JUDGMENT : DEBANGSU BASAK, J. 1. In view of the difference of opinion between the Judges of the Division Bench, the Chief Justice has referred the matter to this Court. 2. Learned advocate appearing for the writ petitioner has contended that, the view expressed by the senior Judge of the Division Bench should be accepted. He has referred to the facts of the case. He has contended that, the writ petitioner was appointed as a constable in the India Reserved Battalion, in the month of January 2012. Two complaints had been made against the writ petitioner on the allegation that on January 14, 2012, the writ petitioner came in front of the house of a lady, under influence of alcohol and used unparliamentary words against her and threatened dire consequences. A First Information Report bearing NC F.I.R No. 31 of 2012 dated January 12, 2012 under Section 504/506 of the Indian Penal Code was initiated against the writ petitioner. A second First Information Report was initiated on January 31, 2012 on the allegation that the writ petitioner on January 31, 2012 without knocking on the door entered the room of the de facto complainant when she was alone and molested her. A criminal proceeding had been initiated against the writ petitioner under Section 107/106/151 of the Criminal Procedure Code against the writ petitioner also. 3. Learned advocate appearing for the writ petitioner has contended that, with regard to such alleged incidents, preliminary enquiry was conducted by a memorandum dated May 14, 2012. Petitioner had been placed under suspension on February 1, 2012 followed by regular disciplinary proceedings initiating against him by a memorandum dated January 24, 2013. Writ petitioner had submitted a representation dated February 6, 2013 where he had denied the allegations against him. In such enquiry, two prosecution witnesses had been examined. Subsequent thereto, the writ petitioner had submitted a letter with the Disciplinary Authority accepting the allegations contained in Article I and II of the memorandum of charge as the de facto complainant already pardoned him. 4. Learned advocate appearing for the writ petitioner has submitted, the Disciplinary Authority took into consideration only the first part of the letter pleading guilty and gave a complete go bye to the procedure postulated in Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965. 5. 4. Learned advocate appearing for the writ petitioner has submitted, the Disciplinary Authority took into consideration only the first part of the letter pleading guilty and gave a complete go bye to the procedure postulated in Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965. 5. Learned advocate appearing for the writ petitioner has contended that, the Disciplinary Authority had passed an order dated February 28, 2014 dismissing the writ petitioner from service. Writ petitioner had preferred an appeal on May 9, 2014 where the Appellate Authority by an order dated June 7, 2014 mechanically affirmed the order of the Disciplinary Authority and dismissed the appeal. 6. Learned advocate appearing for the writ petitioner has submitted that, the criminal case on the basis of the F.I.R No. 40/2012 dated January 31, 2012 culminated in the order of acquittal dated November 14, 2017. On acquittal, the writ petitioner had approached the authorities to review the order taking into consideration the judgement of the criminal court. The authorities by a memorandum dated March 7, 2018 had rejected such request of the writ petitioner. The writ petitioner had thereafter approached the Tribunal by way of OA 351/622/2018 which was dismissed by the order dated August 28, 2023. 7. Learned advocate appearing for the writ petitioner has submitted that, the nature of charges in the disciplinary proceedings as also before the criminal court in more or less identical, the order of acquittal passed by the Criminal Court, allowed the Disciplinary Authority to revisit their decision of punishment and reinstate the writ petitioner in service. He has relied upon 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1618 (Ram Lal vs. State of Rajasthan and Others) in support of his contention. 8. Learned advocate appearing for the writ petitioner has contended that, the view taken by the learned senior Judge of the Division Bench should be accepted. 9. Learned advocate appearing for the administration has contended that, the writ petitioner had acknowledged his guilt twice during the disciplinary proceedings, one before the Disciplinary Authority by a writing dated October 28, 2013 and once before the Appellate Authority in course of hearing of the appeal. 10. Learned advocate appearing for the administration has contended that, the view expressed by the learned Second Judge of the Division Bench should be accepted. 