JUDGMENT : SUNITA AGARWAL, J. 1. Invoking Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act, 1996’ for the sake of brevity), the petitioner herein came for appointment of the sole Arbitrator to adjudicate and decide the dispute arising between the parties, as per the Clause No. 13 of the General Terms and Conditions in connection with the insurance policy dated 24.03.2021. 2. The dispute arising out of the co-insurance policy being a Standard Fire and Special Perils Policy (Material Damage), for the insurance of the petitioner’s assets located at the factory premises situated at S. No. 31 near New Cotton Mill, Amraiwadi, Ahmedabad for the period from 31.03.2021 to 30.03.2022, is sought to be referred to the Arbitrator. Reliance is placed on the Clause 13 of the General Terms & Conditions of the insurance policy providing for arbitration as the dispute resolution mechanism. 3. To decide the claim of the petitioner for referring the dispute to the Arbitrator, certain relevant facts of the case, in brief, are to be noted herein-under. A fire accident had occurred on 10.11.2021 during the subsistence of the period of policy at the factory premises of the petitioner and the petitioner laid a claim with the insurance company (respondent) amounting to Rs. 5,10,33,189/-. The premises was inspected by the surveyor and a final report dated 8.8.2022 was submitted assessing the loss/damages to Rs. 2,48,15,934/- based on the terms and conditions of the insurance policy. The petitioner, however, submits that, as against the loss assessed by the surveyor, the respondent had offered only an amount of Rs. 35,88,978/- as full and final settlement as per the discharge voucher dated 6.1.2023. It is contended that the petitioner had accepted the offered amount of Rs. 35,88,978/- under protest on 16.01.2023 by making an endorsement on the discharge voucher. However, an E-mail was sent by the respondent dated 18.01.2023 asking the petitioner to accept the amount of Rs. 35,88,978/- by giving a clean discharge (to the respondent). It is contended that it is not possible for the petitioner to accept the sum of Rs. 35,88,978/- by giving clean discharge to the respondent as there is a serious dispute with respect to quantum of compensation awarded by the respondent. 35,88,978/- by giving a clean discharge (to the respondent). It is contended that it is not possible for the petitioner to accept the sum of Rs. 35,88,978/- by giving clean discharge to the respondent as there is a serious dispute with respect to quantum of compensation awarded by the respondent. As a result of it, a legal notice dated 30.01.2023 was served upon the respondent, to which an evasive and vexatious reply was given on 10.03.2023. The dispute arising out of the policy as to the quantum of compensation to be paid under the existing policy is, thus, to be resolved by the process of arbitration. 4. The respondent insurance company in reply to the notice dated 30.01.2023 invoking arbitration clause by the petitioner and the affidavit-in-reply filed in the present petition, has taken a categorical stand that the respondent company has not considered the claim for damage of the Vial line machinery, which was purchased having invoice generated on 21st October, 2021 after the inception of the policy with effect from 31.3.2021. It is categorically stated that the machinery, namely Vial line machinery was not included by the present petitioner under the said policy as it was commissioned in the plant of the petitioner after the inception of the policy, i.e. 31.03.2021. The machinery purchased by the petitioner after the inception of the policy date would not be automatically covered. It is further stated that while opting for policy for insurance, the petitioner did not opt for the “ADD-ON coverage” of “Omission on insure Additions, Alteration and Extensions.” There was, thus, no insurance cover available for the new machine, which was purchased after the policy inception date. It is further stated that the amount calculated by the surveyor for the loss of Vial line machinery was not included in the claim disbursement voucher, due to non-coverage of the said machine under the terms of the policy of the insurance. It is denied that the issue is with regard to the quantum of compensation, rather the contention is that the dispute does not fall within the ambit of the arbitration clause 13 of the policy. To this stand of the respondent, in rejoinder, it is submitted that the respondent cannot deny the claim of the Vial line machinery due to non-coverage as per the terms of the policy. 5. To this stand of the respondent, in rejoinder, it is submitted that the respondent cannot deny the claim of the Vial line machinery due to non-coverage as per the terms of the policy. 5. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner refuting the stand of the insurance company has vehemently argued that the issue of denial of the part payment on the ground of non-coverage under the policy or on any other reason, would be a matter which is to be decided by the Arbitral Tribunal. In view of the claim of the petitioner about the estimated loss as per the report of the surveyor, the issue whether the amount claimed by the petitioner is payable or not, cannot be examined by this Court at the pre-referral stage. 