JUDGMENT : BIREN VAISHNAV, J. 1. These appeals, under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, have been filed by the original petitioner, who is common in both the petitions, on being aggrieved by the orders of the learned Single Judge in the respective petitions by which the petitions were dismissed. 2. For the purposes of this order, we shall consider the facts in Letters Patent Appeal No. 813 of 2020 which is filed challenging the order dated 28.09.2020 passed by the learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application No. 8617 of 2020. In Special Civil Application No. 8617 of 2020 filed by the petitioner – appellant herein, the petitioner – appellant made the following prayers : “8. (A) YOUR LORDSHIPS be pleased to issue appropriate writ, order or direction, quashing and setting aside the impugned notice dated 6.6.2020 (Annexure-A) issued by respondent no.3-Deputy Collector, as being illegal and bad in law; (B) YOUR LORDSHIPS be pleased to issue appropriate writ, order or direction, declaring that the NA permission in respect of lands bearing Survey No.56, Block No.93 admeasuring 1 Hectare-25 Gunthas 30 Aare and Survey No. 63, Block No.102 admeasuring 1 Hectare 72 Gunthas 7 Aare situated at Village Datpura, Taluka-Vaghodiya, District- Vadodarais deemed to have been granted w.e.f. 5.7.2018 in view of settled principles of law, in the interest of justice;” 2.2 The subject matter of the present appeals are lands bearing Survey No. 56, Block No. 93 admeasuring 1 Hectare – 25 Gunthas – 30 Are and Survey No. 63, Block No. 102 admeasuring 1 Hectare – 72 Gunthas - 7 Are situated at village Datpura, Ta. Vaghodia, Dist. Vadodara. The lands were originally owned by one Dhirajlal Dhanilal Jaiswal whose name came to be mutated in the revenue records in the year 1991 and one Ajaykumar Ramanlal Jaiswal whose name came to be mutated in the year 1980. Both these persons sold the lands to Hemang Bhanuprasad Bhatt in the years 2006 and 2008 and since then the name of Hemang Bhanuprasad was appearing in the Records of Rights. 2.3 Since the petitioner – appellant intended to purchase the said land in question on 12.09.2016 and 14.02.2017 respectively, agreements to sell as well as registered sale deeds were executed by Mr. Hemang Bhatt in favour of the appellant. 2.3 Since the petitioner – appellant intended to purchase the said land in question on 12.09.2016 and 14.02.2017 respectively, agreements to sell as well as registered sale deeds were executed by Mr. Hemang Bhatt in favour of the appellant. On 05.04.2018, the appellant applied for N.A. permission with respect to the lands to the Collector under Section 65 of the Gujarat Land Revenue Code. It is the case of the appellant that it is an admitted fact that by a communication dated 12.04.2018 the application for N.A. permission was received on 05.04.2018. 2.4 On 04.06.2018, notice under the provisions of Sections 63, 63AB read with Section 84C of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Tenancy Act’) was issued by the Mamlatdar & ALT with respect to the lands. Tenancy Case No. 14 of 2018 was registered. On 18.06.2018, it is the case of the appellant that he appeared and since he wanted to develop the land in question, the appellant voluntarily declared before the Mamlatdar & ALT that he is ready and willing to pay 10% amount of the prevailing jantri rate as premium amounting to Rs. 5,94,740/- determined by the Collector as per the provisions of Section 63AB of the Tenancy Act. 2.5 On 26.06.2018, the appellant deposited the premium amount and a challan was issued accordingly. On 10.07.2018, N.A permission was rejected by the District Development Officer. On 16.07.2018, based on the deposit of premium, the Mamlatdar & ALT passed an order disposing of the Tenancy Case and dropped the notice issued by him under Section 63 read with Section 84C of the Tenancy Act. On 29.08.2018, the appellant requested that his N.A. permission be kept in abeyance in light of the pending revision proceedings. On 06.06.2020, after a period of 23 months from the date of the order dated 16.07.2018 passed by the Mamlatdar & ALT in Tenancy Case No. 14 of 2018, the Deputy Collector issued notice under Section 76A of the Tenancy Act to the appellant for revision of the order dated 16.07.2018 claiming that the records were called for within the stipulated time. 2.6 Aggrieved by this notice, the petitioner filed a petition being Special Civil Application No. 8617 of 2020 for quashing of the notice dated 06.06.2020 and for a declaration of N.A. permission deemed to have been granted. 2.6 Aggrieved by this notice, the petitioner filed a petition being Special Civil Application No. 8617 of 2020 for quashing of the notice dated 06.06.2020 and for a declaration of N.A. permission deemed to have been granted. Pending the petition, on exchange of pleadings i.e. affidavit in reply and affidavit in rejoinder, the learned Single Judge passed a judgment on 28.09.2020 whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the petition filed by the appellant on the ground that the application for N.A permission was decided within a period of 90 days and that the order was taken in review within a period of one year in light of a communication dated 16.07.2017 produced by the State in its reply which, according to the learned Single Judge, could be treated to be an action calling for records within one year. Against the judgment of the learned Single Judge on 28.09.2020, Letters Patent Appeal No. 813 of 2020 is filed. 2.7 While the present appeal was pending, the Deputy Collector based on the notice dated 06.06.2020 which was subject-matter of challenge and pending the appeal on 13.10.2020 passed an order setting aside the order dated 16.07.2018 by which the proceedings under Section 84C were dropped. The Deputy Collector applied Section 63AD of the Tenancy Act imposing penalty of three times of the amount of the prevailing jantri of the lands directing the appellant to restore the land along with the rise therein to the position in which it was before when it was transferred within one month. That order was a subject-matter of challenge in Special Civil Application No. 15462 of 2020. On 28.03.2022, the said petition was rejected on the ground of alternative remedy which gave rise to Letters Patent Appeal No. 349 of 2022 which is tagged with the present appeal. 3. Mr. Mihir Thakore and Mr. Shalin Mehta, learned Senior Advocates have appeared with Mr. Parthiv Shah, learned advocate for the appellants. Mr. Thakore leading the submissions would submit that there was a delayed invocation of revisional power by the Deputy Collector under Section 76A of the Tenancy Act. Reading the provisions of Section 76A, Mr. 3. Mr. Mihir Thakore and Mr. Shalin Mehta, learned Senior Advocates have appeared with Mr. Parthiv Shah, learned advocate for the appellants. Mr. Thakore leading the submissions would submit that there was a delayed invocation of revisional power by the Deputy Collector under Section 76A of the Tenancy Act. Reading the provisions of Section 76A, Mr. Thakore would submit that in exercising the powers of revision, the Collector has to call for the record of any inquiry or the proceedings of the Mamlatdar for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality and propriety of the order and pass an order as he deems fit. Emphasizing on the proviso, he would submit that the proviso indicates that no such record shall be called for after the expiry of one year from the date of such order and no order of such Mamlatdar. In other words, Mr. Thakore would submit that the order of the Mamlatdar was dated 16.07.2018 disposing of the Tenancy Case No. 14 of 2018. The order was sent on the very day by the Mamlatdar to the Deputy Collector. He would submit that the sending of the order to the Deputy Collector is not “calling for the records of any inquiry”. In fact, calling for the record would imply that the Deputy Collector had to apply his mind and decide whether it was a fit case to call for the records. He would submit that reliance placed on the letter dated 16.07.2018 annexed to the reply would indicate that it was not an action which can be termed as calling for the record. 3.1 Mr. Thakore would therefore submit that the show cause notice which was issued by the Deputy Collector on 06.06.2020, after three months from the date of the order, was beyond a period of one year or after the expiry of one year and therefore the proceedings was time barred. He would submit that the letter dated 16.07.2018 pressed into service by the State to indicate that records were called for within a year did not indicate application of mind and therefore even otherwise sending of records by the letter could not be termed as ‘calling for the records’ by the Collector and the show-cause notice therefore was completely without jurisdiction and was therefore required to be quashed and set aside. 3.2 Mr. 3.2 Mr. Thakore in the course of his submissions would rely on the following decisions: (a) Thakorbhai Tribhovandas Rao and others v/s The State of Gujarat and others reported in 1995 (1) GLH 758 (DB); (b) Order dated 06.01.2023 rendered in Letters Patent Appeal No. 813 of 2020 in the case of Dalsukhbhai Chaturbhai Prajapati v/s State of Gujarat; (c) Shah Arvindkumar Daulatkrishnath through POA Shailesh Parikh v/s State of Gujarat reported in 2016 (0) JX (Guj) 793 (para 6); (d) Pragjibhai Lallubhai Patel v/s Raysinhbhai Ishvarbhai Patanwadia reported in 2016(0)AIJEL-HC 237364 (para 7-9). 3.3 Mr. Thakore would submit that the learned Single Judge committed an error of law in relying on the decision in the case of Mangalbhai Fatehsingh Chauhan vs. Bai Naniba reported in 1960 GLR 163 . He would read the judgment including paragraph 11 thereof and submit that the facts stated therein would indicate that the Collector had in fact called for the records within a year which was not the case on hand here inasmuch as in the facts of the present case after the order was passed by the Mamlatdar on 16.07.2018, the record was sent by the Mamlatdar on 16.07.2018, which would not mean calling for the record by the Deputy Collector. He would also submit that reliance placed by the learned Single Judge was therefore misconceived. He would therefore submit that since the notice dated 06.06.2022 was beyond a period of one year, the show- cause was without jurisdiction and contrary to the provisions of Section 76A and therefore the impugned notice should be set aside. 