JUDGMENT : 1. Rule. Learned APP waives service of rule on behalf of respondent - State. With the consent of learned advocates for the parties, the Revision Application is taken up for final hearing. 2. By way of present Revision Applications under section 397 read with section 401 of Cr.P.C., the petitioners – original accused have prayed to quash and set aside order dated 20.10.2023 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Patan below Exh.16 in Sessions Case No.99 of 2021 and Sessions Case No.46 of 2022, whereby, the discharge application of the petitioners accused has been rejected. 2.2. Following relief are claimed in para 7 of the Revision Application:- "(a) To allow this Revision Application. (b) To call for the record and proceedings of Sessions Case No. 99 of 2021 and Sessions Case No. 46 of 2022 pending before the Hon'ble Sessions Court, Patan and further be pleased to quash and set aside the order dated 20/10/2023 at Annexure-A passed below Exhibit- 16 rejecting the discharge application of the petitioners filed in connection with the Sessions Case No. 99 of 2021 and Sessions Case No. 46 of 2022 and be pleased to discharge the petitioners. (c) Pending admission, final hearing and disposal of this petition, to stay the further proceedings of the Sessions Case No.99 of 2021 and Sessions Case No. 46 of 2022 pending before the Hon'ble Sessions Court, Patan. (d) To pass any other and further orders as may be deemed fit and proper." 3. Facts of the case are as under :- 3.1. The case of the prosecution is that on 02/05/2021, an F.I.R. being I-C.R. No. 11217026210431 of 2021 came to be registered with Patan Taluka Police Station, Patan for the offences punishable under sections 306, 498(A) and 114 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 read with section 3 and 7 of the Dowry Prohibition act against the petitioner. The F.I.R. has been filed by one Rameshbhai Amratbhai Rabari inter alia alleging that before 21 years the sister of the complainant namely Champaben got married with the petitioner no.1. It is further alleged in the F.I.R. that out of the wedlock, the petitioner no.1 and the deceased are having two son namely Anant aged 19 years and Aaryan aged 13 years. It is further alleged in the F.I.R. that out of the wedlock, the petitioner no.1 and the deceased are having two son namely Anant aged 19 years and Aaryan aged 13 years. That in the initial period of several years the deceased was treated well by her in-laws and after that the accused persons mentally used to harass the deceased by taunting and demanded dowry. It is further alleged in the F.I.R. that deceased telephoned the complainant and told the complainant about harassment caused by in laws. 3.2. It is further alleged in the F.I.R. that before three years, the complainant along with his five community persons have come to meet the accused persons and scolded the accused persons and at that time an assurance was given that the deceased will not be harassed by the in-laws. It is further alleged in the F.I.R. that in spite of the assurance given by the in-laws, the deceased was mentally and physically harassed by the in-laws by demanding dowry so the in-laws can pay the debt. It is further alleged in the F.I.R. that when the deceased was coming at her parental home, the deceased informed the complainant that the petitioner no.2 said to the deceased that if the deceased will not bring money then she will be thrown out from the house. It is further alleged in the F.I.R. that on the date of incident, at about 1 p.m. in the noon, the complainant was informed by one Rajeshbhai that the deceased was brought to Dharpur Civil Hospital in burning condition, therefore, the complainant with his relative reached at Dharpur Civil Hospital where the deceased was admitted in emergency ward and about 5:30 p.m. in the evening, the deceased died. Hence, impugned FIR is registered. 3.3. Thereafter, the petitioners preferred application for discharge under section 227 of the Cr.P.C. before the learned Trial Court. That the said discharge application has been rejected by the learned Trial Court vide order dated 20.10.2023. Hence, present Revision Application is preferred. 4. It is submitted by learned Senior Advocate Mr.Syed assisted by learned advocate Mr.Umot for the petitioners that the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate that perusal of charge- sheet papers would show that there is no iota of evidence against the petitioners linking them with alleged offence. Hence, present Revision Application is preferred. 4. It is submitted by learned Senior Advocate Mr.Syed assisted by learned advocate Mr.Umot for the petitioners that the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate that perusal of charge- sheet papers would show that there is no iota of evidence against the petitioners linking them with alleged offence. It is submitted that continuation of criminal case against the petitioners is nothing but abuse of process of law. It is submitted that petitioner no.1 is 45% handicap and all the petitioners were residing separately from the deceased and petitioner no.1 who is husband of deceased. It is submitted that marriage span of petitioner no.1 and deceased is 21 years and therefore, there is no presumption against the petitioners as to abatement of suicide as contemplated in section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act. It is submitted that marriage span of petitioner no.1 and deceased is 21 years and therefore, even allegations of demanding dowry is not sustainable. It is submitted that there is no suicide note or dying declaration of the deceased. It is submitted that there is no nexus between any act of the petitioners and its direct effect by which deceased took extreme step to commit suicide. It is submitted that there is no evidence of direct instigation to the deceased to commit suicide, therefore, the ingredients for the offence punishable under 107 of IPC being essential to constitute offence under section 306 of IPC is not attracted. For this submission, learned Senior Advocate has relied on judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sanju @ Sanjay Singh Sengar v/s. State of MP [ (2002) 5 SCC 371 ], in the case of M.Mohan v/s. State [ (2011) 3 SCC 626 ], in the case of Krishna Lal Chawla v/s. State of Uttar Pradesh [ (2021) 5 SCC 435 ] and judgment of this Court in the case of Balwantsinh Khengaji Jadeja v/s. V.B.Rathod [Special Criminal Application No.4461 of 2016]. 