of Mr. Manoj Kumar Tewari, learned Counsel for the petitioner, is that under Regulation 5 of the Union Bank of India (Officers') Service Regulations, 1979 (for short, 'the Regulations') increments shall be granted on the first day of the month in which these fall due. The learned Counsel for the petitioner further submits that the Regulation nowhere prohibits the grant of a notional increment earned by an employee for full one year of entitling service, merely because the increment falls due on the next day after his retirement. He further submits that such an increment can and ought to be notionally granted to the petitioner, because he has justly earned it by working through the whole year, which is the entitling period. 14. It is further submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that, as per law settled in C.P. Mundinamani, the annual increment is granted on the basis of good conduct, while rendering service for one year. Merely because an employee has retired on the day that the increment falls due, it cannot be denied which he has otherwise earned by working through the year with good conduct and efficiently. 15. Mr. Vivek Ratan Agrawal, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-Bank has attempted to distinguish the principle laid down in C.P. Mundinamani holding that Regulation 5 of the Regulations is substantially different from Regulation 40(1) of the Karnataka Electricity Board Employees Service Regulations, 1977 (for short, 'the Karnataka Regulations') on the foot of which the principle in C.P. Mundinamani has been laid down by the Supreme Court. 16. 16. The learned Counsel for the Bank further submits that in the case of the Union bank of India, there is no scope for the payment of an increment that has fallen due the next day following the retirement of an employee, because Regulation 5 of the Regulations curtail an employee's right in this regard by employing suitable words, which cannot be read differently by any Court of law, of ordinary or extraordinary jurisdiction under the Constitution. 17. The learned Counsel for the Bank submits, in accordance with the stand taken in paragraph No. 17 of the affidavit, that the Regulations framed by the Bank do not leave scope for attracting the principles of arbitrariness or unreasonableness to hold an employee entitled to receive increments, where he has retired a day before the increment accrued falls due. 18. We have keenly heard the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record. We think that the substance of Mr. Agrawal's submissions, in this case, are based upon the assertions made in paragraph No. 17 of the personal affidavit filed on behalf of the Bank by respondent No. 2, the General Manager (Human Resource). Paragraph No. 17 of the said affidavit reads: ''17. That in the matter of CP Mundinamani and others, Regulation 40 (1) of Karnataka Electricity Board Employees Service Employees provides that ''an increment accrues from the day following that on which it is earned'' and the employee earned the increment one day prior of their retirement on attaining the age of superannuation and only its enforcement in the form of payment was left. Whereas in case of petitioner, Union Bank of India Officers Service Regulations, Regulation 5 provides that ''the increments specified in the scales of pay set out in Regulation 4 shall, subject to the sanction of the Competent authority, accrue on an annual basis and shall be granted on the first day of the month in which these fall due.'' Therefore, in case of petitioner he even has not earned the increment, if petitioner would have earned, the same become payable to him on the same date if earned on first date of month or even prior if earned on later date. In view of the above, the holding of the Supreme Court is not at all applicable to the petitioner.'' 19. In view of the above, the holding of the Supreme Court is not at all applicable to the petitioner.'' 19. The issue, that arises in this case, has engaged the attention of different High Courts across the country, the earliest decision being rendered by the Madras High Court in State of Tamil Nadu, represented by its Secretary to Government, Finance Department and others v. M. Balasubramaniam, CDJ 2012 MHC 6525. This was followed by a Division Bench of the same High Court in P. Ayammperumal (supra). 20. The crux of the principle laid down by the Madras High Court was that what was material to the entitlement to annual increment was work done during the entire period of one year entitling and it did not matter at all if under the Rules applicable, the increment fell due on the day following retirement when the employee had ceased to be in service. In such cases notional increment had to be granted. This principle was apparently not based on any narrow or a pedantic reading of the rules involved in those cases. It was based on a reasonable construction of the relevant rules that eschewed arbitrariness or unreasonableness. 