3.4 Mr. Thakore would submit that independent of the contention that action under Section 76A is delayed, the show-cause notices issued by the Mamlatdar & ALT under Section 84C read with Sections 63 and 63AB in Tenancy Case No. 14 of 2018 itself is ex-facie without jurisdiction and irrespective of whether the appellant had participated in the proceedings. He would submit that the notice is required to be quashed in light of the judgments of the Apex Court and the High Court which clearly point out that the notices have to be within a reasonable period of time. He would submit that the notice is required to be quashed in light of the judgments of the Apex Court and the High Court which clearly point out that the notices have to be within a reasonable period of time. He would submit pressing into service relevant dates that the notice alleging violation of provisions of Section 63 of the Tenancy Act was issued on 04.06.2018 indicating that in view of the sale of lands to Jaiswal brothers as well as to Mr. Hemang Bhatt was illegal. He would submit that the notice dated 04.06.2018 was issued after 38 and 27 years respectively and in any event from the time when Mr. Hemang Bhatt sold the land to the petitioner, it was 12 years after the purchase by Mr. Hemang Bhatt. He would also submit that the notices were bad inasmuch as the subsequent purchaser would not have the knowledge about the status of prior owners being agriculturists. Mere participation of the appellant and the dropping of the proceedings by the order would not be a disqualification to challenge the notice on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction. In support of the above submissions, he would place reliance on the following decisions: (i) Mohd. Kavi Mohamad Amin v. Fatmabai Ibrahim [ (1997) 6 SCC 71 ]; (ii) Bharatbhai Naranbhai Vegda v/s State of Gujarat [ 2016 (2) GLR 1021 (para 10)]; (iii) Shambhuram Videshiram Morya v/s State of Gujarat [(2011) 1 GLR 665 (para 7)]; (iv) Rameshbhai Ambalal Shah v/s State of Gujarat [ 2011 (3) GLH 98 (para 25)]; (v) Chandulal Gordhandas Ranodriya v/s State of Gujarat [ (2013) 2 GLR 1788 (para 13 to 21)]. 3.5 Relying on the provisions of Section 63AB of Tenancy Act, Mr. Thakore would submit that the order dated 16.07.2018 is valid. He would submit that it is evident that the section applies prospectively from 05.12.2015 and therefore post such invalid transaction, if the land is transferred to an agriculturist before 30.06.2015, the Mamlatdar after coming into force has not to proceed under Section 84C of the Act but has to call upon the person to whom the land was transferred as an agriculturist prior to 30.06.2015. Admittedly in this case when Mr. Hemang Bhatt was an agriculturist, the action to pay 10% of the jantri value and dropping of the proceedings under Section 84C was valid. Mr. Admittedly in this case when Mr. Hemang Bhatt was an agriculturist, the action to pay 10% of the jantri value and dropping of the proceedings under Section 84C was valid. Mr. Thakore would submit that it is an admitted position based on the revenue records that the purchaser Mr. Hemang Bhatt prior to 30.06.2015 was an agriculturist. In such circumstances, Section 63AB would necessarily apply and therefore since the Mamlatdar could not proceed under Section 84C, the order dated 16.07.2018 on merits was not required to be quashed and set aside. The order passed post Section 76A dated 13.10.2020 which was the subject-matter of challenge in Special Civil Application No. 15462 of 2020 and is the subject-matter of Letters Patent Appeal No. 349 of 2022 also therefore deserves to be quashed and set aside. 3.6 Mr. Thakore would further submit that the Deputy Collector was in complete error and there was non application of mind by applying the provisions of Section 63AD of the Tenancy Act. Reading the provision, he would indicate that the provision was introduced by the amendment act of 2015. That it is a substantive provision overriding the provisions of Section 84C of the Act. The effect of the provision indicates that the Act would operate prospectively and it would apply only to a transfer effected in violation of provisions of Section 63(1)(a)(b)(c) of the Tenancy Act made after 05.12.2015. Since the transfers effected in favour of Mr. Ajay Jaiswal was in 29.01.1980 and in favour of Dhirajlal Jaiswal was prior to 09.05.1991, the question of applying Section 63AD does not arise. 3.7 Even with respect of transfer in favour of Mr. Hemang Bhatt, the action could only be initiated under Section 84C and not under Section 63AD of the Act. He would therefore submit that the order impugned in the Special Civil Application filed subsequent to the filing of the Letters Patent Appeal also deserved to be quashed and set aside. 4. Mr. K.M. Antani, learned AGP appearing for the State would submit that the rejections of the petitions by the learned Single Judge was just and proper. He would submit that by virtue of the order passed in Letters Patent Appeal No. 813 of 2020 dated 06.01.2023, the State was required to demonstrate the procedure followed while exercising powers under Section 76A of the Code. Mr. He would submit that by virtue of the order passed in Letters Patent Appeal No. 813 of 2020 dated 06.01.2023, the State was required to demonstrate the procedure followed while exercising powers under Section 76A of the Code. Mr. Antani would refer to the order passed by the Court. 4.1 With regard to the submission of learned Senior Advocate that the notices issued by the Mamlatdar & ALT for requiring the appellant to take recourse under Section 63AB and the challenge to the notice on 04.06.2018, Mr. Antani would submit that the contention has no legs to stand on. He would submit that the case of the appellant before the learned Single Judge in both the petitions was to support the order dated 16.07.2018 in order to challenge the exercise of powers under Section 76A, on the ground that the power exercised under Section 76A was without jurisdiction. Such being the stand of the present appellants, the contention adopted to challenge the notice dated 04.06.2018 initiating proceedings under Section 63AB read with Section 84C can be inferred to be an act of blowing hot and cold and he would submit that the appellants cannot therefore aprobate and reprobate. 4.2 With respect to the contention of the appellants that there was no “calling of the records” by the Deputy Collector and the record was sent to the same suggesting that the primary trigger for the exercise of Section 76A was absent, reading the provisions of Section 76A Mr. Antani would submit that it would reveal that the same comprises of two distinct exercises. So far as exercise of “calling of records” is concerned, the same can be said to be a ministerial/administrative exercise, which exercise was limited by a time period of one year. The ministerial exercise expected from a Deputy Collector was therefore completed on 16.07.2018 itself. The exercise which follows after the ministerial exercise of sending of records is passing of an order which constitutes a quasi judicial exercise and therefore the mandate of giving opportunity to the stakeholders as is envisaged in the latter portion of Section 76A. He would therefore submit that a cumulative consideration of this exercise which follows the ministerial exercise under Section 76A constitutes a quasi judicial exercise and therefore if the “calling of the records” is within one year as the case on hand, the requirement of Section 76A is satisfied. 4.3 Mr. He would therefore submit that a cumulative consideration of this exercise which follows the ministerial exercise under Section 76A constitutes a quasi judicial exercise and therefore if the “calling of the records” is within one year as the case on hand, the requirement of Section 76A is satisfied. 4.3 Mr. Antani would submit that during the entire exercise in the scenario as aforesaid, also in light of the provisions of Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code and Section 97 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the language of Section 76A is analogous and the proposition elaborated as above of the power to “call for records” being administrative or a ministerial exercise does not require application of mind to be reflected in writing. He would therefore submit that the debate thrown open by virtue of order dated 06.01.2023 passed by this court in the Letters Patent Appeal may not be gone into. In light of the understanding of the scheme and the fact that several Mamlatdars & Alts have to pass orders, it cannot be fathomed that knowledge of any order passed by any of the Mamlatdars & Alts will be held by the Deputy Collector who is expected to call for such records of the proceedings and unless and until the records are sent and therefore brought to the knowledge of such Deputy Collectors, the scheme of Section 76A will not operate. 4.4 In the course of his submissions Mr. Antani would press into service the circular of the government dated 21.04.1976 to submit that this policy circular of the State would supplement the mandate of Section 76A to enable knowledge of any order or proceedings to be brought to the notice of the Deputy Collector. He would rely on the decision in the case of Sant Ram Sharma vs. State of Rajasthan and Others reported in AIR 1967 SC 1910 . He would therefore submit that if the Deputy Collector already had with him the record which he intended to take in revision, “calling for the records” after applying mind and reflecting such application of mind in writing would be a futile formality and cannot be read into the section. 4.5 On the concept of deemed N.A being sought by the appellant, Mr. 4.5 On the concept of deemed N.A being sought by the appellant, Mr. Antani would submit that the learned Single Judge was right inasmuch as the permission was rejected within a period of 90 days from the date of the applications received and no case therefore was made out on the concept of deemed permission. 4.6 Without prejudice to the submissions on the jurisdictional aspect, Mr. Antani would submit that if the order dated 16.07.2018 passed by the Mamlatdar which has been set aside by a subsequent order by exercising powers under Section 76A is seen, it was a clear case of the State that the Mamlatdar had sought to misrepresent justifying his exercise under Section 63AB when what was expected of him was to exercise his powers under Section 63AD and therefore if the court were to interfere and set aside the orders on the ground of jurisdiction, the Division Bench in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction the writ court would interfere and set aside orders and thereby resurrect orders which were otherwise illegal. He would therefore submit that the appeals deserved to be dismissed. 