Research › Search › Judgment

Punjab High Court · body

2024 DIGILAW 964 (PNJ)

Baljeet Singh v. State of Haryana

2024-06-24

SUMEET GOEL

body2024
JUDGMENT Sumeet Goel, J. By way of instant order, this Court is proceeding to decide the application (CRM-21064-2024) filed by the applicant-appellant for staying the judgment of conviction/suspending the conviction. 2. Vide judgment dated 07.06.2023 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Special Court, Kaithal, Haryana; the applicant-appellant was convicted for offences punishable under Sections 376(2) (n)/506/201 of IPC and Section 3(1)(w)(i) of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. Further, the applicant-appellant was extended the benefit of doubt qua offences under Section 328 of IPC and Section 3(1)(s) of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 and was accordingly acquitted of the said charges. Thereafter, vide order of sentence dated 07.06.2023, the applicantappellant was awarded the following sentence(s):- Under Section 376(2)(n) of the Indian Penal Code,1860 To undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of Ten (10) years and to pay a fine of rupees twenty five thousand (Rs. 25,000/-). In default of payment of fine, he shall further undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of five (5) months. Under Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 To undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of Two (2) years and to pay a fine of rupees five thousand (Rs. 5,000/-). In default of payment of fine, he shall further undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one (1) month. Under Section 201 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 To undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of One (1) year and to pay a fine of rupees five thousand (Rs. 5,000/-). In default of payment of fine, he shall further undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one (1) month Under Section 3(1)(w)(i) of the Scheduled Castes and The Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 To undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of Two (2) years and to pay a fine of rupees five thousand (Rs. 5,000/-). In default of payment of fine, he shall further undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one (1) month. 3. The applicant-appellant had filed appeal (CRA-S-1736-2023) before this Court on or about 12.06.2023 impugning the judgment of conviction as also order of sentence passed on 07.06.2023 by the trial Court. Vide order dated 26.02.2024 passed by this Court, the applicant-appellant was extended the concession of suspension of his remaining sentence & he was accordingly directed to be released on bail during the pendency of the appeal. Vide order dated 26.02.2024 passed by this Court, the applicant-appellant was extended the concession of suspension of his remaining sentence & he was accordingly directed to be released on bail during the pendency of the appeal. By way of application in question (CRM-21064- 2024), the applicant-appellant has sought for staying the impugned judgment of conviction passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Special Court Kaithal, Haryana/suspending his conviction. 4. Learned counsel for the applicant-appellant has argued that the appeal is pending admitted before this Court and is not likely to be decided in the near future, the applicant-appellant has a very good case in his favour and the appeal is likely to succeed on merits thereof, the applicant-appellant is suffering on account of impugned judgment of conviction and he has been dismissed from his Government service vide order dated 14.06.2023 passed by the office of Director General of Prisons, Haryana. Learned counsel for the applicant-appellant has further argued that once the applicant-appellant has been extended the concession of suspension of sentence and has been released on bail, it is implicit that the judgment of conviction ought to be stayed. 5. Per Contra, learned State counsel has argued that the applicant-appellant, who was a police official, had committed the heinous offence of rape upon the victim belonging to the Scheduled Caste(s) & the trial Court has rightly convicted him in view of the overwhelming evidence available on record. Learned State counsel has further argued that the suspension of sentence accorded to the applicant-appellant is a concept, completely different, from grant of stay of conviction/stay of impugned judgment of conviction as is now sought for by way of the instant application. Learned State counsel has further submitted that no ground is made out to stay the judgment of conviction rendered against the applicant-appellant & thus the application in hand deserves to be dismissed. 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the records. 7. The prime issue, in the application in hand, is as to whether the conviction recorded against the applicant-appellant vide impugned judgment deserves to be suspended/impugned judgment of conviction deserves to be stayed. The analogous legal issues that arise for consideration are:- (A) whether the grant of stay of conviction of an impugned judgment is same as the order granting suspension of sentence thereby releasing the applicant-appellant on bail. The analogous legal issues that arise for consideration are:- (A) whether the grant of stay of conviction of an impugned judgment is same as the order granting suspension of sentence thereby releasing the applicant-appellant on bail. (B) what are the parameters for granting stay of conviction/stay of the impugned judgment vide which conviction has been recorded. Relevant statutory provision 8. Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter to be referred to as Cr.P.C.) reads as under:- "389. Suspension of sentence pending the appeal; release of appellant on bail - (1) Pending any appeal by a convicted person, the Appellate Court may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, order that the execution of the sentence or order appealed against be suspended and, also, if he is in confinement, that he be released on bail, or on his own bond: [Provided that the Appellate Court shall, before releasing on bail or on his own bond a convicted person who is convicted of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years, shall give opportunity to the Public Prosecutor for showing cause in writing against such release: Provided further that in cases where a convicted person is released on bail it shall be open to the Public Prosecutor to file an application for the cancellation of the bail.] (2) The power conferred by this section on an Appellate Court may be exercised also by the High Court in the case of an appeal by a convicted person to a Court subordinate thereto. (3)Where the convicted person satisfies the Court by which he is convicted that he intends to present an appeal, the Court shall,- (i) where such person, being on bail, is sentenced to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years, or (ii) where the offence of which such person has been convicted is a bailable one, and he is on bail, order that the convicted person be released on bail, unless there are special reasons for refusing bail, for such period as will afford sufficient time to present the appeal and obtain the orders of the Appellate Court under sub-section (1), and the sentence of imprisonment shall, so long as he is so released on bail, be deemed to be suspended. (4) When the appellant is ultimately sentenced to imprisonment for a term or to imprisonment for life, the time during which he is so released shall be excluded in computing the term for which he is so sentenced." Relevant case law 9. The precedents, apropos to the matter(s) in issue, are as follows:- (A) Re: whether the suspension of sentence of an appellant is different from stay of conviction awarded to such appellant vide the impugned judgment. (i) A Three Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Rama Narang v. Ramesh Narang: 1995(2) SCC 513 has held as under:- "Section 389(1) empowers the Appellate Court to order that the execution of the sentence or order appealed against be suspended pending the appeal. What can be suspended under this provision is the execution of the sentence or the execution of the order. Does 'Order' in Section 389(1) empowers the Appellate Court to order that the execution of the sentence or order appealed against be suspended pending the appeal. What can be suspended under this provision is the execution of the sentence or the execution of the order. Does 'Order' in Section 389(1) mean order of conviction or an order similar to the one under Sections 357 or 360 of the Code? Obviously the order referred to in Section 389(1) must be an order capable of execution. An order of conviction by itself is not capable of execution under the Code. It is the order of sentence or an order awarding compensation or imposing fine or release on probation which are capable of execution and which, if not suspended, would be required to be executed by the authorities. Since the order of conviction does not on the mere filing of an appeal disappear it is difficult to accept the submission that Section 267 of the 'Companies Act must be read to apply only to a 'final' order of conviction. Such an interpretation may defeat the very object and purpose for which it came to be enacted. It is, therefore, fallacious to contend that on the admission of the appeal by the Delhi High Court the order of conviction had ceased to exist. If that be so why seek a stay or suspension of the Order? In certain situations the order of conviction can be executable, in the sense, it may incur a disqualification as in the instant case. If that be so why seek a stay or suspension of the Order? In certain situations the order of conviction can be executable, in the sense, it may incur a disqualification as in the instant case. In such a case the power under Section 389(1) of the Code could be invoked. In such situations the attention of the Appellate Court must be specifically invited to the consequence that is likely to fall to enable it to apply its mind to the issue since under Section 389(1)it is under an obligation to support its order 'for reasons to be recorded by it in writing. If the attention of the Court is not invited to this specific consequence which is likely to fall upon conviction how can it be expected to assign reasons relevant thereto? No one can be allowed to play hide and seek with the Court; he cannot