JUDGMENT : BIREN VAISHNAV, J. 1. These appeals have been filed challenging the orders of the learned Single Judge in the respective appeals. 2. In Letters Patent Appeal No.147 of 2017, the order under challenge of the learned Single Judge is dated 30.10.2015. Since an application for review was filed challenging the order dated 30.10.2015 which was rejected by oral judgment dated 18.07.2016, Letters Patent Appeal No.148 of 2017 has been filed against the order rejecting the review. 3. For the purposes of this judgment, facts in Letters Patent Appeal No.148 of 2017 are considered. 4. This appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent has been filed by the appellant who was the original petitioner before the learned Single Judge. The appeal has been filed by the appellant challenging the impugned judgment and order dated 18.07.2016 passed by the learned Single Judge in the Review Application in the Special Civil Application No.5999 of 2002. 5. Facts in brief are that the appellant was the original petitioner who approached the learned Single Judge challenging the penalty order dated 28.06.2001 and the appellate order dated 24.10.2001 which confirmed the order of penalty passed by the respondent bank. By the order, the appellant was dismissed from service with effect from 28.02.1999, the date on which the appellant was due for superannuation. 6. Brief facts leading to the filing of the appeal and the petition read as under: “3) The petitioner was appointed in the Bank of India in the year 1957 in the clerical cadre and on account of meritorious performance he was given promotions from time to time and lastly he was holding the post of General Manager. The entire service career of the petitioner is without blemish or stigma except the impugned departmental inquiry held against him which resulted in to penal order of dismissal. 4) The petitioner respectfully submits that he was posted as Executive Trustee on deputation to BOI Mutual Fund, a trust sponsored by the bank as Principal Trustee in June 1992 and subsequently when the BOI Management company Ltd., a wholly Asset owned subsidiary of Bank was formed in December 1993, he was designated as Managing Director of the said company. The petitioner continued in that capacity till he was brought back to the Bank of India in September 1996. The petitioner continued in that capacity till he was brought back to the Bank of India in September 1996. 5) The petitioner respectfully submits was issued charge sheet under he Regulation-6 of the Bank of India Officers Employees' (Discipline & Appeal) Regulations, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as "the said Regulations" for the sake of brevity), in respect of acts of misconduct allegedly committed by him during his tenure of service during June 1992 to September 1996 35 Executive Trustee in the BOI Mutual Fund and as Managing Director of BOI Asset Management Company. Article of charges and statement of allegations in support thereof were given to the petitioner by Memorandum dated 9/12/98 by respondent No.1. Copy of the said Memorandum alongwith Article of charges and statement of allegations are enclosed herewith and marked as Annexure "A" collectively. 6) The petitioner respectfully submits there were six allegations leveled against the petitioner as contained in the Articles of charges. It was alleged in Article-I that the petitioner had unduly accommodated the directors of M/s.Kedia Distilleries Ltd. and/or the brokers and caused wrongful loss to the BOI Mutual Fund. Allegation in Article-II is to the effect that the petitioner has showed undue favours to the directors of M/s.Krishna Texport and Capital Markets Ltd. and/or brokers and caused wrongful loss to the BOI Mutual Funds. Allegations in Article-III is to the effect that in disregard to the sound investment practices, the petitioner had indulged in investment- indiscreet, in 14 "B" group company's shares and the value of these shares having completely eroded in most of the cases, the BOI Mutual Fund incurred serious financial loss. Allegation contained in Article-IV is to the effect that the petitioner had made investments in gross violation of delegation of powers, during the period 25/5/95 to 13/10/95, in individual scrips, per market day and did not make specific and immediate reporting of such transactions to the Board of Directors of the company for approval. It is alleged in Article-V that the petitioner has allowed an amount of Rs.7.40 Crore outstanding in dividend receivable account of BOI Mutual Fund to be written off, as of 31/3/95 through adjustment of entries without specific approval from the Board of Directors of the company and the board of trustees of the fund. It is alleged in Article-V that the petitioner has allowed an amount of Rs.7.40 Crore outstanding in dividend receivable account of BOI Mutual Fund to be written off, as of 31/3/95 through adjustment of entries without specific approval from the Board of Directors of the company and the board of trustees of the fund. Article-VI contained the allegation that the petitioner did not ensure proper accounts of income tax deducted at source receivable in respect of dividend, interest etc. and did not ensure that income returns from 1990-91 filled within a are reasonable time to claim refund of tax deducted at source and further allowed write of am amount of Rs.15,43,882.69 as of 31/3/96 towards outstanding in the books of accounts of BOI Mutual Fund. 7) The petitioner respectfully submits that he had demanded inspection of the relevant documents for the purpose of preparing his reply to the charge sheet by letter dated 24/10/98. The respondent No.1 by letter dated 29/12/98 has stated that since the request for inspection of the documents igreasonable one, time will be given however since the departmental inquiry is required to be completed within short period of time considering the nearing date of retirement of the petitioner, only one day's time was granted to inspect the documents as requested by the petitioner and he was advised by the said letter that written statement of should be submitted within a week's thereafter. Copy of the said letter defence time is enclosed herewith and marked as Annexure "B". 8) The petitioner respectfully submits that respondent No.1 issued order dated 2/1/99 to the effect that the petitioner, though retired on superannuation on 28/2/99, he will cease to be in service at the close of office hours on 28/2/99 but the disciplinary proceedings will continue as if the petitioner is in service until the said proceedings concluded and final order is passed. Copy of the said order enclosed herewith and marked as Annexure "C".” 