5. Having considered the submissions made by learned Senior Advocates and the learned AGP, it is necessary to set out the relevant dates at the cost of reiteration and a brief factual background. Sr. No. Date Particulars Lands (i) bearing Survey no. 56, block no. 93 admeasuring 1 hectare 25 are 30 sq. mtr. and (ii) survey no.63, block no.102 admeasuring 1 hectare72 are 07 sq. mtr. situated at Village Datpura, Taluka: Vaghodiya, District: Vadodara (hereinafter referred to as “the lands”) 1 29.01.1980 Mutation Entry No. 201 recording purchase of survey no. 63, block no. 102 by Ajaykumar Ramanlal Jaiswal [No knowledge as to whether he was an agriculturist or not] (See page 78 of Annexure-H) 2 09.05.1991 Mutation Entry no. 340 recording the purchase of land bearing survey no. 56, block no. 93 by Dhirajlal Dhanilal Jaiswal [No knowledge as to whether he was an agriculturist or not] (See page 78 of Annexure-H) 3 03.07.2006 Mutation Entry no. 561 recording the purchase of land bearing survey no. 63, block no. 102 by Hemang Bhanuprasad Bhatt [He is an agriculturist holding land bearing survey no. 107 of Village: Hathipura (See Ann.R1 pg. 120 of SCA 15462 of 2020)] (Also See page 78 of Annexure-H) 4 01.02.2008 Mutation Entry no. 561 recording the purchase of land bearing survey no. 63, block no. 102 by Hemang Bhanuprasad Bhatt [He is an agriculturist holding land bearing survey no. 107 of Village: Hathipura (See Ann.R1 pg. 120 of SCA 15462 of 2020)] (Also See page 78 of Annexure-H) 4 01.02.2008 Mutation Entry no. 625 recording the purchase of land bearing survey no. 56, block no. 93 by Hemang Bhanuprasad Bhatt [He is an agriculturist holding land bearing survey no. 107 of Village: Hathipura (See Ann.R1 pg. 120 of SCA 15462 of 2020)] (Also See page 78 of Annexure-H) 5 12.09.2016 Registered agreement to sell no. 2861 executed by Hemang Bhanuprasad Bhatt in favour of the appellant, whereby Bhatt Hemang Bhanuprasad agreed to sell the lands in favour of the appellant. (See Annexure- B, Pg. 21-29) 6 14.02.2017 Registered sale deeds no. 375 of 2017 executed by Hemang Bhanuprasad Bhatt in favour of the appellant with respect to survey no. 56, block no. 93. (See Annexure- C, Pg.30-51) 6 14.02.2017 Registered sale deeds no. 376 of 2017 executed by Hemang Bhanuprasad Bhatt in favour of the appellant with respect to survey no. 63, block no. 102. (See Annexure- D, Pg.52-73) 7 05.04.2018 Appellant applied for NA permission with respect to the lands to the Collector-respondent no.2 u/s 65 of the Gujarat Land Revenue Code (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”) and inwarded the same on 05.04.2018 (See Annexure-“E”, Pg.74-75) The said fact is also admitted on the communication dated 12.04.2018 produced by the respondent no.3 (See Pg.98, Annexure-R1) 8 12.04.2018 Acknowledgement given regarding the receipt of the application for NA permission (See Annexure-“R1”, Pg.98) 9 04.06.2018 Notice under section 63, 63AB read with section 84- C of the Bombay Tenancy & Agricultural Lands Act (hereinafter referred to as “the Tenancy Act”) was issued by the Mamlatdar & ALT-respondent no.4 to the appellant with respect to the lands and registered the case as Tenancy Case No. 14 of 2018 making it returnable on 18.06.2018. This was done on the basis of direction issued by the Collector as it is stated in the order dated16.07.2018. (See Annexure-H, Pg. 78-80). There is nothing on record to show that the Collector had issued any such direction to the Mamlatdar & ALT. This was done on the basis of direction issued by the Collector as it is stated in the order dated16.07.2018. (See Annexure-H, Pg. 78-80). There is nothing on record to show that the Collector had issued any such direction to the Mamlatdar & ALT. Note: It will be pertinent to highlight that both Hemang Manuprasad Bhatt & the appellant- Dalsukbhai Chandubhai Prajapati are agriculturists, there is no knowledge and the appellant cannot have knowledge about the status of Ajaykumar Ramanlal Jaiswal and Dhirajlal Dhanilal Jaiswal. Consequently the action if any for violation of Section 63 of the Tenancy Act is being taken on 04.06.2018 in respect of any mutation entries passed on 29.01.1980 and 09.05.1991 when Jaiswals’ purchased the lands. Therefore the initiation of the proceedings itself is exfacie bad and voluntary agreeing by the appellant to pay premium amount under Section 63AB of the Tenancy Act cannot validate these proceedings. 10 18.06.2018 However, since the appellant wanted to develop the land in question, the appellant voluntarily declared before the Mamlatdar & ALT-respondent no.4 that he is ready to pay the 10% amount of prevailing jantri as premium amounting to Rs.5,94,740/- determined by the Collector-respondent no.2 as per section 63AB of the Tenancy Act. (See Annexure-H, Pg.78-80) 11 26.06.2018 Appellant deposited the premium amount of Rs.5,94,740/- with the Mamlatdar & ALT -respondent no.4 and the Treasury Department issued challan to the appellant. (See Annexure-“F”, Pg.76). A copy of the cheque of Rs.5,94,740/- (See Annexure-“G”, Pg.77) 12 10.07.2018 Order rejecting the NA permission application of the appellant by the District Development Officer, Vadodara (See Annexure-“R1”, Pg.99). This order is passed after 30 days of the receipt of the application by the DDO on 05.04.2018. However, the appellant has not received any such order or communication regarding rejection of NA permission (See Pg.129 para 9 of rejoinder) 13 16.07.2018 Order passed by the Mamlatdar & ALT -respondent no.4 disposing of Tenancy Case No. 14 of 2018 in view of the payment of premium paid by the appellant as per Section 63AB of the Tenancy Act and dropped the notice issued by the Mamlatdar & ALT under Section 63 read with Section 84-C of the Tenancy Act. (See Annexure-“H”, Pg.78-80) 14 16.07.2018 Letter by the Mamlatdar & ALT- respondent no.4 to the Deputy Collector-respondent no.3 informing about the order dated 16.07.2018 and also sending the copy of the order along with the record for perusal/observation of the Deputy Collector. This is received by the Collector on 17.07.2018, therefore the letter cannot of 18.07.2017 and has to be of 16.07.2018. Nothing in this letter indicates that the Collector/Deputy Collector called for the record as contemplated in section 76A of the Tenancy Act (See Annexure-“R3”, Pg.101). 15 29.08.2018 Application by appellant requesting to keep the NA permission application pending (See Annexure-“R2”, Pg.100) 16 06.06.2020 After a period of 23 months from the date of order dated 16.07.2018 passed by the Mamlatdar-& ALT respondent no.4 in Tenancy Case No. 14 of 2018, the Deputy Collector-respondent no.3 issued notice under Section 76A of the Tenancy Act to the appellant for revision of the order dated 16.07.2018 claiming that record was called for within the stipulated time. Nothing to show that such record was called for within one year of the order dated 16.07.2018.( See Annexure-A, Pg.20) 17 27.06.2020 Thus, the appellant filed Special Civil Application No. 8617 of 2020 inter alia for (i) quashing and setting aside the impugned notice dated 06.06.2020 under Section 76A of the Tenancy Act at Annexure-A and (ii) declaring that NA permission in respect of the lands is deemed to have been granted w.e.f. 05.07.2018 (Pg. 1- 19) Prayer @ Pg.17 para 8 18 01.09.2020 Affidavit in reply filed by the Deputy Collector- respondent no.3 in Special Civil Application No. 8617 of 2020 and inter alia contended that (i) the petition is premature as all contentions can be raised before the Authority (ii) deemed sanction would not be applicable in the present case as at the relevant point of time, i.e. on 05.04.2018 powers to grant NA permission was with the District Development Officer, which was later given to the Collector from 07.12.2018 and on 12.12.2018 the State Government issued instructions to make such applications online and further that the appellant’s application was rejected by the authority on 10.07.2018 and therefore it was decided within stipulated time of 90 days and (iii) the Mamlatdar & ALT-respondent no.4 sent the copy of the order dated 16.07.2018 to the Deputy Collector- respondent no.4 vide communication dated 16.07.2018 and which was received by the office of the respondent no.3 on 18.07.2018 and that amount to calling the record within one year. (See Pg. 81-97) No document produced showing any application of mind by the Collector and consequently calling for the record by him. 19 04.09.2020 Affidavit in rejoinder by the appellant to the affidavit in reply filed by the respondent no.3-Deputy Collector in Special Civil Application No. 8617 of 2020 (See Pg.123-129) 20 28.09.2020 Judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application No. 8617 of 2020, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the petition filed by the appellant on the grounds that (i)application for NA permission of the appellant decided within 90 days and rejected the said application vide order dated 10.07.2018 and (ii) review was sought to be undertaken vide communication dated 16.07.2017 addressed by the Mamlatdar & ALT – respondent no. 4 to the Deputy Collector- respondent no.3 and therefore it is required to be treated that the record was called for within one year. (See Pg.30 to 42 of LPA No. 813 of 2020) 21 October 2020 Being aggrieved and dissatisfied by the judgment and order dated 28.09.2020 passed by the learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application No. 8617 of 2020, the appellant preferred Letters Patent Appeal No.813 of 2020. (See Pg.30 to 42 of LPA No. 813 of 2020) 21 October 2020 Being aggrieved and dissatisfied by the judgment and order dated 28.09.2020 passed by the learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application No. 8617 of 2020, the appellant preferred Letters Patent Appeal No.813 of 2020. 22 13.10.2020 While the Letters Patent Appeal No. 813 of 2020 was pending, the Deputy Collector passed an order setting aside the order passed by the Mamlatdar & ALT dated 16.07.2018 holding that sale effected to Hemang Bhanuprasad Bhatt was to a non- agriculturist. {(Which is factually incorrect) See Annexure-R1, Pg. 120 of SCA No.15462 of 2020} Consequently the sale to Dalsukbhai Chaturbhai Prajapati- appellant who is an agriculturist had been done on 14.02.2017 after 30.06.2015, the date mentioned in Section 63AB of the Tenancy Act. The Deputy Collector applied Section 63AD of the Tenancy Act imposing penalty of 3 times the amount of the prevailing jantri of the lands and directing the appellant to restore the lands along with the rights and interest therein, the position in which it was before when it was transferred within one month. This is the impugned order in Special Civil Application No. 15462 of 2020 (See SCA 15462, Annexure-A, Pg.28-32) 23 November 2020 Appellant filed Special Civil Application 15462 of 2020 challenging the order dated 13.10.2020 of the Deputy Collector. 