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2024 DIGILAW 96 (GUJ)

Sahebsing Sengar S/o Bindrasing v. State Of Gujarat

2024-01-11

VAIBHAVI D.NANAVATI

body2024
JUDGMENT : 1. By way of present writ-application filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the writ-applicant herein has prayed for following reliefs :- “(A) YOUR LORDSHIP be pleased to admit and allow this petition and be further pleased to issue writ of certiorari or any other writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari and be pleased to quash and set aside the impugned order dated 19.12.2017 passed by the Id. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, Ahmedabad in Appeal No. AA/46/97 as well as Order dated 10.09.1997 passed by the Charity Commissioner in Application No. 36/72/96. (B) During the pendency and till final disposal of this petition, YOUR LORDSHIP be pleased to stay the operation of order dated 19.12.2017 passed by the Id. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, Ahmedabad in Appeal No. AA/46/97 as well as Order dated 10.09.1997 passed by the Charity Commissioner in Application No. 36/72/96. (C) YOUR LORDHSIP be pleased to grant any other further remedy that may deem fit in the eyes of justice, equity and good conscience.” 2. Pending the present writ-application the writ-applicant herein by way of draft amendment dated 25.2.2022 has prayed for amendment which has been allowed by this Court by order dated 12.12.2023. By virtue of the said amendment the writ-applicant herein has further prayed for the following reliefs :- "9A(1) YOUR LORDSHIPS may Se pleased to pass appropriate writ, order and/or direction, quashing and setting aside the order dated 30.03.2007 passed by Respondent no. 3 in Application No. 36/Parchuran/1/2007 (Annexure F), in the interest of justice; 9B(1) Pending admission, hearing and till final disposal of present petition, YOUR LORDSHIPS may be pleased to stay operation, execution and implementation of impugned order dated 30.03.2007 passed by Respondent no. 3 in Application No. 36/Parchuran/1/2007 (Annexure F), and further be pleased to direct the parties to maintain status-quo with respect to the property in question, in the interest of justice;" 3. Brief facts leading to the filing of the present writ application read thus :- 3.1 Various piece and parcels of lands bearing Survey Nos.484, 485-paiki, 490-paiki and 491 situated at Mouje : Naroda, Ahmedabad were owned by the respondent No.4 Trust. The respondent No.4 applied for selling the lands before the Charity Commissioner, Ahmedabad i.e. respondent No.3. The office of the respondent No.3 issued public advertisement on 19.12.1996 inviting bids for the purpose of selling the property. The respondent No.4 applied for selling the lands before the Charity Commissioner, Ahmedabad i.e. respondent No.3. The office of the respondent No.3 issued public advertisement on 19.12.1996 inviting bids for the purpose of selling the property. 3.2 A bid came to be accepted in favour of the respondent No.5 by order dated 10.9.1997. By virtue of the said order dated 10.9.1997 the objections raised by all other parties came to be rejected granting six months time to complete the sale. The said order is duly produced at Annexure-C. 3.3 The writ-applicant herein as well as the respondent No.2 were bidders and were aggrieved by the said order passed by the respondent No.3 dated 10.9.1997 allowing bid of the highest amount of Rs.575.25 paise per square mtrs., in favour of the respondent No.5 i.e. Kailash Kalyan Creation Pvt. Ltd. 3.4 The respondent No.2 challenged the said order passed by the respondent No.3 dated 10.9.1997 by preferring an Appeal being Appeal No.46 of 1997 under Section 36 of the Gujarat Public Trust Act, 1950. The present writ-applicant was also joined as party respondent No.8. The writ-applicant herein was having common interest with other bidders. 3.5 The learned Tribunal granted interim relief by order dated 10.11.1997 in favour of the respondent No.2 which came to be vacated by order dated 23.3.2000. The same has not been challenged either by the respondent No.2 or by the writ-applicant herein. 3.6. Pending the Appeal proceedings the respondent No.4 approached the respondent No.3 seeking revival of the order passed by the respondent No.3 by preferring Application No.36/Misc./1/2007 which came to be allowed by the respondent No.3 by extending the time limit for completing the sale for further period of six months by order dated 30.3.2007. 3.7 Subsequent thereto, pending the Appeal proceedings the respondent No.5 entered into a sale of part of the part of the land with respondent No.14 and created third party right by Registered Sale Deed No.2216 dated 13.4.2007 for a consideration of Rs.32195917/-. 3.8 The said Appeal being Appeal No.AA/46/97 came to be dismissed by the impugned order dated 19.12.2017. 3.9 Being aggrieved by the same, the respondent No.2 approached this Court by preferring the Special Civil Application No.3944 of 2018. 3.10 The writ-applicant herein being respondent No.8 preferred present Special Civil Application No.7310 of 2019 challenging the order passed by the learned GRT dismissing the Appeal dated 19.12.2017. 3.9 Being aggrieved by the same, the respondent No.2 approached this Court by preferring the Special Civil Application No.3944 of 2018. 3.10 The writ-applicant herein being respondent No.8 preferred present Special Civil Application No.7310 of 2019 challenging the order passed by the learned GRT dismissing the Appeal dated 19.12.2017. 3.11 By order dated 21.8.2018 interim relief came to be granted in the Special Civil Application No.3944 of 2018 whereby the parties were directed to maintain status-quo. Further respondent No.2 was directed to furnish a bank guarantee to the extent of Rs.50,00,000/- by way of security for compensating the loss to the concerned respondents. Being aggrieved by the said interim order dated 21.8.2018 passed in the Special Civil Application No.3944 of 2018 the respondent No.14 preferred Letters Patent Appeal No.1258 of 2018 and the respondent No.5 herein preferred Letters Patent Appeal No.1259 of 2018. Pending the said Letters Patent Appeal the respondent No.2 prayed for withdrawal of the Special Civil Application No.3944 of 2018 as well as the Appeal No.AA/46/97 before the respondent No.3 - learned Charity Commissioner, Ahmedabad which came to be granted by the Hon’ble Division Bench. Accordingly, the both the Letters Patent Appeal being Letters Patent Appeal No.1258 of 2018 and Appeal No.AA/46/97 came to be permitted to be withdrawn by the Hon’ble Division Bench. The Special Civil Application No.3944 of 2018 came to be disposed of as not pressed. Accordingly interim relief granted came to be vacated. With the withdrawal of Special Civil Application No.3944 of 2018 the Letters Patent Appeal No.1258 of 2018 as well as Letters Patent Appeal No.1258 of 2018 and Appeal No.1259 of 2019 came to be disposed of as the same would not survive. The connected civil applications also came to be disposed of. 3.12 The writ-applicant objected to the withdrawal of the said Letters Patent Appeals, however the learned Division Bench chose not to consider the said objection and reserved liberty in favour of the writ-applicant to pursue the present writ-application and take all the contentions as available to redress the grievance of the writ-applicant. The order passed in the Letters Patent Appeal No.1258 of 2018, paragraphs 8 to 12 read thus :- “8. We heard these matters over a period of one week and we would have permitted Mr. The order passed in the Letters Patent Appeal No.1258 of 2018, paragraphs 8 to 12 read thus :- “8. We heard these matters over a period of one week and we would have permitted Mr. Shah to withdraw the writ application as well as the appeal filed by his client before the revenue Tribunal at the very first instance. However, there was lot of opposition at the end of Mr. Dave, the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent no.10 (writ applicant in the connected writ applications). However, we shall deal with the writ application filed by the client of Mr. Dave, appropriately, a little later. 9. We permit Mr. Shah, the learned senior counsel to withdraw the main matter itself i.e. the Special Civil Application No.3944 of 2018 as well as the appeal filed by him before the revenue Tribunal. We take notice of the fact that while passing the impugned interim order, the learned Single Judge had directed the clients of Mr. Shah to furnish a bank guarantee to the tune of Rs.50,00,000/- by way of security in the event the respondents would suffer loss of any nature. We are informed by Mr. Shah that this amount has been deposited with the Registry of this High Court. The Registry of this High Court must have surely invested this amount by way of a Fixed Deposit Receipt with any nationalized bank. Since the main writ application itself has been withdrawn, we direct the Registry to refund this amount of Rs.50,00,000/- to the clients of Mr. Shah after proper verification and identification. However, the interest accrued on this amount, shall not be paid to the writ applicants of the Special Civil Application No.3944 of 2018. The interest accrued shall go to the Gujarat State Legal Services Authority. 