JUDGMENT : Viju Abraham, J. Above original petition is filed challenging Ext.P6 order passed in I.A. No.7 of 2023 in O.S. No.336 of 2021 on the file of the Munsiff Court, Kattappana, wherein the request of the petitioner for impleadment as additional 2nd defendant in the suit has been declined. 2. The brief facts necessary for disposal of the original petition are as follows:- O.S. No.336/2021 on the files of Munsiff Court, Kattappana is filed by the 1st respondent as plaintiff seeking a decree restraining the 2nd respondent/defendant i.e. Kattappana Municipality from trespassing into the schedule property or from dismantling or destroying the building therein or from interfering with the plaintiff’s peaceful possession and enjoyment of the same. In the said suit, the petitioner filed an application as I.A. No.7/2023 seeking to get himself impleaded as additional 2nd defendant. 3. The specific contention of the petitioner is that injunction is sought against the local authority by stating incorrect facts. Petitioner would contend that as per the averment in the plaint, eviction notices were issued by the local authority earlier also, against which the plaintiff has moved this Court filing WP(C) No.5772 of 2017, and obtained stay of the proceedings and the said stay order granted is still in force. It is further contended in the plaint that in spite of the stay order granted by this Court, the southern boundary holder who is an influential person who is impleaded as the 6th respondent in the writ petition is influencing the Government officials and making all possible ways and means to somehow dispossess the plaintiff from the schedule property. It is as part of the said conspiracy the defendant had issued provisional order dated 29.10.2021 against the plaintiff. Petitioner would further contend that the 6th respondent in WP(C) No.5772/2017 and the southern boundary holder of the schedule property referred to in the plaint is none other than the petitioner herein, which could be revealed from a perusal of Ext.P2 judgment in WP(C) No.5772/2017. The petitioner would also submit that though it is averred in the plaint that the interim order granted in WP(C) 5772/2017 is still in force, the said writ petition was heard and dismissed as per Ext.P2 judgment. 4. The petitioner would also submit that though it is averred in the plaint that the interim order granted in WP(C) 5772/2017 is still in force, the said writ petition was heard and dismissed as per Ext.P2 judgment. 4. It is the further contention of the petitioner that the 2nd respondent local authority is not seriously prosecuting the suit with a view to favour the plaintiff who is the 1st respondent herein and that the local authority who is the defendant in the suit was set ex-parte and has not filed any written statement. It is in the said circumstance that the petitioner filed Ext.P3 application as I.A. No.7 of 2023 to get himself impleaded as additional defendant No.2 in the original suit. The specific contention of the petitioner is that the construction which has been effected in the schedule property is in clear violation of the distance rule prescribed for effecting construction upon properties adjacent to National Highway/State Highway/major District roads in the State. In Ext.P3 petition it is also brought to the notice that the petitioner is the 6th respondent in WP(C) No.5772/2017, and it is on the application/representation submitted by him that the present order was passed which is challenged in the present suit filed as O.S. No.336/2021, and in view of the above, he has a direct subsisting interest in the suit and therefore sought for impleadment as additional defendant in the suit. 5. To Ext P3 application seeking impleadment, objections were filed as Exts.P4 and P5 by the 1st respondent plaintiff as well as the 2nd respondent Municipality taking a contention that the dispute is purely between the plaintiff and the defendant Municipality. The Munsiff Court, Kattappana considered the petition and passed Ext.P6 order dismissing the petition seeking impleadment in the suit. The reason for issuing Ext.P6 order rejecting the request of the petitioner is that he has got no direct interest in the subject matter and that WP(C) No.5772 of 2017 is pending before this Court in which the petitioner is a party and he can very well agitate his grievance before this Court and also before the concerned authorities, and since the petitioner has no direct interest in the subject matter of the suit he cannot be impleaded as a party in the suit. It is the said order which is assailed in this original petition. 6. It is the said order which is assailed in this original petition. 6. Though a notice was issued to the 1st respondent there was no appearance on his behalf. The 2nd respondent Municipality entered appearance through Counsel and submitted that it is true that the suit was decreed ex-parte, but they have filed a petition to set aside the ex-parte order which is now pending consideration before the Munsiff Court, Kattappana. 