6. Reliance is placed on the decision of the seven Judges Bench of the Apex Court in Duro Felguera, S.A. vs. Gangavaram Port Limited, (2017) 9 SCC 729 and Curative Petition (C) No. 44 of 2023 (In Re: Interplay between Arbitration Agreements under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and the Indian Stamp Act, 1989) [2023 SC Online SC 1666], to submit that the principle of arbitral autonomy is an integral element in the domain of the arbitration law. The competence of Arbitral Tribunal to rule of its own jurisdiction including relying on any objection with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement, also indicates that the Arbitral Tribunal enjoys sufficient autonomy from the National Court. One of the main objectives of the Arbitration Act is to minimize the supervisory role of the Courts in the arbitral process. The party autonomy and settlement of dispute by the Arbitral Tribunal are the hallmark of arbitration law. The role of the courts or the judicial authorities in arbitral proceedings is limited to circumstances where the support of judicial authorities is required for the successful implementation and enforcement of the arbitral process. The Arbitration Act envisages the role of the courts to “support arbitration process by providing necessary aid and assistant when required by law in certain circumstances.” A referral Court at Section 8 or Section 11 stage can only enter into prima facie determination. The legislative mandate of prima facie determination ensures that the referral Courts do not trammel the Arbitral Tribunal’s authority to rule on its own jurisdiction. The legislative mandate of prima facie determination ensures that the referral Courts do not trammel the Arbitral Tribunal’s authority to rule on its own jurisdiction. Section 5 vests judicial authority with jurisdiction over arbitral proceedings in matters expressly allowed in or dealt with under Chapter-I of the Arbitration Act. However, the Courts are prohibited from intervening in the arbitral proceedings in a situation where the Arbitral Tribunal has been bestowed with exclusive jurisdiction. The non-obstente clause limits the extent of judicial intervention in respect of the matters expressly provided under the Arbitration Act. Section 5 is of aid in interpreting the extent of judicial interference under Sections 18 and 11 of the Arbitration Act. Section 5 contains general rule of judicial non-interference. Therefore, every provision of Arbitration Act ought to be construed in view of the Section 5 to give true effect to the legislative intention of minimal judicial intervention. 7. It was urged that the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the 2015 Amendment Act states that sub-section (6A) is inserted in Section 11 to provide that the Supreme Court or the High Court while considering the application under sub-section (4) to (6) “shall confine to the examination of an arbitration agreement.” With the coming into force of 2015 Amendment Act, the nature of preliminary examination at the referral stage under Section 11 is confined to the existence of arbitration agreement. By virtue of non-obstente clause, Section 11(6A) has set out a new position of law, which takes away the basis of the position laid down by the previous decisions of the Apex Court. This indicates that the Parliament intended to confine the jurisdiction of the Courts at the pre-arbitral stage to as minimum a level as possible. 8. The submission is that the effect and impact of the 2015 amendment Act was clarified by the Apex Court in Duro Felguera (supra) noticing that the intention of the legislature of incorporating Section 11(6A) was to limit the scope of referral Courts jurisdiction to only one aspect, i.e. the existence of the arbitration agreement. To determine the existence of the arbitration agreement, the court only needs to examine whether the underline contract consists a clause which provides for arbitration pertaining to the dispute which have arisen between the parties to the agreement. The observations in paragraph Nos. To determine the existence of the arbitration agreement, the court only needs to examine whether the underline contract consists a clause which provides for arbitration pertaining to the dispute which have arisen between the parties to the agreement. The observations in paragraph Nos. 48 and 59 of Duro Felguera (supra) were pressed into service, which read as under: “48. Section 11(6A) added by the 2015 Amendment, reads as follows: “11(6A) The Supreme Court or, as the case may be, the High Court, while considering any application under sub-section (4) or sub-section (5) or sub-section (6), shall, notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any Court, confine to the examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement.” (Emphasis Supplied) From a reading of Section 11(6A), the intention of the legislature is crystal clear i.e. the Court should and need only look into one aspect- the existence of an arbitration agreement. What are the factors for deciding as to whether there is an arbitration agreement is the next question. The resolution to that is simple - it needs to be seen if the agreement contains a clause which provides for arbitration pertaining to the disputes which have arisen between the parties to the agreement. 