ORDER : (Common Prayer: Criminal Original Petitions are filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to call for the records relating to the proceedings in C.C.Nos.77, 78, 81, 80, 79 and 82 of 2005 dated 05.06.2012 on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate, Rajapalayam and quash the same.) 1. All the Criminal Original Petitions have been filed to quash the proceedings in C.C.Nos.77, 78, 81, 80, 79 and 82 of 2005, dated 05.06.2012 on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate, Rajapalayam. 2. Heard Mr.N.Manoharan, for Mr.R.Niresh Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and Mr.K.Murali Sankar, learned counsel appearing for the respondent. 3. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would vehemently contend that the respondent has initiated the criminal prosecution under Sections 14(A) and 14(1-A) of the Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952(hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) for the alleged dues of the provident fund contribution for the period from October 2001 to March 2002. It is the specific contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that they have leased out the mill to M/s.Sree Preethi Spinners under leave and license agreement dated 20.11.2000 and that such leave and license agreement was informed to the respondent through Form No.5A. Therefore, contended that by virtue of Section 14(A) of the Act, the prosecution can be initiated only against the persons, who was in-charge and responsible to the day to day activities of the company. Whereas the petitioner company is now under active management and under the control of one M/s. Sree Preethi Spinners, Dindigul, therefore, he would contend that the very cognizance taken by the learned Judicial Magistrate against this petitioner is abuse of process of law and liable to be quashed. 4. It is the further contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the punishment for the offence under Section 14(A) of the Act may extent upto 3 years, whereas the cognizance was taken by the learned Magistrate beyond the period of limitation. Hence, according to the petitioner, the complaint even otherwise barred by limitation under Section 468 of Cr.P.C. 5. In support of his contention, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners relied upon the following judgments: (i) In Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited Vs. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner and Ors., reported in 1997 (1) MLJ 164 . Hence, according to the petitioner, the complaint even otherwise barred by limitation under Section 468 of Cr.P.C. 5. In support of his contention, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners relied upon the following judgments: (i) In Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited Vs. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner and Ors., reported in 1997 (1) MLJ 164 . (ii) In Annie Thomas-Vs-The Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner and Ors., reported in Manu/KE/0608/2004. (iii) In Transport Corporation of India Ltd., and Ors. Vs. R.M.Gandhi and Ors., reported in 1991 Mh LJ 1055. (iv) In Kailashkumar Radhakrishnan Kanoria & Ors., Vs. State of Gujarat, reported in 2005 (1) MhLJ 1166 . (v) In S.Sampath Kumar Vs. The State of Maharashtra, reported in 2005 (1) MhLJ 1166 . (vi) In Momtaz Begum Vs. The State, reported in AIR 1962 Cal 202 . 6. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent would contend that, though the mill was leased to one M/s.Sree Preethi Spinners, still under Section 17(B) of the Act, the liability of the employer and the person to whom the establishment is so transferred is jointly and severally liable. Therefore, the cognizance taken by the learned Magistrate is well within the parameters of the law. The learned counsel would further contend that the petitioners have suppressed very many facts before this Court as they have already moved the discharge application before the concerned Magistrate in Crl.M.P(MD)No.8867 of 2009 and five other petitions in all the six complaints, which were dismissed by the learned Judicial Magistrate and that against which, the petitioners also preferred the revision in Crl.R.P.No.13 of 2012, and 5 other revisions, which were also dismissed by the District and Sessions Judge, Virudhunagar. However, without disclosing all these facts and without taking appropriate recourse, the filing of the instant quash application, that too with inordinate delay is devoid of merits. Hence, he prays to dismiss the application. 7. I have given my anxious consideration on the submissions made by either side. 8. The main ground urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that, by virtue of Form-5A and by virtue of leave and license agreement, the person who is responsible and in-charge for the company is only M/s.Sri Preethi Spinners, Dindigul and therefore, the prosecution launched against the present petitioners is defective. 8. The main ground urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that, by virtue of Form-5A and by virtue of leave and license agreement, the person who is responsible and in-charge for the company is only M/s.Sri Preethi Spinners, Dindigul and therefore, the prosecution launched against the present petitioners is defective. In this regard, it is useful to refer Section 17(B) of the Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952: “17B. Liability in case of transfer of establishment.