JUDGMENT : C. Jayachandran, J. The facts and events to be discussed in this appeal will unfurl the saga of the respondents/plaintiffs, who have been deprived of their valuable property by virtue of an acquisition as early as on 1978. The issue involved in the suit, from which this appeal arose, was minimal to the effect whether a reference in terms of Section 20 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1961, was in fact made by the respondents herein, a fact finding mission, pure and simple. Seeking a relief in this regard, the respondents have also approached this Court earlier in O.P.No.6311/1990. Relying upon the observations in Ext.A7 judgment rendered in the said Original Petition, as also, other circumstances, the learned Sub Judge, in the impugned judgment found, on the yardstick of preponderance of probability, that an application for reference under Section 20 was in fact preferred. Accordingly, the impugned judgment directed the defendants to refer the matter for consideration of the question of enhanced compensation in respect of the award concerned. An apparently innocuous direction contained in the impugned judgment was not relished by the Government, resulting in the filing of the instant appeal. The saddest part is that the appeal was pending before this Court from 1998 onwards. There was no effort from any quarter to bring up the matter and to get the same disposed of. When this Court, in its venture to identify and dispose of matters which are 25 plus years old, this appeal surfaced. When this was taken up for consideration, it was submitted by the appellant that, some of the respondents are not served even now. This Court chose to hear the appellant, as also, the contesting respondents, who have entered appearance on the merits of the matter and decided to complete the service, only if an interference in the impugned judgment is warranted. Having heard the Special Government Pleader on behalf of the appellant/State and the learned counsel for the contesting respondents, this Court is of the opinion that, there is no scope for any interference, whatsoever, to the impugned judgment, wherefore, this Court is not choosing to wait for completion of service to dispose of this matter. 2. Heard Sri.Hanil Kumar, learned Special Government Pleader (Revenue) for the petitioners, Sri. Arun Krishna Dhan, learned counsel for respondent nos. 2. Heard Sri.Hanil Kumar, learned Special Government Pleader (Revenue) for the petitioners, Sri. Arun Krishna Dhan, learned counsel for respondent nos. 10, 14, 16, 20 to 24 and Sri.Gopalakrishanan Nair, learned counsel for respondents no.2, 5, 6, 18 & 19. 3. With this prelude, this Court will address specifically the issues involved in this appeal. Two items of properties, which belonged to a tharavadu of which the respondents are members, were acquired in the year 1978 for the purposes of the Calicut Drainage Scheme. The first item of property was having an extent of 2.80 acres in Re- survey No.65/2 and the second, an extent of 1.10 acres in Re-survey No.65/7. In respect of the first item, award no.20/1978 was passed and in respect of the second, award no.26/1978 was passed. There is no controversy with respect to an application for reference having been preferred by the respondents in respect of the second item governed by award no.26/1978. The reference was answered and the respondents (owners of the property) were given enhancement in accordance with law. However, the specific issue arose with respect to the factum of an application for reference, preferred at the instance of the respondents in respect of the first item, governed by award no.20/1978, such fact being emphatically denied by the appellant/State. According to the appellants, no such application for reference was preferred in terms of Section 20 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1961, by the respondents in respect of the first item covered by award no.26/1978. 4. An Original Petition was preferred before this Court by the respondents herein, as O.P.No.6311/1990, seeking a mandamus commanding the State to refer the claim made by them against award no.20/1978. After considering the matter at some length, the learned Single Judge found that, the petitioners have to establish their claim in a civil court. It is accordingly, that the instant suit, O.S.No.556/1991, was preferred before the Sub Court, Kozhikode, seeking a declaration that the plaintiffs have filed application under Section 20 of the Land Acquisition Act on 12.09.1978, in respect of award no.20/1978, pertaining to the first item of property having an extent of 2.80 acres. A further direction was also sought for to refer the matter to the Land Acquisition Court for considering the question of enhanced compensation. 5. A further direction was also sought for to refer the matter to the Land Acquisition Court for considering the question of enhanced compensation. 5. The evidence in this case consists of Exts.A1 to A8, supported by the oral evidence of PW1 and PW2, for the plaintiffs (respondents herein). On behalf of the defendant/State, DW1–the Special Revenue Inspector was examined and Exts.B1 and B2 files were marked through him. An affidavit preferred by the 1st plaintiff, one Mr.M.Balakrishnan Nair, in L.A.R.No.85/1980 (pertaining to the second item of property covered by award no.26/1978) was called for and marked as Court Exhibit, C1. 6. On an analysis of the facts, evidence and probabilities of the case, the learned Sub Judge decreed the suit as prayed for. In decreeing the suit, the learned Sub Judge placed reliance upon the observations of this Court in the judgment rendered in O.P.(C)No.6311/1990 (Ext.A7) and also drew adverse inference against the Government/defendant in not producing the concerned files, especially a register which is specifically maintained for recording request for reference. 