21. The issue also fell for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in Union Of India, Central Administrative Tribunal, Allahabad Bench and others where their Lordships of the Division Bench seized of a bunch of similar writ petitions raising the same issue, as the one involved here, considered the question involved there, expressed in the following words: ''The short question involved in this bunch of writ petitions is as under: ''Whether employees who retired on 30th June are entitled to the last annual increment made effective from on 1st July?'''' 22. The question was answered after a survey of the decisions rendered by different High Courts across the country under various rules relating to different employers, all of which were upheld by the Supreme Court with refusal of leave in terms of the following remarks: ''18. The question was answered after a survey of the decisions rendered by different High Courts across the country under various rules relating to different employers, all of which were upheld by the Supreme Court with refusal of leave in terms of the following remarks: ''18. In view of the facts and legal position noted above, since the controversy/question involved in the present writ petitions is squarely covered by the judgments/orders of Hon'ble Supreme Court affirming the judgment of Madras High Court, Bombay High Court, Delhi High Court and the Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench, Lucknow, therefore, all the Writ Petitions deserve to be dismissed and the impugned orders of the Tribunal deserve to be affirmed. 20. For all the reasons aforestated all the writ petitions are dismissed and it is held that the employees who retired on 30th June are entitled to the last increment made effective on 1st July.'' 23. There was still some conflict of opinion with the High Courts of Andhra Pradesh, Kerala and Himachal Pradesh taking a contrary view on the issue. The issue, therefore, wes considered by the Supreme Court in C.P. Mundinamani which is a case that relates to employees of the Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited. The Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited had lost before the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court and moved the Supreme Court by means of Special Leave. 24. In C.P. Mundinamani, the facts show that the employees of the Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited, the writ petitioners-respondents in that case, had retired a day before the annual increment accrued in accordance with Regulation 40(1) of the Karnataka Regulations fell due. The said Regulation made provision that an increment earned would accrue on the day following, and, since, the employee in that case had retired on the day following, the Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited, going by the book, denied the increment that the retiring employees had earned up to the last day of their service. 25. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court, as the report in C.P. Mundinamani would show, formulated the following question: ''13. The short question which is posed for the consideration of this Court is whether an employee who has earned the annual increment is entitled to the same despite the fact that he has retired on the very next day of earning the increment?'' 26. The short question which is posed for the consideration of this Court is whether an employee who has earned the annual increment is entitled to the same despite the fact that he has retired on the very next day of earning the increment?'' 26. In answering the question, their Lordships surveyed the divergent opinions of the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, the Himachal Pradesh High Court and the Kerala High Court, that would support the employer's contention and the other views favouring the employees expressed by the Madras High Court, the Delhi High Court, this Court, the Madhya Pradesh High Court, the Orissa High Court and the Gujarat High Court, and held: ''15. It is the case on behalf of the appellants that the word used in Regulation 40(1) is that an increment accrues from the day following that on which it is earned and in the present case the increment accrued on the day when they retired and therefore, on that day they were not in service and therefore, not entitled to the annual increment which they might have earned one day earlier. It is also the case on behalf of the appellants that as the increment is in the form of incentive and therefore, when the employees are not in service there is no question of granting them any annual increment which as such is in the form of incentive. 16. At this stage, it is required to be noted that there are divergent views of various High Courts on the issue involved. The Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, the Himachal Pradesh High Court and the Kerala High Court have taken a contrary view and have taken the view canvassed on behalf of the appellants. 16. At this stage, it is required to be noted that there are divergent views of various High Courts on the issue involved. The Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, the Himachal Pradesh High Court and the Kerala High Court have taken a contrary view and have taken the view canvassed on behalf of the appellants. On the other hand, the Madras High Court in the case of P. Ayyamperumal (supra); the Delhi high Court in the case of Gopal Singh v. Union of India (Writ Petition (C) No. 10509/2019 decided on 23.1.2020); the Allahabad High Court in the case of Nand Vijay Singh v. Union of India (Writ A No. 13299/2020 decided on 29.6.2021); the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Yogendra Singh Bhadauria v. State of Madhya Pradesh; the Orissa High Court in the case of AFR Arun Kumar Biswal v. State of Odisha (Writ Petition No. 17715/2020 decided on 