— Where an employer, in relation to an establishment, transfers that establishment in whole or in part, by sale, gift, lease or licence or in any other manner whatsoever, the employer and the person to whom the establishment is so transferred shall jointly and severally be liable to pay the contribution and other sums due from the employer under any provision of this Act or the Scheme or the Pension. Scheme or the Insurance Scheme, as the case may be, in respect of the period up to the date of such transfer: Provided that the liability of the transferee shall be limited to the value of the assets obtained by him by such transfer.” 9. By referring the above section, the learned counsel would submit that after the transfer of the Company to M/s.Sree Preethi Spinners, the liability to be discharged by the transferee company. In support of his contention, he relied upon the judgment of this Court in Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited Vs. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner and Ors., reported in MANU/TN/0998/1996, wherein this Court has held that the liability of the employer in relation to the establishment shall continue up to the date of transfer by way of sale, gift, lease or license. Therefore, in the above judgment, it was held that subsequent to the transfer, the liability should only upon the transferee company. 10. Further, the learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of the Bombay High Court, in S.Sampath Kumar-Vs-The State of Maharashtra reported in MANU/MH/0933/2004, and would contend that the cognizance should be taken only against the persons, who are in-charge and responsible for the affairs of the company at the relevant point of time, and not against the dormant person. The other judgment relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner is also on the same proposition. The other judgment relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner is also on the same proposition. Therefore, the entire ground put-forth by the learned counsel for the petitioners revolves around the interpretation of clauses found in the leave and license agreement dated 20.11.2000. For ready reference this Court deems it appropriate to extract the relevant clauses: “D.The LICENSEE has been granted as approved by MANAGING DIRECTOR of the Mills Mrs.K.Senthamarai(the LICENSOR) pursuant to the order of the Company law Board, Principal Bench, new Delhi, dated 03.08.2000 in C.P.No.59 of 1996 and the draft of this agreement has been approved and its execution authorised.” ..................... 4.......... The LICENSOR has agreed to get the permission and clearance from P.F., E.S.I., sales tax, Central Excise, Other statutory authorities and Banks and Banks operation to run the Mills without any problem. 5................. All staff and Labourers who are on the roll as on the date of this agreement will continue and discharge their duties, to the LICENSEE according to the Labor Laws. Fresh appointments may be made by the LICENSEE and such persons shall be withdrawn at the time of termination of the LICENSE. .............................................. On termination of the agreement either due to efflux of time or for any other reason, the LICENSEE agrees to settle all the dues towards gratuity, leave with wages PF, ESI, Sales tax, Bonus Electricity pertaining to the license period before vacating the Mill.” 11. Therefore, through the above clauses, the learned counsel would submit that the leave and license agreement was entered only based upon the order of the National Company Law Board and that, they also made payment on various dates and even by virtue of the order of this Court, dated 21.01.2021 in W.P(MD)No.7857 of 2005 they paid a sum of Rs.10 lakhs. Therefore, contended that the continuance of criminal proceedings are abuse of process of law. At this juncture, we must see whether these type of factual aspect, interpretation of clauses in the agreement and whether minute particulars could be considered while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. 12. It is settled principles of law that by virtue of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M.Jayanthi Vs. At this juncture, we must see whether these type of factual aspect, interpretation of clauses in the agreement and whether minute particulars could be considered while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. 12. It is settled principles of law that by virtue of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M.Jayanthi Vs. K.R.Meenakshi & Anr., reported in 2019 SCC Online SC 2058 and in Devendra Prasad Singh-Vs-State of Bihar & Anr., reported in 2019 4 SCC 351 , the High Court while exercising the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., cannot go into the veracity of the document, and cannot venture in to the marshalling of the evidence and documents. 13. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent though has not seriously disputed in respect of the receipt of payment, he did not confirm that these payments are in respect of the amount dealt in the complaint under challenge. Therefore, as per the ratio of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, this Court cannot go into the minute details of the document submitted before this Court and cannot consider its validity or otherwise. Therefore, the appreciation of evidence can only be before the trial Court. At the best, under Section 482 Cr.P.C., this Court can consider whether the fact relied by the complainant, even if unrebutted whether makes out a case or not. 14. Even on the prima facie reading of the lease agreement, the Provident fund amount has to be settled before vacating the mill. Though the complaint was lodged during the year 2005, the agreement relied lapsed during the year 2003. Therefore, the true meaning of the above clauses has to be established before the trial Court. Therefore, this Court is of the firm view while exercising the jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C, this Court cannot go into the disputed factual aspects and the minute details. 15. The learned counsel has also made feeble attempt to contend that all these complaints are barred by limitation by virtue of Section 468 Cr.P.C. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhagirath Kanoria and Others Vs. 15. The learned counsel has also made feeble attempt to contend that all these complaints are barred by limitation by virtue of Section 468 Cr.P.C. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhagirath Kanoria and Others Vs. State of M.P., reported in (1984) 4 SCC 222 , wherein the relevant paragraph is extracted hereunder: “19.The question whether a particular offence is a continuing offence must necessarily depend upon the language of the statute which creates that offence, the nature of the offence and, above all, the purpose which is intended to be achieved by constituting the particular act as an offence. Turning to the matters before us, the offence of which the appellants are charged is the failure to pay the employer's contribution before the due date. Considering the object and purpose of this provision, which is to ensure the welfare of workers, we find it impossible to hold that the offence is not of a continuing nature. The appellant were unquestionably liable to pay their contribution to the Provident Fund before the due date and it was within their power to pay it, as soon after the due date had expired as they willed. The late payment could not have absolved them of their original guilt but it would have snapped the recurrence. Each day that they failed to comply with the obligation to pay their contribution to the fund, they committed a fresh offence. It is putting an incredible premium on lack of concern for the welfare of workers to hold that the employer who has not paid contribution or the contribution of the employes to the Provident Fund can successfully evade the penal consequences of his act by pleading the law of limitation. Such offences must be regarded as continuing offences, to which the law of limitation cannot apply.” 16. Since all these complaints have been filed for non-payment of the amount, such non-payment by virtue of the above ratio should only be construed as a continuing offence. Therefore, even under Section 468 Cr.P.C, the petitioner cannot have any remedy from this Court. 17. This Court also took cognizance of the fact that the trial Court has already dismissed the discharge petition, and that such order was confirmed by the Sessions Judge under revisional jurisdiction. Therefore, even under Section 468 Cr.P.C, the petitioner cannot have any remedy from this Court. 17. This Court also took cognizance of the fact that the trial Court has already dismissed the discharge petition, and that such order was confirmed by the Sessions Judge under revisional jurisdiction. Therefore, when the revisional Court had declined to interfere in the matter, the High Court should be slow in exercising inherent jurisdiction and cannot act as second revisional Court. It is useful to refer the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ganesh Narayan Hedge Vs. S.Bangarappa and Others, reported in (1995) 4 SCC 41 . Therefore, this Court could not find any merit in these petitions and all the petitions are devoid of merits and liable to be dismissed. 18. However, considering the long pendency of the complaint before the learned Judicial Magistrate, Rajapalayam, this Court directs the learned Judicial Magistrate to dispose of the C.C.Nos.77, 78, 81, 80, 79 and 82 of 2005 dated 05.06.2012, as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Further the learned Judicial magistrate is directed to dispose the complaint according to its respective own merit without being influenced by any of the observation made in this order. Further considering the age of the second petitioner, her presence is dispensed with before the trial Court, except whenever she is called for by the trial Court and for receiving the copy of the complaint, for questioning under Section 313 Cr.P.C, and while pronouncing of judgment. 19. In the result, all these Criminal Original Petitions are dismissed. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.