suppress the precise purpose for which he seeks suspension of the conviction and obtain a general order of stay and then con-tend that the disqualification has ceased to operate." ****** "That takes us to the question whether the scope of Section 389(1) of the Code extends to conferring power on the Appellate Court to stay the operation of the order of conviction. As stated earlier, if the order of conviction is to result in some-disqualification of the type mentioned in Section 267 of the Companies Act we see no reason why we should give a narrow meaning to Section 389(1) of the Code to debar the court from granting an order to that effect in a fit case. The appeal under Section 374 is essentially against the order of conviction because the order of sentence is merely consequential thereto; albeit even the order of sentence can be independently challenged if it is harsh and disproportionate to the established guilt. Therefore, when an appeal is preferred under Section 374 of the Code the appeal is against both the conviction and sentence and therefore, we see no reason to place a narrow on Section 389(1) of the Code not to extend it to an order of conviction. Although that issue in the instant case recedes in the background because High Court scan exercise inherent jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code if the power was not to be found in Section 389(1) of the Code. Although that issue in the instant case recedes in the background because High Court scan exercise inherent jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code if the power was not to be found in Section 389(1) of the Code. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay was not right in holding that the Delhi High Court could not have exercised-jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code if it was confronted with a situation of there being no other provision in the (lode for staying the operation of the order of conviction. In a fit case if the High Court feels satisfied that the order of conviction needs to be suspended or stayed so that the convicted persons does not suffer from a certain disqualification provided for in any other statute, it may exercise the power because otherwise the damage done cannot be undone; the disqualification incurred by Section 267 of the Companies Act and given effect to cannot be undone at a subsequent date if the conviction is set aside by the Appellate Court. But while granting a stay of suspension of the order of conviction the Court must examine the pros and cons and if it feels satisfied that a case is made out for grant of such an order, it may do so and in so doing it may, if it considers it appropriate, impose such conditions as are considered appropriate to protect the interest of the shareholders and the business of the company." (ii) A Five Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of K. Prabhakaran v. P. Jayarajan: AIR 2005 SC 688 , has held as under:- "A person convicted may have filed an appeal. He may also have secured an order suspending execution of the sentence or the order appealed against under Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. But that again would be of no consequence. A Court of appeal is empowered under Section 389 to order that pending an appeal by a convicted person the execution of the sentence or order appealed against be suspended and also, if he is in confinement, that he be released on bail or bond. What is suspended is not the conviction or sentence; it is only the execution of the sentence or order which is suspended. It is suspended and not obliterated. What is suspended is not the conviction or sentence; it is only the execution of the sentence or order which is suspended. It is suspended and not obliterated. It will be useful to refer in this context to a Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in Sarat Chandra Rabha & Ors. v. Khagendranath Nath & Ors., (1961)2 SCR 133 ." iii) The Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Lalsai Khunte v. Nirmal Sinha : 2007 (9) SCC 330 has held as under:- "The question before us is whether the order passed by the appellate Court in a Criminal Case on 9.5.2002 whereby the conviction and sentence of the appellant was suspended, whether this amounts to staying the conviction or not? All other questions are not relevant except the aforesaid question." ***** "Therefore, this Court in recent decisions held that the appellate Court has power to stay the execution of the conviction and if appellate Court has stayed the conviction then in that case, this will not operate as a disqualification. But simply order of suspension of the sentence will not operate as staying the conviction. It was specifically mentioned that the stay of order of the conviction will mean it is temporarily non-operative." iv) A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Shishu Pal Singh v. State of Haryana: 2009(4) RCR (Criminal) 759 has held as under:- "There is a clear cut distinction between suspension of sentence and suspension of conviction. The standards for the latter are totally different as the two stand on different footing. Power to suspend conviction has to be exercised sparingly, particularly in serious crimes, such as murder." (B) Re: Parameters