4.1. Learned Senior Advocate Mr.Syed for the petitioners further submitted that Investigating officer has recorded statement of two sons of petitioner no.1 and deceased and neighbours who are residing nearby house. It is submitted that these witnesses have said in their statement that they are not aware about any harassment caused to the deceased by the petitioners. 4.1. Learned Senior Advocate Mr.Syed for the petitioners further submitted that Investigating officer has recorded statement of two sons of petitioner no.1 and deceased and neighbours who are residing nearby house. It is submitted that these witnesses have said in their statement that they are not aware about any harassment caused to the deceased by the petitioners. It is also submitted that statement of son of petitioner no.1 and deceased suggest that deceased was mentally depressed and she was having suspicion of cancer after undergoing operation of uterus. 4.2. It is also submitted by learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners that learned Trial Court while rejecting plea of discharge mainly relied upon telephonic talks between deceased and her sister took place before she had committed suicide but going through transcript of the said telephonic talks produced along with charge-sheet papers, no material is coming out to say committing abatement to commit suicide. 4.3. Lastly, it is submitted by learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners that so far as statements of Dineshbhai, Bhagvanbhai and Rameshbhai relied on by prosecution is concerned, the said persons have tried to settled the dispute before three years. Thus, there is no nexus coming from the said statements which lead the deceased to commit suicide. It is submitted that there is no material on record to proceed against the petitioners for alleged offence. 4.4. It is submitted that learned Trial Court has committed serious error while rejecting the discharge application. therefore, it is submitted that Revision Application may be allowed and the petitioners may be discharged from the accusation. 5. On the other hand, learned APP objecting present Revision Applications would submit that clear allegations are levelled in the charge-sheet against the accused. Learned APP has relied on statements of Dineshbhai, Bhagwanbhai, Rameshbhai and Kantaben. It is submitted that these persons stated in their statement that there was constant harassment by the petitioners accused to the deceased to bring dowry. This prima facie implies offence of dowry. There are allegations of giving ill-treatment both physical and mental are levelled in the charge-sheet papers against the petitioners accused. Therefore, looking to charges, prima facie case is made out against the petitioners accused to frame charge against them. Various contentions raised in discharge application are required to be tested during trial. There are sufficient evidence to send the accused for trial. Therefore, looking to charges, prima facie case is made out against the petitioners accused to frame charge against them. Various contentions raised in discharge application are required to be tested during trial. There are sufficient evidence to send the accused for trial. Ergo, learned Trial Court has rightly dismissed the application. 5.1. Upon such submissions, it is submitted to dismiss the Revision Application. 6. Head learned advocates for the respective parties. I have also given anxious thought to charge-sheet papers in background of submission canvassed by learned advocates for both the sides. 7. At the outset, let refer to section 227 of Cr.P.C. "227. Discharge: If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing." 8. The Legislature has used the words "there is no sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused", it is material and important. The Court at the time of deciding discharge sought immediately after charge-sheet is filed is required to adjudicate whether there is sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused. The language is negatively couched. Thus, accused needs to show that there is insufficient grounds to proceed against him. It is well-settled that at the stage of the framing the charge, the Court concerned is required to evaluate the materials and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence and for that purpose, the Court concerned may silt and weigh the evidence and it cannot be expected to accept that whatever stated in the charge-sheet papers are gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case. 9. In the case of State of Bihar Vs. Ramesh Singh, (1977)4 SCC 39 , while referring to section 227 of the Code, the Supreme Court observed: “...at that stage, the Court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. 