24 28.02.2022 Special Civil Application No. 15462 of 2020 rejected on the ground of alternative remedy without going into the merits of the matter (See Z13-Z18 of LPA No. 349 of 2022) 25 March 2022 Letters Patent Appeal No. 349 of 2022 preferred challenging the order dated 28.02.2022. 5.1 We will have to first deal with the submission of the learned Senior Advocates for the appellant with regard to the contention that the show-cause notice issued by the Mamlatdar under Section 84C read with Sections 63 and 63AB is exfacie and without jurisdiction and irrespective of the appellant having participated in the proceedings, the show-cause notice issued under Section 84C of the Tenancy Act be quashed. With regard to this submission that the notice dated 04.06.2018 is bad since it was issued in view of the sale of lands to one Ajaykumar Jaiswal and one Dhirajlal Jaiswal as well as to one Hemang Bhatt, having been issued after 38 and 27 years respectively and in any event 12 years after the purchase by Mr. With regard to this submission that the notice dated 04.06.2018 is bad since it was issued in view of the sale of lands to one Ajaykumar Jaiswal and one Dhirajlal Jaiswal as well as to one Hemang Bhatt, having been issued after 38 and 27 years respectively and in any event 12 years after the purchase by Mr. Hemang Bhatt, we would not get into the submissions and adjudicate on this. This is more so, particularly when the plank or the foundation for having approached this court before the learned Single Judge whilst challenging the notice dated 06.06.2020, it is the case of the appellants that the very notice dated 06.06.2020 is bad as it is issued beyond a period of one year from the order of the Mamlatdar & ALT dated 16.07.2018. 5.2 Having supported the order dated 16.07.2018, and attacking the notice under Section 76A as being one beyond reasonable period and thereafter in entirely a turnaround to challenge the very notice of 04.06.2018, is an act which as rightly pointed out by the learned AGP, of aprobating and reprobating. Perusal of the pleadings and the grounds before the learned Single Judge, it is apparent that this was never a subject-matter of consideration before the learned Single Judge and without disputing the legal proposition set out in the cases of Mohd. Kavi Mohamad Amin (supra), Bharatbhai Naranbhai Vegda (supra), Shambhuram Videshiram Morya (supra), Rameshbhai Ambalal Shah (supra) and Chandulal Gordhandas Ranodriya (supra) in absence to the challenge to the notice dated 04.06.2018, even if it is the proposition of law that it is open for us to consider when having supported the order of 16.07.2018, closing the proceedings under Section 84C and making that as a base of challenge to the notice, under Section 76A, it is not open for the appellants to canvass such a submission. 6. We now come to the main submission with regard to the delayed invocation of the revisional powers exercised by the Deputy Collector under Section 76A of the Act. At the outset, we may reproduce the provisions of Section 76A of the Act. 6. We now come to the main submission with regard to the delayed invocation of the revisional powers exercised by the Deputy Collector under Section 76A of the Act. At the outset, we may reproduce the provisions of Section 76A of the Act. “SECTION 76A : Revisional powers of Collector Where no appeal has been filed within the period provided for it, the Collector may, suo motu or on a reference made in this behalf by the State Government, at any time, (a) call for the record of any inquiry or the proceeding of the Mamlatdar or Tribunal for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of any order passed by, and as to the regularity of the proceedings of such Mamlatdar or Tribunal, as the case may be, and (b) pass such order thereon as he deems fit: Provided that no such record shall be called for after the expiry of one year from the date of such order and no order of such Mamlatdar or Tribunal shall be modified annulled or reversed unless opportunity has been given to the interested parties to appear and be heard” (emphasis supplied) 6.1 From the facts, it emerges that the order of the Mamlatdar & ALT which was sought to be revised is dated 16.07.2018. In the affidavit in reply, a strenuous effort is made that the very order is sent by the Mamlatdar & ALT to the Deputy Collector on the very day, albeit a typographical error of 16.07.2017 in the letter sending the records is evident. The submission of the State is and we are called upon to decide this very issued in light of the detailed order passed by the Division Bench of this court on 06.01.2023 in this appeal. The order dated 06.01.2023 reads as under: “1. The short issue which arises for consideration in this appeal revolves around the show-cause notice dated 06.06.2020 which was the subject matter of consideration before the learned Single Judge. The lands bearing Survey No.56, Block No.93 admeasuring 1 Hectare-25 Gunthas 30 Acre and Survey No.63, Block No.102 admeasuring 1 Hectare-72 Gunthas 7 Acre were originally purchased by two brothers in the year 1980 and 1991 and they, in turn, sold the said lands to Mr. Bhatt Hemang Bhanuprasad in the year 2006, who undisputedly was an agriculturist. The said Mr. Bhatt Hemang Bhanuprasad in the year 2006, who undisputedly was an agriculturist. The said Mr. Bhatt sold the subject lands to one Mr. D.C. Prajapati, the appellant herein, in the year 2017, who is also an agriculturist. The said D.C. Prajapati submitted an application to the Jurisdictional Collector, seeking conversion of the land for Non Agricultural purposes. This resulted in proceedings being initiated against the petitioner under Section 76A of Gujarat Tenancy & Agricultual Lands Act, 1948. In the meanwhile, to stave off any technical plea being put forward, and by way of abundant caution, petitioner filed an application under Section 63AB for validation of the sale transaction. This application came to be accepted by the Mamlatdar, who passed an order on 16.07.2018 by calling upon the petitioner to pay the requisite fee, which also came to be paid, and as such, sale transaction stood validated. 2. When the aforesaid factual scenario existed, a show cause notice came to be issued to the petitioner on 06.06.2020 by the Deputy Collector purportedly exercising the suo motu power under Section 76-A which action has been upheld by the learned Single Judge. Hence, this appeal. 3. The records on hand would indicate that pursuant to the show-cause notice dated 06.06.2020, the Deputy Collector adjudicated the said show-cause notice and has passed an order on 13.10.2020 holding that the sale was invalid and consequently the order of the Mamlatdar dated 16.07.2018 has been set aside, which was also the subject matter of Special Civil Application No.15462 of 2020 which has also been dismissed, and challenging the same, Letters Patent Appeal No.349 of 2022 has been filed. Hence, these two appeals are taken up together for consideration. 4. Mr. K.M. Antani, learned AGP appearing for the State has supported the impugned order contending, inter alia, that subsequent to the order passed by the Mamlatdar on 16.07.2018, the office of Mamlatdar has forwarded a communication to the Deputy Collector, Land Reforms, Office of the Collector, Vadodara to take the Tenancy Case No.14 of 2018 in review and forwarded records, and as such, it is well within one year time. 5. In this background, it would be apt and appropriate to note Section 76-A, which reads as under; “76A: Revisional Power of Collector:- Where no appeal has been filed within the period provided for it. 5. In this background, it would be apt and appropriate to note Section 76-A, which reads as under; “76A: Revisional Power of Collector:- Where no appeal has been filed within the period provided for it. the Collector may, suo motu or on a reference made in this behalf by the State Government, at any time,– (a) call for the record of any inquiry or the proceeding of any Mamlatdar or Tribunal for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of any order passed by, and as to the regularity of the proceedings of such Mamlatdar or Tribunal, as the case may be, and (b) pass such order thereon as he deems fit.” 6. A plain reading of the above provision would indicate that Collector can suo motu call for any record of any inquiry or the proceedings of any Mamlatdar for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of any order passed by and as to the regularity of the proceedings of such Mamlatdar or Tribunal, as the case may be. In other words, before calling for records, the Collector/Deputy Collector, as the case may be, would apply its mind to find out as to whether in a given case, the record is to be called for or not. If such record having been called within a period of one year from the date of the order of the Mamlatdar, then contention raised to contrary, would not be eschewed. On the other hand, if the record has been called beyond the period of one year, then proceedings initiated thereunder has to be necessarily held as void ab initio. Learned AGP to make available the original records. Re-list on 12.01.2023.” 6.2 The State Government has tried to persuade us that sending of the records by the letter dated 16.07.2018 would tantamount to exercising of revisional powers within a period of one year inasmuch as the term “calling for records” would make no difference and we must interpret sending of the record “by the letter dated 16.07.2018” as that akin to calling for the records. 6.3 Mr. Antani would submit, as we have earlier recorded, that as far as the Deputy Collector is concerned, the exercise of calling of the records is a ministerial/administrative exercise and this exercise has been carried out within the period of one year. 6.3 Mr. Antani would submit, as we have earlier recorded, that as far as the Deputy Collector is concerned, the exercise of calling of the records is a ministerial/administrative exercise and this exercise has been carried out within the period of one year. Section 76A’s latter portion is the portion which follows the said ministerial exercise that is passing of the order which is a quasi-judicial exercise with the mandate of giving an opportunity of hearing. In the words of Mr. Antani, therefore, a cumulative exercise of consideration followed after the ministerial exercise under Section 76A is done and therefore drawing an analogy from the provisions of Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code and Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code “calling for records” need not be preceded by application of mind. In the facts of the case therefore he would submit that the 16.07.2018 communication of sending the records by the Mamlatdar & ALT is in fact calling for records. 