7. Ms.Mohini Bhavsar learned counsel appearing for the appellant had tendered written submissions in addition to making oral submissions before us and the gist of the submissions made before us indicate that the charges against the appellant were that he had unduly accommodated the directors of M/s.Kedia Distillery and/or brokers and caused wrongful loss to the Bank of India Mutual Fund. Ms.Mohini Bhavsar learned counsel appearing for the appellant had tendered written submissions in addition to making oral submissions before us and the gist of the submissions made before us indicate that the charges against the appellant were that he had unduly accommodated the directors of M/s.Kedia Distillery and/or brokers and caused wrongful loss to the Bank of India Mutual Fund. That, he had shown undue favours to the Directors of M/s.Krishna Texport and Capital Markets Ltd and therefore caused wrongful loss to the bank. That, in disregard to the sound investment practices, the appellant had indulged indiscreet investment in 14 ‘B’ group company’s share. That in gross violation of powers, for the period from 25.05.1995 to 13.10.1995, the appellant made investments in individual scripts per market rate in violation of the provisions and beyond the exercise of his powers. That the appellant allowed an amount of Rs.7.40 crores outstanding in dividend receivable amounts to be written off as of 31.03.1995 through adjustment of entries without specific approval from the Board of Directors. That the appellant did not ensure proper accounts of the income tax deducted at source. 8. Several grounds have been taken by the learned counsel for the appellant inasmuch as the inquiry was in violation of principles of natural justice inasmuch as the documents asked for was not supplied. That the appellant was not alone as he was not the only authority for buying, selling, holding and investing. The confirmation had to come from a committee of Directors and Chartered Accountants. That, the same was done after verification of the Chief Manager. 9. Ms.Bhavsar would submit that the company Kedia Distillery was highly rated company and it was in that light the investment was made as far as M/s.Krishna Texport was concerned, it was enjoying facilities with the State Bank of India and its performance was good and the shares were purchased by the Chief Manager while the appellant was on leave. 10. As far as the allegation of indiscreet investment in 14 companies, he would submit that the decision of investment was taken by the committee with the head of computerized and research department, the panel of brokers was approved by the Chairman of the Mutual Fund and the appellant was unnecessarily made a scapegoat. 10. As far as the allegation of indiscreet investment in 14 companies, he would submit that the decision of investment was taken by the committee with the head of computerized and research department, the panel of brokers was approved by the Chairman of the Mutual Fund and the appellant was unnecessarily made a scapegoat. She would also therefore submit that the subsequent charges were misconceived and reading of the response to the charges in detail, she would assail the veracity of the charge and submit that the Inquiry Officer could not have held the charges to be proved and the consequential order of dismissal was bad. In support of her submissions, she would rely on the following decisions: (i) Letters Patent Appeal No.1114/2022 with Letters Patent Appeal No.258/2023 in case of The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Chandrakant Gokalbhai Patel (Common Judgment dated 06.09.2023). (ii) Writ Petition No.12403/2018 in case of Satyendra Singh Gurjar Vs. Union of India (Judgment dated 20.12.2019) (iii) 2007 AIR SCW 2532 Inspector Prem Chand Vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi and others. (iv) AIR 2012 SC 1339 – Ravi Yashwant Bhoir v. District Collector, Raigad and Ors. 11. Mr.Dharmesh Devnani learned advocate appearing for the bank would support the order passed by the learned Single Judge and also the order of penalty. Taking us through the finding on each charge, as set out by the Inquiry Officer, Mr.Devnani would submit that the findings indicate that the charges on the basis of evidence were held to be proved. He would also take us through the affidavit in reply filed before the learned Single Judge justifying each of the charge. Relying on a decision in the case of B.C.Chaturvedi v. Union of India reported in (1995) 6 SCC 749 , Mr.Devnani would submit that the scope of judicial review in the orders of departmental inquiry is restricted. Even in the cases of proportionality of punishment placing reliance on the decisions in the case of Lalit Popli v. Canara Bank and others reported in (2003) 3 SCC 583 and in the case of Regional Manager UP SRTC, Etawah and others v. Hoti Lal and Another reported in (2003) 3 SCC 605 , Mr.Devnani would submit that the contentions of the counsel for the appellants that at best it was an error of judgment and cannot be termed as misconduct of submissions, which are misconceived. 12. 12. Having considered submissions made by the learned counsel for the respective parties and perusing the orders passed in imposing a penalty based on the findings of the Inquiry Officer, what is apparent is that briefly, the charge against the appellant was that he abused his official position with a view to unduly accommodate the Directors of Kedia Distilleries and caused wrongful loss to the Bank of India Mutual Funds by authorizing investment in scripts without studying the fundamentals of the company. The charges also indicate that one of the charge was that he had shown undue favours to the Directors of M/s.Krishna Texport and Capital Markets Limited by investing in the shares to the extent of 75,000 shares exceeding his delegated authority and knowing fully well that the trading in the volume was very poor. 13. Perusal of the Inquiry Officer’s report as well as the penalty order would indicate that based on the evidence led before the Inquiry Officer, it is found that the appellant could not bring out any contradiction in the evidence by the cross- examination of the witnesses. Based on the documents, the written defense and the oral and other evidence which were brought on record before the Inquiry Officer, the Inquiry Officer found that the total investments in the four cases had acceded the delegated authority given to the delinquent. Discussion of delegation of powers before the Inquiry Officer indicated that the purchases which were made on 06.07.1995 to 30.10.1995 had exceeded his delegation of powers. The Inquiry Officer based on the depositions of the witnesses which were not adequately rebutted in the cross-examination, held that the charges which have been set out in the charge-sheet and the Inquiry Officer’s report were held to be proved. 