59. The scope of the power under Section 11 (6) of the 1996 Act was considerably wide in view of the decisions in SBP and Co. (supra) and Boghara Polyfab (supra). This position continued till the amendment brought about in 2015. After the amendment, all that the Courts need to see is whether an arbitration agreement exists - nothing more, nothing less. The legislative policy and purpose is essentially to minimize the Court’s intervention at the stage of appointing the arbitrator and this intention as incorporated in Section 11 (6A) ought to be respected.” 9. Reliance is also placed on the observations in paragraph Nos. 163, 164 and 187 of the judgment in Curative Petition (C) No. 44 of 2023, which read as under: “163. The burden of proving the existence of arbitration agreement generally lies on the party seeking to rely on such agreement. In jurisdictions such as India, which accept the doctrine of competence-competence, only prima facie proof of the existence of an arbitration agreement must be adduced before the referral court. The burden of proving the existence of arbitration agreement generally lies on the party seeking to rely on such agreement. In jurisdictions such as India, which accept the doctrine of competence-competence, only prima facie proof of the existence of an arbitration agreement must be adduced before the referral court. The referral court is not the appropriate forum to conduct a mini- trial by allowing the parties to adduce the evidence in regard to the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement. The determination of the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement on the basis of evidence ought to be left to the arbitral tribunal. This position of law can also be gauged from the plain language of the statute. 164. Section 11(6A) uses the expression “examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement.” The purport of using the word “examination” connotes that the legislature intends that the referral court has to inspect or scrutinize the dealings between the parties for the existence of an arbitration agreement. Moreover, the expression “examination” does not connote or imply a laborious or contested inquiry.100 On the other hand, Section 16 provides that the arbitral tribunal can “rule” on its jurisdiction, including the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement. A “ruling” connotes adjudication of disputes after admitting evidence from the parties. Therefore, it is evident that the referral court is only required to examine the existence of arbitration agreements, whereas the arbitral tribunal ought to Rule on its jurisdiction, including the issues pertaining to the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement. A similar view was adopted by this Court in Shin-Etsu Chemical Co. Ltd. vs. Aksh Optifibre Ltd. MANU/SC/0488/2005 : (2005) 7 SCC 234 .” 187. The decision of the majority in N.N. Global (supra) assumes that the inadmissibility of the document in evidence renders it unenforceable. However, the effect of the principle of competence-competence is that the arbitral tribunal is vested with the power and authority to determine its enforceability. The question of enforceability survives, pending the curing of the defect which renders the instrument inadmissible. By appointing a tribunal or its members, this Court (or the High Courts, as the case may be) is merely giving effect to the principle enshrined in Section 16. The question of enforceability survives, pending the curing of the defect which renders the instrument inadmissible. By appointing a tribunal or its members, this Court (or the High Courts, as the case may be) is merely giving effect to the principle enshrined in Section 16. The appointment of an arbitral tribunal does not necessarily mean that the agreement in which the arbitration Clause is contained as well as the arbitration agreement itself are enforceable. The arbitral tribunal will answer precisely these questions.” 10. Further reliance is placed on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Mayavati Trading Private Limited vs. Pradyut Deb Burman, (2019) 8 SCC 714 and paragraph Nos. 3 to 11 of the said decision have been pressed into service to substantiate the above submission that at the stage of Section 11(6) application only “existence of arbitration agreement has to be looked into and not other preliminary issues.” 