6.4 Analysing the provisions of Section 76A of the Act indicates that the Collector may suo motu or on a reference made in this behalf by the State Government “call for the records” of any inquiry or a proceeding of the Mamlatdar or Tribunal. Reading of the letter dated 16.07.2018, “calling for the record” within one year as held by the learned Single Judge in our opinion is seriously flawed. “Sending of the records” cannot be said to be termed as “Calling for the records”. We have also seen the original files in light of the order dated 06.01.2023 and there are no documents to indicate as to whether the Deputy Collector had “called for the record” within one year from the date of the order dated 16.07.2018. The submission of the learned AGP reading the circulars and citing decisions that executive instructions can always subplant in the interpretations of the provisions is misconceived. 6.5 The contention of the learned Senior Counsels that the term “calling for the records” essentially would involve an application of mind by the Deputy Collector is a submission that we must accept. While coming to a tentative conclusion that the order which is passed by a lower hierarchical authority and that the same needs to be revised, the term “calling for the records” would definitely have woven into it a complete judicial exercise of application of mind. While coming to a tentative conclusion that the order which is passed by a lower hierarchical authority and that the same needs to be revised, the term “calling for the records” would definitely have woven into it a complete judicial exercise of application of mind. Without rebate on this issue, we have a support of the decision of the Full Bench of the High Court of Bombay in the case of Manohar Ramchandra Manapure vs. State of Maharashtra [1989 LawSuit(Bom) 260 where precisely the very issue of “calling for records” in light of the period of limitation was discussed. 6.6 The provision in question before the Full Bench was Section 45(2) of the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961. The petitioners therein had filed a writ petition challenging the order passed by the Commissioner, Nagpur Division. A preliminary objection was raised before the Commissioner regarding the bar of limitation in initiating proceedings under Section 45(2) of the Ceiling Act. The contention of the petitioners was that the proceedings were initiated or the records were called for after the expiry of the period of three years from the date of declaration under Section 21(2) of the Ceiling Act. That contention was negatived by the Commissioner. The Division Bench of the Mumbai High Court held that under the proviso to that section where powers are delegated, the records may be called for before the expiry of the period of limitation and therefore the proviso to section 45(2) does not require the Commissioner to pass an order within three years from the date. The Division Bench held that once the papers were called for within three years there is nothing in the proviso to prevent the Commissioner from passing the order on perusal of the papers thereafter. When the matter was placed before a learned Single Judge, the submission was that the revisional powers must be completed within the period of limitation and in light of conflict of the decisions on this issue, the matter was placed before the Division Bench. The contention of the petitioners before the Full Bench was that when the section specifically provides the purpose for which the record is to be called, then all the expressions used in the section will have to be read together. The contention of the petitioners before the Full Bench was that when the section specifically provides the purpose for which the record is to be called, then all the expressions used in the section will have to be read together. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners “calling for the records” is not an empty formality but has a specific purpose behind it, namely, for satisfying as to the legality and propriety of the order or declaration. It was in light of this, that the Full Bench of the High court held thus: “3. Section 45 of the Ceiling Act with which we are concerned in this petition reads as under : "45(1). In all matters connected with this Act, the State Government shall have the same authority and control over the officers authorised under section 27, the Collectors and the Commissioners acting under this Act, as they do in the general and revenue administration. (2) The State Government may, suo motu or on an application made to it by the aggrieved person, at any time, call for the record of any enquiry or proceedings under sections 17 to 21 (both inclusive) or under section 27 for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any enquiry or proceedings (or any part thereof) under those sections or of any order passed under section 27, and may pass such order thereon as it deems fit, after giving the party a reasonable opportunity of being heard : Provided that, nothing in this sub-section shall entitle the State Government to call for the record of any enquiry or proceedings of a declaration or part thereof under section 21 in relation to any land, unless an appeal against any such declaration or part thereof has not been filed within the period provided for it, the possession of such land has not been taken under sub-section (4) of section 21 and a period of three years from the date of such declaration or part thereof has not elapsed. (3) The State Government may, subject to such restrictions and conditions as it may impose, by Notification in the Official Gazette, delegate to the Commissioner the powers conferred on it by sub-section (2)." From the bare reading of sub-section (2) with the proviso of section 45, it is quite clear that the State Government or its delegate, the Commissioner, whom the powers are delegated, may suo mote or on an application made to him by an aggrieved person, at any time, call for the record of any enquiry or proceedings under sections 17 to 21 (both inclusive) or under section 27 for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any enquiry or proceedings or any part thereof under those sections. Though sub-section (2) is generally worded and does not provide for any limitation for exercising the power, the proviso to section 45 in terms lays down that nothing in sub-section (2) shall entitle the Government to call for a record of enquiry or proceedings of a declaration or part thereof under section 21 in relation to any land, unless an appeal against any such declaration or part thereof has not been filed within the period provided for it and the possession of such land has not been taken under sub-section (4) of section 21 and a period of three years from the date of such declaration or part thereof has not elapsed. 6. Having considered the rival contentions raised before us, in our view section 45(2) will have to be reasonably construed to achieve the object of the legislation. The starting point of limitation as prescribed in the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 45 is the declaration or part thereof under section 21 of the Act. It also lays down certain conditions. The meaning assigned to the word "call" in Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. 2 and Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary is "to summon". If this is the meaning of the word "call", then it contemplates some action or application of mind on the part of the State Government or its delegate before calling for the record. It cannot be equated with a mechanical, clerical or ministerial act of calling for the records of all the proceedings irrespective of the fact whether they are required or not for the purpose specified in the section. It cannot be equated with a mechanical, clerical or ministerial act of calling for the records of all the proceedings irrespective of the fact whether they are required or not for the purpose specified in the section. We are informed that general instructions have been issued to all the Collectors and Sub-Divisional Officers to send all the records of the proceedings to the Commissioner. Thus in substance all the records relating to the proceedings resulting in the declaration under section 21 of the Act are practically stored in the office of the Commissioner. Such a storing of the records or sending of the records by the respective Collectors or Sub- Divisional Officers cannot be equated with the summoning of the records or calling for the records for the purposes specified in section 45(2) of the Act. It requires a conscious application of mind on the part of the competent authority qua - particular proceedings. The word "any" as used in sub-section (2) of section 45 is indicative of this intention. Section 45(2) contemplates different stages, namely, calling for the records, giving opportunity of being heard to the parties concerned and ultimate decision. However, record is not to be called for merely satisfying the curiosity or for storing. It has a purpose behind it. The State Government is not appointed as roving Commission; but is expected to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial powers. The object behind prescribing the limitation for calling for the record is not to upset settled position at very late stage. The proviso to section 45(2) will have to be construed in this background. In a given case it may not be possible to dispose of a revision itself within the period of 3 years from the date of declaration for more than one reason. The ultimate decision of the revision will depend upon the various circumstances. Issuing of notices to the parties concerned for giving them a reasonable opportunity of being heard is a must. In a given case in view of the several uncertainties including the death of the parties and the time taken for bringing their legal representatives on record, it may not be possible to dispose of the whole revision within the period of 3 years. Therefore, the Legislature in its wisdom has restricted the limitation prescribed under the proviso only to calling for the record. Therefore, the Legislature in its wisdom has restricted the limitation prescribed under the proviso only to calling for the record. Though this calling for the record, will require some positive act on the part of the authority, it must ultimately depend upon the facts of each case; as to when record was actually called by the concerned authority. We do not find any compelling reason to construe the proviso so as to include in its import all the proceedings, namely, right from the initiation to the ultimate order. If that was the intention of the Legislature, then the proviso would have been differently worded. Therefore, we agree with the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court in Kisan v. Additional Commissioners case (cited supra). 