9. In the case of State of Bihar Vs. Ramesh Singh, (1977)4 SCC 39 , while referring to section 227 of the Code, the Supreme Court observed: “...at that stage, the Court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of the suspicion cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But if at the initial stage, if there is a strong suspicion, which leads the Court to think that there is a ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The Supreme Court observed that:- If the evidence which the Prosecutor to adduced to prove the guilt of the accused, even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. The Supreme Court then went on to observe If the scales as to the guilt or innocence of the accused are even at the conclusion of the trial, then on the theory of benefit of doubt the case must end in the acquittal of the accused; but if, on the other hand, the scales are even at the initial stage of making an order under section 227 or section 228, then in such a situation, ordinarily and generally the order will have to be made under section 228 and not under section 227." 10. In the case of Superintendent & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Anil Bhunja & Ors., AIR 1980 SC 52 , the Supreme Court observed that the standard test, proof and judgment which is to be applied finally before finding the accused guilty or otherwise is not exactly to be applied at the stage of Section 227 or Section 228. At this stage, even a very strong suspicion founded upon materials before the Magistrate, which leads him to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged, may justify the framing of charges against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence. 11. Same principles were reiterated by the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v. Jiendra Bijja & Ors., AIR 1990 SC 1962 . 12. In the case of State by Inspector of Police, Chennai v/s. S. Selvi [ AIR 2018 SC 81 ], the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that the Court must proceed with presumption that material brought on record by prosecution are true and must evaluate such material with view to find out whether facts disclose existence of ingredients of offence. 13. In the case of State of Tamil Nadu v/s. R. Soundirarasu [ (2023) 6 SCC 768 ], the Hon'ble Apex Court after referring to sections 227, 228, 239, 240 and 245 of Cr.P.C., in para 53 to 74 has held as under :- "53. The aforestated Sections indicate that the CrPC contemplates discharge of the accused by the Court of Sessions under Section 227 in a case triable by it, cases instituted upon a police report are covered by Section 239 and cases instituted otherwise than on a police report are dealt with in Section 245. The three Sections contain somewhat different provisions in regard to discharge of the accused. As per Section 227, the trial judge is required to discharge the accused if “the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused”. The obligation to discharge the accused under Section 239 arises when “the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless”. The power to discharge under Section 245(1) is exercisable when “the Magistrate considers, for reasons to be recorded, that no case against the accused has been made out which, if unrebutted would warrant his conviction”. 54. The obligation to discharge the accused under Section 239 arises when “the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless”. The power to discharge under Section 245(1) is exercisable when “the Magistrate considers, for reasons to be recorded, that no case against the accused has been made out which, if unrebutted would warrant his conviction”. 54. Sections 227 and 239 respectively provide for discharge being made before the recording of evidence and the consideration as to whether the charge has to be framed or not is required to be made on the basis of the record of the case, including the documents and oral hearing of the accused and the prosecution or the police report, the documents sent along with it and examination of the accused and after affording an opportunity to the parties to be heard. On the other hand, the stage for discharge under Section 245 is reached only after the evidence referred to in Section 244 has been taken. 55. Despite the slight variation in the provisions with regard to discharge under the three pairs of Sections referred to above, the settled legal position is that the stage of framing of charge under either of these three situations, is a preliminary one and the test of “prima facie” case has to be applied — if the trial court is satisfied that a prima facie case is made out, charge has to be framed. 56. The nature of evaluation to be made by the court at the stage of framing of charge came up for consideration of this Court in Onkar Nath Mishra and others v. State (NCT of Delhi) and another, (2008) 2 SCC 561 , and referring to its earlier decisions in the State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa, (1996) 4 SCC 659 , and the State of M.P. v. Mohanlal Soni, (2000) 6 SCC 338 , it was held that at that stage, the Court has to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged and it is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the materials on record. The relevant observations made in the judgment are as follows:- "11. The relevant observations made in the judgment are as follows:- "11. