ORDER : Arun Monga, J. 1. Grievance of the petitioner herein is against the order dated 04.04.2024 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Dungarpur, upholding the orders dated 30.05.2022 and 01.07.2022 passed by the learned Trial Court whereby in the exercise of powers under Section 216 Cr.P.C., the charges earlier framed against the petitioner accused were altered / added, and additional charges under Section 467, 468, 471 of IPC have been framed. 2. Briefly speaking, the facts leading to the filing of the instant petition, as pleaded in the petition, are as follows: 2.1 Complainant Dileep Shah filed a complaint before the ACJM, Dungarpur under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. against the petitioner with allegations that the petitioner runs a girls' hostel for Scheduled Tribes in Dungarpur, aided by the Social Welfare Department, under the name of Chetna Janjati Chhatrawas, and that the petitioner is the Manager / Administrative Officer of the said hostel. It is alleged that the petitioner, by creating forged documents, has shown 25 students in the hostel whereas only 9- 10 students were actually studying there and received grants from the Social Welfare Department, etc. Consequently, the offences under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 409 & 120B of IPC were made out against them. 2.2 The said complaint was forwarded to the Police Station Kotwali Dungarpur, District Dungarpur, resulting in the registration of FIR No.317/2023 against the petitioner for the offence under Section 420 IPC, and an investigation commenced. Upon the conclusion of the investigation, a charge sheet was filed against the petitioner for the offence under Section 420 IPC. 2.3 During the pendency of the trial, the learned Public Prosecutor submitted an application under Section 216 Cr.P.C. before the learned Trial Court, seeking to alter the charges from Section 420 IPC to Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 IPC. The said application was allowed by the learned trial Court vide impugned order dated 30.05.2022. Resultantly, charges were framed against the petitioner for the alleged offences under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 IPC vide the impugned order dated 01.07.2022. 2.4 Being aggrieved by the impugned order dated 30.05.2022 and 01.07.2022, the petitioner challenged the same by filing a revision before the learned revisional Court which too was rejected by the impugned order dated 04.04.2024, whereby the learned revisional Court upheld the orders dated 30.05.2022 and 01.07.2022 passed by the learned Trial Court. Hence, the present petition. 2.4 Being aggrieved by the impugned order dated 30.05.2022 and 01.07.2022, the petitioner challenged the same by filing a revision before the learned revisional Court which too was rejected by the impugned order dated 04.04.2024, whereby the learned revisional Court upheld the orders dated 30.05.2022 and 01.07.2022 passed by the learned Trial Court. Hence, the present petition. 3. In the aforesaid backdrop, I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and learned PP. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has canvassed his arguments on similar lines as grounds taken in the petition which inter alia are: 4.1 The learned courts below have not considered the relevant aspect of the case that after a thorough investigation, chargesheet against the petitioner has been filed for the offence under Section 420 IPC. The learned trial court itself has framed charges for the said offence. But now, because of an application filed by the prosecutor, the charges against the petitioner have been altered and she has been charged for additional offences under Sections 467, 468 and 471 IPC which are prima facie not made out against the petitioner from the investigation. 4.2 Learned courts below have utterly failed to appreciate the fact that the charge has been altered on the application filed by the public prosecutor, whereas, it is settled law that the power of invocation of Section 216 Cr.P.C. is exclusively confined with the Court as an enabling provision for the purpose of alteration or addition of any charge at any time before pronouncement of the judgment. No party, neither complainant nor the accused or for that matter the prosecution has any vested right to seek any addition or alteration of charge. If such a course by the parties is allowed, then it will be well-not be impossible for the Criminal Court to conclude its proceedings and the concept of speedy trial will be jeopardized. 4.3 Further it is submitted that the matter relates to the year 2013. However, the application for alteration of charge was filed in the year 2022 i.e. after a delay of about 9 years. If the alteration of charge is allowed at this stage, the trial will further get delayed which will prejudice the petitioner’s rights. However, the learned courts below have utterly failed to appreciate this important aspect of the matter. Thus, the impugned orders are not sustainable and deserve to be quashed and set aside. If the alteration of charge is allowed at this stage, the trial will further get delayed which will prejudice the petitioner’s rights. However, the learned courts below have utterly failed to appreciate this important aspect of the matter. Thus, the impugned orders are not sustainable and deserve to be quashed and set aside. 5. Per contra, learned PP would argue that any of the parties in the trial can file an application under Section 216 to invoke powers of the Court and seek alteration / addition of the charges already framed. 6. Having perused the case file and after hearing rival arguments, I am unable to persuade myself with the stand taken by the learned PP. The plain language of Section 216 of Cr.P.C. suggests otherwise. For ready reference, the said section is reproduced hereinbelow:- “216. Court may alter charge.