11. Considering the above submissions, this Court may take note of the position of law as explained in a recent decision of the Apex Court in NTPC Ltd. vs. SPML Infra Ltd. 2023 SCC Online SC 389 on the issue of pre-referral jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 11 of the Act, 1996. The Apex Court had underscored the limited scope within which an application under Section 11(6) of the Act has to be considered. It was noted that the position of law with respect to the referral jurisdiction as it existed before advent of Section 11 (6A) in the Act was based on the sole articulated principle formulated by the Apex Court in National Insurance National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Boghara Polyfab (P) Ltd. (2009) 1 SCC 267 , wherein it was held that the issue of non-arbittrability of a dispute will have to be examined by the Court in cases where accord and discharge of the contract is alleged. Following the said principle in Union of India vs. Master Construction Co. (2011) 12 SCC 349 observed that when the validity of discharge voucher, no-claim certificate or settlement agreement is in dispute, the court must prima facie examine the credibility of the allegations before referring the parties to the arbitration. Following the said principle in Union of India vs. Master Construction Co. (2011) 12 SCC 349 observed that when the validity of discharge voucher, no-claim certificate or settlement agreement is in dispute, the court must prima facie examine the credibility of the allegations before referring the parties to the arbitration. In an another decision in New India Assurance vs. Genus Power Infrastructure Ltd. (2015) 2 SCC 424 , the Apex Court observed that allegations of fraud, coercion, demur and undue-influence must be prima facie substantiated through evidence by the parties raising the allegations. However, with the addition of Sub-Section (6A) to Section 11 of the Act by amendment Act, 2015, the jurisdiction of the Court under Section 11(6) of the Act is limited to the examination as to whether the arbitration agreement exists between the parties, “nothing more nothing less.” Three Judge bench in Mayavati Trading Private Limited (supra) has reiterated the principles laid down in Duro Felguera (supra) that Section 11(6A) is confined to examination of existence of an arbitration agreement and is to be understood in the narrow sense as has been laid down in the said judgment. 12. It was observed therein that another three Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Vidya Droliya vs. Durga Trading Corporation, (2021) 2 SCC 1 laid down an overreaching principle with respect to pre-referral jurisdiction under Section 11(6) of the Act. The relevant portions of the said decision has been noted by the Apex Court in paragraph No. 22 of NTPC Ltd.(supra), which read as under: “22. The entire case law on the subject was considered by a three-judge bench of this Court in Vidya Drolia (supra), and an overarching principle with respect to the pre-referral jurisdiction under Section 11(6) of the Act was laid down. The relevant portion of the judgment is as follows: “153. Accordingly, we hold that the expression “existence of an arbitration agreement” in Section 11of the Arbitration Act, would include aspect of validity of an arbitration agreement, albeit the court at the referral stage would apply the prima facie test on the basis of principles set out in this judgment. The relevant portion of the judgment is as follows: “153. Accordingly, we hold that the expression “existence of an arbitration agreement” in Section 11of the Arbitration Act, would include aspect of validity of an arbitration agreement, albeit the court at the referral stage would apply the prima facie test on the basis of principles set out in this judgment. In cases of debatable and disputable facts, and good reasonable arguable case, etc., the court would force the parties to abide by the arbitration agreement as the Arbitral Tribunal has primary jurisdiction and authority to decide the disputes including the question of jurisdiction and non- arbitrability. 154. Discussion under the heading “Who Decides Arbitrability?” can be crystallised as under: 154.1 Ratio of the decision in SBP and Co. vs. Patel Engg. Ltd. (2005) 8 SCC 618 on the scope of judicial review by the court while deciding an application under Sections 8 or 11 of the Arbitration Act, post the amendments by Act 3 of 2016 (with retrospective effect from 23-10-2015) and even post the amendments vide Act 33 of 2019 (with effect from 9-8-2019), is no longer applicable. 154.2. Scope of judicial review and jurisdiction of the court under Sections 8 and 11 of the Arbitration Act is identical but extremely limited and restricted. 154.3. The general rule and principle, in view of the legislative mandate clear from Act 3 of 2016 and Act 33 of 2019, and the principle of severability and competence-competence, is that the Arbitral Tribunal is the preferred first authority to determine and decide all questions of non-arbitrability. The court has been conferred power of “second look” on aspects of non- arbitrability post the award in terms of sub-clauses (i), (ii) or (iv) of Section 34(2) (a) or sub-clause (i) of Section 34(2)(b) of the Arbitration Act. 154.4. Rarely as a demurrer the court may interfere at Section 8 or 11 stage when it is manifestly and ex facie certain that the arbitration agreement is non-existent, invalid or the disputes are non-arbitrable, though the nature and facet of non-arbitrability would, to some