7. We find further internal evidence available for construing section 45(2) read with the proviso in the manner we have construed it in section 44-A of the Ceiling Act. Section 45-A was inserted in the Ceiling Act by Maharashtra Act No. XXI of 1975. It confers the powers of revision upon the Commissioner in enquiry and proceedings under sections 25 and 27 of the Act. In this proviso also a limitation is prescribed for calling for the record. However, an exception is made in case of a reference from the State Government. Said section lays down that in case the Commissioner decides to exercise the revisional powers suo motu or on an application made to him by an aggrieved person, then he cannot summon the record after the expiry of the period of one year from the date of the award of compensation or grant of the land by the Collector. This clearly indicates that the Legislature has not treated calling of a record as a ministerial act, but a conscious act on the part of the revisional authority after due application of mind. As already observed, the record is to be called for a specific purpose namely, for satisfying as to the legality or propriety of the enquiry or proceedings of the declaration or part thereof. Therefore, it is quite obvious to us that after applying his mind, the revisional authority will have to can for the record of the enquiry or proceedings after conscious application of mind to the facts and circumstances of each case. 8. Therefore, it is quite obvious to us that after applying his mind, the revisional authority will have to can for the record of the enquiry or proceedings after conscious application of mind to the facts and circumstances of each case. 8. So far as the decision of another Division Bench in Pedre Januario Caries's case is concerned, the said decision will have to be read in its context. We do not feel that it lays down a general law in that behalf. The Division Bench in the said case was concerned with the provisions of Goa, Daman and Diu Land Revenue Code, 1968 including section 192 and section 32(2)(c) of the said Code. Section 192 of the said Code was somewhat similarly worded as that of section 45(2) read with the proviso. However to the case before the Division Bench section 32(2) of the Code applied which dealt with deemed permission after the lapse of ninety days. The Division Bench also placed reliance on the ruling reported in State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghava Natha, AIR 1969 SC 1297 . In paragraph 12 of the said judgment while construing somewhat similar provisions of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, this is what the Supreme Court observed : "12. It seems to us that section 65 itself indicates the length of the reasonable time within which the Commissioner must act under section 211. Under section 65 of the Code if the Collector does not inform the applicant of his decision on the application within a period of three months the permission applied for shall be deemed to have been granted. This section shows that a period of three months is considered ample for the Collector to make up his mind and beyond that the Legislature thinks that the matter is so urgent that permission shall be deemed to have been granted. Reading sections 211 and 65 together it seems to us that the Commissioner must exercise his revisional powers within a few months of the order of the Collector. This is reasonable time because after the grant of the permission for building purposes the occupant is likely to spend money on starting building operations at least within a few months from the date of the permission. This is reasonable time because after the grant of the permission for building purposes the occupant is likely to spend money on starting building operations at least within a few months from the date of the permission. In this case, the Commissioner set aside the order of the Collector on October 12, 1961, i.e. more than a year after the order, and it seems to us that this order was passed too late." It appears from the judgment of the Division Bench in Pedre Januaric Caries's case that in view of these observations of the Supreme Court the Division Bench held that to the cases covered by section 32(2)(c) of the Goa, Daman and Diu Land Revenue Code, even for exercising revisional jurisdiction under section 192 of the Code a period of one year as prescribed by the proviso could be treated as a reasonable period. Therefore, the observations of the Division Bench in that case should be confined to the facts of that case. In our view, by interpretative process it cannot be held that though the proviso in specific terms lays down that no record shall be called after the expiry of one year from the date of the order sought to be revised and even though the record is called during the said period, no order could be issued thereafter. By interpretative process a limitation could not have been laid down even for passing an order or giving a decision in all cases. To that extent, we find it difficult to agree with the view taken in Pedre Januaria Caries's case. However, it must be held as observed by the Supreme Court in State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav (cited supra) or in Mansaram v. S. P. Pathak, AIR 1983 SC 1239 that the State Government or its delegate are expected to exercise said power within a reasonable time depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 9. In the case before us, admittedly the necessary application of mind on the part of the Commissioner was much beyond the period of three years of the impugned order. In the view we have taken, therefore, it will have to be held that the records were not called within period of three years. In view of this admitted position, it is clear that the Commissioner had no powers to exercise the revisional jurisdiction. In the view we have taken, therefore, it will have to be held that the records were not called within period of three years. In view of this admitted position, it is clear that the Commissioner had no powers to exercise the revisional jurisdiction. On this short ground, therefore, the rule will have to be made absolute.” 6.7 Reading the aforesaid decision, the Full Bench of the court has assigned the meaning to the word “call” being akin to “to summon”. According to the Full Bench, it contemplates some action or application of mind on the part of the State Government or its delegates. It cannot be equated with a mechanical, clerical or a ministerial act of calling for the records of all the proceedings. It was therefore found by the Full Bench that the legislature in its wisdom had restricted the limitation period under the proviso only to the calling for the records. In other words, therefore, the submission of the learned AGP with regard to the ministerial act and the sending of records satisfying the aspect of limitation clearly is contrary to the law laid down by the Full Bench. The reading of the decision of the Full Bench clearly indicates that the legislature has not treated “calling for the records” as a ministerial act but a conscious act on the part of the revisional authority after due application of mind and therefore it is quite obvious that after applying the mind the revisional authority will have to call for the record or proceedings. Therefore, the letter dated 16.07.2018 sending the records can in no manner be interpreted to mean “calling for the records”. It is in light of this that in light of the provisions of judgment of the Apex court in the case of State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghava Natha, AIR 1969 SC 1297 that the Full Bench quashed the notice as being beyond a reasonable period. 6.8 The decision of the Full Bench has been followed by a learned Single Judge of the Bombay High court in the case of Champabai W/O Shankarrao Patwari vs. State of Maharashtra [ 2004(1) MHLJ 148 ]. Paras 4 to 7 of the decision read as under: “4. 6.8 The decision of the Full Bench has been followed by a learned Single Judge of the Bombay High court in the case of Champabai W/O Shankarrao Patwari vs. State of Maharashtra [ 2004(1) MHLJ 148 ]. Paras 4 to 7 of the decision read as under: “4. Having regard to the facts of the present petitions, I proceed to deal with the first submission, that the Additional Commissioner "called for the record" without conscious application of mind to the facts of each case. It has been brought to my notice from the original record, that the Additional Commissioner who acted as a delegate of the State Government, had prepared a cyclostyled/printed format of the order under which the record of the cases were called. In the printed format of the order, two blank spaces were left to be filled in i.e. the name of the person (party in whose case the S.L.D.T. had passed order) and the next, the date of decision rendered by S.L.D.T. Barring the two blank spaces wherein the name of the party and the date of order of S.L.D.T. were to be filled in, the rest of the order is dentical in each and every case and it has to be so for the reason that the order is in a printed form. For the sake of proper appreciation of the manner in which the Additional Commissioner has exercised the jurisdiction, it would be appropriate to reproduce the printed form of the order and it reads thus : Before Shri S. D. Mhaske, I.A.S., Additional Commissioner, Aurangabad Division, Aurangabad. Case No. Dated : ......... Sub: Revision under sec. 45(2) of the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961, in respect of the inquiry and proceedings u/ss. 17 to 21 in Case No.................... The State of Maharashtra v. R/.o............................ Decided by Surplus Land Determination Tribunal ......... Whereas it appears from the preliminary data collected for this purpose, that the inquiry u/ss. 17 to 21 of the aforesaid Act has not been properly conducted and there exists a prima facie need to satisfy myself as to the legality and propriety of the order passed on ....... in the above case. And whereas : (a) an appeal against the declaration u/s. 21 has not been filed within the period provided therefor. 