for granting stay of conviction. i) A Three Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Ravikant S. Patil v. Sarvabhouma S. Bagali: 2007 (1) SCC 673 , has held as under:- " It deserves to be clarified that an order granting stay of conviction is not the rule but is an exception to be resorted to in rare cases depending upon the facts of a case. Where the execution of the sentence is stayed, the conviction continues to operate. But where the conviction itself is stayed, the effect is that the conviction will not be operative from the date of stay. An order of stay, of course, does not render the conviction non-existent, but only non-operative. Where the execution of the sentence is stayed, the conviction continues to operate. But where the conviction itself is stayed, the effect is that the conviction will not be operative from the date of stay. An order of stay, of course, does not render the conviction non-existent, but only non-operative. Be that as it may. Insofar as the present case is concerned, an application was filed specifically seeking stay of the order of conviction specifying that consequences if conviction was not stayed, that is, the appellant would incur disqualification to contest the election. The High Court after considering the special reason, granted the order staying the conviction. As the conviction itself is stayed in contrast to a stay of the execution of the sentence, it is not possible to accept the contention of the respondent that the disqualification arising out of conviction continues to operate even after stay of conviction." (ii) The Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Shyam Narain Pandey v. State of U.P. : 2014 (8) SCC 209 has held as under:- "8. It has been consistently held by this Court that unless there are exceptional circumstances, the appellate Court shall not stay the conviction, though the sentence may be suspended. There is no hard and fast rule or guidelines as to what are those exceptional circumstances. However, there are certain indications in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 itself as to which are those situations and a few indications are available in the judgments of this Court as to what are those circumstances. 9. It may be noticed that even for the suspension of the sentence, the Court has to record the reasons in writing under Section 389(1) Cr.P.C. Couple of provisos were added under Section 389(1) Cr.P.C. pursuant to the recommendations made by the Law Commission of India and observations of this Court in various judgments, as per Act 25 of 2005. It was regarding the release on bail of a convict where the sentence is of death or life imprisonment or of a period not less than ten years. If the appellate court is inclined to consider release of a convict of such offences, the public prosecutor has to be given an opportunity for showing cause in writing against such release. It was regarding the release on bail of a convict where the sentence is of death or life imprisonment or of a period not less than ten years. If the appellate court is inclined to consider release of a convict of such offences, the public prosecutor has to be given an opportunity for showing cause in writing against such release. This is also an indication as to the seriousness of such offences and circumspection which the Court should have while passing the order on stay of conviction. Similar is the case with offences involving moral turpitude. If the convict is involved in crimes which are so outrageous and yet beyond suspension of sentence, if the conviction also is stayed, it would have serious impact on the public perception on the integrity institution. Such orders definitely will shake the public confidence in judiciary. That is why, it has been cautioned time and again that the court should be very wary in staying the conviction especially in the types of cases referred to above and it shall be done only in very rare and exceptional cases of irreparable injury coupled with irreversible consequences resulting in injustice." (iii) The Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Navjot Singh Sidhu v. State of Punjab and another: 2007 (2) SCC 574 has held as under. "Though for the purpose of decision of the prayer made by the appellant for staying or suspending the order of conviction, it is not necessary to minutely examine the merits of the case, nevertheless we consider it proper to refer to the medical evidence, which has an important bearing on the nature of the offence alleged to have been committed by the appellant." (iv) The Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of K. C. Sareen v. CBI, Chandigarh: 2001 (6) SCC 584 has held as under:- "11. The legal position, therefore, is this: Though the power to suspend an order of conviction, apart from the order of sentence, is not alien to Section 389(1) of the Code, its exercise should be limited to very exceptional cases. Merely because the convictioned person files an appeal in challenge of the conviction the court should not suspend the operation of the order of conviction. The court has a duty to look at all aspects including the ramifications of keeping such conviction in abeyance. Merely because the convictioned person files an appeal in challenge of