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclosed the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At that stage, the court is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the material on record. What needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. At that stage, even strong suspicion founded on material which leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged would justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence.” 57. Then again in the case of Som Nath Thapa (supra), a three- Judge Bench of this Court, after noting the three pairs of Sections i.e. (i) Sections 227 and 228 resply in so far as the sessions trial is concerned; (ii) Sections 239 and 240 resply relatable to the trial of warrant cases; and (iii) Sections 245(1) and (2) qua the trial of summons cases, which dealt with the question of framing of charge or discharge, stated thus: (SCC p. 671, para 32). "32...if on the basis of materials on record, a court could come to the conclusion that commission of the offence is a probable consequence, a case for framing of charge exists. To put it differently, if the court were to think that the accused might have committed the offence it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be that the accused has committed the offence. It is apparent that at the stage of framing of a charge, probative value of the materials on record cannot be gone into; the materials brought on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true at that stage." 58. In a later decision in Mohanlal Soni (supra), this Court, referring to several of its previous decisions, held that: (SCC p. 342, para 7) "7. In a later decision in Mohanlal Soni (supra), this Court, referring to several of its previous decisions, held that: (SCC p. 342, para 7) "7. The crystallised judicial view is that at the stage of framing charge, the court has to prima facie consider whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The court is not required to appreciate evidence to conclude whether the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused.” 59. Reiterating a similar view in Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another, (2013) 11 SCC 476 , it was observed by this Court that while framing charges the court is required to evaluate the materials and documents on record to decide whether the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value would disclose existence of ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At this stage, the court is not required to go deep into the probative value of the materials on record. It needs to evaluate whether there is a ground for presuming that the accused had committed the offence and it is not required to evaluate sufficiency of evidence to convict the accused. It was held that the Court at this stage cannot speculate into the truthfulness or falsity of the allegations and contradictions & inconsistencies in the statement of witnesses cannot be looked into at the stage of discharge. 60. In the context of trial of a warrant case, instituted on a police report, the provisions for discharge are to be governed as per the terms of Section 239 which provide that a direction for discharge can be made only for reasons to be recorded by the court where it considers the charge against the accused to be groundless. It would, therefore, follow that as per the provisions under Section 239 what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not that a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. It would, therefore, follow that as per the provisions under Section 239 what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not that a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. At that stage, even strong suspicion founded on material which leads the Court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offences alleged would justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of that offence, and it is only in a case where the Magistrate considers the charge to be groundless, he is to discharge the accused after recording his reasons for doing so. 61. Section 239 envisages a careful and objective consideration of the question whether the charge against the accused is groundless or whether there is ground for presuming that he has committed an offence. What Section 239 prescribes is not, therefore, an empty or routine formality. It is a valuable provision to the advantage of the accused, and its breach is not permissible under the law. But if the Judge, upon considering the record, including the examination, if any, and the hearing, is of the opinion that there is "ground for presuming" that the accused has committed the offence triable under the chapter, he is required by Section 240 to frame in writing a charge against the accused. The order for the framing of the charge is also not an empty or routine formality. It is of a far-reaching nature, and it amounts to a decision that the accused is not entitled to discharge under Section 239, that there is, on the other hand, ground for presuming that he has committed an offence triable under Chapter XIX and that he should be called upon to plead guilty to it and be convicted and sentenced on that plea, or face the trial. (See :V.C. Shukla v. State through CBI, AIR 1980 SC 962 ). 62. Section 239 of the CrPC lays down that if the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless, he shall discharge the accused. The word 'groundless', in our opinion, means that there must be no ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence. (See :V.C. Shukla v. State through CBI, AIR 1980 SC 962 ). 62. Section 239 of the CrPC lays down that if the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless, he shall discharge the accused. The word 'groundless', in our opinion, means that there must be no ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence. The word 'groundless' used in Section 239 of the CrPC means that the materials placed before the Court do not make out or are not sufficient to make out a prima facie case against the accused. 