extent, determine the level and nature of judicial scrutiny. The restricted and limited review is to check and protect parties from being forced to arbitrate when the matter is demonstrably “non-arbitrable” and to cut off the deadwood. The restricted and limited review is to check and protect parties from being forced to arbitrate when the matter is demonstrably “non-arbitrable” and to cut off the deadwood. The court by default would refer the matter when contentions relating to non-arbitrability are plainly arguable; when consideration in summary proceedings would be insufficient and inconclusive; when facts are contested; when the party opposing arbitration adopts delaying tactics or impairs conduct of arbitration proceedings. This is not the stage for the court to enter into a mini trial or elaborate review so as to usurp the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal but to affirm and uphold integrity and efficacy of arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism.” (Emphasis supplied) 13. Paragraph No. 23 in NTPC Ltd. (supra) then discussed with the limited scope of judicial scrutiny at the pre-referral stage navigating through the test of ‘prima facie review’ is explained as under: “23. The limited scope of judicial scrutiny at the pre-referral stage is navigated through the test of a ‘prima facie review’. This is explained as under: “133. Prima facie case in the context of Section 8 is not to be confused with the merits of the case put up by the parties which has to be established before the Arbitral Tribunal. It is restricted to the subject-matter of the suit being prima facie arbitrable under a valid arbitration agreement. Prima facie case means that the assertions on these aspects are bona fide. When read with the principles of separation and competence-competence and Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, the referral court without getting bogged down would compel the parties to abide unless there are good and substantial reasons to the contrary. 134. Prima facie examination is not full review but a primary first review to weed out manifestly and ex facie non-existent and invalid arbitration agreements and non-arbitrable disputes. The prima facie review at the reference stage is to cut the deadwood and trim off the side branches in straightforward cases where dismissal is barefaced and pellucid and when on the facts and law the litigation must stop at the first stage. Only when the court is certain that no valid arbitration agreement exists or the disputes/subject-matter are not arbitrable, the application under Section 8 would be rejected. At this stage, the court should not get lost in thickets and decide debatable questions of facts. Only when the court is certain that no valid arbitration agreement exists or the disputes/subject-matter are not arbitrable, the application under Section 8 would be rejected. At this stage, the court should not get lost in thickets and decide debatable questions of facts. Referral proceedings are preliminary and summary and not a mini trial. .................... 138. On the other hand, issues relating to contract formation, existence, validity and non-arbitrability would be connected and intertwined with the issues underlying the merits of the respective disputes/claims. They would be factual and disputed and for the Arbitral Tribunal to decide. 139. We would not like to be too prescriptive, albeit observe that the court may for legitimate reasons, to prevent wastage of public and private resources, can exercise judicial discretion to conduct an intense yet summary prima facie review while remaining conscious that it is to assist the arbitration procedure and not usurp jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal. Undertaking a detailed full review or a long-drawn review at the referral stage would obstruct and cause delay undermining the integrity and efficacy of arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism. Conversely, if the court becomes too reluctant to intervene, it may undermine effectiveness of both the arbitration and the court. There are certain cases where the prima facie examination may require a deeper consideration. The court’s challenge is to find the right amount of and the context when it would examine the prima facie case or exercise restraint. The legal order needs a right balance between avoiding arbitration obstructing tactics at referral stage and protecting parties from being forced to arbitrate when the matter is clearly non-arbitrable. 