30.7.2021); and the Gujarat High Court in the case of State of Gujarat v. Takhatsinh Udesinh Songara (Letters Patent Appeal No. 868/2021) have taken a divergent view than the view taken by the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and have taken the view that once an employee has earned the increment on completing one year service he cannot be denied the benefit of such annual increment on his attaining the age of superannuation and/or the day of retirement on the very next day. 17. Now so far as the submission on behalf of the appellants that the annual increment is in the form of incentive and to encourage an employee to perform well and therefore, once he is not in service, there is no question of grant of annual increment is concerned, the aforesaid has no substance. In a given case, it may happen that the employee earns the increment three days before his date of superannuation and therefore, even according to the Regulation 40(1) increment is accrued on the next day in that case also such an employee would not have one year service thereafter. It is to be noted that increment is earned on one year past service rendered in a time scale. Therefore, the aforesaid submission is not to be accepted. 18. It is to be noted that increment is earned on one year past service rendered in a time scale. Therefore, the aforesaid submission is not to be accepted. 18. Now, so far as the submission on behalf of the appellants that as the increment has accrued on the next day on which it is earned and therefore, even in a case where an employee has earned the increment one day prior to his retirement but he is not in service the day on which the increment is accrued is concerned, while considering the aforesaid issue, the object and purpose of grant of annual increment is required to be considered. A Government servant is granted the annual increment on the basis of his good conduct while rendering one year service. Increments are given annually to officers with good conduct unless such increments are withheld as a measure of punishment or linked with efficiency. Therefore, the increment is earned for rendering service with good conduct in a year/specified period. Therefore, the moment a Government servant has rendered service for a specified period with good conduct, in a time scale, he is entitled to the annual increment and it can be said that he has earned the annual increment for rendering the specified period of service with good conduct. Therefore, as such, he is entitled to the benefit of the annual increment on the eventuality of having served for a specified period (one year) with good conduct efficiently. Merely because, the Government servant has retired on the very next day, how can he be denied the annual increment which he has earned and/or is entitled to for rendering the service with good conduct and efficiently in the preceding one year. In the case of Gopal Singh (supra) in paragraphs 20, 23 and 24, the Delhi High Court has observed and held as under : (para 20) ''Payment of salary and increment to a central Government servant is regulated by the provisions of F.R., CSR and Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules. Pay defined in F.R. 9(21) means the amount drawn monthly by a central Government servant and includes the increment. A plain composite reading of applicable provisions leaves no ambiguity that annual increment is given to a Government servant to enable him to discharge duties of the post and that pay and allowances are also attached to the post. Pay defined in F.R. 9(21) means the amount drawn monthly by a central Government servant and includes the increment. A plain composite reading of applicable provisions leaves no ambiguity that annual increment is given to a Government servant to enable him to discharge duties of the post and that pay and allowances are also attached to the post. Article 43 of the CSR defines progressive appointment to mean an appointment wherein the pay is progressive, subject to good behaviour of an officer. It connotes that pay rises, by periodical increments from a minimum to a maximum. The increment in case of progressive appointment is specified in Article 151 of the CSR to mean that increment accrues from the date following that on which it is earned. The scheme, taken cumulatively, clearly suggests that appointment of a central Government servant is a progressive appointment and periodical increment in pay from a minimum to maximum is part of the pay structure. Article 151 of CSR contemplates that increment accrues from the day following which it is earned. This increment is not a matter of course but is dependent upon good conduct of the central Government servant. It is, therefore, apparent that central Government employee earns increment on the basis of his good conduct for specified period l.e. a year in case of annual increment. Increment in pay is thus an integral part of progressive appointment and accrues from the day following which it is earned.'' (para 23) ''Annual increment though is attached to the post and becomes payable on a day following which it is earned but the day on which increment accrues or becomes payable is not conclusive or determinative. In the statutory scheme governing progressive appointment increment becomes due for the services rendered over a year by the Government servant subject to his good behaviour. The pay of a central Government servant