14. With regard to the violation of principles of natural justice, perusal of the additional affidavit- in-reply filed by the respondents would indicate that the perusal of list of documents which are requested by the appellant, was gone into by the Inquiry Officer and for which the inspection was not given. It was found that they were not found to be relevant in the context of the charges. On record, the bank has placed a letter dated 05.03.1999 in a tabulated form suggesting that each of the document which was demanded had no connection with the charges. 15. It was found that they were not found to be relevant in the context of the charges. On record, the bank has placed a letter dated 05.03.1999 in a tabulated form suggesting that each of the document which was demanded had no connection with the charges. 15. On merits, having seen the Inquiry Officer’s report in context of each charge, it is well settled that the crux of the charges against the appellant would indicate that the mutual fund of the bank had suffered a serious loss. That there was indiscreet investment in the shares of the companies and the appellant had unduly accommodated the Directors of the respective companies. In other words, being the Managing Director of the Mutual Fund Sector of Bank of India, on appreciation of evidence, the Inquiry Officer found each of the charge to be proved. 16. Perusal of the order of the learned Single Judge would also indicate that on a review being filed, the learned Single Judge dealt with each of the contention and the relevant portion of the order of the learned Single Judge reads as under: “5. Mr. D.C. Dave, the learned senior advocate assisted by Ms. M.O. Narsinghani appearing for the applicant submitted that five contentions have not been dealt with in the main judgment and order, and therefore, this Court may consider those contentions and pass an appropriate order in that regard. The contentions are as under: (i) The findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer are based on “no evidence”. To put it in other words, the case in hand is one wherein there is no legal evidence to come to a conclusion that the applicant had indulged in any misconduct warranting dismissal from service after putting in forty one years of service. (ii) Many relevant documents were demanded, but those were not supplied. As a result, the applicant was not in a position to defend himself. The failure to supply the relevant documents although demanded rendered the entire inquiry vitiated, as a result, rendering the order of dismissal illegal. (iii) The Bank thought fit to initiate the inquiry only against the applicant herein though the decision to purchase the shares was taken by the Board consisting of many members. (iv) The witnesses examined in the course of inquiry were of no consequence. (iii) The Bank thought fit to initiate the inquiry only against the applicant herein though the decision to purchase the shares was taken by the Board consisting of many members. (iv) The witnesses examined in the course of inquiry were of no consequence. (v) Lastly even if the misconduct is believed, having regard to the fact that the applicant had put in almost forty one years of unblemished service, he should not have been dismissed from service, but could have been inflicted with any other penalty on the basis of which at least he could have received retiral benefits. In short, the learned counsel has invoked the doctrine of proportionality. 6 Let me clarify that no other contentions were raised, except those referred to above. 7 Mr. Dave, the learned senior advocate appearing for the applicant therefore prays that there being merit in this application, the same may be allowed and either the main judgment and order be recalled or the contentions may be dealt with and the order of dismissal be quashed and set aside. 8 On the other hand, this writ application has been vehemently opposed by Mr. Nandish Chudger, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Nanavati Associates appearing for the Bank. Mr. Chudger submits that this application for review is not maintainable in law. He pointed out that during the course of the hearing of the main matter, only one contention was pressed hard, the one relating to the authority of the Bank to initiate the departmental inquiry. He pointed out that such contention was pressed hard on the argument that the applicant herein is alleged to have committed the misconduct in his capacity as the Executive Trustee of the Bank of India Mutual Fund and Managing Director of the Bank of India Assets Management Company, which altogether is a separate legal entity. He pointed out that this contention has been dealt with by this Court and the same was negatived. According to Mr. Chudger, the contentions, which are sought to be raised in this application, were never canvassed. 9. Mr. Chudger, therefore, prays that there being no merit in this writ application, the same may be rejected. 10. I need not reiterate the facts as those could be found in the judgment and order passed in the main matter dated 30th October 2015. 11. 9. Mr. Chudger, therefore, prays that there being no merit in this writ application, the same may be rejected. 10. I need not reiterate the facts as those could be found in the judgment and order passed in the main matter dated 30th October 2015. 11. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having considered the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is whether the applicant is entitled to the reliefs as prayed for in this application. 