10. The Special Civil Application No.3944 of 2018 is disposed of as not pressed. The interim relief granted stands vacated forthwith. With the withdrawal of the Special Civil Application No.3944 of 2018 and the interim relief being vacated, the present Letters Patent Appeal No.1258 of 2018 as well as the connected Letters Patent Appeal No.1259 of 2018 would not survive. Both the appeals are disposed of accordingly. The connected civil applications also stand disposed of. 11. So far as the Special Civil Application No.7310 of 2019 is concerned, i.e. the writ application filed by the client of Mr. Both the appeals are disposed of accordingly. The connected civil applications also stand disposed of. 11. So far as the Special Civil Application No.7310 of 2019 is concerned, i.e. the writ application filed by the client of Mr. Dhaval Dave, we deem fit to send this matter back to the learned Single Judge. Mr. Dave, would like to amend his writ application appropriately. Mr. Dave can request the court concerned in this regard. We do not express any opinion on the question whether the client of Mr. Dave should be permitted to amend his writ application or not. 12. Let the Special Civil Application No.7310 of 2019 be now notified before the appropriate Court in accordance with the determination.” In the aforesaid sets of facts the writ-applicant herein has prayed for the reliefs as referred above. 4. Heard Mr. B. T. Rao, the learned advocate appearing for the writ-applicant. Mr. Rao, the learned advocate appearing for the writ-applicant submitted that the impugned order dated 10.9.1997 passed by the learned Charity Commissioner in the proceedings being No.36/72/96 and the order dated 30.3.2017 passed by the learned Charity Commissioner below Application No.36/Misc./1/2007 are orders which are passed without jurisdiction. It was submitted that the learned Charity Commissioner has no power to review/revive its own order. 4.1 Mr. Rao, the learned advocate submitted that the writ-applicant herein was the respondent in the proceedings before the learned GRT and supporting the case of the respondent No.2, in view thereof the writ-applicant chose not to prefer a separate Appeal challenging the order passed by the learned Charity Commissioner dated 10.9.1997 whereby the order of purchase of land in question came to be passed in favour of the respondent No.5. 4.2 It was submitted that the learned Charity Commissioner by order dated 10.9.1997 had permitted six months time to complete the sale. It was submitted that the aforesaid direction was not complied with. It was not open for the learned Charity Commissioner to review/revive the order dated 10.9.1997 by extending the time period of six months by order dated 30.3.2017 to the respondent No.4 Trust to complete the sale. 4.3 It was submitted that the said extension could not have been granted by the respondent No.3 after a lapse of 10 years when the property price touched sky-high. 4.4 Mr. 4.3 It was submitted that the said extension could not have been granted by the respondent No.3 after a lapse of 10 years when the property price touched sky-high. 4.4 Mr. Rao, the learned advocate submitted that the bidders had contested before the learned GRT, that the Charity Commissioner had no jurisdiction to pass such order. 4.5 It was submitted that though the writ-applicant had not challenged the order passed by the learned Charity Commissioner dated 10.9.1997 by filing an Appeal under Section 36 of the Act before the GRT, it is always open for the writ-applicant to challenge the orders which are without jurisdiction. Placing reliance on the same, it was submitted that the delay caused in challenging the orders can be considered by the Court taking into consideration the manner in which the impugned orders came to be passed by the respondent authorities. 4.6 Placing reliance on the aforesaid submissions, it was submitted that the prayers as prayed for in the present writ application be allowed. 5. Heard Mr. Mihir Joshi, the learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. M. T. M. Hakim, the learned advocate appearing for the respondent No.5. 5.1 Mr. Joshi, the learned Senior Counsel submitted that the present writ-application is filed with an ulterior motive. It was submitted that the writ-applicant herein was sixth highest bidder amongst the other bidders. The writ-applicant herein is seeking to challenge the order dated 19.12.2017 passed by the learned GRT dismissing the Appeal No.AA/46/97 wherein the writ-applicant was respondent No.8. The writ-applicant was party to the said proceedings and was supporting the respondent No.2. The writ-applicant chose not to challenge the order passed by the learned Charity Commissioner in the Application No.36/72/96 order dated 10.9.1997 whereby the learned Charity Commissioner allowed the sale between the respondent Trust and respondent No.5 within six months. The writ-applicant was also aware of the order passed by the learned Charity Commissioner reviving the order dated 10.9.1997 granting extension of time by six months vide order dated 30.3.2007 i.e. additional six months to the respondent No.4 Trust to complete the sale with the respondent No.5. 5.2 Relying on the aforesaid, Mr. The writ-applicant was also aware of the order passed by the learned Charity Commissioner reviving the order dated 10.9.1997 granting extension of time by six months vide order dated 30.3.2007 i.e. additional six months to the respondent No.4 Trust to complete the sale with the respondent No.5. 5.2 Relying on the aforesaid, Mr. Joshi, the learned Senior Counsel submitted that the writ-applicant herein is aware about the orders passed by the learned Charity Commissioner from time to time and the order passed by the learned GRT as referred above, however the writ-applicant chose not to challenge those orders, though the writ-applicant was aware that the respondent No.2 had filed Appeal No.AA/46/97 before the learned GRT praying for setting aside the order passed by the learned Charity Commissioner and the respondent No.2 be declared as purchaser. It was submitted that the stay granted by the learned GRT came to be vacated by order dated 30.3.2000. The writ-applicant herein has chosen not to challenge the said orders. It was submitted that the writ-applicant was also aware with respect to the order dated 30.3.2007 whereby extension of time came to be granted by the learned Charity Commissioner to complete the sale within further six months. Third party rights have been created by the respondent No.5 in favour of the respondent No.14. It was submitted that while filing the present writ-application also the writ-applicant chose not to challenge the said order dated 30.3.2007 even after the Appeal came to be rejected by impugned order dated 19.12.2017. The writ-applicant has challenged the orders dated 30.3.2007 passed by the respondent No.3 by an amendment dated 25.2.2022 after the order came to be passed by the Hon’ble Division Bench in the Letters Patent Appeal No.1258 of 2018. In view thereof also the order dated 30.3.2007 can be said to have attained finality and the present writ-application may not be entertained and the same be dismissed with exemplary cost. 5.3 It was submitted that the orders passed by the learned Charity Commissioner allowing the sale in favour of the respondent No.5 was dated 10.9.1997 the order of extension of six months to complete the sale qua the respondent No.5 is subject matter of challenge after the period of more than 20 years and the writ-applicant can be said to have acquiesced the right to challenge. 5.4 It was submitted that the stay that was granted in the Appeal being Appeal No.AA/46/97 on 10.11.1997 stood vacated on 23.3.2000 which was never challenged. 5.5 The prayers in the Appellate proceedings were with respect to the grievance raised by the respondent No.2 and, therefore, the orders passed by the Appellate Tribunal only qua the grievance raised by the writ-applicant. The writ-applicant chose never to challenge the said orders passed by the respondent No.3 - learned Charity Commissioner from time to time and in view thereof, if the writ-applicant was aggrieved by the said order, under such circumstances, the writ-applicant ought to have challenged the same independently. It is now not open for the writ-applicant to challenge the orders passed by the learned Charity Commissioner dated 10.9.1997 and 30.3.2007 directly before this Court in teeth with the order that was challenged by the respondent No.2 independently after a lapse of more than 20 years. 5.6 It was submitted that the writ-applicant has acquiesced the right to challenge. The delay in filing the present writ-application is not explained by the writ-applicant. The Appeal was filed by the respondent No.2 before the learned GRT. The respondent No.2 withdrew the said Appeal and the Special Civil Application No.3944 of 2018 both. Resultantly, orders passed by the respondent No.3 - learned Charity Commissioner dated 10.9.1997 and 30.3.2007 have attained finality. To substantiate the aforesaid, Mr. Joshi, the learned Senior Counsel placed reliance on the decision reported in 2005 SCC OnLine Bombay 1726, paragraphs 5 and 6. 5.7 Mr. Joshi, the learned Senior Counsel submitted that if the writ-applicant were to file an Appeal, Section 36 of the Act provides that the Appeal is to be filed within period of 30 days. Reliance was placed on the decision in the Chairman, State Bank of India and Anr. vs. M. J. James, reported in (2022) 2 SCC 301 . Also in the case of State of Rajasthan and Ors. vs., D. R. Laxmi and Ors., reported in (1996) 6 SCC 445 . 