JUDGMENT : Mayank Kumar Jain, J. 1. Heard Sri Sameer Sharma, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Ankit Srivastava, learned counsel for the applicants, Sri Vijay Kumar Rai, learned A.G.A for the State of U.P. and Ms Bindu Kumari, learned counsel for opposite party no. 2. 2. Present Application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed to quash the entire proceedings of Complaint Case No. 5039 of 2022 (R.Sathesh Shankar Vs. Vinod Kumar Gupta and others) and set aside the order dated 27.04.2023 passed by learned Civil Judge, (Senior Division)- Fast Track Court/Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar whereby the leaned trial Court took cognizance of the offence under Sections 406 and 506 of I.P.C. and issued summons against the applicants to face trial of the aforementioned case, under Sections 406 and 506 of I.P.C, Police Station- Phase-3, District Gautam Budh Nagar, pending in the court of Civil Judge, (Senior Division)-Fast Track Court/Additional Chief Judicial Magsitrate, Gautam Budh Nagar. 3. Opposite party no. 2 instituted a criminal complaint against the applicants under Sections 406 and 506 IPC. 4. The substance of the complaint are summarised as under: – 5. The complainant is a resident of Tamil Nadu and he worked in Hyderabad branch of Gas Plant Division of Nuberg Engineering Ltd., from 2011 to 2022 as Sales Engineer (G.P.D). 6. Suddenly, on 06.04.2022, Vinod Kumar Gupta-Director of the company sent a Whats App message to the complainant. He asked the complainant to submit his papers (resignation) without giving any reason. In place of complainant Shashi Shekhar Sharma was appointed on 11.04.2022. When the complainant asked Shashi Shekhar Sharma about reason for asking him to resign, he abused, threatened him and suggested that he should talk to Vinod Kumar Gupta. 7. On making enquiry from Vinod Kumar Gupta-Director of the company, no answer was given to the complainant. 8. When the complainant made demand of his outstanding salary from Vinay Kaushik, no satisfactory answer was given. The complainant was forcibly removed from the company. When the complainant went to the Head Office of Neuberg Engineering Ltd. for settlement of his outstanding salary and P.P.F etc, Vinod Kumar Gupta and Siddharth Kumar did not allow the complainant to enter the premises. 9. The complainant was forcibly removed from the company. When the complainant went to the Head Office of Neuberg Engineering Ltd. for settlement of his outstanding salary and P.P.F etc, Vinod Kumar Gupta and Siddharth Kumar did not allow the complainant to enter the premises. 9. The learned Civil Judge, (Senior Division)-Fast Track Court/Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar, after recording primary evidence of the complainant under Section 200 Cr.P.C., summoned the applicants to face trial under Section 406 and 506 IPC. 10. Sri Sameer Sharma, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Sri Ankit Srivastava, learned counsel for the applicants, submitted that applicant no. 1-Vinod Kumar Gupta is the Managing Director, applicant no. 2-Vinay Kaushik is the H.R. (Head), applicant no. 3-Siddharth Kumar Gupta is the former Managing Director and applicant no. 4-Shashi Shekhar Sharma is the former Manager of the Nuberg Engineering Ltd. The company is an established and leading manufacturer and supplier of various gas plants including P.S.A based Nitrogen gas plants, Oxygen gas plants and other gas plants/systems and is also in the business of fabrication/manufacturing of various vessels, reactors, absorbers, columns, heat exchangers, tanks and other engineering equipments. 11. The “Company” appointed opposite party no. 2 as an Engineer Sales in the Gas Plant Division in Noida and deputed him to work in its Hyderabad branch in the year 2011. Further, after considering the satisfactory performance of opposite party no. 2, the “Company” promoted him as a Manager in GDP/Sales and Marketing Division in the year 2021. 12. It is submitted that a “Proprietary Information and Non-Compete Agreement” was signed on 10.03.2016. It was provided that any employee of the “Company” cannot disclose any information of the Company to any person, firm or corporation, without written authorization of the President or Board of Directors of the Company. 13. Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that surprisingly on 06.04.2022, opposite party no. 2, resigned from the “Company”. When reason for resignation was asked by the company, then it was orally informed by opposite party no. 2, that due to personal reasons and some family issues, he is permanently shifting to his home town and requested to accept his resignation, which was accepted. 14. Learned Counsel for the applicants submitted that after resignation from the “Company”, opposite party no.2, joined its competitor and rival company namely “Noxair Engineering Private Limited” on the post of Director. 2, that due to personal reasons and some family issues, he is permanently shifting to his home town and requested to accept his resignation, which was accepted. 14. Learned Counsel for the applicants submitted that after resignation from the “Company”, opposite party no.2, joined its competitor and rival company namely “Noxair Engineering Private Limited” on the post of Director. By doing this, opposite party no. 2 breached the agreement dated 10.03.2016, by sharing all the techniques, methods and other confidential information of the “Company” thereby resulting directly or indirectly in wrongful loss to the company. The “Company” sent a legal notice dated 21.06.2022 to opposite party no. 2 to resign or discontinue his engagement from any project with “Noxair Engineering Private Limited” and also to pay damages of Rs. 25 lakhs. 