12. Having regard to the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer and also considering the impugned order of dismissal passed by the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority, it is very difficult for me to say that the case in hand is one of “No evidence”. In this regard, let me look into the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Siddharth Mohanlal Sharma v. South Gujarat University [ 1982 (1) GLR 233 ]. The Division Bench has explained the rule of “No evidence” very succinctly. The following observations are made: “The findings of fact recorded in the course of such an inquiry, unless they are collateral or jurisdictional, are exempt from judicial review and that the Court exercising writ jurisdiction cannot sit in appeal over the ultimate decision based on such findings and review it on merits. However, there are two well-known exceptions to the said rule. First, the case must not be one where there is "no evidence" to support the findings. Secondly, the ultimate decision based on such findings must not be perverse or unreasonable.” The following further observations on “no evidence” rule were also pressed in service. They are as under: “The "no evidence" rule has the same content and meaning in our country as in England "No evidence" does not merely signify total dearth of evidence; evidence which does not reasonably support the conclusion is also comprehended within the meaning of the said expression. In other words, cases where there is complete lack of evidence and cases where the evidence, if any, is incapable of rationally leading to the conclusion reached, are both treated, on a par so far the applicability of the rule of "no evidence" is concerned. In none of these decided cases, there was "no evidence" in the sense of there being utter paucity of evidence. In none of these decided cases, there was "no evidence" in the sense of there being utter paucity of evidence. There was some evidence, direct or circumstantial, on the basis of which the domestic tribunal had reached the conclusion of guilt. The grievance that there was "no evidence" was examined by applying the test whether or not, accepting the whole of the evidence as it stood, the impugned conclusion followed legally or logically. In cases where direct evidence was not available, the totality of circumstances was carefully considered and the challenge that there was no evidence in support of the decision was examined by applying the test whether probabilities and circumstantial evidence justified the conclusion. Where direct evidence was available, the challenge was examined by applying the test whether it was so thoroughly inconsistent with the rest of the evidence as to make it impossible of acceptance. Mere suspicion, even if honestly and bona fide entertained on the basis of apparently cogent circumstances, was held to be out of bounds even in domestic inquiries, where the principle that in punishing the guilty scrupulous care must be taken to see that the innocents are not punished, was found to apply as much as it applies to regular criminal trials. In the ultimate analysis, the test which appears to have been applied is whether there was some material capable of having any evidential value. If not, the case was held to fall within the mischief of the rule of "no evidence".” 13 At this stage, I may also refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. Sree Rama Rao [ AIR 1963 SC 1723 ]: "There is no warrant for the view expressed by the High Court that in considering whether a public officer is guilty of the misconduct charged against him, the rule followed in criminal trials that an offence is not established unless proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court, must be applied, and if that rule be not applied, the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is competent to declare the order of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant' it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated." Further important observations are: "Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence." 14 Therefore, if there is some evidence on the basis of which the employer has reached to a conclusion as regards the guilt of the charge against the delinquent, this Court in exercise of its extraordinary powers should be very slow to interfere with the same. The case in hand, in my view, cannot be said to be of “no evidence”. All relevant aspects of the charge levelled against the applicant were considered threadbare and at the end of it, the Bank, as the employer, thought fit to dismiss the applicant from service. 15 In my view, this is a case of “loss of confidence”. Since the loss of confidence by the employer in the employee is a feature which certainly affects the character or reputation of the employee, the allegation of loss of confidence amounts to a stigma and, therefore, a regular departmental inquiry was initiated which ultimately resulted in the order of dismissal from the service. 16 The Supreme Court, in the case of Lalit Popli v. Canara Bank & Ors. [ (2003) 3 SCC 583 ], while considering the nature of proof required in a departmental enquiry on the scope of judicial review of the High Court under Article 226, observed as under; "It is fairly well settled that the approach and objective in criminal proceedings and the disciplinary proceedings are altogether distinct and different. [ (2003) 3 SCC 583 ], while considering the nature of proof required in a departmental enquiry on the scope of judicial review of the High Court under Article 226, observed as under; "It is fairly well settled that the approach and objective in criminal proceedings and the disciplinary proceedings are altogether distinct and different. In the disciplinary proceedings the preliminary question is whether the employee is guilty of such conduct as would merit action against him, whereas in criminal proceedings the question is whether the offences registered against him are established and if established what sentence should be imposed upon him. The standard of proof, the mode of enquiry and the rules governing the enquiry and trial are conceptually different. (State of Rajasthan v. B.K. Meena and Ors. (1996) 6 SCC 417 ). In case of disciplinary enquiry the technical rules of evidence have no application. The doctrine of "proof beyond doubt" has no application. Preponderance of probabilities and some material on record are necessary to arrive at the conclusion whether or not the delinquent has committed misconduct. While exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution the High Court does not act as an appellate authority. Its jurisdiction is circumscribed by limits of judicial review to correct errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice. Judicial review is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an Appellate Authority. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and Ors. ( 1995 (6) SCC 749 ) the scope of judicial review was indicated by stating that review by the Court is of decision making process and where the findings of the disciplinary authority are based on some evidence, the Court or the Tribunal cannot re-appreciate the evidence and substitute its own finding. As observed in R. S. Saini v. State of Punjab and Ors. ( 1999 (8) SCC 90 ) in paragraphs 16 and 17 the scope of interference is rather limited and has to be exercised within the circumscribed limits." 17 In B.C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India, [ (1995) 6 SCC 749 ], the Supreme Court observed as under: A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the Appellate Authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof." 18 The Supreme Court, in the case of Michael & Anr. Johnbson Pumps Ltd., AIR 1975 SC 661 , indicated that the loss of confidence is often a subjective feeling or an individual reaction to an objective set of facts and motivations. Therefore, in a reasonable case of a confidential or responsible post being misused or a sensitive or strategic position being abused, it may be a high risk to keep the employee, once suspicion has started. When a termination order, after a full fledged departmental inquiry is based on the ground of misconduct or loss of confidence, and the same is not a colourable one, then a Court should be slow to interfere, but such belief or suspicion of the employer should not be a mere whim or fancy and it should be bonafide and reasonable and must rest on some tangible basis. The punishment of dismissal from the service having been inflicted after considering the materials and after giving opportunity to the writ applicant, this Court should not enter into the question of merit of the finding either of the Inquiry Officer or with regard to the satisfaction of the Disciplinary Authority with regard to the quantum of punishment. This Court should not interfere with the quantum of punishment unless it is shown that the same is arbitrarily imposed or is beyond the competence of the Disciplinary Authority or is apparently disproportionate or is impermissible in law. 19 The above takes me to deal with the contention as regards the failure to supply the relevant documents though demanded. This contention has also not appealed to me. Practically, in all service matters of the present nature and more particularly in the cases arising from the departmental inquiry, this contention of non-supply of the documents is a stock argument. 19 The above takes me to deal with the contention as regards the failure to supply the relevant documents though demanded. This contention has also not appealed to me. Practically, in all service matters of the present nature and more particularly in the cases arising from the departmental inquiry, this contention of non-supply of the documents is a stock argument. I take notice of the letter dated 26th March 1999 of the Presenting Officer addressed to the Commissioner for Departmental Inquiry and Inquiring Authority, Central Vigilance Commission, New Delhi. This letter is at page – 541 (Annexure : A-III) to the main petition. This issue has been dealt with exhaustively. The relevancy of each and every document has been considered and reasons have been assigned in that regard. 20 I am also not impressed by the submission that only the applicant was targeted and proceeded departmentally. There is no basis as such to put forward such a contention. The facts of the case speaks for itself. There is nothing to impute any bad faith or mala fide or malice in this regard. 21 So far as the fourth contention as regards the relevancy of the witnesses examined in the course of the inquiry is concerned, I may only say that if otherwise on the basis of the materials on record, the guilt of the delinquent is established, then such contention pales into insignificance. It is the department to decide who is to be examined. The delinquent always gets an opportunity to cross-examine those witnesses. The delinquent also gets an opportunity to examine his own defence witness, if any. Thus, this contention has also not impressed me at all. 22 So far as the last contention as regards the “doctrine of proportionality” is concerned, I may only say that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being the fact finding authority have the exclusive powers to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose the appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court, while exercising the powers of judicial review, should not normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. They are invested with the discretion to impose the appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court, while exercising the powers of judicial review, should not normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the Court, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof. 23 In the matter of Om Kumar and others v/s. Union of India, reported in (2001) 2 SCC 386 , the Supreme Court has explained the Wednesbury principle applicable on the subject of punishment and proportionality. 24 A Division Bench of this Court has, in an unreported decision rendered in the matter of J.H.Joshi v. State of Gujarat (Special Civil Application No.5691/2002, decided on 10th May 2005), observed as under: ”The doctrine of proportionality and Wednesbury rule evolved in England in Council of Civil Services Union Vs. Minister for Civil Services (1983) 1 AC 768 and Associated Provincial Picture Houses Limited Vs. Wednesbury Corporation - 1948 2 All ER 680 have been applied by the Courts in India in various decisions. In Union of India Vs. C.G. Ganayutham - AIR 1997 SC 3387 , the Supreme Court considered the ambit and scope of the doctrine of proportionality and Wednesbury rule in the light of various judicial pronouncements and laid down the following propositions: "(1) To judge the validity of any administrative order or statutory discretion normally the Wednesbury test is to be applied to find out if the decision was illegal or suffered from procedural improprieties or was one which no sensible decision maker could, on the material before him and within the framework of the law, have arrived at. The Court would consider whether relevant matters had not been taken into account or whether irrelevant matters had been taken into account or whether the action was not bonafide.. The Court would also consider whether the decision was absurd or perverse. The Court would not however go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator amongst the various alternatives open to him. Nor could the Court