6. Mr. Saurin Mehta, the learned advocate appearing for the respondent No.4 - Trust adopted and supported submissions advanced by Mr. Mihir Joshi, the learned Senior Counsel. Mr. Also in the case of State of Rajasthan and Ors. vs., D. R. Laxmi and Ors., reported in (1996) 6 SCC 445 . 6. Mr. Saurin Mehta, the learned advocate appearing for the respondent No.4 - Trust adopted and supported submissions advanced by Mr. Mihir Joshi, the learned Senior Counsel. Mr. Mehta, the learned advocate submitted that once the permission has been granted by the learned Charity Co missioner under Section 36 of the Act, and same was not challenged by the writ-applicant before an appropriate forum, the writ-applicant cannot get advantage of his own wrong. He submitted that the writ-applicant was not the lowest bidder nor has shown any bonafide in respect to the subject property. Therefore, the writ-applicant has locus standi since the writ-applicant has not preferred a statutory Appeal under Section 36(3) of the Act though sought to be canvassed as an aggrieved. Moreover, he further submitted that the challenge in the writ-application and by way of an amendment is nothing but mala fide and after thought. Mr. Mehta, the learned advocate also submitted that pursuant to the permission granted by the respondent No.3 – the learned Charity Commissioner a Registered Sale Deed has been executed in favour of respondent No.5 and, therefore, rights and obligations in favour of the said respondent are crystallized. He further submitted that before the present writ-applicant preferred the writ-application, though not challenged the permission granted by the learned Charity Commissioner by way of an Appeal before the learned GRT, the rights are established in favour of the respondent No.5 and, therefore, prejudice would be caused to the parties as the belated stage. In view of the same, the present writ-application is without any substance. 6.1 It was submitted that the respondent Trust has followed the due procedure of law pursuant to the order dated 10.9.1997 allowing the sale with respect to Survey Nos.491, 490-paiki and 484. Pending the Appeal the parties had approached the learned Charity Commissioner seeking extension of time and in the facts of the present case, time came to be extended and the sale deed has been entered into Kailash Kalyan Trust – respondent No.5 and the respondent No.5 in turn sold the property to the respondent No.14. 6.2 Mr. Pending the Appeal the parties had approached the learned Charity Commissioner seeking extension of time and in the facts of the present case, time came to be extended and the sale deed has been entered into Kailash Kalyan Trust – respondent No.5 and the respondent No.5 in turn sold the property to the respondent No.14. 6.2 Mr. Mehta, the learned advocate also submitted that the writ-applicant having failed to prefer Appeal under Section 36(3) of the Gujarat Public Trust Act the present writ application is barred by delay and latches and in view thereof to substantiate the aforesaid challenge placed reliance on (2013) 9 SCC 485 para-4 and 8. It was submitted that the sale deed came to be entered into between the respondent No.5 and respondent No.14 on 13.4.2007 which is a Registered Sale Deed. Placing reliance on the same, it was submitted that present writ-application be dismissed. 7. Mr. Rohan Shah, the learned AGP appearing for the State placed reliance on Section 36(3) read with Rule 24(3) of the Act and submitted that the order passed by the learned Charity Commissioner is just and proper and is empowered to grant extension if it appeals to do so to the competent authority. 8. Mr. Amar Bhatt, the learned advocate appearing for the respondent No.14 submitted the equities are created in favour of the respondent No.14 as back as on 13.4.2007. It was submitted that on that ground alone the present writ-application may not be entertained and the present writ-application be dismissed. 9. Mr. Rao, the learned advocate appearing for the writ- applicant in rejoinder submitted that the learned Charity Commissioner has no powers to pass order of extension of time and, therefore the learned Charity Commissioner being devoid of powers any order passed without jurisdiction can be challenged at any time and that there would not be bar to challenge an order that is passed without jurisdiction. Analysis :- 10. The following emerge for consideration of this Court :- The controversy in the facts of the present case revolves around various piece and parcel of lands bearing Survey Nos.484, 485-paiki, 490-paiki and 491 situated at Mouje : Naroda, Ahmedabad which was of the ownership of the respondent No.4 Trust. The respondent No.4 applied for selling the said land before the learned Charity Commissioner i.e. respondent No.3 herein. The respondent No.4 applied for selling the said land before the learned Charity Commissioner i.e. respondent No.3 herein. The office of the respondent No.3 issued public advertisement on 19.12.1996 inviting bids from the public for sale of the subject property. 10.1 The respondent No.3 accepted the offer of the respondent No.5 vide order dated 10.9.1997. While passing the said order, objections of other parties came to be rejected by the respondent No.3. The respondent No.3 granted six months time to complete the sale. The said order is duly produced at Annexure-C. 10.2 It was the case of the respondent No.2 that the respondent No.2 was the highest bidder and being aggrieved by the said order dated 10.9.1997 passed by the respondent No.3 as referred above, the said order came to be challenged by the respondent No.2 before the learned GRT under the provisions of Section 36(3) of the Gujarat Public Trust Act, 1950 registering an Appeal being Appeal No.46 of 1997. The present writ-applicant was also joined as respondent No.8 in the said proceedings. The learned GRT by order dated 10.11.1997 stayed the order passed by the respondent No.3 dated 10.9.1997, however the said stay came to be vacated on 23.3.2000. The said order vacating the stay has remained unchallenged. The writ-applicant herein supported the respondent No.2 who was the appellant in the said Appeal. 10.3 Pending the said Appeal the respondent No.4 approached the respondent No.3 by an application seeking extension of time to comply with the order passed by the respondent No.3 dated 10.9.1997 being Application No.36/Misc./1/2007 which came to be allowed by the respondent No.3 by order dated 30.3.2007. The said order remained unchallenged during the entire proceedings before the learned GRT, however the writ-applicant herein has challenged by the same by filing an amendment in the year 2022 which came to be granted by this Court. 10.4 While granting the extension the learned Charity Commissioner considered the said application and passed the impugned order. Relevant paragraph-3 of the said reads thus:- The relevant paragraph-3 reads thus (true translation) :- “(3) On examining the entire case and perusing the order issued by this office, it emerges that the order was issued on 10/09/1997 and limitation thereof is over. Considering the same, the applicant’s submission with regard to extension of limitation is not admissible. However, an application, along with an affidavit, has been presented at page no. Considering the same, the applicant’s submission with regard to extension of limitation is not admissible. However, an application, along with an affidavit, has been presented at page no. 183 for reinstatement of the order dated 10/09/1997. Perusing the same as well as the grounds stated in the said application and the affidavit and perusing the documents presented, the fact in the present case is clearly established that, in view of the order dated 10/09/1997 in the earlier Application No. 36/72/1996, the purchaser M/s. Kailas Kalyan Creators Pvt. Ltd. had paid Rs.2,86,00,000/- to the applicant trust, which has been deposited in the Dena Bank, Naranpura and Naroda branch of the Trust. The said deposits have been produced in the accounts of the Trust. Therefore, the purchaser has deposited the amount as per the order of this office. However, considering the copies of the certified documents, produced in the application of the applicant and its annexures, the sale deed of the land in question was not executed in time due to encroachment of the slum dwellers and different court proceedings and the sale deed and the procedure of sale was not completed, therefore, there is a lapse in time limit of six months. For the entire proceeding, upon considering the circumstances that the purchasers on behalf of the applicant trust, have incurred the expenses for the entire court proceeding and expenses to vacate the disputed land and on the basis of the order, who is authorized to purchase the disputed land, the predecessor Joint Charity Commissioner has passed order with respect to application no.36/72/96 and fixed the time limit. The said order shall have to be considered as lapsed upon completion of the aforesaid time limit. Therefore, there is no question to extend the said order. However, upon considering the transaction with regard to the disputed land between the applicant trust and the purchaser Kailas Kalyan Creators Pvt. Ltd. and in order to avoid further complications in that regard in future and upon taking into consideration the objectives of the Trust, there is no other option than to restore the said order. However, upon considering the transaction with regard to the disputed land between the applicant trust and the purchaser Kailas Kalyan Creators Pvt. Ltd. and in order to avoid further complications in that regard in future and upon taking into consideration the objectives of the Trust, there is no other option than to restore the said order. Therefore, I arrive to the decision to restore the said order until the procedure of Sale-deed is not completed and it appears necessary to grant permission to execute the Sale-deed within the period of 6 months and therefore, the following order is hereby passed in the interest of justice.” Subsequent to the aforesaid order dated 30.3.2007 passed by the respondent No.3 - learned Charity Commissioner the respondent No.5 entered into into a sale of part of the land by Registered Sale Deed No.2216 dated 13.4.2007 with the respondent No.14. The said sale deed has also remained unchallenged. The learned GRT dismissed the Appeal No.AA/46/97 filed by the respondent No.2 by order dated 19.12.2017. 