7. The question to be considered is whether the request of the petitioner in Ext.P3 to get impleaded in the suit as additional 3rd defendant was rightly rejected as per Ext.P6. Even going by the pleadings in the plaint, it is an admitted fact that the southern boundary holder of the schedule property is having a boundary dispute with the plaintiff for the last so many years and that the said southern boundary holder is the petitioner herein. Further, it is stated in the plaint that the action now initiated by the issuance of a provisional order dated 29.10.2021 is at the instance of the petitioner herein who has influenced the Government officials for the issuance of the said order. An additional affidavit has been filed by the petitioner in this Original Petition wherein it is stated that the petitioner had obtained possession of a large extent of property which takes in the plaint schedule property and he obtained possession on the strength of Ext.P7 agreement. It is further averred that it is in the above said property trespass was committed by the plaintiff and obtained a possession certificate illegally for an extent of 5 cents. He would further submit that a suit was also filed by the 1st respondent as O.S. No.291/2013 which was later dismissed. 8. In the light of the averment in the affidavit filed by the petitioner and referring to paragraph 3 of the plaint, it is the case of the petitioner that there is a dispute in respect of the property between the petitioner and the 1st respondent and that he has a substantial interest in the suit and the rejection of Ext.P3 application seeking impleadment as per Ext.P6 is illegal. It is admitted in the plaint that the action now initiated by issuing a provisional order by the respondent Municipality is on a complaint by the petitioner. It is admitted in the plaint that the action now initiated by issuing a provisional order by the respondent Municipality is on a complaint by the petitioner. It is also averred in the plaint that the petitioner is sharing the southern boundary of the schedule property. The petitioner has a case that the property in his possession has been encroached upon by the 1st respondent and has obtained a possession certificate illegally. A reading of Ext.P6 order which is impugned herein, revealed that the defendant Municipality has not filed a written statement in the suit, and was set ex parte, though the learned Counsel for the 2nd respondent Municipality would contend that they have filed a petition to set aside the ex-parte order. The specific contention of the petitioner is that the 2nd respondent Municipality is not seriously contesting the suit and the fact that they have not even filed any written statement and they were set ex parte would reveal that the said allegation is not without any basis. 9. This Court in Girijadevi v. Hormis Thaliath [ 1983 KLT 732 ] was considering a question as to whether in a case where the plaintiff put up a wall in violation of the Municipal Rules, the neighbouring owner could be impleaded in the suit. That was a case where based on the complaint filed by the petitioner therein, action was taken by the Municipal Corporation for demolition of the unauthorised construction by the 1st respondent therein who is the plaintiff in the suit. Even though there was an allegation in the said plaint that it was at the instance of the petitioner therein that the Commissioner of Corporation passed the impugned order directing the demolition of the additional construction, the petitioner in the said writ petition was not made a party in the suit, and only the local authority and its officers were impleaded as defendants in the suit. Thereupon, the petitioner therein filed an application to get herself impleaded as additional 3rd respondent in the said suit and the trial Court dismissed the same on the ground that the plaintiff is dominus litis and the petitioner has no right to get herself impleaded in the suit against the opposition of the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff cannot be compelled to fight a litigation against a person against whom he does not claim any relief. The said order was challenged and in Girijadevi’s case cited supra it was held as follows:- “4. It is the case of the petitioner that the 1st respondent has made additional constructions on the existing compound wall in contravention of the Municipal Rules, the Municipal Rules are intended for the purpose of promoting health, safety and convenience of all the residents in the municipal area and a violation of the rule by an adjacent owner of land and building is a direct infringement of the rights of the petitioner safeguarded under the Rule itself. According