—(1) Any Court may alter or add to any charge at any time before judgment is pronounced. (2) Every such alteration or addition shall be read and explained to the accused. (3) If the alteration or addition to a charge is such that proceeding immediately with the trial is not likely, in the opinion of the Court, to prejudice the accused in his defence or the prosecutor in the conduct of the case, the Court may, in its discretion, after such alteration or addition has been made, proceed with the trial as if the altered or added charge had been the original charge. (4) If the alteration or addition is such that proceeding immediately with the trial is likely, in the opinion of the Court, to prejudice the accused or the prosecutor as aforesaid, the Court may either direct a new trial or adjourn the trial for such period as may be necessary. (5) If the offence stated in the altered or added charge is one for the prosecution of which previous sanction is necessary, the case shall not be proceeded with until such sanction is obtained, unless sanction has been already obtained for a prosecution on the same facts as those on which the altered or added charge is founded.” 7. (5) If the offence stated in the altered or added charge is one for the prosecution of which previous sanction is necessary, the case shall not be proceeded with until such sanction is obtained, unless sanction has been already obtained for a prosecution on the same facts as those on which the altered or added charge is founded.” 7. The perusal of the above section leaves no manner of doubt that unequivocally, it is the power vested with the learned Court which is seized of the trial to form an opinion to alter or add any charge, provided the same does not prejudice the accused in his defence or after such alteration or addition, the trail shall proceed further unhindered as if it would have proceeded on the basis of the original charge. 8. The provision, ibid, provides a balanced approach to frame charges during a trial. Such a power is to be exercised by the Trial Judge alone at his own instance so as to be totally neutral and seemingly not at the instance of a prejudiced party. Section 216 ensures that while the court has the flexibility to adjust charges based on new evidence or legal considerations, but at the same time the rights of the accused to a fair trial are protected from the potential prejudice. Procedural safeguards ought to be upheld so as to not jeopardize the rights of an accused/under trial. 9. In the present case, not only the adding of the additional charges will change the course of the trial, but it will severely jeopardize the rights of the accused qua the sentence to be awarded to them since the punishment envisaged under Section 468 is up to life imprisonment as against 7 years prescribed under Section 420 of IPC. In this context, reference may be had to judgment rendered by Supreme Court in P. Kartikalakshmi Vs. Sri Ganesh & Anr. Criminal Appeal No. 1709 of 2014, (2017) 3 SCC 347 . Relevant part thereof, is reproduced hereinbelow:- “7. We were taken through Sections 221 and 222 CrPC in this context. In the light of the facts involved in this case, we are only concerned with Section 216 CrPC. We, therefore, do not propose to examine the implications of the other provisions to the case on hand. We wish to confine ourselves to the invocation of Section 216 and rest with that. In the light of the facts involved in this case, we are only concerned with Section 216 CrPC. We, therefore, do not propose to examine the implications of the other provisions to the case on hand. We wish to confine ourselves to the invocation of Section 216 and rest with that. In the light of our conclusion that the power of invocation of Section 216 CrPC is exclusively confined with the Court as an enabling provision for the purpose of alteration or addition of any charge at any time before pronouncement of the judgment, we make it clear that no party, neither de facto complainant nor the accused or for that matter the prosecution has any vested right to seek any addition or alteration of charge, because it is not provided under Section 216 CrPC. If such a course to be adopted by the parties is allowed, then it will be well-nigh impossible for the criminal court to conclude its proceedings and the concept of speedy trial will get jeopardised. 8. In such circumstances, when the application preferred by the appellant itself before the trial court was not maintainable, it was not incumbent upon the trial court to pass an order under Section 216 CrPC. Therefore, there was no question of the said order being revisable under Section 397 CrPC. The whole proceeding, initiated at the instance of the appellant, was not maintainable. Inasmuch as the legal issue had to be necessarily set right, we are obliged to clarify the law as is available under Section 216 CrPC. To that extent, having clarified the legal position, we make it clear that the whole proceedings initiated at the instance of the appellant was thoroughly misconceived and vitiated in law and ought not to have been entertained by the trial court. As rightly pointed out by the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 1, such a course adopted by the appellant and entertained by the court below has unnecessarily provided scope for protraction of the proceedings which ought not to have been allowed by the court below.” 10. In view of the aforesaid and as an upshot of my discussion as recorded in the preceding part of this order, the impugned order cannot be sustained and has to be necessarily set aside. It is so ordered. 11. In view of the aforesaid and as an upshot of my discussion as recorded in the preceding part of this order, the impugned order cannot be sustained and has to be necessarily set aside. It is so ordered. 11. Petition is disposed of and since the additional charges stand quashed, the trial shall proceed further in accordance with law on the basis of original charges framed against the accused. 12. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand(s) disposed of.