the conviction the court should not suspend the operation of the order of conviction. The court has a duty to look at all aspects including the ramifications of keeping such conviction in abeyance. It is in the light of the above legal position that we have to examine the question as to what should be the position when a public servant is convicted of an offence under the PC Act. No doubt when the appellate Court admits the appeal filed in challenge of the conviction and sentence for the offence under the PC Act, the superior Court should normally suspend the sentence of imprisonment until disposal of the appeal, because refusal thereof would render the very appeal otiose unless such appeal could be heard soon after the filing of the appeal. But suspension of conviction of the offence under the PC Act, de hors the sentence of imprisonment as a sequel thereto, is a different matter. 12.Corruption by public servants has now reached a monstrous dimension in India. Its tentacles have started grappling even the institutions created for the protection of the republic. Unless those tentacles are intercepted and impeded from gripping (gripping) the normal and orderly functions of the public and impeded from gripping the normal and orderly functions of the public offices, through strong legislative, executive as well as judicial exercises the corrupt public servants could even paralyse the functioning of such institutions and thereby hinder the democratic policy. Prof iteration of corrupt public servants could garner momentum to cripple the social order if such men are allowed to continue to manage and operate public institutions. When a public servant was found guilty of corruption after a judicial adjudicatory process conducted by a court of law, judiciousness demands that he should be treated as corrupt until he is exonerated by a superior Court. The mere fact that an appellate Court or revisional forum has decided to entertain his challenge and to go into the issues and findings made against such public servants once again should not even temporarily absolve him from such findings. The mere fact that an appellate Court or revisional forum has decided to entertain his challenge and to go into the issues and findings made against such public servants once again should not even temporarily absolve him from such findings. If such a public servant becomes entitled to hold public office and to continue to do official acts until he is judicially absolved from such findings by reason of suspension of the order of conviction it is public interest which suffers and sometimes even irreparably. When a public servant who is convicted of corruption is allowed to continue to hold public office it would impair the morale of the other persons manning such office, and consequently that would erode the already shrunk confidence of the people in such public institutions besides demoralising the other honest public servants who would either be the colleagues or subordinates of the convicted person. If honest public servants are compelled to take orders from proclaimed corrupt officers on account of the suspension of the conviction the fall out would be one of shaking the system itself. Hence it is necessary that the court should not aid the public servant who stands convicted-for corruption charges to hold only public office until he is exonerated after conducting a judicial adjudication at the appellate or revisional level. It is a different matter if a corrupt public officer could continue to hold such public office even without the help of a court order suspending the conviction." v) The Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of State of Maharashtra v. Gajanan: 2003 (12) SCC 432 , held as under:- "In the said judgment of K.C. Sareen (supra), this Court has held that it is only in very exceptional cases that the court should exercise such power of stay in matters arising out of the Act. The High Court has in the impugned order nowhere pointed out what is the exceptional fact which in its opinion required it to stay the conviction. The High Court also failed to note the direction of this Court that it has a duty to look at all aspects including ramification of keeping such conviction in abeyance. The High Court, in our opinion, has not taken into consideration any of the above factors while staying the conviction. The High Court also failed to note the direction of this Court that it has a duty to look at all aspects including ramification of keeping such conviction in abeyance. The High Court, in our opinion, has not taken into consideration any of the above factors while staying the conviction. It should also be noted that the view expressed by this Court in K.C. Sareen's case (supra) was subsequently approved followed by the judgment of this Court in Union of India v. Atar Singh and anr., JT 2001(10) SC 212." (vi) The Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of State of Maharashtra Through CBI v. Balakrishna Dattatrya Kumbhar : 2012 (12) SCC 384 has held as under:- "Thus, in view of the aforesaid discussion, a clear picture emerges to the effect that the Appellate Court is an exceptional case, may put the conviction in abeyance along with the sentence, but such power must be exercised with great