17 to 21 of the aforesaid Act has not been properly conducted and there exists a prima facie need to satisfy myself as to the legality and propriety of the order passed on ....... in the above case. And whereas : (a) an appeal against the declaration u/s. 21 has not been filed within the period provided therefor. (b) that a period of three years from the date of the aforesaid order has not elapsed. Now, therefore, I, S. D. Mhaske, I.A.S., Additional Commissioner, Aurangabad Division, Aurangabad, in exercise of the powers vested in me under sec. 45(2) proviso read with Government Notification Revenue and Forest Department No. ICH-1065/4979l-M(Spl) dated 3.06.1965, hereby order to call for the record and proceedings of the above case. (S. D. Mhaske) Additional Commissioner, Aurangabad. Copy forwarded with compliments to the Additional Tahsildar............. for information. The original record reveals that the two blank spaces were initially filled in by writing of pencil and thereafter, the blank spaces are filled in by pen, unmindful of even rubbing of the pencil writing. Barring Writ No. 56 of 1988, no order passed by the Additional Commissioner bears his signature. The order that is available in other writ petitions is without the signature of the Additional Commissioner but it appears that someone has put in the initials of the then Additional Commissioner at the place where the Additional Commissioner was expected to sign. 5. Having regard to the facts referred to hereinabove, in regard to the printed order, the learned Advocates appearing for the petitioners contended that the decision to initiate the proceedings viz. the order to "call for the record", reveals total non-application of mind and on this count, the initiation of proceedings, so also, the impugned order falls to the ground. True, it is that if the State Government or its delegate chooses to have an order readily available in a printed form, it is impossible to infer application of mind to the facts of each case, which according to the Full Bench, is a must. I have no doubt, that the order to call for record or the decision to initiate the proceedings was arrived at in a mechanical fashion, as if it is a ministerial act. 6. In this regard, the learned Counsel for the petitioners have placed reliance on a judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Jai Singh and others, etc. 6. In this regard, the learned Counsel for the petitioners have placed reliance on a judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Jai Singh and others, etc. etc. V/s. State of Jammu & Kashmir,. In the said case, the short question that was involved was as to whether the Detaining Authority had applied his mind while issuing the detention order. The Apex Court on examination of the record, found that the grounds of detention were verbatim reproduction of the dossier submitted by the Senior Superintendent of Police, Udhampur to the District Magistrate requesting that a detention order may kindly be issued. The following facts were noticed by the Apex Court : "At the top of the dossier, the name is mentioned as Sardar Jai Singh, father's name is mentioned as Sardar Ram Singh and the address is given as village Bharakh, Tehsil .Reasi. Thereafter it is recited "The subject is an important member of " Thereafter follow various allegations against Jai Singh, paragraph by paragraph. In the grounds of detention, all that the District Magistrate has done is to change the first three words "the subject is" into "you Jai Singh, s/o Ram Singh, resident of village Bharakh, Tehsil Reasi". Thereafter word for word the police dossier is repeated and the word "he" wherever it occurs referring to Jai Singh in the dossier is changed into 'you' in the grounds of detention. We are afraid it is difficult to find greater proof of non- application of mind." The observations of the Apex Court apply with full force to the facts of the present case. The next judgment on which reliance is placed is by a learned Single Judge of this Court (Coram : J. G. Chitre, J.) in the case of Mohammed Sadiq Abdul Khalil Patel & others V/s. V/s. Y. Choughule, P.S.I. & others,. In the said case, the Executive Magistrate made use of cyclostyled orders without even scoring of the redundant lines. The learned Judge observed that every order has to be consistent with provisions of law and has to show application of judicial mind. It is further observed thus : "He is not supposed to go by following/mechanical process of passing already typed order, in which multiple lines are printed for the purpose of meeting the demand of situation. The learned Judge observed that every order has to be consistent with provisions of law and has to show application of judicial mind. It is further observed thus : "He is not supposed to go by following/mechanical process of passing already typed order, in which multiple lines are printed for the purpose of meeting the demand of situation. It by itself shows non-application of mind, while passing the order though, the learned Magistrate has printed some words to show that he has used his judicial discretion and has applied judicial mind." Similar is the view taken in another judgment of Division Bench of this Court, relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioners, which is in the case of Vidyaprasarak Samoj and another V/s. State of Goa and others,. 7. The learned Advocates appearing for the petitioners have also placed reliance on a reference judgment delivered by a Division Bench of this Court (Coram : B. H. Marlapalle and V/s. G. Munshi, JJ.) in Writ Petition No. 639 of 1988. A learned Single Judge of this Court (Coram : A. B. Naik, J.) disagreeing with the view taken by another learned Single Judge of this Court (Coram : R. M. S. Khandeparkar, J.) had made the reference. The said reference was answered by the Division Bench by restating the ratio laid down by the Full Bench and observed thus in para 9 of the judgment : "The Full Bench of this Court in the case of Manohar (supra) by confirming the earlier view taken in Kisan's case (supra) has clearly stated that an order by the Commissioner for calling for record is a legal necessity even thougli such a record may be available in the Divisional Commissioner's office, either for storing or at the instance of the Collector or Tahsildar, who passed the initial order. Passing of an order for calling for record and proceedings is a must and such an order must also indicate application of mind by the Divisional Commissioner. Passing of an order for calling for record and proceedings is a must and such an order must also indicate application of mind by the Divisional Commissioner. Scrutiny of record and passing of order to call for record and proceedings passed by the Commissioner, indicating application of mind, is the stage, which ought to be completed within a period of three years and the limitation of three years is not applicable for the remaining two stages." The learned Advocates appearing for the petitioners have also relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Lotan Fakira Patil V/s. State of Maharashtra and others, wherein the learned Single Judge following the Full Bench decision, has emphasized the need for application of mind while passing the order calling for the record.” 6.9 In our opinion, therefore, the submission of the learned counsels for the appellants that the letter dated 16.07.2018 cannot be termed as “calling for the records” has to be accepted. 7. Having held thus, the only relevant date before us where the powers of revision were sought to be initiated would be the date of 06.06.2020 which is beyond the period of one year for the purpose of satisfying himself and therefore in light of the decisions of this Court in the cases of Thakorbhai Tribhovandas (supra), Shah Arvindkumar (supra) and Pragjibhai Lallubhai Patel (supra), the relevant paragraphs of which read as under, we are of the opinion that the exercise of powers of revision was beyond the period of one year and the notice dated 06.06.2020 deserves to be quashed and set aside. 1995 (1) GLH 758 (DB) (para 3) (Thakorbhai Tribhovandas Rao and others v/s The State of Gujarat and others. “3. Undisputedly, the orders of the Mamlatdar and A. L. T., Matar which are sought to be revised under Section 76-A were passed in the years 1971, 1972 and 1973. The petitioners have received the notice to appear before the Deputy Collector only in September 1981. The provisions of Section 76A read as under : "76A. “3. Undisputedly, the orders of the Mamlatdar and A. L. T., Matar which are sought to be revised under Section 76-A were passed in the years 1971, 1972 and 1973. The petitioners have received the notice to appear before the Deputy Collector only in September 1981. The provisions of Section 76A read as under : "76A. Where no appeal has been filed within the period provided for it the Collector may, suo motu or on a reference made in this behalf by the State Government, at any time.- (a) call for the record of any inquiry or the proceeding of any Mamlatdar or Tribunal for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of any order passed by, and as to the regularity of the proceedings of such Mamlatdar or Tribunal, as the case may be, and (b) pass such order thereon as he deems fit : Provided that no such record shall be called for after the expiry of one year from the date of such order and no order of such Mamlatdar or Tribunal shall be modified, annulled or reversed unless opportunity has been given to the interested parties to appear and be heard." It will be seen that no record can be called for by the Collector after the expiry of one year from the date of the order made by the Mamlatdar or the Tribunal for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of such order or as to the regularity of the proceedings of the Mamlatdar or Tribunal. The proviso to Section 76A would be applicable even in a case where a Reference is made by the State Government requiring the Collector to call for the record and proceedings for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of the order. The limitation prescribed by the proviso for the exercise of the revisional powers beyond the expiry of one year from the date of the order is clear and explicit and the Collector will have no revisional power to be exercised beyond the period of one year prescribed by the proviso to Section 76A. The limitation prescribed by the proviso for the exercise of the revisional powers beyond the expiry of one year from the date of the order is clear and explicit and the Collector will have no revisional power to be exercised beyond the period of one year prescribed by the proviso to Section 76A. Therefore, the only contention which was raised on behalf of the petitioners against the validity of the impugned notices belatedly seeking to take up the orders of Mamlatdar and A. L. T. passed in 1971, 1972, 1973 for Revision under Section 76A of the Act deserves to be accepted. The learned Counsel appearing for the respondents had hardly any answer to the mandatory provisions of the proviso to Section 76A prescribing the time limit during which the power could be exercised for