to the petitioner she is entitled to insist that in making any construction, the 1st respondent-plaintiff complies with the requirements of the rule and the protection of the Rule is not denied to the petitioner. In support of the proposition, the learned Counsel for the petitioner relies on the decision in Hirendra Nath v. Calcutta Corporation (AIR. 1941 Cal.386) wherein it is stated at page 389 as follows: "It must be assumed that in framing the statutory rules relating to the space to be left between buildings and their height, the Legislature had in view of the general convenience of all residents in the municipal area in order to ensure proper ventilation and sanitation for the ratepayers, and possibly adequate means of preventing the spread of fires from one building to another. In this view of the matter, it is impossible to say that the petitioner would not be affected by any breach of the existing rules, and, in my view, he has a clear right to insist that these rules should be strictly observed by the Corporation in reference to any plans for the extension of the Tagore building". The same view is expressed in the decision in Krishna Kali Mallik v. Babulal Shah & Others (AIR. 1965 Cal. 148) where Justice A. N. Ray (as he then was) stated at page 155, Para.42, as follows: "42. In the present case the defendants have an obligation under the Statute to build in accordance with Rules. That statutory obligation it is contended by the defendants, is enforceable by the Corporation only under some sections of the Act. The Corporation has the right to proceed against the offending building because of the benefit and the interest of the public safeguarded by the Act that buildings shall not be constructed in violation of the Statute. That statutory obligation it is contended by the defendants, is enforceable by the Corporation only under some sections of the Act. The Corporation has the right to proceed against the offending building because of the benefit and the interest of the public safeguarded by the Act that buildings shall not be constructed in violation of the Statute. An illegal construction by the defendants materially affects the right to or enjoyment of the plaintiff's property. The defendants owe duty and obligation under the Statute not only to the Corporation as custodian of the owners of buildings but also to the plaintiff. This duty arises by implication under the Statute. If the defendant constructs a building according to a plan which is illegal the adjoining owner has the right to ask for an injunction because there is an invasion of right to and enjoyment of property by the illegal construction and the defendant owes an obligation to the plaintiff to obey the law". The decision in AIR. 1965 Cal. 148 is followed in the decision in B. Raghunandan Sarvan v. Smt. Kanta Devi and another (AIR. 1975 All. 130), wherein at page 132 it is stated as follows: "When a Municipal Board makes bye-laws of the present nature, it does so for the purpose of promoting and maintaining health, safety and convenience of the inhabitants of the Municipality. Their violation will naturally affect adversely the health, safety and convenience of the citizens; it must therefore, be held that the byelaw casts an obligation on citizens not to act in violation thereof, and every citizen can claim an injunction to prevent the breach of the bye-law. A similar view was taken by the Calcutta High Court in AIR. 1965 Cal. 148 (supra) where, dealing with the rights of a resident in the locality to check the constructions which were going to be made without leaving adequate space as required under the bye-law. It was observed by A. N. Ray, J. that "it was impossible to say that the petitioner would not be affected by any breach of the existing rules, and in my view he has a right to insist that these rules should be strictly observed in reference to any plan". It was observed by A. N. Ray, J. that "it was impossible to say that the petitioner would not be affected by any breach of the existing rules, and in my view he has a right to insist that these rules should be strictly observed in reference to any plan". From these authorities it is clear that a construction in violation of the Municipal Building Rules is a direct infringement of the rights of the petitioner recognised and provided for in the Rule itself and the petitioner has a direct interest in the subjectmatter of the suit where the 1st respondent seeks an injunction against the Municipal Corporation and its Commissioner from enforcing an order for demolition of a construction said to be opposed to the requirements of the Municipal Rules in that behalf. On the facts of the present case there cannot be any dispute that the petitioner has direct interest in the subject-matter of the suit. The Municipal Building Rules are intended for the benefit of all residents in