ORDER : 1. The present petition has been filed by the present petitioner (original defendant – appellant) by challenging the judgment and order dated 26.05.2023 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.102 of 2022 by the learned 3rd Addl. District Judge, Nadiad, Kheda, whereby the lower appellate court has dismissed the application. 2. Brief facts of the case as per the case of the petitioner in this petition are as such that the present petitioner is the owner of land bearing block/survey no. 526/4 paiki B admeasuring 0-24-88 square meters situated at Antroli village, Matar Taluka, Kheda District, (hereinafter referred to as 'the land in question', for short) by virtue of registered sale deed dated 23.09.2013 executed by the respondent herein. It is further the case of the petitioner in this petition that the respondent, in the year 2016, preferred a Regular Civil Suit No.25 of 2016 seeking the relief of cancellation of sale deed against the petitioner on the ground of no/inadequate consideration received by the respondent while executing the registered sale deed in favour of the petitioner. It is further the case of the petitioner in this petition that subsequently, after filing of the suit, the respondent gave false assurance to the petitioner of settling the dispute outside the court and hence the petitioner in good faith, relied upon the said assurance made by the respondent and thereby didn't attend the court proceeding regularly. However, the respondent, by keeping the petitioner under false belief, proceeded with the suit & obtained a judgment & decree of cancellation of sale deed in his favour on date 31.12.2016, without there being any contest from the side of the petitioner herein. Subsequently, upon acquiring the knowledge of the said decree, the petitioner again approached the respondent to know the status of the settlement proposal as indicated by the respondent previously, but the respondent started giving vague and absurd replies and hence. the petitioner, for the first time, became aware about the ill intention of the respondent herein. Thereafter, on 10.10.2018, after gathering all the papers, the petitioner handed over the same to Mr. Vasant since he assured the petitioner that he would be filing the appeal through a person, who is very well known to him. Subsequently, upon inquiry, the petitioner became aware that the appeal has been filed and further the aforementioned person i.e. Mr. Thereafter, on 10.10.2018, after gathering all the papers, the petitioner handed over the same to Mr. Vasant since he assured the petitioner that he would be filing the appeal through a person, who is very well known to him. Subsequently, upon inquiry, the petitioner became aware that the appeal has been filed and further the aforementioned person i.e. Mr. Vasant was not found in the village and he had stopped picking up the calls of the petitioner. Therefore, the petitioner again preferred again an application to get all the papers from the trial court on 14.2.2022 and the same were received by the petitioner on date 23.3.2022. It is further the case of the petitioner in this petitioner that the Petitioner, as a result, preferred the appeal along with application for condonation of delay viz. Civil Misc. Application No. 102 of 2022 before the lower appellate court on 04.05.2022. Subsequently, the Lower Court has dismissed the application for condonation of delay in preferring the appeal. Hence, the petition has been preferred. 3. Heard Mr. Jenil M. Shah, the learned counsel for the petitioner. 4. He has submitted that pursuant to earlier order dated 21.12.2023 passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, he has already filed additional affidavit-in-reply. By relying on the said affidavit by pointing out various aspects as well as documents annexed with the affidavit, he has submitted that from the bar reading of the affidavit, it transpires that sufficient cause is made out and the petitioner is not deliberately delaying the proceeding, but the circumstances are beyond his control and, therefore, he could not pursue the remedy vigilantly as required under the law. Hence, he has good ground on merits to contest the proceeding in appeal as the suit itself is not maintainable. Furthermore, he has submitted that the Court should take liberal view while considering the delay and length of delay is not material for condonation. However, the lower appellate court has observed that there is delay of five years and three months, but actually, from the record, it transpires that there is a delay of four years and three months. Furthermore, he has submitted that by imposing appropriate cost, the delay caused in preferring the appeal can be condoned. However, the lower appellate court has observed that there is delay of five years and three months, but actually, from the record, it transpires that there is a delay of four years and three months. Furthermore, he has submitted that by imposing appropriate cost, the delay caused in preferring the appeal can be condoned. In support of his submissions, he has relied upon the decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases of (i) Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu And Others vs Gobardhan Sao And Others reported in (2002) 3 SCC 195 , (ii) N. Balakrishnan vs. M. Krishnamurthy reported in (1998) 7 SCC 123 , and has submitted that the Court should exercise its discretion by considering the facts of each case. In the present case, there is no mala fide intention on the part of the petitioner and, therefore, the lower appellate court has committed the mistake by rejecting the application for condonation of delay. In view of the above, he has prayed to allow the present petition by passing appropriate order, and even by awarding the cost for condoning the delay. 5.1 I have considered the submissions made at the bar. I have also perused the impugned order passed by the lower appellate court. I have also perused the additional affidavit filed by the present petition in support of the submissions made at the bar. I have gone through the judgments cited at the bar by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 5.2 There is no quarrel about the ratio of the judgments cited at the bar, specifically, in the cases of (i) N. Balakrishnan (supra), more particularly, paragraphs Nos. 7 to 13 are relevant, as under: “7. Learned single judge then observed that when the party is in utter negligence, he cannot be permitted to blame the counsel. Learned single judge has further remarked that: "A perusal of the affidavit does not reveal any diligence on the part of the respondent in the conduct of the proceedings. When already the suit has been decreed ex-parte, the respondent ought to have been more careful and diligent in prosecuting the matter further the conduct of the respondent clearly reveals that at any point of time, he has not relished his responsibility as a litigant." 8. The appellant's conduct does not on the whole warrant to castigate him as an irresponsible litigant. The appellant's conduct does not on the whole warrant to castigate him as an irresponsible litigant. What he did in defending the suit was not very much far from what a litigant would broadly do. Of course, it may be said that he should have been more vigilant by visiting his advocate at short intervals to check up the progress of the litigation. But during these days when everybody is fully occupied with his own avocation of life an omission to adopt such extra vigilance need not be used as a ground to depict him as a litigant not aware of his responsibilities, and to visit him with drastic consequences. 9. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases delay of very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in reversional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on whole untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first cut refuses to condone the dela. In such cases, the superior cut would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammeled by the conclusion of the lower court. 10. The reason for such a different stance is thus: The primary function of a court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. Time limit fixed for approaching the court in different situations in not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. 11. Rule of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. Time limit fixed for approaching the court in different situations in not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. 11. Rule of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. the object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. Law of limitation fixes a life-span for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of time newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. Law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim Interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be putt to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. 12. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain Vs. Kuntal Kumari [ AIR 1969 SC 575 ] and State of West Bengal Vs. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality [ AIR 1972 SC 749 ]. 13. It must be remembered that in every case of delay there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning delay the Could should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a looser and he too would have incurred quiet a large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant the court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss.” (ii) Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu And Others (supra), more particularly, paragraph No.12 is relevant, as under: “12. Thus it becomes plain that the expression "sufficient cause" within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of the Code or any other similar provision should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to a party. In a particular case whether explanation furnished would constitute "sufficient cause" or not will be dependant upon facts of each case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking steps. But one thing is clear that the courts should not proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject the petition by a slipshod order in over jubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal an exception more so when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide can be imputed to the defaulting party. On the other hand, while considering the matter the courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not be lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine like manner. On the other hand, while considering the matter the courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not be lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine like manner. However, by taking a pedantic and hyper technical view of the matter the explanation furnished should not be rejected when stakes are high and/or arguable points of facts and law are involved in the case, causing enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party against whom the lis terminates either by default or inaction and defeating valuable right of such a party to have the decision on merit. While considering the matter, courts have to strike a balance between resultant effect of the order it is going to pass upon the parties either way.” 5.3 Now, considering the fact of the present case, it is evident that the application has been filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, as under: “5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.— Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. Explanation.— The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section.” 5.4 Furthermore, the only requirement of law is that whether the appellant, who is seeking condonation is coming with sufficient cause. Sufficient cause is required to be considered by keeping in mind that whether the petitioner remained negligent in pursuing his remedy. It transpires from the record of the present petition that during the course of trial, though the appellant has appeared before the lower appellate court, but has not contested the application and practically, the proceedings has been proceeded and decided ex parte. Furthermore, it is also sought to be explained by learned counsel for the petitioner that why the application has not been contested. Furthermore, it is also sought to be explained by learned counsel for the petitioner that why the application has not been contested. It has been explained that the plaintiff has promised the original defendant to short out issue in amicable manner. It also transpires that the judgment and decree is passed on 31.12.2016, which is actually passed on 31.12.2017 as per Rojkam produced by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Subsequently, the application was filed by the petitioner for obtaining certified copy on 14.02.2022 and the same was received by the petitioner on 23.03.2022. Consequently, the appeal along with delay condonation application has been preferred. It is evident that there is delay of four year, four months and four days occurred in preferring the appeal. 5.5 Furthermore, while examining the condonation of delay, the lower appellate court has taken into consideration that whether sufficient cause is made out or not. The lower appellate court has found in its impugned judgment that sufficient cause is occurred, which is beyond the control of the party and due to unavoidable circumstances, the party could to preferred the appeal within the prescribed period of time. While going through additional affidavit filed before this Court, it transpires that there is unacceptable excuse, whereby the attempt has been made by the petitioner to throw the burden on the shoulder of mediator, which is not justifiable and is found afterthought. The explanation given before the trial court is also not showing any aspect that the petitioner was remained vigilant and had actually made attempt to pursue the remedy before the trial court as well as before the appellate court. 5.6 The lower appellate court has rightly considered the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer reported in AIR 2014 SC 746 , more particularly, observation made in paragraph Nos.9 and 12 has been reproduced in its judgment, as under: “9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Sufficient cause is the cause for which defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See: Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. v. Bhootnath Banerjee & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 1336 ; Lala Matadin v. A. Narayanan, AIR 1970 SC 1953 ; Parimal v.Veena @ Bharti AIR 2011 SC 1150 ; and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai AIR 2012 SC 1629 .) 