JUDGMENT : 1. Petitioners are the plaintiffs in O.S. No. 564 of 1997. The 2nd plaintiff, who is the wife of the 1st petitioner and mother of petitioners 2 to 6, died during the pendency of the suit. 2. O.S. No. 564 of 1997 on the files of Munsiff’s Court, Hosdurg was a suit for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants and their men from trespassing into the plaint B schedule and C schedule properties. The suit was instituted based on a purchase certificate issued by the Land Tribunal (II), Kanhangad in SM No. 1084 of 1976 in respect of 4 Acres of land. The plaintiffs also prayed for a declaration of title based on the purchase certificate. During the pendency of the suit, an application under Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was filed as I.A. No. 2298 of 2000 for staying the suit in view of the pendency of appeal before the appellate authority as A.A. No. 2 of 1999 and the Munsiff’s Court stayed the suit till disposal of the appeal as per Ext.P3 order dated 23.3.2001. In the meanwhile, the appellate authority allowed A.A.N o. 2 of 1999 and remanded the matter to the Land Tribunal for fresh disposal in accordance with law. Thereafter, the petitioners again filed I.A. No. 2336 of 2002 under Section 125(3) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 and Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to refer the question of tenancy to the Land Tribunal in view of the order of the Appellate Authority in remanding the matter back to the Tribunal. The Munsiff's Court, by Ext.P4 order dated 30.01.2003, had stayed the trial of the suit finding that the question of tenancy would have to be decided in terms of Section 125(3) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963. This was more so when, the question of the validity of the purchase certificate was gaining attention of the appellate authority under the provisions of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963. Consequent on remand, the Land Tribunal cancelled the purchase certificate issued to the 1st petitioner/1st plaintiff. Aggrieved by the order cancelling the purchase certificate in favour of the 1st petitioner/1st plaintiff, he preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority, Kannur as A.A. No. 100 of 2011 which is still pending consideration. Consequent on remand, the Land Tribunal cancelled the purchase certificate issued to the 1st petitioner/1st plaintiff. Aggrieved by the order cancelling the purchase certificate in favour of the 1st petitioner/1st plaintiff, he preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority, Kannur as A.A. No. 100 of 2011 which is still pending consideration. When the presiding officer of the trial court changed, the court suo motu took up I.A. No. 2336 of 2002 stating that the suit is in the target list and therefore, the same has to be taken up and disposed of earlier, and found that during the pendency of the proceedings before the Land Tribunal, the suit cannot be stayed in terms of Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure and accordingly, by Ext.P5 order dated 7.8.2019, its order dated 30.01.2003 in I.A. No. 2336 of 2002 was reviewed and vacated. Challenging the said order, Ext.P5, the petitioners had come up before this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 3. I have heard Advocate A. Arunkumar, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners and Advocate Satheeshan Alakkadan, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents. 4. Learned Counsel for the petitioners contended that Ext.P5 order was without jurisdiction. The Munsiff's Court had already taken up I.A. No. 2336 of 2002 on 30.01.2003 and had stayed the suit until further orders, because of the pendency of the proceedings before the Land Tribunal in S.M. No. 1084 of 1976. That being so, according to the learned Counsel for the petitioners, the power of review could not have been exercised by the trial court after a lapse of 16 years. Thus, according to the petitioners, the order of the trial court is without jurisdiction and hence, required to be interfered with in exercise of the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, Sri. Satheeshan Alakkadan, submitted that the trial of the suit was stayed on the ground that the SM proceedings were pending before the Land Tribunal, Kanhangad. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, Sri. Satheeshan Alakkadan, submitted that the trial of the suit was stayed on the ground that the SM proceedings were pending before the Land Tribunal, Kanhangad. Once the SM proceedings were terminated on remand, finding that the purchase certificate issued was liable to be cancelled, according to the learned Counsel for the respondents, the order of the trial court under Ext.P4 automatically gets vacated and therefore, the trial of the suit ought to have been proceeded by the Munsiff’s Court and therefore, there is nothing illegal in the order passed by the trial court and hence, prayed for the disposal of the original petition. 6. I have considered the rival submissions raised across the bar. 7. On analysis of the rival submissions raised across the bar, two issues arise for consideration before this Court: (a) Whether the trial court was entitled to exercise the power of review suo motu after the lapse of 16 years? (b) Whether the trial of the suit was liable to be stayed in terms of provisions under Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, especially, when the order of the Land Tribunal, Kanhangad was challenged in appeal before the appellate authority, Kannur in A.A. No. 100 of 2011. 