10. Learned advocate appearing for the administration has contended that, the view expressed by the learned Second Judge of the Division Bench should be accepted. He has relied upon 2021 Volume 12 Supreme Court Cases 569 (State of Rajasthan and Others vs. Heem Singh) and contended that, the acquittal cannot be said to be an honourable acquittal. Moreover, mere acquittal from the criminal case cannot lead to automatic reinstatement. Charges in the two proceedings were different. 11. The writ petitioner was appointed as a Constable on December 12, 2002 with the Indian Reserve Battalion. Authorities of such police force had received two complaints against the writ petitioner. Two First Information Reports were initiated against the writ petitioner one being on January 14, 2012 bearing F.I.R No. 31 of 2012 under Section 504/506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 on the allegation that on January 14, 2012 the writ petitioner had come in front of the house of one lady under the influence of alcohol and used unparliamentry words against her and threatened dire consequences. The second First Information Report had been registered on January 31, 2012 against the writ petitioner under Section 451/356/506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 on the allegation that on January 31, 2012 the writ petitioner without knocking on the door, entered the room of the de facto complainant when she was alone and molested her while she was lying on the bed. 12. A criminal proceeding had been initiated by the police against the writ petitioner being Challan No. 27 of 2012 dated January 31, 2012 under Section 107/106/151 of the Criminal Procedure Code for the writ petitioner holding out threats against the de facto complainant of the second F.I.R. 13. By a memorandum dated May 14, 2012 a preliminary enquiry had been directed to be conducted. A report with regard to such preliminary enquiry had been submitted on June 18, 2012. Such preliminary enquiry report had identified the documents collected and the statements recorded. Preliminary enquiry report had concluded that, the writ petitioner unauthorisedly trespassed into the house of the lady and tried to molest her and threatened her husband with dire consequences. In respect of such an incident a First Information Report had been registered with the police. After obtaining bail he had been arrested again. Preliminary enquiry report had concluded that, the writ petitioner unauthorisedly trespassed into the house of the lady and tried to molest her and threatened her husband with dire consequences. In respect of such an incident a First Information Report had been registered with the police. After obtaining bail he had been arrested again. In addition thereto preliminary enquiry had also concluded that on January 14, 2012 the writ petitioner under intoxication had threatened a lady who lodged a complaint with the police which was registered as a First Information Report. Writ petitioner had been arrested and subsequently released on bail. 14. Articles of charges had been framed as against the writ petitioner in the disciplinary proceedings. Primarily the writ petitioner had been charged under two articles of charges. The first article of charge had revolved around the incident of January 14, 2012 while the second was with regard to the incident of January 31, 2012. In respect of both, criminal proceedings were pending. Both related to incidents involving ladies. 15. Writ petitioner had submitted his reply to the charges on February 6, 2013. In the disciplinary proceedings, the enquiry officer had proceeded to record the evidence of the prosecution witnesses. In the disciplinary proceedings, the writ petitioner had been represented by an advocate. After cross-examination of the prosecution witness No. 3, the writ petitioner had pleaded guilty to the charges levelled against him. Such plea of guilty had been tenderedto the authorities by the writ petitioner by a writing dated October 28, 2013. 16. The Disciplinary Authority by an order dated February 28, 2014 had considered the article of charges as against the writ petitioner. The Disciplinary Authority had found the writ petitioner to be a habitual defaulter. Being a member of the disciplined force, writ petitioner had been found to be responsible for protecting the right and honour of the citizens and that instead of discharging such duty honestly and sincerely writ petitioner had indulged in criminal activities unbecoming of a member of a uniform force. Disciplinary Authority had found that the act of mis-conduct if allowed to continue or if leniency was shown towards the writ petitioner then the same can be a bad precedent and would encourage other members of the force to wrongly believe that such incidents are minor delinquencies which could be overlooked. Disciplinary Authority had found that the act of mis-conduct if allowed to continue or if leniency was shown towards the writ petitioner then the same can be a bad precedent and would encourage other members of the force to wrongly believe that such incidents are minor delinquencies which could be overlooked. Writ petitioner had been found to display scant regard for authority or respect for women. Such element had been found not to be an asset of a disciplined force. His act of indiscipline had been found to bring undesirable and having negative impact on the organization. Therefore, writ petitioner had been found not suitable to continue in Indian Reserve Battalion whose bedrock was discipline, orderliness and courage. He had been dismissed from service. 