63. The learned author Shri Sarkar in his Criminal P.C., 5th Edition, on page 427, has opined as:- "The provision is the same as in S. 227, the only difference being that the Magistrate may examine the accused, if necessary, of also S. 245. The Magistrate shall discharge the accused recording reasons, if after (i) considering the police report and documents mentioned in S. 173; (ii) examining the accused, if necessary and (iii) hearing the arguments of both sides he thinks the charge against him to be groundless, i.e., either there is no legal evidence or that the facts do not make out any offence at all." 64. In short, it means that if no prima facie case regarding the commission of any offence is made out, it would amount to a charge being groundless. 65. In Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1972 SC 545 , this Court has stated about the ambit of Section 251(A)(2) of the CrPC 1898, which is in pari materia with the wordings used in Section 239 of the CrPC as follows:- "It cannot be said that the Court at the stage of framing the charge has not to apply its judicial mind for considering whether or not there is a ground for presuming the commission of the offence by the accused. The order framing the charges does substantially affect the person's liberty and it cannot be said that the Court must automatically frame the charge merely because the prosecuting authorities by relying on the documents referred to in S. 173 consider it proper to institute the case. The responsibility of framing the charges is that of the Court and it has to judicially consider the question of doing so. The responsibility of framing the charges is that of the Court and it has to judicially consider the question of doing so. Without fully adverting to the material on the record it must not blindly adopt the decision of the prosecution." 66. In para 16, this Court has stated as:- "16.... Under sub-sec. (2), if upon consideration of all the documents referred to in S. 173, Criminal P.C. and examining the accused, if considered necessary by the Magistrate and also after hearing both sides, the Magistrate considers the charge to be groundless, he must discharge the accused. This sub-section has to be read along with sub- sec. (3), according to which, if after hearing the arguments and hearing the accused, the Magistrate thinks that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence triable under Chap. XXI of the Code within the Magistrate's competence and for which he can punish adequately, he has to frame in writing a charge against the accused. Reading the two sub- sections together, it clearly means that if there is no ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, the charges must be considered to be groundless, which is the same thing as saying that there is no ground for framing the charges." (Emphasis supplied) 67. Thus the word 'groundless', as interpreted by this Court, means that there is no ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence. 68. This Court has again dealt with this aspect of the matter in Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Anil Kumar Bhunja, AIR 1980 SC 52 . This Court has stated in the said case as:- "At this stage, even a very strong suspicion found upon materials before the Magistrate, which leads him to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged, may justify the framing of charges against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence." 69. The suspicion referred to by this Court must be founded upon the materials placed before the Magistrate which leads him to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged. Therefore, the words "a very strong suspicion" used by this Court must not be a strong suspicion of a vacillating mind of a Judge. Therefore, the words "a very strong suspicion" used by this Court must not be a strong suspicion of a vacillating mind of a Judge. That suspicion must be founded upon the materials placed before the Magistrate which leads him to form a presumptive opinion about the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged. 70. Section 239 has to be read along with Section 240 of the CrPC. If the Magistrate finds that there is prima facie evidence or the material against the accused in support of the charge (allegations), he may frame charge in accordance with Section 240 of the CrPC. But if he finds that the charge (the allegations or imputations) made against the accused does not make out a prima facie case and does not furnish basis for framing charge, it will be a case of charge being groundless, so he has no option but to discharge the accused. 71. Indeed in case where the Magistrate finds that taking cognizance of the offence itself was contrary to any provision of law, like Section 468 of the CrPC, the complaint being barred by limitation, so he cannot frame the charge, he has to discharge the accused. Indeed, in a case where the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence without taking note of Section 468 of the CrPC, the most appropriate stage at which the accused can plead for his discharge is the stage of framing the charge. He need not wait till completion of trial. The Magistrate will be committing no illegality in considering that question and discharging the accused at the stage of framing charge if the facts so justify. 