circumspection and caution, for the purpose of which, the applicant must satisfy the Court as regards the evil that is likely to befall him, if the said conviction is not suspended. The Court has to consider all the facts as are pleaded by the applicant, in a judicious manner and examined whether the facts and circumstances involved in the case are such, that they warrant such a course of action by it. The court additionally, must record in writing, it. The court additionally, must record in writing, its reasons for granting such relief. Relief of staying the order of conviction cannot be granted only on the ground that an employee may lose his job, if the same is not done. The instant case is required to be examined in light of the aforesaid settled legal propositions. The relevant part of the impugned order reads as under: (vii) The Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Afjal Ansari v. State of UP: 2023 INSC 1071 has held (majority view) as under:- "10. At the outset, it is imperative to delineate the essential parameters that must be meticulously examined to determine whether a case can be made out for suspension of conviction under Section 389(1) of the CrPC. Section 389(1) enjoys upon the Appellate Court, the power to issue an order for the suspension of a sentence or an order of conviction during the pendency of an appeal. Section 389(1) enjoys upon the Appellate Court, the power to issue an order for the suspension of a sentence or an order of conviction during the pendency of an appeal. It may be thus of paramount importance to scrutinise the precise language of Section 389(1) of the CrPC, which is articulated as follows: xxxx 11. It becomes manifestly evident from the plain language of the provision, that the Appellate Court is unambiguously vested with the power to suspend implementation of the sentence or the order of conviction under appeal and grant bail to the incarcerated convict, for which it is imperative to assign the reasons in writing. This Court has undertaken a comprehensive examination of this issue on multiple occasions, laying down the broad parameters to be appraised for the suspension of a conviction under Section 389(1) of the CrPC. There is to gainsaying that in order to suspend the conviction of an individual, the primary factors that are to be looked into, would be the peculiar facts and circumstances of that specific case, where the failure to stay such a conviction would lead to injustice or irreversible consequences. The very notion of irreversible consequences is centered on factors, including the individual's criminal antecedents, the gravity of the offence, and its wider social impact, while simultaneously considering the facts and circumstances of the case." Analysis (re law) 10. The statutory provision of Section 389 of Cr.P.C., 1973; when read in light of ratio decidendi of the judgment of Three Judges Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Rama Narang (supra); unequivocally shows that there is a conceptual difference between powers of an appellate Court to suspend the order of sentence vis-a-vis the powers of an appellate Court to stay the judgment of conviction/suspend the conviction. Indubitably, the power to grant both these kinds of order is enshrined in Section 389 of Cr.P.C., 1973 itself. However, the parameters for granting these two kind of orders are completely different. Ergo, an order granting suspension of sentence can; by no stretch of legal imagination; be said to be granting, nay granting ipso facto, stay/suspension of conviction as well. Indubitably, the power to grant both these kinds of order is enshrined in Section 389 of Cr.P.C., 1973 itself. However, the parameters for granting these two kind of orders are completely different. Ergo, an order granting suspension of sentence can; by no stretch of legal imagination; be said to be granting, nay granting ipso facto, stay/suspension of conviction as well. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Five Judges Bench judgment in case of K. Prabhakaran (supra) has clearly held that order suspending sentence only ensures that the appellant is released from custody since only the execution of the order is suspended & the same cannot be construed to mean that judgment of conviction has also been stayed. Further, the dicta of judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Lalsai Khunte (supra) and a Division Bench Judgment of this Court in case of Shishupal Singh (supra) also holds that there is a clear distinction between suspension of sentence and stay/suspension of conviction & parameters thereof are also completely different. Therefore, it is postulated principle that an order granting suspension of sentence to an appellant can, in no way, mean that stay/suspension of conviction also, automatically, stands granted. 10.1 The seminal issue, that now craves attention of this Court is, as to what are the parameters/factors for granting of an order of stay/suspension of conviction to a convict-appellant. A Three Judges Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Ravikant. S. Patil (supra) has held that grant of an order staying conviction is an exception and is required to be passed in rare facts. Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Shyam Narain Pandey (supra) has enunciated that conviction ought not to be stayed in cases wherein appellant has been convicted for serious offences or for offences involving moral turpitude. The mere fact that an appeal has been preferred against the judgment of conviction and final adjudication thereof would take time is not a ground, by itself, for granting an order of stay of conviction. The Court, while considering such a plea, may choose to delve into the merits of the case if so required as was done in Navjot Singh Sidhu's case (supra) by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Court, while considering such a plea, may choose to delve into the merits of the case if so required as was done in Navjot Singh Sidhu's case (supra) by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. More recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Afjal Ansari (supra) has held (majority view) that the Court ought to see whether, in the facts/circumstances of the case in hand, failure to stay conviction would cause irreversible consequences/injustice. 10.2 The likely irreversible and severe consequences which may entail upon the convict-appellant resulting into manifest injustice; material reflecting that the convict-appellant was proceeded against, in a mala fide manner, by the prosecution/complainant; the judgment of conviction being self evidently illegal/unsustainable; the likely public/societal effect of the conviction in question etc; nature and manner of offence(s) committed by appellant are some of the factors which are required to be considered at the hands of the Court examining a plea for stay of conviction. Such plea by the applicant-appellant should satiate the Court that rare and exceptional circumstances exist wherein failure to stay the conviction would result in irreparable injury coupled with irreversible consequences causing injustice. There is no gainsaying that the factors enumerated hereinbove are illustrative in nature for no exhaustive factors/parameters can be laid down for consideration of such a plea by the Court since every case has its own unique factual conspectus. It was said by Lord Denning, which observation met with approval by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, that: "..... Each case depends on its own facts, and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough, because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect. In deciding such case, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cardozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide, therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, its broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive." 10.3 The judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of K. C. Sareen (supra), Gajanan (supra) and Balakrishana Dattatrya Kumbhar (supra) have put case(s) involving conviction of a public servant in corruption cases in a different realm, such cases being exceptional cases from the point of view of stay of conviction. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has, repeatedly; clearly cautioned the exercise of such powers in favour of the convicted public servant lest it may result into the convicted public servant continuing into office which will result in shaking of public confidence. A public office is as much a representation of powers of governance as it is an institute invested with trust, an imprimatur created for public welfare. Therefore, malfeasance is a grievous act with farreaching consequences, for an act of corruption by a public official shakes the public confidence to its very core. Even if it may be a singular act committed by an individual, its effects percolate through and can become a sequelae for the entire social fabric. It is just not possible to blot out the stains left on by even a singular act of corruption in public office. To borrow, with impunity, upon the verisimilitude in Macbeth (penned by William Shakespeare): "Macbeth: Will all great Neptune's ocean wash this blood Clean from my hand? No, this my hand will rather The multitudinous seas incarnadine, Making the green one red" (Act 2, Scene 2) In point of fact, even if punishment is handed out and a certain contrition is exacted by the erring person, the shaken public confidence may not recuperate, since (quoting from Macbeth): "Here's the smell of the blood still: all the perfumes of Arabia will not sweeten this little Hand." (Act 5 Scene 1) This, however, ought not to mean that, in any case whatsoever an order of conviction in a corruption case cannot be stayed. However, such power in corruption cases ought to be exercised with a very high degree of caution and circumspection only in cases involving exceptional/accentuating facts. In other words, Courts ought to tread with circumspection and caution while dealing with a plea, for suspension of conviction, in corruption cases. 11. As a result of the above said discussion, the following principles emerge: (A) (i) The power of an appellate Court to grant an order of suspension of sentence is distinct from the power of such an appellate Court to grant an order for stay of conviction. 