substitute its decision to that of the administrator. The Court would also consider whether the decision was absurd or perverse. The Court would not however go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator amongst the various alternatives open to him. Nor could the Court substitute its decision to that of the administrator. This is the Wednesbury test. (2) The Court would not interfere with the administrators decision unless it was illegal or sufiered from procedural impropriety or was irrational in the sense that it was in outrageous definance of logic or moral standards. The possibility of other tests, including proportionality being brought into English Administrative Law in future is not ruled out. These are the CCSU principles. (3)(a) As per Bugdaycay, Brind and Smith, as long as the European Human Rights Convention (Contention) is not incorporated into English Law, the English Courts merely exercise a secondary judgment to find out if the decision maker could have, on the material before him, arrived at the primary judgment in the manner he has done. (3)(b) If the Convention is incorporated in England making available the principle of proportionality, then the English Courts will render primary judgment on the validity of the administrative action and find out if the restriction is disproportionate or excessive or is not based upon a fair balancing of the fundamental freedom and the need for the restriction thereupon. (4)(a) The position in our country in administrative law, where no fundamental freedoms are involved, is that the Courts/Tribunals will only play a secondary role while the primary judgment as to reasonableness will remain with the executive or administrative authority. The secondary judgment of the Court is to be based on Wednesbury the CCSU principles as stated by Lord Greene and Lord Diplock respectively to find if the executive or administrative authority has reasonably arrived at his decision as the primary authority. (4)(b) Whether in the case of administrative or executive action affecting fundamental freedoms, the Courts in our country will apply the principle of 'proportionality' and assume a primary role, is left open, to be decided in an appropriate case where such action is alleged to offend fundamental freedoms."” 25 In Apparel Export Promotion Council Vs. (4)(b) Whether in the case of administrative or executive action affecting fundamental freedoms, the Courts in our country will apply the principle of 'proportionality' and assume a primary role, is left open, to be decided in an appropriate case where such action is alleged to offend fundamental freedoms."” 25 In Apparel Export Promotion Council Vs. A.K. Chopra - (1999) 1 SCC 759 , the Supreme Court reiterated the otherwise well settled principles of law on the scope of judicial review of disciplinary action taken by the employer and laid down the following propositions:- "It is a settled position that in departmental proceedings, the disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts and in case an appeal is presented to the appellate authority, the appellate authority has also the power/and jurisdiction to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion, on facts, being the sole fact-finding authorities. Once findings of fact, based on appreciation of evidence are recorded, the High Court in writ jurisdiction may not normally interfere with those factual findings unless it finds that the recorded findings were based either on no evidence or that the findings were wholly perverse and/or legally untenable. The adequacy or inadequacy of the evidence is not permitted to be canvassed before the High Court. Since the High Court does not sit as an appellate authority over the factual findings recorded during departmental proceedings, while exercising the power of judicial review, the High Court cannot, normally speaking, substitute its own conclusion, with regard to the guilt of the delinquent, for that of the departmental authorities. Even in so far as imposition of penalty or punishment is concerned, unless the punishment or penalty imposed by the disciplinary or the departmental appellate authority, is either impermissible or such that it shocks the conscience of the High Court, it should not normally substitute its own opinion and impose some other punishment or penalty. Even in so far as imposition of penalty or punishment is concerned, unless the punishment or penalty imposed by the disciplinary or the departmental appellate authority, is either impermissible or such that it shocks the conscience of the High Court, it should not normally substitute its own opinion and impose some other punishment or penalty. Further, it is a well-settled principle that even though judicial review of administrative action must remain flexible and its dimension not closed, yet the court, in exercise of the power of judicial review, is not concerned with the correctness of the findings of fact on the basis of which the orders are made so long as those findings are reasonably supported by evidence and have been arrived at through proceedings which cannot be faulted with for procedural illegalities or irregularities which vitiate the process by which the decision was arrived at. Judicial review, is directed not against the decision, but is confined to the examination of the decision-making process. Judicial review, not being an appeal from a decision, but a review of the manner in which the decision was arrived at, the court, while exercising the power of judicial review, must remain conscious of the fact that if the decision has been arrived at by the administrative authority after following the principles established by law and the rules of natural justice and the individual has received a fair treatment to meet the case against him, the court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the administrative authority on a matter which fell squarely within the sphere of jurisdiction of that authority." 