72. The real test for determining whether the charge should be considered groundless under Section 239 of the CrPC is that whether the materials are such that even if unrebutted make out no case whatsoever, the accused should be discharged under Section 239 of the CrPC. The trial court will have to consider, whether the materials relied upon by the prosecution against the applicant herein for the purpose of framing of the charge, if unrebutted, make out any case at all. 73. The trial court will have to consider, whether the materials relied upon by the prosecution against the applicant herein for the purpose of framing of the charge, if unrebutted, make out any case at all. 73. The provisions of discharge under Section 239 of the CrPC fell for consideration of this Court in K. Ramakrishna and others v. State of Bihar and another, (2000) 8 SCC 547 , and it was held that the questions regarding the sufficiency or reliability of the evidence to proceed further are not required to be considered by the trial court under Section 239 and the High Court under Section 482. It was observed as follows:- “4. The trial court under Section 239 and the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not called upon to embark upon an inquiry as to whether evidence in question is reliable or not or evidence relied upon is sufficient to proceed further or not. However, if upon the admitted facts and the documents relied upon by the complainant or the prosecution and without weighing or sifting of evidence, no case is made out, the criminal proceedings instituted against the accused are required to be dropped or quashed. As observed by this Court in Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi, [ 1999 (3) SCC 259 ] the High Court or the Magistrate are also not supposed to adopt a strict hypertechnical approach to sieve the complaint through a colander of finest gauzes for testing the ingredients of offence with which the accused is charge. Such an endeavour may be justified during trial but not during the initial stage.” 74. In the case of State by Karnataka Lokayukta, Police Station, Bengaluru v. M.R. Hiremath, (2019) 7 SCC 515 , this Court observed and held in paragraph 25 as under:- “25. The High Court ought to have been cognizant of the fact that the trial court was dealing with an application for discharge under the provisions of Section 239 CrPC. The parameters which govern the exercise of this jurisdiction have found expression in several decisions of this Court. The High Court ought to have been cognizant of the fact that the trial court was dealing with an application for discharge under the provisions of Section 239 CrPC. The parameters which govern the exercise of this jurisdiction have found expression in several decisions of this Court. It is a settled principle of law that at the stage of considering an application for discharge the court must proceed on the assumption that the material which has been brought on the record by the prosecution is true and evaluate the material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the material, taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary to constitute the offence. In State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan [State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709 , adverting to the earlier decisions on the subject, this Court held: (SCC pp. 721-22, para 29) “29. … At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the law does not permit a mini trial at this stage.”” 14. What appears from above observations and findings by the Hon'ble Apex Court that at the stage of framing of charge, the Court has to consider whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The court is not required to appreciate evidence to conclude whether the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused. In other words, the Court is not required to find out that accused is to be acquitted or convicted. The Court has to silt and weigh evidence and material on record in limited space as to see that whether sufficient grounds exists to send the accused for trial. 15. In other words, the Court is not required to find out that accused is to be acquitted or convicted. The Court has to silt and weigh evidence and material on record in limited space as to see that whether sufficient grounds exists to send the accused for trial. 15. Learned Trial Court has observed following reasons in para 4, while rejecting the discharge application. The reasoning are in Gujarati language, but for better understanding they are translated in English which are as under :- "(04) Thus, keeping in view the aforesaid facts and circumstances and upon reading the facts of the complaint, the complainant in this case is the brother of the deceased Champaben, and in his complaint, he has alleged that the accused of this case, who are mother-in- law, father-in-law, brother-in-law, husband and sister-in- law of the deceased Champaben, used to often taunt her saying that, “You do not do any work and debt has been accumulated in constructing this house, hence you vacate our house.” On being asked to return nine tola gold given as dowry during marriage, the deceased returned that nine tola gold. When the deceased informed about this by phone, he took five person of the community including Rabari Dineshbhai Babubhai, Bhagwanbhai Arjanbhai, complainant-her brother and Rameshbhai Mafabhai and went to the house of in laws of the deceased at Khanpur, Rajkua and rebuked the accused persons. At that time the accused promised that they will not torture the deceased now onwards, but thereafter they started torturing her again and the accused used to say that, she should leave the constructed house and if she want to live in the house, she should get money from her parents so that debt can be repaid. Accused Virambhai used to say that, if she doesn’t bring the money to repay the debt then he will throw her out of the house, he used to say that he will get seven ladies like her, which was informed