ORDER : 1. The appeal, under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short, ‘the CPC’), by the appellant – original plaintiff, arising from the impugned judgment and decree dated 10.03.2022 passed by the learned 5th Additional District Judge, Vadodara in Regular Civil Appeal No.350 of 2019, confirming the judgment and decree dated 24.10.2019 passed by the learned 29th Additional Senior Civil Judge, Vadodara in Regular Civil Suit No.720 of 2003, dismissing the same. 2. The brief facts of the present case are as under : 2.1 The suit was filed by the appellant – original plaintiff for permanent injunction regarding Shop No.3 situated at First Floor, City Point, Vadodara (for short, ‘the suit property’), stating that the plaintiff – Govindram S. Bajaj has purchased the suit property from the defendants for a total sale consideration of Rs.71,000/-; and that the plaintiff has plaid an amount of Rs.21,000/- in cash and remaining balance amount of Rs.50,000/- by way of a cheque bearing No.199538 dated 28.05.2003 drawn on City Bank, Vadodara; and that the possession of the suit property long with its materials lying in it has been handed over to the plaintiff by the defendants; and that the plaintiff is doing business of ready-made garments in the name of ‘New Fashion’ in the suit property; and that the defendant has also given possession receipt as well as payment receipt (writing regarding sale of the suit property) in presence of advocate Shri Gopal Ramani and other witnesses; and that the defendants were absconders since few years pursuant to the offence of misappropriation of money; and that on 16.07.2023 in the evening, the defendants tried to enter into the suit property and gave threats to the plaintiff and asked to vacate the suit property, the plaintiff has filed the suit being Regular Civil Suit No.720 of 2003 before the learned trial Court. 2.2 The learned trial Court, after considering the various evidence – documentary as well as oral at Exh. 29, 46, 50, 51, 33, 52 to 56, 59, 69, 63 to 68 and 71 and framed the issues at Exh.23 and decided it accordingly and dismissed the suit, after hearing the parties, on merit. 2.3 Being aggrieved, the plaintiff has preferred an appeal being Regular Civil Appeal No.350 of 2019 before the learned appellate Court below, which is also dismissed, on merit. 2.3 Being aggrieved, the plaintiff has preferred an appeal being Regular Civil Appeal No.350 of 2019 before the learned appellate Court below, which is also dismissed, on merit. 2.4 It is these judgments and decrees, which are challenged by the appellant – original plaintiff before this Court in this second appeal. 3.1 Learned advocate Mr. Vedant Rajyaguru for learned advocate Mr. A.J. Yagnik for the appellant – original plaintiff has submitted that the appellant has physical possession of the suit property since 20.05.2003 after paying the total consideration; and that the possession receipt shows that the plaintiff had purchased the suit property from the defendants after paying full consideration and the possession of the suit property was also handed over on the very same day by the defendants to the plaintiff; and that it is in the knowledge of the defendants; and that the defendants have not filed any suit for restoration of the possession against the plaintiff; and that the principles of ‘possession follows the title’ should be ignored by the learned Courts below; and that the learned Courts below have erred in observing that the suit for only permanent injunction is not maintainable without declaration relief. 3.2 He has suggested the following substantial questions of law. (i) Whether the learned trial Court and learned Appellate Court has committed substantial error of law in not property considering the documentary as well as oral evidences on record ? (ii) Whether the learned trial Court and the learned Appellate Court have committed substantial error of law in misreading and misinterpreting the documentary as well as oral evidence on record while passing the impugned judgment and decree ? (iii) Whether the learned trial Court and the learned Appellate Court has committed a substantial error of law in not framing the proper points of determination as mandatory under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure ? (iv) Whether the learned trial Court and the learned Appellate Court have erred in passing the impugned judgment, order and decree contrary to the provisions of Section 96 read with Order 41 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure ? 3.3 He has submitted that this appeal may be allowed. 4.1 It is noted that during the pendency of the proceedings, the original plaintiff has died and therefore, his legal heir – Mahesh Govindram Bajaj has preferred the appeal before the learned appellate Court below. 3.3 He has submitted that this appeal may be allowed. 4.1 It is noted that during the pendency of the proceedings, the original plaintiff has died and therefore, his legal heir – Mahesh Govindram Bajaj has preferred the appeal before the learned appellate Court below. 4.2 It is also noted that the present appeal, along with civil application for stay, is filed in the year 2022 and is adjourned from time to time – some time due to paucity of time and some time, at the request of learned advocate for the appellant. 5.1 I have considered the submissions made by the learned advocate for the appellant. I have also considered the documents available on record. I have perused the impugned judgments and decrees passed by both the learned Courts below. From record it transpires as under : There are concurrent findings recorded by both the learned Courts below. The defendants are the owners of the suit property. Allegedly, the plaintiff has purchased the suit property from the defendants for a sale consideration of Rs.71,00/-. But, the plaintiff has paid Rs.21,000/- in cash and Rs.50,000/- by way of a cheque drawn on City Bank, Vadodara. The plaintiff has failed to establish his case before the learned trial Court by producing cogent evidence – bank statement, etc., though asked for by the learned trial Court, regarding payment of sale consideration, as alleged. There is no sale deed. The burden of proof is on the plaintiff as he has filed a suit before the learned trial Court. The possession without any valid and legal title does not follow the title. The defendant has filed a criminal complaint against the so-called witnesses of the possession receipt and payment receipt. The plaintiff has failed to prove the signature of the defendants in the so-called possession receipt. The plaintiff has failed to produce on record the original possession receipt, though he has stated that he will produce at later stage. Only producing receipt of payment without supporting cogent evidence – bank statement does not prove the title of the plaintiff over the suit property. The defendants are the absconders qua the offence of misappropriation of money is not the issue before this Court. 5.2 At this stage, it would be fruitful to refer to the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which reads as under: “[100. The defendants are the absconders qua the offence of misappropriation of money is not the issue before this Court. 