17. Writ petitioner had preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority on May 9, 2014. Such appeal had been disposed of by an order dated June 7, 2014. Appellate Authority had recorded that, the writ petitioner appeared before it where the writ petitioner failed to bring any new facts. However, writ petitioner had requested for reinstatement into service stating that he will not indulge in any such undesirable activity in the future. 18. Appellate Authority had taken note of the conduct of the writ petitioner. Appellate Authority had taken note of the fact that the Disciplinary Authority gave the writ petitioner enough opportunity to rectify his conduct and that the writ petitioner repeatedly indulged in indiscipline, not acceptable from a member of a uniform force. Consequently, the Appellate Authority did not find any merit in the appeal and proceeded to reject the same. 19. Writ petitioner had accepted the order of dismissal dated February 28, 2014 as affirmed by the Appellate Authority on June 7, 2014. He did not move the Central Administrative Tribunal with regard to such order of dismissal. 20. The First Information Report being F.I.R No. 40/2012 had been taken up for consideration by the learned Judicial Magistrate, 1stClass,2ndCourt at Port Blair and by a judgement dated November 14, 2017, the learned Court was pleased to hold that, the prosecution was unable to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. Learned Court had therefore proceeded to acquit the writ petitioner from such criminal case. 21. Learned Court had therefore proceeded to acquit the writ petitioner from such criminal case. 21. Writ petitioner had thereafter filed a representation dated February 7, 2018 with the authorities requesting for review of the order of penalty of dismissal passed by the Disciplinary Authority as affirmed by the Appellate Authority. This representation dated February 7, 2018 had been disposed of by the authorities on March 17, 2018 holding that the acquittal from the criminal case had no bearing upon the disciplinary proceedings which stood concluded and was on a different footing. 22. Being aggrieved by such rejection, writ petitioner had moved the Central Administrative Tribunal by way of OA No. 351/622/2018/AM which was disposed of by an order dated August 28, 2023. Learned Tribunal had held that, there was no procedural lapse in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. Learned Tribunal had found that the decision of the Disciplinary Authority as affirmed by the Appellate Authority did not suffer from any legal infirmity and that such decision was based on cogent evidence. The contention that, acquittal from the criminal case should result in reinstatement did not find favour with the learned Tribunal. 23. Being aggrieved by the order dated August 28, 2023 passed by the Tribunal writ petitioner had filed the present writ petition. In the present writ petition, the Division Bench had differed in their opinion with the learned First Judge holding that on the acquittal of the writ petitioner in the criminal case, the writ petitioner was entitled to reinstatement. The second judge however, had held that, the Tribunal was correct in holding that there was no procedural lapse in the conduct of the disciplinary proceedings and that, acquittal in the criminal case did not affect the decision taken in the disciplinary proceedings. 24. Which of the two views of the learned Judges of the Division Bench is correct has fallen for consideration in this reference. 25. Ram Lal (supra) has considered the issue as to the effect of an order of acquittal on the order of dismissal passed in the disciplinary enquiry. It has observed as follows :- “10. We have examined both the questions independently. We are conscious of the fact that a writ court's power to review the order of the disciplinary authority is very limited. The scope of enquiry is only to examine whether the decision-making process is legitimate. It has observed as follows :- “10. We have examined both the questions independently. We are conscious of the fact that a writ court's power to review the order of the disciplinary authority is very limited. The scope of enquiry is only to examine whether the decision-making process is legitimate. (See SBI v. A.G.D. Reddy [SBI v. A.G.D. Reddy, (2023) 14 SCC 391 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1064 : 2023 INSC 766 ] .) As part of that exercise, the courts exercising power of judicial review are entitled to consider whether the findings of the disciplinary authority have ignored material evidence and if it so finds, the courts are not powerless to interfere. (See United Bank of India v. Biswanath Bhattacharjee [United Bank of India v. Biswanath Bhattacharjee, (2022) 13 SCC 329 : (2023) 2 SCC (L&S) 705 : 2022 INSC 117] .) 