rises, by periodical increments, from a minimum to the maximum in the prescribed scale. The entitlement to receive increment therefore crystallises when the Government servant completes requisite length of service with good conduct and becomes payable on the succeeding day.'' (para 24) ''In isolation of the purpose it serves the fixation of day succeeding the date of entitlement has no intelligible differentia nor any object is to be achieved by it. The entitlement to receive increment therefore crystallises when the Government servant completes requisite length of service with good conduct and becomes payable on the succeeding day.'' (para 24) ''In isolation of the purpose it serves the fixation of day succeeding the date of entitlement has no intelligible differentia nor any object is to be achieved by it. The central Government servant retiring on 30th June has already completed a year of service and the increment has been earned provided his conduct was good. It would thus be wholly arbitrary if the increment earned by the central Government employee on the basis of his good conduct for a year is denied only on the ground that he was not in employment on the succeeding day when increment became payable.'' ''In the case of a Government servant retiring on 30th of June the next day on which increment falls due/becomes payable looses significance and must give way to the right of the Government servant to receive increment due to satisfactory services of a year so that the scheme is not construed in a manner that if offends the spirit of reasonableness enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The scheme for payment of increment would have to be read as whole and one part of Article 151 of CSR cannot be read in isolation so as to frustrate the other part particularly when the other part creates right in the central Government servant to receive increment. This would ensure that scheme of progressive appointment remains intact and the rights earned by a Government servant remains protected and are not denied due to a fortuitous circumstance.'' 19. The Allahabad High Court in the case of Nand Vijay Singh (supra) while dealing with the same issue has observed and held in paragraph 24 as under : ''24. Law is settled that where entitlement to receive a benefit crystallises in law its denial would be arbitrary unless it is for a valid reason. The only reason for denying benefit of increment, culled out from the scheme is that the central Government servant is not holding the post on the day when the increment becomes payable. Law is settled that where entitlement to receive a benefit crystallises in law its denial would be arbitrary unless it is for a valid reason. The only reason for denying benefit of increment, culled out from the scheme is that the central Government servant is not holding the post on the day when the increment becomes payable. This cannot be a valid ground for denying increment since the day following the date on which increment is earned only serves the purpose of ensuring completion of a year's service with good conduct and no other purpose can be culled out for it. The concept of day following which the increment is earned has otherwise no purpose to achieve. In isolation of the purpose it serves the fixation of day succeeding the date of entitlement has no intelligible differentia nor any object is to be achieved by it. The central Government servant retiring on 30th June has already completed a year of service and the Increment has been earned provided his conduct was good. It would thus be wholly arbitrary if the increment earned by the central Government employee on the basis of his good conduct for a year is denied only on the ground that he was not in employment on the succeeding day when Increment became payable. In the case of a Government servant retiring on 30th of June the next day on which increment falls due/becomes payable looses significance and must give way to the right of the Government servant to receive increment due to satisfactory services of a year so that the scheme is not construed in a manner that if offends the spirit of reasonableness enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The scheme for payment of increment would have to be read as whole and one part of Article 151 of CSR cannot be read in isolation so as to frustrate the other part particularly when the other part creates right in the central Government servant to receive increment. This would ensure that scheme of progressive appointment remains intact and the rights earned by a Government servant remains protected and are not denied due to a fortuitous circumstance.'' 20. Similar view has also been expressed by different High Courts, namely, the Gujarat High Court, the Madhya Pradesh High Court, the Orissa High Court and the Madras High Court. This would ensure that scheme of progressive appointment remains intact and the rights earned by a Government servant remains protected and are not denied due to a fortuitous circumstance.'' 