the municipal area and a violation of the rule by an adjoining owner of land, is a direct infringement of the rights of the petitioner recognised by the rules. A decree for permanent injunction against the defendants namely the Municipal Corporation and its Commissioner, if granted would adversely affect the petitioner's right to have the construction if any in violation of the Municipal Rules demolished and removed. The decision in AIR. 1969 Punj. & Haryana p. 57 and the other decisions following the same, and referred to above do not preclude the impleadment of a third party whose interests in the subject-matter of the suit will be directly affected by the decision in the suit. As laid down by the Supreme Court in AIR 1958 SC. 886 , all persons who have a direct interest in the subject-matter of the suit, can be impleaded as parties to the suit. The present case would therefore fall under the exception to the general rule, that in the normal course no party will be impleaded as a defendant in the suit when the plaintiff opposes such impleadment. This is a case where the rights of the petitioner recognised by the Municipal Rules will be adjudicated upon in her absence if she is not impleaded as a party defendant in the suit. This is a case where the rights of the petitioner recognised by the Municipal Rules will be adjudicated upon in her absence if she is not impleaded as a party defendant in the suit. The result is, I set aside the impugned order of the court below, allow I.A. No. 2856 of 1982 and direct the petitioner to be impleaded as additional third defendant in O.S. No. 604 of 1982 on its file.” (underline supplied) In the light of the judgment in Girijadevi’s case cited supra, I am of the opinion that the petitioner is a person having a direct interest in the subject matter of the suit. 10. It is true that 1st respondent being the plaintiff is the master of the suit and applying the doctrine of “dominus litis“ the plaintiff cannot be compelled to fight against a person against whom he does not wish to fight and against whom he does not claim any relief. But this theory cannot be over stretched in the matter of impleading of parties, because it is the duty of the court to ensure that if for deciding the real matter in dispute, a person is a necessary party, the court can order such person to be impleaded. The provisions of Order 1 Rule 10(2) C.P.C., are very wide and the powers of the court are equally extensive and the court may, at any stage of the proceedings order that the name of any party, who ought to have been joined as a plaintiff or defendant or whose presence before the court may be necessary in order to enable the court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added. 11. In Razia Begum Vs. Anwar Begum, AIR 1958 SC 886 , the Hon’ble Apex court has held that in a suit relating to property, in order that a person may be added as a party, he should have a direct interest as distinguished from a commercial interest, in the subject matter of the litigation. In the present case, even going by the averment in Ext P1 plaint, the petitioner is the Southern boundary holder of the schedule property and has a boundary dispute with the plaintiff and it is at the instigation of the petitioner that the notice challenged in the suit was issued by the Municipality. In the present case, even going by the averment in Ext P1 plaint, the petitioner is the Southern boundary holder of the schedule property and has a boundary dispute with the plaintiff and it is at the instigation of the petitioner that the notice challenged in the suit was issued by the Municipality. The petitioner has in the Original Petition and in the affidavit filed clearly explained his interest in the plaint schedule property including his possession and the trespass committed by the 1st respondent to the said property. In Mahadeva Rice & Oil Mills Vs. Chennimalai Gounder, AIR 1968 Mad. 287 , the Madras High Court, explained the basic object of the provision Order 1 Rule 10 C.P.C., and held that if for the adjudication of the "real controversy" between the parties on record, the presence of a third party is necessary, then he can be impleaded. Therefore, going by the dictum laid down in the judgments cited supra, I am of the opinion that the petitioner is a proper party whose presence is necessary for fully adjudicating the matters involved in the suit. In view of the above facts and circumstances, I am of the opinion that the Ext.P3 application filed by the petitioner seeking impleadment in O.S. No.336 of 2021 as additional defendant No.2 ought to have been allowed by the trial court. Therefore, the above original petition is allowed, setting aside Ext.P6 order and directing the Munsiff Court, Kattappana, to allow Ext.P3 application submitted by the petitioner and implead him as additional defendant No.2 in O.S No. 336 of 2021.