12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim “dura lex sed lex” which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.” 5.7 It also transpires that in the case of Basawaraj and Anr. (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court considered various judgments, as under: (i) Manindra Land And Buildingcorporation vs Bhutnath Banerjee And Others reported in AIR 1964 SC 1336 . (ii) Parimal vs. Veena alias Vharti reported in AIR 2011 SC 1150 . (iii) Maniben Devraj Shah vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai reported in AIR 2012 SC 1629 . 5.8 It transpires that the lower appellate court has rightly followed the dictum of law that the court must exercise its discretion by keeping in mind the presence of sufficient cause to condone the delay. Otherwise, if the Court is not keeping in mind this aspect, then such exercise would tantamount to show utter disrespect towards the legislature as well as the guidelines issued by the Hon’ble Apex Court. 5.9 In the present case, I found that the lower appellate court has used its discretion in justifiable manner as no sufficient cause is made out and no justifiable reason is found to condone the delay. On the contrary, the conduct of the petitioner speaks that the petitioner is remained negligent through out the legal proceeding though he was aware about the legal proceeding and has filed his appearance before the lower appellate court. On the contrary, the conduct of the petitioner speaks that the petitioner is remained negligent through out the legal proceeding though he was aware about the legal proceeding and has filed his appearance before the lower appellate court. 5.10 At this stage, it is required to refer the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Garments Craft vs. Prakash Chand Goel reported in (2022) 4 SCC 181 , more particularly, paragraph Nos.15 to 17 are relevant, wherein it was held that High Courts while exercising powers under Article 227 does not act as an appellate authority and cannot re-appreciate evidence and the jurisdiction exercised under Article 227 is in nature of correctional jurisdiction to set aside grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse of process of law and High Court cannot substitute its own view on merits. The aforesaid relevant paragraphs are as follows: “15. Having heard the counsel for the parties, we are clearly of the view that the impugned order is contrary to law and cannot be sustained for several reasons, but primarily for deviation from the limited jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the determination under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior court or tribunal.1 The jurisdiction exercised is in the nature of correctional jurisdiction to set right grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse, violation of fundamental principles of law or justice. The power under Article 227 is exercised sparingly in appropriate cases, like when there is no evidence at all to justify, or the finding is so perverse that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion that the court or tribunal has come to. It is axiomatic that such discretionary relief must be exercised to ensure there is no miscarriage of justice. 16. Explaining the scope of jurisdiction under Article 227, this Court in Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd., (2001) 8 SCC 97 has observed:- “6. It is axiomatic that such discretionary relief must be exercised to ensure there is no miscarriage of justice. 16. Explaining the scope of jurisdiction under Article 227, this Court in Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd., (2001) 8 SCC 97 has observed:- “6. The scope and ambit of exercise of power and jurisdiction by a High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is examined and explained in a number of decisions of this Court. The exercise of power under this article involves a duty on the High Court to keep inferior courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do the duty expected or required of them in a legal manner. The High Court is not vested with any unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the subordinate courts or tribunals. Exercise of this power and interfering with the orders of the courts or tribunals is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where if the High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice remains uncorrected. It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the face of the record. The High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of facts of an inferior court or tribunal, if there is no evidence at all to justify or the finding is so perverse, that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion, which the court or tribunal has come to.” 17. The factum that the counsel for the appellant had applied for the certified copy would show that the counsel for the appellant was aware that the ex- parte decree had been passed on the account of failure to lead defence evidence. This would not, however, be a good ground and reason to set aside and substitute the opinion formed by the trial court that the appellant being incarcerated was unable to lead evidence and another chance should be given to the appellant to lead defence evidence. This would not, however, be a good ground and reason to set aside and substitute the opinion formed by the trial court that the appellant being incarcerated was unable to lead evidence and another chance should be given to the appellant to lead defence evidence. The discretion exercised by the trial court in granting relief, did not suffer from an error apparent on the face of the record or was not a finding so perverse that it was unsupported by evidence to justify it. There could be some justification for the respondent to argue that the appellant was possibly aware of the ex-parte decree and therefore the submission that the appellant came to know of the ex-parte decree only on release from jail on 6th May 2017 is incorrect, but this would not affect the factually correct explanation of the appellant that he was incarcerated and could not attend the civil suit proceedings from 6th October 2015 to 6th May 2017. If it was felt that the application for setting aside the exparte decree was filed belatedly, the court could have given an opportunity to the appellant to file an application for condonation of delay and costs could have been imposed. The facts as known, equally apply as grounds for condonation of delay. It is always important to take a holistic and overall view and not get influenced by aspects which can be explained. Thus, the reasoned decision of the trial court on elaborate consideration of the relevant facts did not warrant interference in exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution.” 5.11 Considering all these aspects, I found no perversity or infirmity in the findings of the lower appellate court as the lower appellate court has exercised its discretion in accordance with law and in accordance with the facts of the present case. I am of the opinion that no case is made out to exercise my power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India for interfering in the impugned order. 6. As a result, the present petition is dismissed.