11. As a result of the above said discussion, the following principles emerge: (A) (i) The power of an appellate Court to grant an order of suspension of sentence is distinct from the power of such an appellate Court to grant an order for stay of conviction. (ii) In case an appellate Court grants an order of suspension of sentence, such an order neither implies that an order for stay of conviction is also ipso facto granted by way of such an order for suspension of sentence nor that an order for stay of conviction has to be mandatorily granted on this score itself. The Court is required to pass an order for suspension of conviction, separately, from the order granting suspension of sentence (and consequential release of appellant from custody). Such an order ought to be a well reasoned speaking order. (B) An order granting stay of conviction should be passed under exceptional circumstances. The factors required for consideration of such a plea are the likely severe and irreversible consequences which may entail upon the convict-appellant by way of the judgment of the conviction resulting into manifest injustice; exceptional hardship being faced by the convict-appellant on account of such conviction; the material available which may reflect that the convict-appellant was proceeded against, in a mala fide manner, by prosecution/complainant; nature of offence(s) for which appellant has been convicted; antecedents of the appellant; likely adverse societal/public impact of conviction in question; the illegality of judgment of conviction being writ large on face of it & other factors of akin nature. The factor that a convict-appellant may loose his job shall ordinarily not be a ground by itself to the grant stay of conviction, more so if the convict-appellant is a public servant who has been convicted for the offence of corruption. The litmus test for such a plea is that the Court should be satisfied that, there exist rare/exceptional circumstances, wherein declining of the stay of conviction would inevitably result in irreparable loss to the appellant coupled with irreversible consequences causing injustice nay grave injustice. Needless to say that these factors are only illustrative in nature for it is neither axiomatic nor feasible to lay down any exhaustive set of guidelines. This power ought to be exercised by a Court in light of the facts/circumstances of the particular case which is receiving consideration by such Court. Needless to say that these factors are only illustrative in nature for it is neither axiomatic nor feasible to lay down any exhaustive set of guidelines. This power ought to be exercised by a Court in light of the facts/circumstances of the particular case which is receiving consideration by such Court. Analysis (Re facts of present case) 12. Now this Court reverts to the facts of the case in hand to ratiocinate thereupon. 12.1 The applicant-appellant, who was working as a police official, has been convicted by the trial Court for serious offence(s) of sexual assault which is found, by the trial Court, to have been committed by him by misusing his official position. The victim belongs to the Scheduled Caste community. More so, the applicant-appellant was a married man having three children. The conduct of the applicant-appellant, in this factual backdrop, is grossly unbecoming of a police official. The stay of conviction has been sought for by pleading that the appeal is pending admitted before this Court and is not likely to be decided in near future. This, of course, is no ground to stay the conviction of the applicant-appellant. It has been further pleaded that the applicant-appellant is suffering on account of his conviction recorded on 07.06.2023 where in after he has been dismissed from service. It is worth noticing herein that the judgment of conviction was passed on 07.06.2023, the appeal was filed on or about 12.06.2023, applicant-appellant was dismissed from service on 14.06.2023 and he was accorded the benefit of suspension of sentence on 26.02.2024 & he has preferred the instant application (for stay of conviction) on or about 10.05.2024. The reason that the applicant-appellant is unable to continue in service, in a case of the kind as is the instant one, is no compelling ground to stay the conviction, more so, when the applicant-appellant already stands dismissed from service on 14.06.2023. Ergo, the prime cause pleaded by the applicant-appellant for stay of conviction is, in fact, much ado about nothing. No cause much less plausible cause is made out, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, to stay the judgment of conviction. Therefore, the application in hand deserves rejection. Decision 13. The application in hand (CRM-21064-2024) is dismissed. 14. Needless to state that nothing said hereinabove shall be construed as opinion on the merits of the main appeal. 15. Therefore, the application in hand deserves rejection. Decision 13. The application in hand (CRM-21064-2024) is dismissed. 14. Needless to state that nothing said hereinabove shall be construed as opinion on the merits of the main appeal. 15. Before parting with this order, this Court finds itself unable to hold back from appreciating the able assistance rendered by Sh. Sushil Jain, Advocate (Learned counsel for the applicant-appellant) and Ms. Mahima Yashpal (Learned Deputy Advocate General, Haryana).