140. Accordingly, when it appears that prima facie review would be inconclusive, or on consideration inadequate as it requires detailed examination, the matter should be left for final determination by the Arbitral Tribunal selected by the parties by consent. The underlying rationale being not to delay or defer and to discourage parties from using referral proceeding as a ruse to delay and obstruct. In such cases a full review by the courts at this stage would encroach on the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal and violate the legislative scheme allocating jurisdiction between the courts and the Arbitral Tribunal. Centralisation of litigation with the Arbitral Tribunal as the primary and first adjudicator is beneficent as it helps in quicker and efficient resolution of disputes.” (Emphasis supplied) 14. Centralisation of litigation with the Arbitral Tribunal as the primary and first adjudicator is beneficent as it helps in quicker and efficient resolution of disputes.” (Emphasis supplied) 14. It was, thus, observed that following the general rule and the principles laid down in Vidya Droliya (supra), the Apex Court has consistently held that the Arbitral Tribunal is the preferred first authority to determine and decide all the questions of non-arbitrability. 15. Noticing the above, it was held in paragraph Nos. 24 to 28 in NTPC Ltd. as under: “24. Following the general rule and the principle laid down in Vidya Drolia (supra), this Court has consistently been holding that the arbitral tribunal is the preferred first authority to determine and decide all questions of non-arbitrability. In Pravin Electricals Pvt. Ltd. vs. Galaxy Infra and Engg. Pvt. Ltd. and Sanjiv Prakash vs. Seema Kukreja and Others and Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. vs. NCC Ltd. the parties were referred to arbitration, as the prima facie review in each of these cases on the objection of non-arbitrability was found to be inconclusive. Following the exception to the general principle that the court may not refer parties to arbitration when it is clear that the case is manifestly and ex-facie non-arbitrable, in BSNL and Another vs. Nortel Networks India (P) Ltd. and Secunderabad Cantonment Board vs. B. Ramachandraiah and Sons, arbitration was refused as the claims of the parties were demonstrably time-barred. 25. Eye of the Needle: The above-referred precedents crystallise the position of law that the pre-referral jurisdiction of the courts under Section 11(6) of the Act is very narrow and inheres two inquiries. The primary inquiry is about the existence and the validity of an arbitration agreement, which also includes an inquiry as to the parties to the agreement and the applicant’s privity to the said agreement. These are matters which require a thorough examination by the referral court. The secondary inquiry that may arise at the reference stage itself is with respect to the non- arbitrability of the dispute. 26. As a general rule and a principle, the arbitral tribunal is the preferred first authority to determine and decide all questions of non-arbitrability. As an exception to the rule, and rarely as a demurrer, the referral court may reject claims which are manifestly and ex-facie non-arbitrable. 26. As a general rule and a principle, the arbitral tribunal is the preferred first authority to determine and decide all questions of non-arbitrability. As an exception to the rule, and rarely as a demurrer, the referral court may reject claims which are manifestly and ex-facie non-arbitrable. Explaining this position, flowing from the principles laid down in Vidya Drolia (supra), this Court in a subsequent decision in Nortel Networks (supra) held: “45.1.........While exercising jurisdiction under Section 11 as the judicial forum, the court may exercise the prima facie test to screen and knockdown ex facie meritless, frivolous, and dishonest litigation. Limited jurisdiction of the courts would ensure expeditious and efficient disposal at the referral stage. At the referral stage, the Court can interfere “only” when it is “manifest” that the claims are ex facie time-barred and dead, or there is no subsisting dispute...” 27. The standard of scrutiny to examine the non-arbitrability of a claim is only prima facie. Referral courts must not undertake a full review of the contested facts; they must only be confined to a primary first review and let facts speak for themselves. This also requires the courts to examine whether the assertion on arbitrability is bona fide or not. The prima facie scrutiny of the facts must lead to a clear conclusion that there is not even a vestige of doubt that the claim is non-arbitrable. On the other hand, even if there is the slightest doubt, the rule is to refer the dispute to arbitration. 28. The limited scrutiny, through the eye of the needle, is necessary and compelling. It is intertwined with the duty of the referral court to protect the parties from being forced to arbitrate when the matter is demonstrably non-arbitrable. It has been termed as a legitimate interference by courts to refuse reference in order to prevent wastage of public and private resources. Further, as noted in Vidya Drolia (supra), if this duty within the limited compass is not exercised, and the Court becomes too reluctant to intervene, it may undermine the effectiveness of both, arbitration and the Court. It has been termed as a legitimate interference by courts to refuse reference in order to prevent wastage of public and private resources. Further, as noted in Vidya Drolia (supra), if this duty within the limited compass is not exercised, and the Court becomes too reluctant to intervene, it may undermine the effectiveness of both, arbitration and the Court. Therefore, this Court or a High