revising the orders of the Mamlatdar or the Tribunal, This petition therefore, deserves to be allowed. The impugned notices issued by the Deputy Collector, Kheda in Tenancy Revision Nos. 183 to 224 dated 4-9-1981 seeking to revise under Section 76A, the orders made by the Mamlatdar or the Tribunal in 1971, 1972 and 1973 are hereby set aside. Rule is made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs” 2016 (0) JX (Guj) 793 (para 6) (Shah Arvindkumar Daulatkrishnath through POA Shailesh Parikh v/s State of Gujarat) 6. As stated herein above, the legality of the impugned orders passed by the respondent Nos.2 and 4 is being examined only qua the provisions contained in Section 76A of the Tenancy Act as the respondent No.2 has reviewed the order of the Mamlatdar under Section 76A of the Tenancy Act. From the bare reading of the proviso to Section 76A of the Tenancy Act, it clearly transpires that the Collector could not have called for the record of any proceedings either suo motu or on the reference made by the State Government, after the expiry of one year from the date of such order passed by the Mamlatdar or Tribunal. In the case of Thakorbhai Tribhovandas Rao and Ors. Vs. State of Gujarat and Ors. In the case of Thakorbhai Tribhovandas Rao and Ors. Vs. State of Gujarat and Ors. (supra), it has also been held as under:- "It will be seen that no record can be called for by the Collector after the expiry of one year from the date of the order made by the Mamlatdar or the Tribunal, for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of such order or as to the regularity of the proceedings of the Mamlatdar or Tribunal. The proviso to Sec. 76A would be applicable even in a case where a Reference is made by the State Government requiring the Collector to call for the record and proceedings for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of the order. The limitation prescribed by the proviso for the exercise of the revisional powers beyond the expiry of one year from the date of the order is clear and explicit and the Collector will have no revisional power to be exercised beyond the period of one year prescribed by the proviso to Sec. 76A." 2016(0)AIJEL-HC 237364 (para 7-9) (Pragjibhai Lallubhai Patel v/s Raysinhbhai Ishvarbhai Patanwadia) “7 In the instant case, it is required to be noted that the Mamlatdar and ALT had initiated the proceedings under Section 84C of the Tenancy Act and dropped the same by the order dated 10.8.1978. Again the said Mamlatdar had initiated the said proceedings and again dropped the same by the order dated 6.9.1988. In both the proceedings, the respondent No.1 Raysingbhai Ishvarbhai Patanwadia was the party to the proceedings, however, he had not bothered to challenge the said orders. It was the Deputy Collector (Land Reforms) who, in exercise of the revisional power under Section 76A, had suo motu taken the case in revision and, that too, after a period of one year from the date of the order passed by the Mamlatdar. It is settled legal position that the Collector or the Deputy Collector could not call for any record after the expiry of one year from the date of the order passed by the Mamlatdar or the Tribunal, in view of the proviso to Section 76A of the said Act, and therefore, the very initiation of the proceedings under Section 76A at the instance of the Deputy Collector was bad in law. 8. 8. At this juncture, beneficial reference of the decision of this Court in the case of Thakorbhai Tribhovandas Rao And Ors. vs State Of Gujarat And Ors., reported in (1995) 1 GLR 636 be made in this regard. This Court while dealing with Section 76A of the Tenancy Act in the said decision has held as under:- "It will be seen that no record can be called for by the Collector after the expiry of one year from the date of the order made by the Mamlatdar or the Tribunal, for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of such order or as to the regularity of the proceedings of the Mamlatdar or Tribunal. The proviso to Section 76A would be applicable even in a case where a Reference is made by the State Government requiring the Collector to call for the record and proceedings for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of the order. The limitation prescribed by the proviso for the exercise of the revisional powers beyond the expiry of one year from the date of the order is clear and explicit and the Collector will have no revisional power to be exercised beyond the period of one year prescribed by the proviso to Section 76A. ..." 9. In view of the afore-stated legal position, no record could be called for by the Collector or Deputy Collector after the expiry of one year from the date of the order of the Mamlatdar or the Tribunal, in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 76A of the said Act” 8. A valiant effort has been made by learned AGP to submit that while exercising powers and in the event of quashing the notice we would resurrect an illegal order inasmuch as the Mamlatdar & ALT under the Tenancy Act had passed the order which is sought to be revised without application of mind inasmuch as the provisions of Section 63A ought to have been applied which was not done, whereas the Mamlatdar had undertaken an exercise in the application of Section 63AB. 9. 9. Having held that the show-cause notice dated 06.06.2020 is beyond time, we would not be required to undertake the very exercise that we should, however, what is apparent is that pending Letters Patent Appeal No. 813 of 2020, the revenue authorities proceeded to pass an order on merits pursuant to the notice which was impugned in the first round and an order dated 13.10.2020 was passed which triggered Special Civil Application No. 1546 of 2020 which the learned Single Judge of this court has dismissed on the ground of an alternative remedy which has given rise to consequential Letters Patent Appeal No. 349 of 2022. We may therefore discuss the issue of application of Section 63AD. Section 63AD of the Tenancy Act which was inserted and brought into force on 05.12.2015 reads as under: “63AD. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 84C, where the Mamalatdar suo moto or on the application of any person, has reason to believe that, in the breach of the provisions of clause (a), (b) or (c) of sub-section (1) of section 63, transfer of the land has taken place in favour of a person who is not an agriculturist or in favour of any institution, the Mamalatdar shall issue a notice to such person or institution and, after affording an opportunity of being heard, decide whether the transfer of the land is valid or not. (2) If the Mamalatdar comes to a decision that the transfer of such land is not valid then he shall pass an order thereby,- (i) imposing the penalty of three times the amount of the prevailing Jantri of such land on such person or institution in whose favour such land is not validly transferred; and (ii) directing the person or institution in whose favour such land is not validly transferred to restore the land along with the rights and interest there in to the position in which it was immediately before such transfer within a period of one month of such order. Explanation - For the purpose of this Act, the expression "Jantri" means the index of base market values as may be determine by the State Government from time to time.” 9.1 Obviously, reading the provision indicates that it overrides the provisions of Section 84C of the Tenancy Act. Explanation - For the purpose of this Act, the expression "Jantri" means the index of base market values as may be determine by the State Government from time to time.” 9.1 Obviously, reading the provision indicates that it overrides the provisions of Section 84C of the Tenancy Act. The effect of the provision being substantive, the changes in law take place are as under: (i) 3 months period given to the parties to the transaction to voluntarily restore the land along with rights and interest therein to the position in which it was immediately before the transfer or acquisition provided in Section 84-C is substituted by a mandatory provision whereby the land will have to be mandatorily restored by the transferee to the transferor within a period of one month. Moreover, the transferee will be penalised by an order imposing penalty of three times the amount of the prevailing jantri value. Thus what was voluntary reversal of transaction becomes mandatory coupled with penalty. (ii) Under Section 84-C on a lapse of a period of 3 months property would vest in the State under Section 84-C(3) of the Tenancy Act and shall disposed of under Section 84-C(4) of the Tenancy Act as per priority list. This is given a go by under Section 63AD and the property would never vest now in the State and it will only revert to the original owner and the original owner may be able to either getting it converted to non-agricultural use and sell it to the non-agriculturist purchaser again or may seek permission of the Collector and sell to the non- agriculturist purchaser. (iii) Section 63AD only applies if the transfer is in violation of Section 63 (1) (a), (b) or (c). While Section 84-C continues to apply even after 05.12.2015 in the transfer is in violation of any other provision of the Tenancy Act including Section 43. So in so far as breach of Section 43 is concerned 84- C would continue to apply while if there is any violation of Section 63(1) (a), (b) or (c), Section 63AD will override Section 84-C. (iv) Section 63AD is a liberal provision in that the property does not vest in the State but only reverts to the original owner from the non-agriculturist and the non-agriculturist is penalised. 9.2 Reading the aforesaid substantive changes in the law, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the amendment which was brought into effect from 05.12.2015 would operate prospectively and not affect transfers which were carried out in alleged violations of the provisions of Section 63(1)(a)(b)(c) prior to 29.01.1980, 09.05.1991 and though the sale in favour of the appellant was affected on 14.02.2017, after coming into the force of the provisions of Section 63AD, however, the same being in favour of an agriculturist, there was no breach of provisions of Section 63(1)(a)(b)(c). Even otherwise, in light of the show-cause notice being beyond the period of one year, the order dated 13.10.2020 which was a subject-matter of a subsequent petition which gives rise to Letters Patent Appeal No. 349 of 2022 would not stand. 10. For the aforesaid reasons, therefore, Letters Patent Appeals No. 813 of 2020 and 349 of 2022 are allowed. The orders of the learned Single Judge in the respective petitions are quashed and set aside. Connected civil applications are disposed of. No costs.