10.5 Being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned GRT in Appeal No.AA/46/97 dated 19.12.2017 the respondent No.2 approached this Court by preferring the Special Civil Application No.3944 of 2018. 10.6 By order dated 21.8.2018 interim relief came to be granted in the Special Civil Application No.3944 of 2018 whereby the parties were directed to maintain status-quo with regard to the nature, character and possession of the land in question pending the said writ-application. The respondent No.2 was further directed to furnish a bank guarantee of Rs.50,00,000/- by way of security, in the event the respondents would suffer loss of any nature. 10.7 Being aggrieved by the said interim order the respondent No.2 preferred Letters Patent Appeal No.1259 of 2018 and the respondent No.14 preferred Letters Patent Appeal No.1258 of 2018. The respondent No.2 sought permission to withdraw the said Special Civil Application No.3944 of 2018 as well as Appeal filed by the respondent No.2 before the learned GRT being Appeal No.AA/46/97 which came to be permitted to be withdrawn by the Hon’ble Division Bench by order dated 23.7.2021. Considering the fact that the Special Civil Application No.3944 of 2018 was permitted to be withdrawn, the interim relief stood vacated accordingly. The Letters Patent Appeal No.1258 of 2018 and connected Letters Patent Appeal No.1259 of 2018 came to be disposed of, as the same would not survive. Considering the fact that the Special Civil Application No.3944 of 2018 was permitted to be withdrawn, the interim relief stood vacated accordingly. The Letters Patent Appeal No.1258 of 2018 and connected Letters Patent Appeal No.1259 of 2018 came to be disposed of, as the same would not survive. The present Special Civil Application No.7310 of 2019 came to be relegated to the learned Single Judge to adjudicate the dispute in question. 11. In the opinion of this Court, undisputedly the respondent No.2 as referred above preferred Appeal No.AA/46/97 challenging the order passed by the respondent No.3 in favour of the respondent No.4 and prayed for a direction that the sale be set aside and the offer of the appellant i.e. the respondent No.2 herein be accepted and respondent No.2 be declared as purchaser on the grounds as stated in the Appeal which is duly referred above, wherein it was prayed that the order passed by the respondent No.3 - learned Charity Commissioner dated 10.9.1997 be set aside and bid of the respondent No.2 be accepted and the respondent No.2 be declared as purchaser and appropriate orders be passed. (a) Undisputedly the said Appeal being Appeal No.46 of 1997 itself came to be withdrawn by the respondent No.2 and in view thereof there is no Appeal as on today and the order passed by the learned GRT itself does not survive. (b) The writ-applicant has been a party to the proceedings right from the publication of the advertisement to the order passed by the learned GRT in the year 1997. (c) The writ-applicant has chosen not to challenge the said order passed by the respondent No.3 - learned Charity Commissioner dated 10.9.1997 in favour of the respondent No.5, the order vacating interim relief in the Appeal dated 23.3.2000 proceedings being Appeal No.46 of 1997 whereby the interim relief came to be vacated as also the order passed by the respondent No.3 learned Charity Commissioner in Application No.36/Misc./1/2007 directing to restore the order dated 10.9.1997 until the process of sale is not completed and it appears to grant permission to execute the sale deed within a period of six months. (d) Pursuant to the granting extension of time the respondent No.5 alienated the said property in favour of the respondent No.14 pending the proceedings before the learned GRT. (d) Pursuant to the granting extension of time the respondent No.5 alienated the said property in favour of the respondent No.14 pending the proceedings before the learned GRT. Accordingly the respondent No.14 came to be joined as party respondent in the Appeal proceeding before the GRT. The writ-applicant chose not to challenge the said sale deed as well. (e) The present writ-applicant chose to challenge the order passed by the learned GRT by filing of the present writ-application challenging the order passed by the learned Charity Commissioner restoring the order dated 10.9.1997 and granting permission to execute the sale deed within a period of six months as also the order passed by the learned GRT dated 19.12.2017 dismissing the Appeal being Appeal No.AA/46/97. Though the writ-applicant was aware about the orders passed from time to time, the writ-applicant chose not to take any action until the orders attained finality. The equities have been created in favour of the respondent No.14 since 2007. 12. In the aforesaid set of facts, in the opinion of this Court, present case is governed by the following position of law. Position of law :- (a) In the case of State of Rajasthan and Ors. vs., D. R. Laxmi and Ors., reported in (1996) 6 SCC 445 , paragraph-10 reads thus :- “10. The order or action, if ultra vires the power, becomes void and it does not confer any right. But the action need not necessarily be set at naught in all events. Though the order may be void, if the party does not approach the court within reasonable time, which is always a question of fact and have the order invalidated or acquiesced or waived, the discretion of the court has to be exercised in a reasonable manner. When the discretion has been conferred on the court, the court may in appropriate case decline to grant the relief, even if it holds that the order was void. The net result is that extraordinary jurisdiction of the court may not be exercised in such circumstances. It is seen that the acquisition has become final and not only possession had already been taken but reference was also sought for; the award of the court u/s. 26 enhancing the compensation was also accepted. The order of the appellate court had also become final. It is seen that the acquisition has become final and not only possession had already been taken but reference was also sought for; the award of the court u/s. 26 enhancing the compensation was also accepted. The order of the appellate court had also become final. Under those circumstances, the acquisition proceedings having become final and the compensation determined also having become final, the High court was highly unjustified in interfering with and in quashing the notification u/s. 4(1) and declaration u/s. 6.” (b) In the case of M/s. Jigna Construction Co., Mumbai vs. The State of Mah and Ors., reported in 2005 SCC OnLine Bom, 1726, paragraphs 5 and 7 read thus :- “5. The grievance of the petitioners is that although they had offered highest price the trustees rejected their offer and the lower offer of the respondent. no. 4 was accepted. The basic question is, what is the locus of the petitioners to canvas the grievance. According to Mr. Parekh, pursuant to the advertisement given by the trustees the petitioners had given their offer and appeared before the Charity Commissioner and thus the petitioners were party to the proceedings and they have a right to approach this Court being a party aggrieved. This submission is wholly erroneous. The proceeding under section 36 of the Act are not a lis between the parties to adjudicate contesting claims. The mandate of section 36 is that no transfer of the trust property shall be valid unless approved by the Charity Commissioner with previous sanction. The Charity Commissioner as per the scheme has to accord the sanction, having regard to the interest or benefit of the trust. The Charity Commissioner in these proceedings after inquiry has to record satisfaction in this behalf. Section 36 merely authorizes the Charity Commissioner to ascertain as to whether the trustees acted in the best interest of the trust. The petitioners, since neither necessary nor proper party to the proceedings under section 36, cannot claim any entitlement to invoke Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India to canvas their grievance against sanction accorded under subsection (I) of section 36 of the Act. 7. In Girdhar v. Rev. The petitioners, since neither necessary nor proper party to the proceedings under section 36, cannot claim any entitlement to invoke Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India to canvas their grievance