20. Similar view has also been expressed by different High Courts, namely, the Gujarat High Court, the Madhya Pradesh High Court, the Orissa High Court and the Madras High Court. As observed hereinabove, to interpret Regulation 40(1) of the Regulations in the manner in which the appellants have understood and/or interpretated would lead to arbitrariness and denying a Government servant the benefit of annual increment which he has already earned while rendering specified period of service with good conduct and efficiently in the last preceding year. It would be punishing a person for no fault of him. As observed hereinabove, the increment can be withheld only by way of punishment or he has not performed the duty efficiently. Any interpretation which would lead to arbitrariness and/or unreasonableness should be avoided. If the interpretation as suggested on behalf of the appellants and the view taken by the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court is accepted, in that case it would tantamount to denying a Government servant the annual increment which he has earned for the services he has rendered over a year subject to his good behaviour. The entitlement to receive increment therefore crystallises when the Government servant completes requisite length of service with good conduct and becomes payable on the succeeding day. In the present case the word ''accrue'' should be understood liberally and would mean payable on the succeeding day. Any contrary view would lead to arbitrariness and unreasonableness and denying a Government servant legitimate one annual increment though he is entitled to for rendering the services over a year with good behaviour and efficiently and therefore, such a narrow interpretation should be avoided. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the Madras High Court in the case of P. Ayyamperumal (supra); the Delhi High Court in the case of Gopal Singh (supra); the Allahabad High Court in the case of Nand Vijay Singh (supra); the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Yogendra Singh Bhadauria (supra); the Orissa High Court in the case of AFR Arun Kumar Biswal (supra); and the Gujarat High Court in the case of Takhatsinh Udesinh Songara (supra). We do not approve the contrary view taken by the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Principal Accountant-General, Andhra Pradesh (supra) and the decisions of the Kerala High Court in the case of Union of India v. Pavithran (O.P. (CAT) No. 111/2020 decided on 22.11.2022) and the Himachal Pradesh High Court in the case of Hari Prakash v. State of Himachal Pradesh (CWP No. 2503/2016 decided on 6.11.2020).'' 27. Now, the respondents say that the principles laid down by the Supreme Court do not apply in view of the rules of the respondent-Bank which are very different from Regulation 40 of the Karnataka Regulations. In carving out this distinction, it is emphasised by the respondent-Bank that whereas Regulation 40(1) of the Karnataka Regulations, provides that ''an increment accrues from the day following that on which it is earned and the employees earned the increment one day prior to their retirement upon attaining the age of superannuation leaving its enforcement alone to be done by the Bank in the shape of payment, Regulation 5 of the Regulations applicable to the respondents provide very differently. 28. The Regulation 5 of the Regulations in the relevant part says ''that the annual increments specified in the scales of pay set out in the Regulation 4, subject to the sanction of the competent Authority, accrue on an annual basis and shall be granted on the first day of the month in which these fall due'' 29. It is contended by the Bank that the petitioner had not earned the increment under the said rules for if he had earned it the same would become payable to him on the same date, if earned on the first day of the month or even earlier, if earned on a later date. It is urged that in view of this distinction, in the wordings of the two rules, the principle in C.P. Mundinamani would not avail the petitioner. 30. It is further submitted that in C.P. Mundinamani only payment of increment was due on the day following retirement, which the employee had earned during service. In the petitioner's case, the increment had neither been earned during service nor due on the date of retirement and when the increment was due to be added, the petitioner was not in service as he had superannuated. In the petitioner's case, the increment had neither been earned during service nor due on the date of retirement and when the increment was due to be added, the petitioner was not in service as he had superannuated. Honing this argument further, an illustration has been given by the respondents in paragraph No. 10(c) of the personal affidavit which reads: ''10……… In view of the table of comparison, it is apparent that the case of petitioner is different from the case of judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court verdict in C.P.Mundinamani and others in terms that : c) For an example, A is KTPCL employee. His annual increment became due on 31.1.2013 and He had been superannuated on 31.1.2013 (the same date). Therefore, A has already earned the increment. Despite he had earned the increment, it did not become payable/accrue because as per regulation 40(1) increment accrues from the day following that on which it is earned. In case of Respondent Bank, in same context, if such increment would have been earned on 31.1.2013, the same (sic. would) become payable on the very first date of that month i.e. 1.1.2013. But in case of the petitioner, his increment itself was due on 1.2.2013 when he ceased to be in service.'' 