8. The power of review is traceable provisions of the Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Order 47 Rule 1 of the CPC reads as follows: “1. Application for review of judgment: (1) Any person considering himself aggrieved: (a) by a decree or Order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred. (b) by a decree or Order from which no appeal is allowed. (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or Order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the Order. (2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or order may apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some other party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or when, being respondent, he can present to the Appellate Court the case on which he applies for the review. Explanation - The fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the Court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior Court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment.” A reading of Order 47 Rule 1 leaves no room for any doubt that for exercising the power of review, there should be an application by the aggrieved party. None of the parties who were aggrieved by the order passed under Ext.P4 had chosen to file a Review Petition. On what basis, the trial court exercised the power of review suo motu and after a lapse of 16 years, is not clear from the reading of Ext.P5 order. Perhaps only inference that could be drawn is that the presiding officer of the court changed and hence there was a change of opinion. Hence, on two counts the order of the trial court calls for interference. (A) the power of review being exercised suo motu. (B) power of review being exercised based on the change of opinion of the presiding officer who took charge subsequently. Thus, the decision of the trial court in having suo motu reviewed the order after a lapse of 16 years is clearly without Jurisdiction. Either way, the aforesaid reasons cannot constitute a ground for review. 9. There is yet another reason as to why, this Court should find against Ext.P5 order is unsustainable. It is pertinent to note that I.A. No. 2336 of 2002 was ordered on 30.01.2003. Once the interlocutory application is ordered, the trial court cannot take up the very same interlocutory application and pass fresh orders thereafter. Still further, the reasoning of the trial court that since the suit is included in the target list, the stay already granted as early as in January, 2003 should be vacated, cannot find favour by this Court. Once the interlocutory application is ordered, the trial court cannot take up the very same interlocutory application and pass fresh orders thereafter. Still further, the reasoning of the trial court that since the suit is included in the target list, the stay already granted as early as in January, 2003 should be vacated, cannot find favour by this Court. Therefore, on all three grounds, this Court finds that Ext.P5 order is liable to be interfered with. 10. Coming to the second question, it is pertinent to note that the suit is based on the strength of the purchase certificate which now stood cancelled by the order of the Land Tribunal, Kanhangad in SM No. 1084 of 1976. Though initially the SM proceedings was allowed and purchase certificate was ordered to be issued in favour of the petitioners/plaintiffs, the same was cancelled after the remand order of the appellate authority. Be that as it may, now the matter is pending before the appellate authority under AA No. 100 of 2011. It must be noticed that independent parallel proceedings were initiated before the Land Tribunal even before the institution of the suit. Hence, it is not possible to hold that a reference under Section 125(3) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 must be made. The scheme of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 envisages that the question of tenancy be decided by an authority constituted under the Act. The jurisdiction of civil court is barred. Therefore, when the question of entitlement of purchase for issuance of certificate is pending either before the Land Tribunal or before the appellate authority, the civil court cannot proceed with the suit. 11. Before parting with this case, necessarily this Court should notice that the suit is one which was instituted in the year 1997. It has been since 27 years after the institution of the suit and the suit has not attained finality. This is mainly because the appeal against the order of Land Tribunal has not been decided finally at the hands of appellate authority constituted under the provisions of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. Therefore an incidental question may crop up, whether this Court should exercise its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and issue directions to the Appellate authority Kannur to dispose of the Appeal, A.A. No. 100 of 2011, within a time frame. 12. Therefore an incidental question may crop up, whether this Court should exercise its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and issue directions to the Appellate authority Kannur to dispose of the Appeal, A.A. No. 100 of 2011, within a time frame. 12. The power of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is well defined. It does not confine to administrative superintendence but also includes the power to review the orders passed by the courts over which the power of superintendence is being exercised. Unlike the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, wherein it is limited by traditional fetters or technicalities of procedure, the power under Article 227 can be exercised suo motu. It must be noticed that the circumstances under which the power can be exercised suo motu cannot be defined. Suffice to say, this Court being custodian of justice, could exercise the power suo motu. On facts, this Court feels that in the interest of justice powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has to be exercised suo motu to issue appropriate directions to the Appellate Authority, Kannur to finalse the proceedings in appeal, A.A. No. 100 of 2011, within a time frame. 13. In the result, the original petition stands allowed. Ext.P5 order dated 07.08.2019 in I.A. No. 2336 of 2002 in O.S. No. 564 of 1997 on the files of the Munsiff's Court, Hosdurg is set aside. The trial of the suit is stayed until the proceedings in AA No. 100 of 2011 on the files of the appellate authority, Kannur is finalised. The Appellate Authority, Kannur is directed to take up A.A. No. 100 of 2011 and decide in accordance with law, after hearing both sides at any rate within a period of six months of receipt of a copy of this judgment. A further direction is issued to the Munsiff’s Court, Hosdurg to proceed with the trial of the suit as expeditiously as possible after receipt of the order from the Appellate Authority, Kannur in A.A. No. 100 of 2011.