5.2 At this stage, it would be fruitful to refer to the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which reads as under: “[100. Second appeal.—(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any Court subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. (2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree passed ex parte. (3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal. (4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question. (5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question.” 5.3. It is relevant to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Gurbachan Singh (Dead) Through Lrs Gurcharan Singh (Dead) Through Lrs and Others., reported in 2023 SCC Online SC 875, more particularly paragraphs 7, 14 and 15 thereof, which read as under : “7. The parameters of an appeal under Section 100, CPC passing muster are well established. The section itself dictates that such an appeal shall only be maintainable when the case involves a substantial question of law or that the appellate decree has been passed ex parte. the latter, obviously is not the case. This court has, in a multitude of decisions, expounded on what may be termed as a substantial question of law to satisfy the requirements of section 100. In Nazir Mohamed v. J. Kamala (2- Judge Bench), it was observed:— “27. the latter, obviously is not the case. This court has, in a multitude of decisions, expounded on what may be termed as a substantial question of law to satisfy the requirements of section 100. In Nazir Mohamed v. J. Kamala (2- Judge Bench), it was observed:— “27. In [HeroVinoth v. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545 ], this Court referred to and relied upon Chunilal V. Mehta and Sons Ltd. [Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314 ] and other judgments and summarised the tests to find out whether a given set of questions of law were mere questions of law or substantial questions of law. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment of this Court in Hero Vinoth [Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545 ] are set out hereinbelow : (SCC p. 554, para 21) “21. The phrase “substantial question of law”, as occurring in the amended Section 100 CPC is not defined in the Code. The word substantial, as qualifying “question of law”, means— of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with—technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of “substantial question of law” by suffixing the words “of general importance” as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code or Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution. The substantial question of law on which a second appeal shall be heard need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general importance. In [Guran Ditta v. Ram Ditta, 1928 SCC OnLine PC 31 : (1927-28) 55 IA 235 : AIR 1928 PC 172 ] the phrase “substantial question of law” as it was employed in the last clause of the then existing Section 100 CPC (since omitted by the Amendment Act, 1973) came up for consideration and their Lordships held that it did not mean a substantial question of general importance but a substantial question of law which was involved in the case. In Chunilal case [Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. In Chunilal case [Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314 ] the Constitution Bench expressed agreement with the following view taken by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in [Rimmalapudi Subba Rao v. Noony Veeraju, 1951 SCC OnLine Mad 100 : AIR 1951 Mad 969 ] : (Chunilal case [Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314 ], AIR p. 1318, para 5) ‘5. … when a question of law is fairly arguable, where there is room for difference of opinion on it or where the Court thought it necessary to deal with that question at some length and discuss alternative views, then the question would be a substantial question of law. On the other hand if the question was practically covered by the decision of the highest court or if the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and the only question was of applying those principles to the particular facts of the case it would not be a substantial question of law.’ 28. To be “substantial”, a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by the law of the land or any binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case and/or the rights of the parties before it, if answered either way.” (Emphasis supplied) 14. As already noted above, another ground of objection taken by the Appellant is the fact of the impugned judgment entering into a reappreciation of evidence. While it is true that ordinarily, in second appeal, the court must not disturb facts established by the lower court or the first appellate court. However, it is also equally well recognised that this rule is not an absolute one or in other words, it is not a rule set in stone. In Nazir Mohamed (supra) this Court has recognised three conditions in which a court in such jurisdiction, may disturb findings of fact. They are:— “(i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. They are:— “(i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. A decision based on no evidence, does not refer only to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding.” 15. A Bench of three learned Judges, recently in Balasubramanian v. M. Arockiasamy (Dead) Through LRs. , had referred to, with approval judgment rendered in Ramathal v. Maruthathal (two-Judge Bench) wherein it was observed that the restraint in interfering with questions of fact under the jurisdiction of second appeal, is not an absolute rule. Where the court is of the view that the conclusions drawn by the court below do not have a basis in the evidence led or it is of the view that the appreciation of evidence “suffers from material irregularity” the court will be justified in interfering with such findings.” 6. Thus, from the above facts and circumstances of the case and considering the impugned judgments and observations made by both the learned Courts below, this Court is of the opinion that both the learned Courts below have framed the issues/points and decided it accordingly by giving cogent and convincing reasons, as recorded in the impugned judgments. The impugned judgments of both the learned Courts below are just, proper, in accordance with law and in consonance with the material available on the record as well as after properly appreciating the documentary as well as oral evidence produced on the record. This Court finds that there is no perversity or illegality in the findings given by both the Courts below. The impugned judgments and decrees are just, proper and legal and no interference is required to be made by this Court. This Court further finds that no any question, much less any substantial question of law arises in this group of appeals for consideration of this Court. 7. Under the circumstances, the second appeal needs to be dismissed and is dismissed accordingly, at the admission stage. 8. In view of above, interim application would not survive and is disposed of accordingly.