31. It is this very hair splitting distinction that has been sought to be employed by the respondent-Bank to overcome their liability to notionally pay the petitioner's increment, which seems to be his entitlement, going by the principle in C.P. Mundinamani as well as various High Courts that have held for it. We are afraid that the distinction drawn by the Bank is no more than one that seeks to play with words. There is nothing of substance about it. The principle on which C.P. Mundinamani has been decided is that an employee, who has worked for one whole year that entitles him to increment but retires on the day that it falls due under the rules, must have benefit of it extended to him notionally, while working out his post retiral benefits. 32. The remarks of their Lordships in paragraph No. 20 of the report in C.P. Mundinamani are founded on completion of the requisite length of service with good conduct. 32. The remarks of their Lordships in paragraph No. 20 of the report in C.P. Mundinamani are founded on completion of the requisite length of service with good conduct. The fact that it becomes payable on the succeeding day, or as the respondents say in this case ''on the first day of the month in which these fall due'', to emphasise that in the petitioner's case, the increment never fell due before the 1st of February, is a submission stated to be rejected. Emphasis of the principle in C.P. Mundinamani is on the employee working through the year with good conduct which is the basis of entitlement. The day on which it falls due is neither decisive nor relevant. 33. In the Karnataka Regulations also it was not said that increment would be payable on the succeeding day. It said that it would accrue on the succeeding day about which it was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that it should be understood liberally to mean payable on the succeeding day. It was observed that any contrary view would lead to arbitrariness and unreasonableness. It could constitute denying a Government servant one legitimate annual increment that he had earned by rendering services over a period of one year with good behaviour. Their Lordships emphasised that a narrow interpretation in the matter was to be eschewed. 34. The respondent-bank precisely wants us to fall for the trap of a narrow interpretation. After all, this is not a penal statute that has to be strictly construed in favour of an accused. The grant of an increment is a reward for the employees' satisfactory services over a year. The words in Rule 5 about which the distinction drawn is that the increment in the Bank's case is to be granted on the first day of the month in which it falls due, does not take away the denial out of the mischief of the rule laid down in C.P. Mundinamani which is that the only matter of substance is the employees' satisfactory services, over a period of one year, which would lead him to earn the increment. The mere provision in the rule that the annual increment would become payable on the first day of the month when it falls due is merely a cosmetic distinction because after all it does not, in any manner, affect the period of one year's satisfactory service that would entitle the concerned employee to the due increment. 35. Once, in C.P. Mundinamani, the Supreme Court has held that the right to receive increment under the rules is founded on a year's satisfactory service, which in the case of the respondents is also not different, merely providing that the increment would become payable on the first day of the month when it falls due after the completion of one year, would not cure the respondents' denial of the petitioner's claim of the vice of arbitrariness and unreasonableness. 36. In this view of the matter, in the considered opinion of this Court, the impugned order passed by the respondents cannot be sustained. 37. In the result, this petition succeeds and is allowed with costs in the sum of Rs. 25,000/-. The impugned order dated 15.6.2023, passed by the General Manager (Human Resource), Union Bank of India, Mumbai, is hereby quashed and a mandamus is issued to the Union Bank of India represented by its Managing Director-cum-Chief Executive Officer, Mumbai, Central Office and the General Manager (Human Resource), Union Bank of India, Mumbai, to ensure between themselves payment of increment to the petitioner for the period 1.2.2012 to 31.3.2013 on a notional basis. The petitioner's pension shall be revised accordingly and arrears of pension paid to the petitioner within a period of eight weeks of the receipt of a copy of this judgment failing which the arrears will carry simple interest at the rate of 6% per annum for the period of delay. 38. The costs shall be paid to the petitioner also within a period of eight weeks failing which it will be open to the petitioner to make an application to the Registrar General who will then issue a Recovery Certificate to the District Magistrate, Azamgarh to recover the costs from the Assistant General Manager, Union Bank of India, Azamgarh and cause it to be credited in the account of the learned Registrar General. The Registrar General will then remit costs to the petitioner in account. 39. The Registrar General will then remit costs to the petitioner in account. 39. Let this judgment be communicated to the learned Registrar General, the District Magistrate, Azamgarh, the Managing Director-cum-Chief Executive Officer, Union Bank of India, Mumbai and the General Manager (Human Resource), Union Bank of India, Mumbai by the Registrar (Compliance).