Court, as the case may be, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 11(6) of the Act, is not expected to act mechanically merely to deliver a purported dispute raised by an applicant at the doors of the chosen arbitrator, as explained in DLF Home Developers Limited v. Rajapura Homes Pvt. Ltd.” (Emphasis supplied) 16. The eye of the needle principle propounded in NTPC Ltd. (supra) talks of the position of law that the pre-referral jurisdiction of the Courts under Section 11(6) of the Act is very narrow and inheres two inquiries: (i) The primary inquiry is about the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement, which also includes an inquiry as to the parties to the agreement and the applicant’s privity to the said agreement. These are the matters which require a thorough examination by the referral court. (ii) The secondary inquiry that may arise at the reference stage itself is with respect to non-arbitrability of the dispute. 17. In Curative Petition (C) No. 44 of 2023 in Review Petition (C) No. 704 of 2021 in Civil Appeal No. 1599 of 2020 in Reference Interplay between Arbitration Agreements under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, the question before the Apex Court was whether such arbitration agreement would be unenforceable or invalid if the underlying contract is not stamped. While answering the question the Apex Court has examined the issue that Section 11(6) A of the Arbitration Act confines referral Court’s power to the examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement and such examination does not extend to the adequacy of the stamping under Section 33 of the Stamp Act. 18. While answering the said question, the Apex Court referring to the decisions in Vidya Drolia (supra), Patel Engg. Limited (supra) and NTPC Ltd. (supra) has observed that 2015 Amendment Act has legislatively overruled the dictum of Patel Engg. Limited (supra). 18. While answering the said question, the Apex Court referring to the decisions in Vidya Drolia (supra), Patel Engg. Limited (supra) and NTPC Ltd. (supra) has observed that 2015 Amendment Act has legislatively overruled the dictum of Patel Engg. Limited (supra). The legislature confined the scope of reference under Section 11(6)A to the examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement. Use of the term “examination” itself connotes that the scope of the power is limited to a prima facie determination. 19. Referring to Duro Felguera, S.A. (supra), it was noted that referral Courts only need to consider one aspect to determine the existence of an agreement, whether the underling contract contains the arbitration agreement which provides for arbitration pertaining to the disputes which have arisen between the parties to the agreement. Therefore, the scope of examination under Section 11(6) A should be confined to the existence of an arbitration agreement on the basis of Section 7. It was further observed that the burden of proving existence of arbitration agreement generally lies on the party seeking to rely on such agreement. It was further observed in Paragraphs Nos. 164 and 166 as under: “164. Section 11(6A) uses the expression “examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement.” The purport of using the word “examination” connotes that the legislature intends that the referral court has to inspect or scrutinize the dealings between the parties for the existence of an arbitration agreement. Moreover, the expression “examination” does not connote or imply a laborious or contested inquiry. 148 On the other hand, Section 16 provides that the arbitral tribunal can “rule” on its jurisdiction, including the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement. A “ruling” connotes adjudication of disputes after admitting evidence from the parties. Therefore, it is evident that the referral court is only required to examine the existence of arbitration agreements, whereas the arbitral tribunal ought to rule on its jurisdiction, including the issues pertaining to the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement. A similar view was adopted by this Court in Shin-Etsu Chemical Co. Ltd. vs. Aksh Optifibre Ltd. 165. When the referral court renders a prima facie opinion, neither the arbitral tribunal, nor the court enforcing the arbitral award will be bound by such a prima facie view. A similar view was adopted by this Court in Shin-Etsu Chemical Co. Ltd. vs. Aksh Optifibre Ltd. 165. When the referral court renders a prima facie opinion, neither the arbitral tribunal, nor the court enforcing the arbitral award will be bound by such a prima facie view. If a prima facie view as to the existence of an arbitration agreement is taken by the referral court, it still allows the arbitral tribunal to examine the issue in-depth. Such a legal approach will help the referral court in weeding out prima facie non-existent arbitration agreements. It will also protect the jurisdictional competence of the arbitral tribunals to decide on issues pertaining to the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement.” 