against sanction accorded under subsection (I) of section 36 of the Act. 7. In Girdhar v. Rev. E.H., as Lewellen he then, was, 1991 following Mh LJ 91, the another view learned taken by single Bharucha Judge of J. this court, A.A. Desai J observed as follows: "The petitioner is a builder who is anxious to purchase and not being a person having interest in the trust or a beneficiary cannot question the correctness or legality of the order. The petitioner to succeed in his commercial deal under the guide of a guardian of the interest of a trust is prosecuting this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution which cannot be entertained. He is in reality prosecuting his personal commercial interest which cannot be permissible. In Arunodaya Prefab v. M.D. Kambli, 1979 Mh LJ 104 it is observed that under section 36 of the Act read with rule 24, the Charity Commissioner is concerned only with the according or refusing sanction to particular sale which the trustees proposed to make. It is a proceeding which concerns only with the trustees. To decide whether the sale is in the interest of the trust, he is empowered to make such inquiries as deemed necessary. It is for the trustees to decide to whom the should sell the property subject tot he sanction of the Charity Commissioner to the proposed sale. It is further held that the petitioners who have sent uninvited offer to the Charity Commissioner have no locus standi to challenge the order of the Charity Commissioner by writ petition on the ground of being higher bidder. The Charity Commissioner is not obliged to associate the petitioner into inquiry or to consider the offer made by the petitioner. Shri Deshpande tried to urge that in the instant case, the petitioner made an offer on invitation. Therefore he is entitled to maintain this petition. I am unable to agree. The nature of proceedings under section 36 an the scope is definite. Shri Deshpande tried to urge that in the instant case, the petitioner made an offer on invitation. Therefore he is entitled to maintain this petition. I am unable to agree. The nature of proceedings under section 36 an the scope is definite. Even if the offer was made by the petitioner on the invitation of the trustee, he does not acquire any right to question the legality or correctness of the order passed by the Charity Commissioner under section 36 of the Act". (c) In the case of Chairman, State Bank of India and Anr. vs. M. J. James, reported in (2022) 2 SCC 301 , paragraphs 36, 39, 40 and 41 read thus :- “36. What is a reasonable time is not to be put in a straitjacket formula or judicially codified in the form of days etc. as it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. A right not exercised for a long time is non-existent. Doctrine of delay and laches as well as acquiescence are applied to non-suit the litigants who approach the court/appellate authorities belatedly without any justifiable explanation for bringing action after unreasonable delay. In the present case, challenge to the order of dismissal from service by way of appeal was after four years and five months, which is certainly highly belated and beyond justifiable time. Without satisfactory explanation justifying the delay, it is difficult to hold that the appeal was preferred within a reasonable time. Pertinently, the challenge was primarily on the ground that the respondent was not allowed to be represented by a representative of his choice. The respondent knew that even if he were to succeed on this ground, as has happened in the writ proceedings, fresh inquiry would not be prohibited as finality is not attached unless there is a legal or statutory bar, an aspect which has been also noticed in the impugned judgment. This is highlighted to show the prejudice caused to the appellants by the delayed challenge. We would, subsequently, examine the question of acquiescence and its judicial effect in the context of the present case. 39. Before proceeding further, it is important to clarify distinction between 'acquiescence' and 'delay and laches'. This is highlighted to show the prejudice caused to the appellants by the delayed challenge. We would, subsequently, examine the question of acquiescence and its judicial effect in the context of the present case. 39. Before proceeding further, it is important to clarify distinction between 'acquiescence' and 'delay and laches'. Doctrine of acquiescence is an equitable doctrine which applies when a party having a right stands by and sees another dealing in a manner inconsistent with that right, while the act is in progress and after violation is completed, which conduct reflects his assent or accord. He cannot afterwards complain.17 In literal sense, the term acquiescence means silent assent, tacit consent, concurrence, or acceptance, See M/S Vidyavathi Kapoor Trust v. Chief Commissioner Tax (1992) 194 ITR 584 which denotes conduct that is evidence of an intention of a party to abandon an equitable right and also to denote conduct from which another party will be justified in inferring such an intention. See Krishan Dev v. Smt. Ram Piari AIR 1964 HP 34 Acquiescence can be either direct with full knowledge and express approbation, or indirect where a person having the right to set aside the action stands by and sees another dealing in a manner inconsistent with that right and inspite of the infringement takes no action mirroring acceptance. However, acquiescence will not apply if lapse of time is of no importance or consequence. 40. Laches unlike limitation is flexible. However, both limitation and laches destroy the remedy but not the right. Laches like acquiescence is based upon equitable considerations, but laches unlike acquiescence imports even simple passivity. On the other hand, acquiescence implies active assent and is based upon the rule of estoppel in pais. As a form of estoppel, it bars a party afterwards from complaining of the violation of the right. Even indirect acquiescence implies almost active consent, which is not to be inferred by mere silence or inaction which is involved in laches. Acquiescence in this manner is quite distinct from delay. Acquiescence virtually destroys the right of the person. Given the aforesaid legal position, inactive acquiescence on the part of the respondent can be inferred till the filing of the appeal, and not for the period post filing of the appeal. Nevertheless, this acquiescence being in the nature of estoppel bars the respondent from claiming violation of the right of fair representation. 41. Given the aforesaid legal position, inactive acquiescence on the part of the respondent can be inferred till the filing of the appeal, and not for the period post filing of the appeal. Nevertheless, this acquiescence being in the nature of estoppel bars the respondent from claiming violation of the right of fair representation. 41. The questions of prejudice, change of position, creation of third-party rights or interests on the part of the party seeking relief are important and relevant aspects as delay may obscure facts, encourage dubious claims, and may prevent fair and just adjudication. Often, relevant and material evidence go missing or are not traceable causing prejudice to the opposite party. It is, therefore, necessary for the court to consciously examine whether a party has chosen to sit over the matter and has woken up to gain any advantage and benefit, which aspects have been noticed in M/s Dehri Rohtas Light Rly. Co. Ltd. v. District Board, Bhojpur and Others, (1992) 2 SCC 598 and State of Maharashtra v. Digambar., (1995) 4 SCC 683 These facets, when proven, must be factored and balanced, even when there is delay and laches on the part of the authorities. These have bearing on grant and withholding of relief. Therefore, we have factored in the aspect of prejudice to the appellants in view of the relief granted in the impugned judgment.” (d) In the case of Union of India and Ors. vs. N. Murugesan and Ors., reported in (2022) 2 SCC 25 , paragraphs 20 to 25, 28 and 29 read thus :- “DELAY, LACHES AND ACQUIESCENCE: 20. The principles governing delay, laches, and acquiescence are overlapping and interconnected on many occasions. However, they have their distinct characters and distinct elements. One can say that delay is the genus to which laches and acquiescence are species. Similarly, laches might be called a genus to a species by name acquiescence. However, there may be a case where acquiescence is involved, but not laches. These principles are common law principles, and perhaps one could identify that these principles find place in various statutes which restrict the period of limitation and create non-consideration of condonation in certain circumstances. They are bound to be applied by way of practice requiring prudence of the Court than of a strict application of law. The underlying principle governing these concepts would be one of estoppel. They are bound to be applied by way of practice requiring prudence of the Court than of a strict application of law. The underlying principle governing these concepts would be one of estoppel. The question of prejudice is also an important issue to be taken note of by the Court. LACHES: 21. The word laches is derived from the French language meaning "remissness and slackness". It thus involves unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a claim involving an equitable relief while causing prejudice to the other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law requires while asserting a right, and therefore, must stand in the way of the party getting relief or remedy. 