15. Learned counsel for the applicants further submitted that against the aforesaid legal notice, opposite party no. 2 also sent a legal notice dated 27.06.2022 to the “Company” demanding Rs. 8,80,000/- in lieu of his outstanding salary due upon “Company”. Thereafter, the “Company” on 30.09.2022, filed a civil suit for permanent injunction against opposite party no. 2 in Karkarduma Court, Delhi. 16. He further argued that the “Company” is not liable to pay any pending dues to opposite party no. 2, as his resignation was accepted on the same day, as per his request and Relieving Cum Experience Letter was also issued to him. 17. Learned counsel for the applicant also submitted that the allegation in the impugned complaint regarding non-payment of salary, and even if it is accepted, even then the same does not constitute a criminal offence, as opposite party no. 2 breached the terms and conditions of agreement dated 10.03.2016. It is also submitted that there is an allegation of breach of trust upon the “Company” but the fact is that there is no entrustment of anything in any manner upon the “Company”, therefore, the question of misappropriation does not arise at all. 18. Learned counsel for the applicant also submitted that the ingredients of Section 506 I.P.C are also not attracted and the same is alleged just to give colour of a criminal case. 19. It is also submitted that opposite party no. 2 filed an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C without supported by any affidavit, therefore, the same is not maintainable, hence the impugned complaint is also neither maintainable nor sustainable. 20. 19. It is also submitted that opposite party no. 2 filed an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C without supported by any affidavit, therefore, the same is not maintainable, hence the impugned complaint is also neither maintainable nor sustainable. 20. He relied upon judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court namely:- (a) Deepak Gaba and Ors. Vs,. State of U.P. and Ors. (2023) 3SCC 423. (b) Binod Kumar And Others Vs. State of Bihar and Another, (2014) 10 SCC 663 ; (c) Sarabjit Kaur Vs. State of Punjab and Another, (2023) 5 SCC 360 ; (d) Vinod Natesan Vs. State of Kerala and Anothers, (2019) 2 SCC 401 ; (e) Mehmood UL Rehman Vs. Khazir Mohammad Tunda and Others, (2015) 12 SCC 420 ; 21. It is further submitted that the learned trial Court passed the impugned summoning order dated 27.04.2023 against the applicants without following the procedural aspect which is duly established by law. Therefore, the summoning order is bad in eyes of law. 22. Per contra, Ms Bindu Kumari, learned counsel for opposite party no. 2. vehemently opposed the prayer. She submitted that opposite party no. 2 did not commit any violation of the employment contract. She also submitted that the applicants themselves with ill intention and unethical behaviour, compelled opposite party no. 2 to submit his resignation. 23. It is also submitted that according to the Company Rules and Regulation Act of Employment Contract, it is necessary to provide three months notice period to an employee before terminating him or her by giving proper reason of termination. But the “Company” did not follow any such kind of rules and regulations and suddenly terminated the services of opposite party no. 2. It is also submitted that the applicants have not submitted any proof from which they can prove that opposite party no. 2 has shared any data of their company to third party. 24. It is also submitted that opposite party no. 2 is a resident of Tamil Nadu and just to harass and to extract illegal money from him, the “Company” filed a civil suit in Delhi Court. The same is dismissed on the ground of territorial jurisdiction on 05.10.2023. It is also submitted that opposite party no. 2 also sent legal notice dated 27.06.2022 to the “Company” in lieu of his outstanding salary and amount of Provident Fund amounting to Rs. 8,80,000/-. The same is dismissed on the ground of territorial jurisdiction on 05.10.2023. It is also submitted that opposite party no. 2 also sent legal notice dated 27.06.2022 to the “Company” in lieu of his outstanding salary and amount of Provident Fund amounting to Rs. 8,80,000/-. but no heed was paid till date. 25. Opposite party no. 2 did not commit any breach of trust. She further submitted that not only the salary of the complainant but the entire amount of Provident Fund was detained and misappropriated by the applicants. The applicants falsely gave a notice demanding Rs.25 lakhs from the complainant. Since, it was a frivolous and vague demand, therefore, the complainant did not pay such amount. To put pressure upon the complainant, the remaining amount of his salary and the entire Provident Fund which was entrusted to the complainant is detained and misappropriated by them. 26. Sri Vijay Kumar Rai, learned A.G.A vehemently opposed the prayer on behalf of the State and submitted that on the earlier occasion it was submitted on behalf of the applicant that a civil suit is pending between the applicants and opposite party no. 2. No such suit was pending because the said suit had been dismissed for want of jurisdiction prior to the date on which interim relief was granted to the applicant. Thus, the applicant concealed material fact from the Court and obtained the interim protection. He further submitted that on one hand the salary of the applicant was not paid to him and on the other hand the entire amount of Provident Fund, which was deducted by the complainant from the salary of complainant which was entrusted to applicants was not paid to him. Therefore, applicants misappropriated the amount of opposite party no. 2. 27. Perused the record. 28. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pramod Suryabhan Pawar Vs. State of Maharashtra and another, (2019) 9 SCC 608 has considered the principles, scope, and ambit of the powers of the Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and held that: “6. Section 482 is an overriding section which saves the inherent powers of the court to advance the cause of justice. Under Section 482 the inherent jurisdiction of the court can be exercised (i) to give effect to an order under CrPC; (ii) to prevent the abuse of the process of the court; and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. Under Section 482 the inherent jurisdiction of the court can be exercised (i) to give effect to an order under CrPC; (ii) to prevent the abuse of the process of the court; and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. The powers of the court under Section 482 are wide and the court is vested with a significant amount of discretion to decide whether or not to exercise them. The court should be guarded in the use of its extraordinary jurisdiction to quash an FIR or criminal proceeding as it denies the prosecution the opportunity to establish its case through investigation and evidence. These principles have been consistently followed and reiterated by this Court. In Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal [Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal, (2007) 12 SCC 1 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 259], this Court observed : (SCC p. 10, paras 23-24): “23. This Court in a number of cases has laid down the scope and ambit of courts' powers under Section 482 CrPC. Every High Court has inherent powers to act ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice, for the administration of which alone it exists, or to prevent abuse of the process of the court. Inherent power under Section 482 CrPC can be exercised: (i) to give effect to an order under the Code; (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of the court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. 24. Inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC though wide have to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution and only when exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in this section itself. Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the court would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific provisions in the statute.” 7. Given the varied nature of cases that come before the High Courts, any strict test as to when the court's extraordinary powers can be exercised is likely to tie the court's hands in the face of future injustices. Given the varied nature of cases that come before the High Courts, any strict test as to when the court's extraordinary powers can be exercised is likely to tie the court's hands in the face of future injustices. This Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] conducted a detailed study of the situations where the court may exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction and laid down a list of illustrative examples of where quashing may be appropriate. It is not necessary to discuss all the examples, but a few bear relevance to the present case. The Court in Bhajan Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] noted that quashing may be appropriate where: (SCC pp. 378-79, para 102) “102. … (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2). *** (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 8. In deciding whether to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482, the Court does not adjudicate upon the veracity of the facts alleged or enter into an appreciation of competing evidence presented. The limited question is whether on the face of the FIR, the allegations constitute a cognizable offence. As this Court noted in Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra [Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 18 SCC 191 : 2018 SCC OnLine SC 3100], (Dhruvaram Sonar) : (SCC para 13) “13. It is clear that for quashing the proceedings, meticulous analysis of factum of taking cognizance of an offence by the Magistrate is not called for. Appreciation of evidence is also not permissible in exercise of inherent powers. It is clear that for quashing the proceedings, meticulous analysis of factum of taking cognizance of an offence by the Magistrate is not called for. Appreciation of evidence is also not permissible in exercise of inherent powers. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of its inherent powers.” 29. Perusal of the record goes to show that admittedly the complainant was employee with the applicants. No such prima-facie evidence is brought on record that after resigning from the “Company” of the applicants the complainant joined another company namely Noxair Engineering Private Limited and shared confidential information of applicant’s company. Therefore, it cannot be said that the complainant vitiated the conditions of “Proprietary Information and Non-Compete Agreement” dated 10.03.2016. The amount of his salary for three months as well as the entire amount of Provident Fund is not paid to the complainant. The suit filed by the applicants is also dismissed by the Court concerned, therefore, no civil proceedings are pending at this moment between the parties. 30. So far as the notice dated 21.06.2022, given by the applicants to complainant is concerned in which a demand of Rs. 25 lakhs as damages was raised, it is argued that since such demand was not meeted out by the complainant, therefore, the amount of Rs. 8,80,000/- which was due upon the applicants was detained by them. 31. The statement of Section 200 Cr.P.C of the complainant was recorded in which he supported the version of the complaint. 32. The learned trial Court after consideration of the primary, oral and documentary evidence available on record passed a reasoned order for summoning the applicants. 33. In view of the above, this Court is of the opinion, that learned counsel for the applicant could not point out any legal infirmity in the order impugned which may warrant any interference by this Court at this stage in exercise of power conferred under 482 Cr.P.C. jurisdiction. 34. The application stands dismissed.