20. From a careful reading of the recent decision of the Apex Court in NTPC Ltd. (supra) where eye of the needle principle has been propounded for the referral Court and the decision of the Constitution Bench, the guiding principles for the referral Courts may be culled out as under: (i) As a general rule, the arbitral Tribunal is the preferred first authority to determine and decide all questions of non-arbitrability. (ii) As an exception to the above rule and rarely as a demurrer, the referral Court may reject the claims which are manifestly and ex-facie non-arbitrable. (iii) While exercising the jurisdiction under Section 11 as a judicial forum, the Court may exercise the prima facie test to screen and knock-down ex facie meritless, frivolous and dishonest litigation. The limited jurisdiction of the Court would ensure expeditious and efficient disposal at the referral stage. (iv) At the referral stage, the court can interfere “only” when it is “manifest” that the claims are ex-facie time barred and dead, or there is no subsisting dispute.” (v) The standard of scrutiny to examine the non-arbitrability of the claim is only prima facie. The referral Courts must not undertake full review of the contested facts; they must only be confined to a primary first review and let the facts speak for themselves. This also requires the Courts to examine whether the assertion on arbitrability is bona fide or not. (vi) The prima facie scrutiny of the facts must lead to a clear conclusion that there is not even a vestige of doubt that the claim is non-arbitrable. This also requires the Courts to examine whether the assertion on arbitrability is bona fide or not. (vi) The prima facie scrutiny of the facts must lead to a clear conclusion that there is not even a vestige of doubt that the claim is non-arbitrable. On the other hand, even if there is a slightest doubt, the rule is to refer the dispute to arbitration. (vii) The limited scrutiny, through the eye of the needle, is necessary and compelling. It is intertwined with the duty of the referral Court to protect the parties from being forced to arbitrate when the matter is demonstrably non-arbitrable. It has been termed as a legitimate interference by Courts to refuse reference in order to prevent wastage of public and private resources. (viii) As noted in NPTC Limited (supra), with reference to the observation in Vidya Droliya (supra), if this duty within the limited compass is not exercised, and the Court becomes too reluctant to intervene, it may undermine the effectiveness of both, arbitration and the Court. 21. The High Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 11(6) of the Act, is not expected to act mechanically, merely to deliver the purported dispute raised by an applicant at the doors of the chosen Arbitrator. 22. Considering the “limited scope of examination” under the expression “ examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement” under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act’ 1996, within the limited scope of scrutiny, through the eye of the needle, this Court finds that the prima facie scrutiny into the facts of the instant case, leads to an irresistible conclusion that there is no subsisting claim or dispute, inasmuch, as the only claim of the petitioner for the damage of Vial line machinery, purchased after the inception of the policy, was not covered under the Insurance policy. The Insurance company, namely the respondent is not bound to indemnify the petitioner for the said purported loss. The learned counsel for the petitioner could not dispute the submissions of the learned counsel for the respondent insurance company about non-coverage of the vial line machine under the Insurance policy. The result is that in case the matter is referred to the Arbitrator, it would result in the Insurance Company being forced to arbitrate when the dispute is demonstrably non-arbitrable. The result is that in case the matter is referred to the Arbitrator, it would result in the Insurance Company being forced to arbitrate when the dispute is demonstrably non-arbitrable. It is manifest that the claim of the petitioner for the loss of damage of the Vial line machinery is not covered by the arbitration agreement, incorporated in the insurance policy. Thus, within the scope of Section 11(6), on a prima facie examination of the facts, it is evident that no arbitration agreement exists with respect to the dispute pertaining to the damages of the Vial line machinery, as it was not covered in the insurance policy. 23. The assertion of the learned counsel for the petitioner that even this dispute is required to be referred to the Arbitrator and the referral Court cannot look into the same is found to be misconceived, inasmuch as, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 11(6) of the Act, this Court is not expected to act mechanically as a post office merely to deliver the purported dispute to an Arbitrator. 24. In view of the above discussion, this Court reaches at an irresistible conclusion that there is not even a vestige of doubt that the claim of the petitioner is non-arbitrable. 25. In view of the above discussion, the arbitration petition stands dismissed.