22. Two essential factors to be seen are the length of the delay and the nature of acts done during the interval. As stated, it would also involve acquiescence on the part of the party approaching the Court apart from the change in position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would be unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a remedy to a party who knocks its doors when his acts would indicate a waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has put the other party in a particular position, and therefore, it would be unreasonable to facilitate a challenge before the Court. Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on equity is not expected to be allowed to avail a remedy. 23. A defence of laches can only be allowed when there is no statutory bar. The question as to whether there exists a clear case of laches on the part of a person seeking a remedy is one of fact and so also that of prejudice. The said principle may not have any application when the existence of fraud is pleaded and proved by the other side. To determine the difference between the concept of laches and acquiescence is that, in a case involving mere laches, the principle of estoppel would apply to all the defences that are available to a party. Therefore, a defendant can succeed on the various grounds raised by the plaintiff, while an issue concerned alone would be amenable to acquiescence. ACQUIESCENCE : 24. We have already discussed the relationship between acquiescence on the one hand and delay and laches on the other. 25. Therefore, a defendant can succeed on the various grounds raised by the plaintiff, while an issue concerned alone would be amenable to acquiescence. ACQUIESCENCE : 24. We have already discussed the relationship between acquiescence on the one hand and delay and laches on the other. 25. Acquiescence would mean a tacit or passive acceptance. It is implied and reluctant consent to an act. In other words, such an action would qualify a passive assent. Thus, when acquiescence takes place, it presupposes knowledge against a particular act. From the knowledge comes passive acceptance, therefore instead of taking any action against any alleged refusal to perform the original contract, despite adequate knowledge of its terms, and instead being allowed to continue by consciously ignoring it and thereafter proceeding further, acquiescence does take place. As a consequence, it reintroduces a new implied agreement between the parties. Once such a situation arises, it is not open to the party that acquiesced itself to insist upon the compliance of the original terms. Hence, what is essential, is the conduct of the parties. We only dealt with the distinction involving a mere acquiescence. When acquiescence is followed by delay, it may become laches. Here again, we are inclined to hold that the concept of acquiescence is to be seen on a case-to-case basis. 28. We would not dwell deep into the extraordinary and discretionary nature of relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. This principle is to be extended much more when an element of undue delay, laches and acquiescence is involved. The following decisions of this Court would suffice: 28.1 UP Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 464 : "8. Our attention was also invited to a decision of this Court in State of Karnataka v. S.M. Kotrayya [ (1996) 6 SCC 267 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 1488]. In that case the respondents woke up to claim the relief which was granted to their colleagues by the Tribunal with an application to condone the delay. The Tribunal condoned the delay. Our attention was also invited to a decision of this Court in State of Karnataka v. S.M. Kotrayya [ (1996) 6 SCC 267 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 1488]. In that case the respondents woke up to claim the relief which was granted to their colleagues by the Tribunal with an application to condone the delay. The Tribunal condoned the delay. Therefore, the state approached this Court and this Court after considering the matter observed as under: (SCC p. 268) • "Although it is not necessary to give an explanation for the delay which occurred within the period mentioned in subsections (1) or (2) of Section 21, explanation should be given for the delay which occasioned after the expiry of the aforesaid respective period applicable to the appropriate case and the Tribunal should satisfy itself whether the explanation offered was proper. In the instant case, the explanation offered was that they came to know of the relief granted by the Tribunal in August 1989 and that they filed the petition immediately thereafter. That is not a proper explanation at all. What was required of them to explain under sub-sections (1) and (2) was as to why they could not avail of the remedy of redressal of their grievances before the expiry of the period prescribed under sub-section (1) or (2). That was not the explanation given. Therefore, the Tribunal was wholly unjustified in condoning the delay." 9. Similarly in Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana [ (1997) 6 SCC 538 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1550] this Court reaffirmed the rule that if a person chose to sit over the matter and then woke up after the decision of the Court, then such person cannot stand to benefit. In that case it was observed as follows: (SCC p. 542) "The delay disentitles a party to discretionary relief under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution. The appellants kept sleeping over their rights for long and woke up when they had the impetus from Virpal Singh Chauhan case [Union of India v. Virpal Singh Chauhan, (1995) 6 SCC 684 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 1 : (1995) 31 ATC 813]. The appellants desperate attempt to redo the seniority is not amenable to judicial review at this belated stage." 10. The appellants desperate attempt to redo the seniority is not amenable to judicial review at this belated stage." 10. In Union of India v. C.K. Dharagupta [ (1997) 3 SCC 395 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 821] it was observed as follows: (SCC p. 398, para 9) "9. We, however, clarify that in view of our finding that the judgment of the Tribunal in R.P. Joshi [R.P. Joshi v. Union of India, OA No. 497 of 1986 decided on 17-3-1987] gives relief only to Joshi, the benefit of the said judgment of the Tribunal cannot be extended to any other person. The respondent C.K. Dharagupta (since retired) is seeking benefit of Joshi case [R.P. Joshi v. Union of India, OA No. 497 of 1986 decided on 17-3-1987] . In view of our finding that the benefit of the judgment of the Tribunal dated 17-3- 1987 could only be given to Joshi and nobody else, even Dharagupta is not entitled to any relief." 11. In Govt. of WB v. Tarun K. Roy [ (2004) 1 SCC 347 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 225] their Lordships considered delay as serious factor and have not granted relief. Therein it was observed as follows: (SCC pp. 359-60, para 34) "34. The respondents furthermore are not even entitled to any relief on the ground of gross delay and laches on their part in filing the writ petition. The first two writ petitions were filed in the year 1976 wherein the respondents herein approached the High Court in 1992. In between 1976 and 1992 not only two writ petitions had been decided, but one way or the other, even the matter had been considered by this Court in Debdas Kumar [State of WB v. Debdas Kumar. The plea of delay, which Mr Krishnamani states, should be a ground for denying the relief to the other persons similarly situated would operate against the respondents. Furthermore, the other employees not being before this Court although they are ventilating their grievances before appropriate courts of law, no order should be passed which would prejudice their cause. The plea of delay, which Mr Krishnamani states, should be a ground for denying the relief to the other persons similarly situated would operate against the respondents. Furthermore, the other employees not being before this Court although they are ventilating their grievances before appropriate courts of law, no order should be passed which would prejudice their cause. In such a situation, we are not prepared to make any observation only for the purpose of grant of some relief to the respondents to which they are not legally entitled to so as to deprive others therefrom who may be found to be entitled thereto by a court of law." 28.2 Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. Dugal Kumar, (2008) 14 SCC 295 : "24. As to delay and laches on the part of the writ petitioner, there is substance in the argument of learned counsel for the appellant Company. It is well settled that under Article 226 of the Constitution, the power of a High Court to issue an appropriate writ, order or direction is discretionary. One of the grounds to refuse relief by a writ court is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches. It is imperative, where the petitioner invokes extraordinary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, that he should come to the court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ is indeed an adequate ground for refusing to exercise discretion in favour of the applicant. 