11. We are also conscious of the fact that mere acquittal by a criminal court will not confer on the employee a right to claim any benefit, including reinstatement. (See State of T.N. v. S. Samuthiram [State of T.N. v. S. Samuthiram, (2013) 1 SCC 598 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 566 : (2013) 1 SCC (L&S) 229] .) 12. However, if the charges in the departmental enquiry and the criminal court are identical or similar, and if the evidence, witnesses and circumstances are one and the same, then the matter acquires a different dimension. If the Court in judicial review concludes that the acquittal in the criminal proceeding was after full consideration of the prosecution evidence and that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the charge, the Court in judicial review can grant redress in certain circumstances. The Court will be entitled to exercise its discretion and grant relief, if it concludes that allowing the findings in the disciplinary proceedings to stand will be unjust, unfair and oppressive. Each case will turn on its own facts. (See G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat [G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat, (2006) 5 SCC 446 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1121] , State Bank of Hyderabad v. P. Kata Rao [State Bank of Hyderabad v. P. Kata Rao, (2008) 15 SCC 657 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 489] and S. Samuthiram [State of T.N. v. S. Samuthiram, (2013) 1 SCC 598 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 566 : (2013) 1 SCC (L&S) 229].)” 26. An order of punishment passed by the Disciplinary Authority in a departmental proceeding is amenable to judicial review. However, the scope of judicial review is limited to the legality of the decision making process rather than the decision itself. However, if the punishment imposed is established to be disproportionate to the charges proved then the Court can set aside the punishment imposed with a direction upon the Disciplinary Authority to decide on the quantum of punishment. 27. An order of acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically result in the discharge of the delinquent in the departmental proceeding or reversal of the order of dismissal, if the same was so passed. An order of acquittal in a criminal case assumes relevance only, and only if, the charges in the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are identical or similar, and evidences, circumstances and witnesses are the same. 28. In the facts of Ram Lal (supra) the Supreme Court had found that the very same witnesses who were examined in the departmental enquiry were examined in the criminal trial. It had taken into consideration the charge in the criminal case as also in the departmental proceedings. It had noted that, charges in both the proceedings related to the alteration of his date of birth. In the criminal proceedings, at the appeal court stage, the delinquent therein had received the benefit of doubt as to the date of birth of the delinquent. It had observed that, in the criminal case, the charge against the delinquent was not just not proved and that in fact, the charge stood disproved by the prosecution evidence. Additionally, Supreme Court had been satisfied that the charges in the two proceedings were not only similar but identical and the evidence, witnesses and circumstances were all the same. 29. In the facts of the present case, the disciplinary proceedings had been based upon four misdemeanours of the writ petitioner. Four misdemeanours had also resulted in two First Information Reports. One of the First Information Report had culminated into the order of acquittal at the appeal court stage. 30. The two First Information Reports relating to offences against women, committed by the writ petitioner, had been taken into consideration in the disciplinary proceedings apart from two other criminal misdemeanours of the writ petitioner. One of the First Information Report had culminated into the order of acquittal at the appeal court stage. 30. The two First Information Reports relating to offences against women, committed by the writ petitioner, had been taken into consideration in the disciplinary proceedings apart from two other criminal misdemeanours of the writ petitioner. One of the First Information Report with regard to the crime against women committed by the writ petitioner had resulted in the order of acquittal. Therefore, it cannot be said that, the charge in the criminal case in which the writ petitioner had been acquitted and the departmental proceedings were identical or similar or that, the evidences, circumstances and witnesses in both of them were same or similar. While the charges departmental proceeding had related to two independent incidents of crime against two different ladies, the criminal case was restricted to only one of them. 31. In the departmental proceedings, writ petitioner had admitted the charges after examination of three witnesses. Writ petitioner had been represented by an advocate in the departmental proceedings. There is nothing on record to suggest that the writ petitioner had submitted the letter accepting his guilt in the disciplinary proceedings, involuntarily. That apart, writ petitioner had accepted his guilt before the Appellate Authority also. Again, nothing has been placed on record to suggest such admission of guilt before the Appellate Authority was also involuntary. 32. Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority had taken into account the fact that the writ petitioner was member of a disciplined force and that, he had acted in a manner so as to undermine the discipline of such force. He had been a repeat offender. Moreover, in the event, such incidences of misdemeanours against ladies by a member of a disciplined force is treated as a minor offence, the same would lead to large scale indiscipline in the disciplined force. Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority had taken into consideration that as a member of a disciplined force, writ petitioner was required to protect the life and property of a citizen and that, his repeated actions in committing crimes against women and acting contrary to the discipline of the force was unbecoming of a member of a disciplined force. 33. Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority had taken into consideration that as a member of a disciplined force, writ petitioner was required to protect the life and property of a citizen and that, his repeated actions in committing crimes against women and acting contrary to the discipline of the force was unbecoming of a member of a disciplined force. 33. In Heem Singh (supra) Supreme Court has held that, acquittal in a criminal case by itself cannot be a ground for interfering with an order of punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority. An order of dismissal can be passed even if the delinquent had been acquitted in the criminal charge. Unless the accused had an honourable acquittal in the criminal trial, as opposed to an acquittal due to witness turning hostile for technical reasons, the acquittal shall not affect the decision of the disciplinary proceedings and lead to automatic reinstatement. What would constitute an honourable acquittal has been considered by the Supreme Court therein. It has observed that it was difficult to define what is meant by honourably acquitted. It has held that, when the accused is acquitted after full consideration of prosecution evidence and that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the charged levelled against the accused it can possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted. 34. In the facts of the present case, in the departmental proceedings after examination and cross-examination of three prosecution witnesses the writ petitioner had acknowledged his guilt to the charges levelled against him. The first article of charge had been with regard to incident of January 14, 2012 where, he was found creating nuisance and using unparliamentry words under the influence of alcohol against a lady and threatening her and her daughter with dire consequence. The second article of charge had been in relation to an incident dated January 31, 2012, again against a different lady, where, the writ petitioner had illegitimately entered the house of such lady when she was alone and tried to molest her. The criminal case which had resulted in the judgement of acquittal was in relation to the incident dated January 31, 2012 only. Therefore, both the article of charge were not before the criminal court while it had considered the charges in such criminal case as against the writ petitioner. Obviously, the witnesses, evidences and circumstances were also different. 35. The criminal case which had resulted in the judgement of acquittal was in relation to the incident dated January 31, 2012 only. Therefore, both the article of charge were not before the criminal court while it had considered the charges in such criminal case as against the writ petitioner. Obviously, the witnesses, evidences and circumstances were also different. 35. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, the charges in the departmental proceedings and the criminal court cannot be said to be identical or the evidence, witnesses and circumstances to be the same. Consequently, the acquittal in the criminal case would have no bearing on the decision arrived at in the disciplinary proceeding. 36. The facts and circumstances of the present case, therefore, allow the view of the second Judge to be accepted as correct. 37. The present reference is therefore answered by accepting the view of the second Judge of the Division Bench as correct. Reference is therefore disposed of.