to him by his sister when he had gone to the temple on full moon day. Thus, considering the facts of the complaint of the complainant and in the evidences produced by the prosecution in this case, recording and transcription of the telephonic conversation between complainant’s sister Kantaben and deceased Champaben is produced. Thus, considering the facts of the complaint of the complainant and in the evidences produced by the prosecution in this case, recording and transcription of the telephonic conversation between complainant’s sister Kantaben and deceased Champaben is produced. In these circumstances, upon reading the transcription of the said recording, it appears from the telephonic conversations between deceased and Kantaben, that there were talks about debt related to house and there was always some quarrel in the house. In these circumstances, apart from giving the complainant an opportunity to prove his case, it does not seem justifiable to acquit the accused of this case at this stage. Further, upon reading the transcription and perusing the facts of the complaint of the complainant, it appears that there is sufficient evidence on record to frame the charge against the accused in this case. Now the contention raised on behalf of the accused is that, neither suicide note of the deceased is produced nor her dying declaration has been recorded. However, it is not always necessary that a deceased person commits suicide only after writing a suicide note and in some cases, if such a step is taken in anger, the thought of writing a suicide note might not even occur. There is no evidence on the record that the deceased in this case was educated, in those circumstances, it does not appear that she knew how to write and even if she was capable of writing, it is not a sequence of events that a person commits suicide only after writing a suicide note. Upon perusing medical certificate, it appears that when the deceased was brought for treatment, she had eighty percent burn injuries and even the complainant has mentioned in his complaint that when he reached the hospital, the deceased was not in a condition to speak. Thus, when the deceased was brought to the hospital with eighty percent burn injuries, she was not in condition to speak and thus, her D.D. could not be recorded. In these circumstances, the present case takes base on a circumstantial evidence. Therefore, at this stage, as releasing the accused of this crime without giving the prosecution of this case i.e. complainant an opportunity to prove his case would not be justified in law, Hence, the following final order is passed. 16. Clear finding has been recorded by learned Trial Court against the petitioners - accused. Therefore, at this stage, as releasing the accused of this crime without giving the prosecution of this case i.e. complainant an opportunity to prove his case would not be justified in law, Hence, the following final order is passed. 16. Clear finding has been recorded by learned Trial Court against the petitioners - accused. If we peruse statements of Dineshbhai, Bhagwanbhai, Rameshbhai and Kantaben, it clearly reveals that there was constant harassment by the petitioners - accused to the deceased. They have stated that three years prior to incident also, the petitioners accused used to harass the deceased to bring dowry and was subjected to cruelty. There are call details between Kantaben who is sister of the deceased and deceased, wherein, deceased has stated that she was harassed by the petitioners by taunting and demanding dowry to pay debt. 17. It was submitted by learned advocate for the petitioners that there is no evidence in charge-sheet paper which indicate instigation or abatement which prompted deceased to commit suicide. However, such contention needs to be tested in trial. Charge-sheet papers which includes statement of the witnesses namely Dineshbhai, Bhagwanbhai, Rameshbhai and Kantaben, prima facie establish existence of grounds to proceed further in trial. Learned Trial Court has not committed any error in denying discharge plea of the petitioners - accused. 18. Learned Senior Advocate Mr.Syed for the petitioners also argued that going by charge-sheet papers would not indicate any past antecedent which instigated deceased to commit suicide and as such essential ingredients of section 107 being abatement to do something is missing in the case and therefore, offence under section 306 of IPC is not maintainable. Argument appears to be attractive but looking to overall aspect including the aspect that offence under section 3 and 7 of Dowry Prohibition Act as well as offence under section 498(A) of IPC is also alleged against the present petitioners with section 306 of IPC, as observed herein-above statement of four witnesses and last talk with the sister of the deceased, prima facie establish sufficient grounds against accused to frame charge. 19. Insofar as judgments relied by learned advocate for the petitioners are concerned, facts of the present case are different from the facts of the those case and therefore, they are not helpful to the petitioners. 20. 19. Insofar as judgments relied by learned advocate for the petitioners are concerned, facts of the present case are different from the facts of the those case and therefore, they are not helpful to the petitioners. 20. No error much less error of law has been crept in the impugned order as role of the accused are stated in commission of offence and clearly reveals in charge-sheet papers. 21. For the foregoing reasons, the Revision Application fails and is accordingly, dismissed. Rule is discharged. Interim arrangement granted earlier, if any, stands discontinued.