25. Under the English law, an application for leave for judicial review should be made "promptly". If it is made tardily, it may be rejected. The fact that there is breach of public law duty does not necessarily make it irrelevant to consider delay or laches on the part of the applicant. Even if leave is granted, the question can be considered at the time of final hearing whether relief should be granted in favour of such applicant or not. 26. The fact that there is breach of public law duty does not necessarily make it irrelevant to consider delay or laches on the part of the applicant. Even if leave is granted, the question can be considered at the time of final hearing whether relief should be granted in favour of such applicant or not. 26. In R. v. Dairy Produce Quota Tribunal, ex p Caswell [(1990) 2 AC 738 : (1990) 2 WLR 1320 : (1990) 2 All ER 434 (HL)], AC at p. 749, the House of Lords stated [Ed.: Quoting from O'Reilly v. Mackman, "The public interest in good administration requires that public authorities and third parties should not be kept in suspense as to the legal validity of a decision the authority has reached in purported exercise of decision-making powers for any longer period than is absolutely necessary in fairness to the person affected by the decision." 27. The underlying object of refusing to issue a writ has been succinctly explained by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd [1874 LR 5 PC 221 : 22 WR 492], thus: (LR pp. 239-40) "Now the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation, in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy." 28. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy." 28. This Court has accepted the above principles of English law. In Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi [ (1969) 1 SCC 110 : (1969) 2 SCR 824 ] and Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India [ (1970) 1 SCC 84 : (1970) 2 SCR 697 ] this Court ruled that even in cases of violation or infringement of fundamental rights, a writ court may take into account delay and laches on the part of the petitioner in approaching the court. And if there is gross or unexplained delay, the court may refuse to grant relief in favour of such petitioner." 28.3 State of J&K v. R.K. Zalpuri, (2015) 15 SCC 602 : "20. Having stated thus, it is useful to refer to a passage from City and Industrial Development Corpn. v. Dosu Aardeshir Bhiwandiwala, (2009) 1 SCC 168 , wherein this Court while dwelling upon jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, has expressed thus: (SCC p. 175, para 30) "30. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 is duty-bound to consider whether: (a) adjudication of writ petition involves any complex and disputed questions of facts and whether they can be satisfactorily resolved; (b) the petition reveals all material facts; (c) the petitioner has any alternative or effective remedy for the resolution of the dispute; (d) person invoking the jurisdiction is guilty of unexplained delay and laches; (e) ex facie barred by any laws of limitation; (f) grant of relief is against public policy or barred by any valid law; and host of other factors." 21. In this regard reference to a passage from Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. v. K. Thangappan, (2006) 4 SCC 322 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 791 would be apposite: (SCC p. 325, para 6) "6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. Ltd. v. K. Thangappan, (2006) 4 SCC 322 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 791 would be apposite: (SCC p. 325, para 6) "6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party." • After so stating the Court after referring to the authority in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, (1986) 4 SCC 566 restated the principle articulated in earlier pronouncements, which is to the following effect: (SCC p. 326, para 9) "9. ... the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction." 22. In State of Maharashtra v. Digambar, (1995) 4 SCC 683 a three-Judge Bench laid down that: (SCC p. 692, para 19) "19. Power of the High Court to be exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution, if is discretionary, its exercise must be judicious and reasonable, admits of no controversy. In State of Maharashtra v. Digambar, (1995) 4 SCC 683 a three-Judge Bench laid down that: (SCC p. 692, para 19) "19. Power of the High Court to be exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution, if is discretionary, its exercise must be judicious and reasonable, admits of no controversy. It is for that reason, a person's entitlement for relief from a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, be it against the State or anybody else, even if is founded on the allegation of infringement of his legal right, has to necessarily depend upon unblameworthy conduct of the person seeking relief, and the court refuses to grant the discretionary relief to such person in exercise of such power, when he approaches it with unclean hands or blameworthy conduct." 23. Recently in Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 38, it has been ruled thus: (SCC p. 117, para 16) "16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant-a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, 'procrastination is the greatest thief of time' and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis." 24. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant-a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, 'procrastination is the greatest thief of time' and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis." 24. At this juncture, we are obliged to state that the question of delay and laches in all kinds of cases would not curb or curtail the power of the writ court to exercise the discretion. In Tukaram Kana Joshi v. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corpn., (2013) 1 SCC 353 : (2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 491 it has been ruled that: (SCC pp. 359-60, para 12) "12. ... Delay and laches is adopted as a mode of discretion to decline exercise of jurisdiction to grant relief. There is another facet. The Court is required to exercise judicial discretion. The said discretion is dependent on facts and circumstances of the cases. Delay and laches is one of the facets to deny exercise of discretion. It is not an absolute impediment. There can be mitigating factors, continuity of cause of action, etc. That apart, if the whole thing shocks the judicial conscience, then the Court should exercise the discretion more so, when no third-party interest is involved. Thus analysed, the petition is not hit by the doctrine of delay and laches as the same is not a constitutional limitation, the cause of action is continuous and further the situation certainly shocks judicial conscience." And again: (SCC p. 360, para 14) "14. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down as to when the High Court should refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a party who moves it after considerable delay and is otherwise guilty of laches. Discretion must be exercised judiciously and reasonably. In the event that the claim made by the applicant is legally sustainable, delay should be condoned. In other words, where circumstances justifying the conduct exist, the illegality which is manifest, cannot be sustained on the sole ground of laches. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have a vested right in the injustice being done, because of a non-deliberate delay. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have a vested right in the injustice being done, because of a non-deliberate delay. The court should not harm innocent parties if their rights have in fact emerged by delay on the part of the petitioners. (Vide Durga Prashad v. Controller of Imports and Exports, (1969) 1 SCC 185 , Collector (LA) v. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107 : 1989 SCC (Tax) 172, Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Co. Ltd. v. District Board, Bhojpur, (1992) 2 SCC 598 , Dayal Singh v. Union of India, (2003) 2 SCC 593 ] and Shankara Coop. Housing Society Ltd. v. M. Prabhakar" 29. The aforesaid principle is also required to be adopted while considering a case involving approbation and reprobation.” 13. It is apposite to refer to Section 36 of the Gujarat Public Trusts Act, 1950 which reads thus :- “SECTION 36 : Alienation of immovable property of public trust (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the instrument of trust- (a) no sale, mortgage, exchange or gift of any immovable property, and (b) no lease for a period exceeding ten years in the case of agricultural land or for a period exceeding three years in the case of non-agricultural land or a building. belong to a public trust, shall be valid without the previous sanction of the Charity Commissioner. (2) The decision of the Charity Commissioner under subsection (1) shall be communicated to the trustees and shall be published in such manner as may be prescribed. (3) Any person aggrieved by such decision may appeal to the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal within thirty days from the date of its publication. (4) Such decision shall, subject to the provisions of subsection (3) be final. The writ-applicant chose not to avail the statutory remedy by preferring an independent Appeal as provided under Section 36(3) of the Act. Section 36(3) provides that any person aggrieved by any decision by the learned Charity Commissioner may Appeal to the learned GRT within 30 days from its publication. Admittedly the writ-applicant has chosen not to avail the remedy by filing Appeal under Section 36 of the Act. 13.1 It is also apposite to refer Rule 24 of the Bombay Public Trust (Gujarat) Rules, 1961 which reads thus :- “Rule 24. Admittedly the writ-applicant has chosen not to avail the remedy by filing Appeal under Section 36 of the Act. 13.1 It is also apposite to refer Rule 24 of the Bombay Public Trust (Gujarat) Rules, 1961 which reads thus :- “Rule 24. Application under section 36 for sanction of alienations .