26 In Om Kumar Vs. Union of India [ AIR 2000 SC 3689 ], the Supreme Court traced the history of the principle of proportionality, referred to the propositions culled out in Union of India v. C. G. Ganayutham's case [AIR 197 SC 3387], noticed the decision of the House of Lords in R. Vs. Chief Constable of Sussesc ex.p. International Trader's Ferry Ltd. (1999) 1 All ER 129, wherein the principles of Wednesbury and proportionality were almost equated and held that where the decision of an administrative authority is attacked being arbitrary, the principle of secondary review will have to be kept in mind. Paragraphs 28, 29 66 to 71 of this judgment which theortises the law on the subject are reproduced below: "28. Paragraphs 28, 29 66 to 71 of this judgment which theortises the law on the subject are reproduced below: "28. By 'proportionality' we mean the question whether, while regulating exercise of fundamental rights, the appropriate or least restrictive choice of measures has been made by the Legislature or the Administrator so as to achieve the object of the legislation or the purpose of the administrative order, as the case may be. Under the principle, the Court will see that the Legislature and the administrative authority maintain a proper balance between the adverse effects which the legislation or the administrative order may have on the rights, liberties, or interests of persons keeping in mind the purpose which they were intended to serve. The Legislature and the administrative authority are, however, given an area of discretion or a range of choices but as to whether the choice made infringes the rights excessively or not is for the Court. That is what is meant by proportionality." "29. The above principle of proportionality has been applied by the European Court to protect the rights guaranteed under the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1950 and in particular, for considering whether restrictions imposed were restrictions which were 'necessary' - within Arts. 8 to 11 of the said Convention (corresponding to our Art. 19(1) and to find out whether the restrictions imposed on fundamental freedoms were more excessive than required. (Handyside V. UK (1976) 1 HER p.737) Articles 2 and 5 of the Convention contain provisions similar to Art. 21 of our Constitution relating to life and liberty. The European Court has applied the principle of proportionality also to questions of discrimination under Art. 14 of the Convention (corresponding to Art. 14 of our Constitution). (See European Administrative Law by J. Schwaze, 1992. Pp.677 - 866)." "66. It is clear from the above discussion that in India where administrative action is challenged under Art. 14 as being discriminatory, equals are treated unequally or unequals are treated equally, the question is for the constitutional Courts as primary reviewing Courts to consider correctness of the level of discrimination applied and whether it is excessive and whether it has a nexus with the objective intended to be achieved by the Administrator. Here the Court deals with the merits of the balancing action of the Administrator and is, in essence, applying proportionality and is a primary reviewing authority." "67. But where, an administrative action is challenged as 'arbitrary' under Art. 14 on the basis of Royappa (as in cases where punishments in disciplinary cases are challenged), the question will be whether the administrative order is 'rational' or 'reasonable' and the test then is the Wednesbury test. The Courts would then be confined only to a secondary role and will only have to see whether the Administrator has done well in his primary role, whether he has acted illegally or has omitted relevant factors from consideration or has taken irrelevant factors into consideration or whether his view is one which no reasonable person could have taken. If his action does not satisfy these rules, it is to be treated as arbitrary. (In G.B. Mahajan V. Jalgaon Municipal Council (1991) 3 SCC 91 at p. 111 : ( AIR 1991 SC 1153 at 1165), Venkatachaliah, J. (as he then was) pointed out that 'reasonableness' of the Administrator under Art. 14 in the context of Administrative Law has to be judged from the stand point of Wednesbury rules. In Tata Cellular V. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 651 at Pp. 679-680: (1994 AIR SCW 3344 and at Pp. 3369-70: AIR 1996 SC 11 ); Indian Express Newspapers Vs. Union of India (1985) 1 SCC 641 at p.691 : ( AIR 1986 SC 515 at Pp.542-43): Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Association V. Union of India (1989) 4 SCC 187 at p.241 : ( AIR 1990 SC 334 at p.368: 1990 Lab IC 324 at p.358) and U.P. Financial Corporation V. GEM CAP (India) Pvt.Ltd. (1993) 2 SCC 299 , at p. 307: (1993 SC 1435 at p.1439), while judging whether the administrative action is arbitrary' under Art. 14 (i.e. otherwise than being discriminatory), this Court has confined itself to a Wednesbury review always." "71. Thus, from the above principles and decided cases, it must be held that where an administrative decision relating to punishment in disciplinary cases is questioned as 'arbitrary' under Art. 14, the Court is confined to Wednesbury principles as a secondary reviewing authority. The Court will not apply proportionality as a primary reviewing Court because no issue of fundamental freedoms nor of discrimination under Art. 14 applies in such a context. The Court will not apply proportionality as a primary reviewing Court because no issue of fundamental freedoms nor of discrimination under Art. 14 applies in such a context. The Court while reviewing punishment and if it is satisfied that Wednesbury principles are violated, it has normally to remit the matter to the Administrator for a fresh decision as to the quantum of punishment. Only in rate cases where there has been long delay in the time taken by the disciplinary proceedings and in the time taken in the Courts, and (in) such extreme or rate cases can the Court substitute its own view as to the quantum of punishment." 27 In Regional Manager U.P. SRTC V. Hoti Lal, (2003) 3 SCC 605 , the Supreme Court outlined the mode to be adopted for determining whether the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is shockingly disproportionate and observed as under: "The Court or tribunal while dealing with the quantum of punishment has to record reasons as to why it is felt that the punishment was not commensurate with the proved charges. The scope for interference is very limited and restricted to exceptional cases. In the impugned order of the High Court no reasons whatsoever have been indicated as to why the punishment was considered disproportionate. Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. A mere statement that it is disproportionate would not suffice. It is not only the amount involved but the mental set-up, the type of duty performed and similar relevant circumstances which go in to the decision-making process while considering whether the punishment is proportionate or disproportionate. If the charged employee holds a position of trust where honesty and integrity are inbuilt requirements of functioning, it would not be proper to deal with the matter leniently. Misconduct in such cases has to be dealt with iron hands. Where the person deals with public money or is engaged in financial transactions or acts in a fiduciary capacity, the highest degree of integrity and trustworthiness is a must and unexceptional." (underlining is ours) 28 In Director General, RPF V. Ch. Misconduct in such cases has to be dealt with iron hands. Where the person deals with public money or is engaged in financial transactions or acts in a fiduciary capacity, the highest degree of integrity and trustworthiness is a must and unexceptional." (underlining is ours) 28 In Director General, RPF V. Ch. Sai Babu [ (2003) 4 SCC 331 ], the Supreme Court reiterated that the High Court should ordinarily not interfere with the discretion exercised by the disciplinary authority in the matter of imposition of punishment and observed: "Normally, the punishment imposed by a disciplinary authority should not be disturbed by the High Court or a tribunal except in appropriate cases that too only after reaching a conclusion that the punishment imposed is grossly or shockingly disproportionate, after examining all the relevant factors including the nature of the charges proved, the past conduct, penalty imposed earlier, the nature of duties assigned having due regard to their sensitiveness, exactness expected and discipline required to be maintained, and the department/establishment in which the delinquent person concerned works." 29 The above noted decisions give a clear idea of the limited scope of judicial review of the discretion exercised by the employer to impose a particular penalty on the delinquent employee. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the High Courts/Tribunals should not exercise the appellate jurisdiction in such matters and substitute their opinions by the one formed by the disciplinary authority. It has also been held that the punishment imposed by the competent authority should not be modified/substituted with a lesser penalty unless the High Court is satisfied that the same is grossly or shockingly or is so unreasonable that no person of reasonable prudence would have imposed such punishment in the facts and circumstances of the case. 30 It is true that the applicant herein had put in long service of almost forty one years, but unfortunately, at the fag end, he indulged in an act which shook the confidence of his employer. He should have been careful more particularly, having regard to the fact that he was a Bank Officer and was dealing with the money of the people at large. He owed a higher responsibility considering the post he was holding and the nature of duties and functions he was discharging.” 17. He should have been careful more particularly, having regard to the fact that he was a Bank Officer and was dealing with the money of the people at large. He owed a higher responsibility considering the post he was holding and the nature of duties and functions he was discharging.” 17. As set out in the judgment of the Supreme Court of which Mr.Devnani had relied upon, we may refer to the decision in case of Lalit Popli (supra). Para 17 to 19 of the decision in case of Lalit (supra) read as under: “17. While exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution the High Court does not act as an appellate authority. Its jurisdiction is circumscribed by limits of judicial review to correct errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice. Judicial review is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an Appellate Authority. 18. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and Ors. ( 1995 (6) SCC 749 ) the scope of judicial review was indicated by stating that review by the Court is of decision making process and where the findings of the disciplinary authority are based on some evidence, the Court or the Tribunal cannot re-appreciate the evidence and substitute its own finding. 19. As observed in R.S.Saini v. State of Punjab and Ors. ( 1999 (8) SCC 90 ) in paragraphs 16 and 17 the scope of interference is rather limited and has to be exercised within the circumscribed limits. It was noted as follows: "16. Before adverting to the first contention of the appellant regarding want of material to establish the charge, and of non- application of mind, we will have to bear in mind the rule that the court while exercising writ jurisdiction will not reverse a finding of the inquiring authority on the ground that the evidence adduced before it is insufficient. If there is some evidence to reasonably support the conclusion of the inquiring authority, it is not the function of the court to review the evidence and to arrive at its own independent finding. If there is some evidence to reasonably support the conclusion of the inquiring authority, it is not the function of the court to review the evidence and to arrive at its own independent finding. The inquiring authority is the sole judge of the fact so long as there is some legal evidence to substantiate the finding and the adequacy or reliability of the evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the court in writ proceedings. 17. A narration of the charges and the reasons of the inquiring authority for accepting the charges, as seen from the records, shows that the inquiring has based its conclusions on materials available on record after considering the defence put forth by the appellant and these decisions, in our opinion, have been taken in a reasonable manner and objectively. The conclusion arrived at by the inquiring authority cannot be termed as either being perverse or not based on any material nor is it a case where there has been any non- application of mind on the part of the inquiring authority. Likewise the High Court has looked into the material based on which the enquiry Officer has come to the conclusion, within the limited scope available to it under Article 226 of the Constitution and we do not find any fault with the findings of the High Court in this regard." 18. Conscious of the fact that we are in appeal examining a decision of the learned Single Judge who in exercise powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, our scope would get restricted further. 19. For the aforesaid reasons we do not find any merit in the appeal and the appeals are therefore dismissed. 20. In view of the disposal of the main appeal, connected Civil Application will also not survive and hence the same is also disposed of.