- (1) Every application for sanction of an alienation shall contain information inter alia on the following points:- (i) whether the instrument of trust contains any directions as to alienation of immoveable property; (ii) what is the necessity for the proposed alienation; (iii) how the proposed alienation is in the interest of the public trust; and (iv) in the case of a proposed lease, the terms of the past leases, if any Such application shall be accompanied, as far as practicable, by a valuation report of an expert. (2) The Charity Commissioner, before according or refusing sanction, may make such inquiry as he may deem necessary. (3) In according sanction, the Charity Commissioner may impose such conditions or give such directions as he may deem fit. (4) The decision of the Charity Commissioner under subsection (1) of Section 36 shall be published in a local newspaper having circulation in the area where the property concerned is situate, and also on the notice boards of the offices of the Charity Commissioner and the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner, as the case may be, of the region in which the property is situate in a manner sufficient to give information about the material particulars regarding the number of the application for sanction, the name of the public trust, the description of the property for the alienation of which sanction is accorded and the price at which it is proposed to be sold or mortgaged or the rent at which and the period for which it is proposed to be leased and the substance of such decision.” While according sanction the learned Charity Commissioner may impose such conditions and give such directions in the interest of the Trust under Rule 24(3) of the Rules, 1961. Under the provisions of Section 36 of the Act read with Rule 24, the learned Charity Commissioner is concerned only with according or refusing sanction to particular sale which the trustees proposes to make. Under the provisions of Section 36 of the Act read with Rule 24, the learned Charity Commissioner is concerned only with according or refusing sanction to particular sale which the trustees proposes to make. It is for the trustees to decide to whom they should sell the property, subject to sanction of the learned Charity Commissioner to the proposed sale. If the learned Charity Commissioner feels the need to ascertain market price of the property, he may issue necessary direction to the trustees which have to be followed by the trustees. 14. Considering the facts of the present case, provisions of law as well as position of law as referred above, this Court is inclined to pass the following order :- (A) Section 36(3) of the Act provides that any order passed by the Charity Commissioner is subject matter of challenge within a period of thirty days from passing of the said order. The said time as prescribed by the Act has been given a gobye by the writ-applicant herein having chosen not to challenge the orders dated 10.9.1997 and 30.3.2007 passed by the learned Charity Commissioner, the learned GRT vacated the interim relief granted to the respondent No.2 by order dated 10.11.1997 and subsequent sale deed for part of the land entered into between the respondent No.5 and respondent No.14 as back as in the year 2007. The present writ-application came to be filed by the writ-applicant herein in the year 2019 challenging the order passed by the learned GRT dismissing the Appeal No.AA/46/97 dated 19.12.2017 filed by the respondent No.2. In view of the aforesaid, in the opinion of this Court, the writ-applicant has acquiesced the right to challenge. (B) The present writ-applicant has challenged the order passed by the learned Charity Commissioner dated 10.9.1997 in Application No.36/72/96 after a period of 20 years, the order dated 30.3.2007 passed in Application No.36/Misc./1/2007 in the year 2022 after the order came to be passed by the Hon’ble Division Bench in the Letters Patent Appeal No.1258 of 2018 whereby Special Civil Application No.3944 of 2018, Letters Patent Appeal No.1258 of 2018 and Letters Patent Appeal No.1259 of 2018 came to be disposed of as having become infructuous. The order dismissing the Appeal No. AA/46/97 has been challenged by the writ-applicant herein directly invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of India without availing statutory remedy of Appeal provided under Section 36(3) of the Act within a period of 30 days from passing of the said order. The present writ-application is accordingly barred by unreasonable delay and latches. The writ-applicant has been negligent in ascertaining his rights. (C) The writ-applicant can be said to be a fence sitter having been party to the proceedings right from the year 1997 and being the fifth highest bidder in the auction proceedings undertaken by the respondent No.3 - learned Charity Commissioner. (D) The two essential factors are required to be considered are the length of delay and the nature of acts done during the interregnum period. As stated above, the same would also involve acquiescence on the part of the writ-applicant apart from the change in position in the interim period. It is unjustified to confer remedy on a party who approaches the Court where apparently in the facts of the present case the writ-applicant has waived such a right by way of his conduct wherein the writ-applicant has been a party to the entire proceedings but having chosen not to challenge the same. (E) By virtue of the order dated 23.7.2021 passed in the Letters Patent Appeal No.1258 of 2018 no proceedings with respect to the Appeal are pending before the learned GRT and, therefore, the prayers qua challenge of the order dismissing the Appeal No.AA/46/97 dated 19.12.2017 does not survive. (F) The third party rights in favour of the respondent No.14 have been created as back as on 13.4.2007 after the order came to be passed by the respondent No.3 - learned Charity Commissioner granting extension of time to complete the sale by order dated 30.3.2007. The writ-applicant having not challenged the said order passed by the learned Charity Commissioner, it is now not open for the writ-applicant to challenge the same which according to the writ-applicant is passed without jurisdiction. The writ-applicant having not challenged the said order passed by the learned Charity Commissioner, it is now not open for the writ-applicant to challenge the same which according to the writ-applicant is passed without jurisdiction. (G) The respondent No.3 - learned Charity Commissioner by considering the extension of time Application No.36/Misc./1/2007 seeking revival of the order dated 10.9.1997 passed by the respondent No.4 Trust while allowing the said application by order dated 30.3.2007 has assigned reasons as referred above and proceeded to restore the order dated 10.9.1997 permitting the sale to be completed by a period of six months from the date of the said order. The respondent No.3 - learned Charity Commissioner thought it fit that it was appropriate to pass the said order in the year 2007 considering the fact that the respondent No.2 had deposited an amount of Rs.2,86,00,000/- in the Trust account in Dena Bank, Naranpura and Naroda Branch of the Trust. The receipts of deposit were produced before respondent No.3 - the learned Charity Commissioner. In view thereof, the learned Charity Commissioner held that the respondent No.2 had deposited the amount as per the order passed by the learned Charity Commissioner dated 10.9.1997. On Perusal of certified documents produced in the application and its annexures the sale deed of the land in question was not executed in time due to encroachment of the slum dwellers and different Court proceedings and the procedure for execution of the sale deed could not be completed and, therefore, there was a lapse in the time limit of six months. The respondent No.3 - learned Charity Commissioner further proceeded to hold that the respondent No.5 Kailash Kalyan Creation Pvt., had incurred expenses for the entire Court proceedings and expenses to vacate the land in dispute and on the basis of that order was authorised to purchase the disputed land and in view thereof, the said order dated 30.3.2007 came to be passed by the respondent No.3 - learned Charity Commissioner. The said order can be said to have attained finality. The respondent No.3 – learned Charity Commissioner being the loco-parentis exercised the powers to take appropriate decision in the interest of respondent No.4 - Trust. 13. For the foregoing reasons, no case is made out to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The present writ-application fails and is dismissed accordingly.