7. Learned Special Government Pleader for the appellants would raise three points before this Court. The first aspect is that, there was a complete denial as regards the receipt of an application under Section 20 of the Act, and that the appreciation of evidence in this regard is neither legal, nor proper. According to the learned Special Government Pleader, drawing adverse inference against the Government, when the burden is heavy on the plaintiffs to prove the fact that an application in fact has been preferred by them under Section 20, is grossly illegal. The second point urged by the learned counsel is that, even if Ext.A2 application is taken as one under Section 20 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1961, the same is clearly beyond the period of limitation prescribed in Section 20(2)(a) of the Act. The period prescribed under Section 20(2)(a) is six weeks from the date of the Collector's award. The award was passed on 31.07.1978, whereas, Ext.A2 application for reference is admittedly filed only on 12.09.1978. The period of 42 days corresponding to six weeks expired on 11.09.1978, wherefore, Ext.A2 application is beyond the time prescribed, is the argument advanced. The third aspect espoused by the learned Special Government Pleader is with respect to Ext.C1 affidavit, the appreciation of which in the impugned judgment is far from satisfactory. The period of 42 days corresponding to six weeks expired on 11.09.1978, wherefore, Ext.A2 application is beyond the time prescribed, is the argument advanced. The third aspect espoused by the learned Special Government Pleader is with respect to Ext.C1 affidavit, the appreciation of which in the impugned judgment is far from satisfactory. According to the learned Special Government Pleader, Ext.C1 would completely demolish the plaintiffs' claim that Ext.A2 application was preferred in respect of the first item of property covered by award No.20/1978. 8. In answer to the above contentions of the appellants, Sri.Arun Krishna Dhan, learned counsel appearing for the respondents aforementioned, would submit that, the judgment impugned, being well considered, warrants no interference, whatsoever. Learned counsel invited the attention of this Court to the findings in paragraph no.3 of Ext.A7 judgment of this Court to the effect that the files produced by the Government is not complete and that several letters and other relevant materials are missing in the files. Yet another finding made by the learned Single Judge is to the effect that, it is not possible to reject the contention that Ext.P3 application therein (Ext.A2 herein) was not made in time. One more finding arrived at by the learned Single Judge was heavily relied upon by the learned counsel, which is to the effect that an application for reference made promptly with respect to award no.26/1978 pertaining to the second item of property, is a clear indication that the plaintiffs would not have forgotten about award no.20/1978. Learned counsel would point out that, the parties were relegated to the remedy of filing a civil suit only in the context of affidavits against affidavits. Inasmuch as there is a finding in Ext.A7 judgment to the effect that the records produced are incomplete, it was the bounden duty of the Government to produce the relevant records, especially the official register which is admitted to have been maintained for recording the receipt of request for references. On burden of proof and also in drawing adverse inference, learned counsel placed heavy reliance upon two judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kamakshi Builders v. Ambedkar Educational Society and others [ 2007 (12) SCC 27 ] and Gopal Krishanaji Ketkar v. Mohamed Haji Latif and others [ AIR 1968 SC 1413 ]. On burden of proof and also in drawing adverse inference, learned counsel placed heavy reliance upon two judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kamakshi Builders v. Ambedkar Educational Society and others [ 2007 (12) SCC 27 ] and Gopal Krishanaji Ketkar v. Mohamed Haji Latif and others [ AIR 1968 SC 1413 ]. In the latter judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, a Bombay decision in T.S. Murugsesam Pillai v. Manickavasaka Desika [1917 (19) BOMLR 456] is also relied upon. Going by the dictum laid down in these judgments, irrespective of the burden of proof, the party, who is in possession of best evidence, has to adduce proof, failing which, drawing adverse inference is nothing, but legal. 9. On the question of limitation, learned counsel would submit that, instant facts are governed by Section 20(2)(b) and not (a) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1961. As a matter of fact, notice was issued by the District Collector on 07.08.1978, which can only be in terms of Section 20(2)(b) of the Act, which would also go to show that the plaintiffs or any among them were not present at the time when the award was made. If it is a case governed by Section 20(2)(b), the instant application for reference vide Ext.A2 is well within the time, is the submission made. 10. On the third aspect which pertains to Ext.C1 affidavit, learned counsel would submit that, the same has been properly explained, which has been rightly taken stock of by the learned Sub Judge in the impugned judgment. As has been noted in Ext.A7 judgment of this Court, the parties concerned, including the plaintiffs, were laboring under the impression that the reference made in respect of the second item covered by award no.26/1978 is a composite reference in respect of both the awards; and it is only when the same was revealed to be otherwise that Ext.C1 affidavit happened to be preferred. At any rate, the rights of the parties cannot be decided solely depending upon the contents of Ext.C1 affidavit; and other relevant materials, which has been rightly taken stock of by the learned Sub Judge, are also liable to be reckoned, is the alternate submission made by the counsel for the respondents. 11. Sri.Gopalakrishanan Nair, learned counsel for the respondents afore-referred would adopt the contentions raised by the learned counsel for other respondents, which have already been adverted above. 11. Sri.Gopalakrishanan Nair, learned counsel for the respondents afore-referred would adopt the contentions raised by the learned counsel for other respondents, which have already been adverted above. 12. Having heard the respective counsel for the parties, this Court finds considerable force in the submissions made by the counsel for the respondents. The first aspect to be noted is that, in civil suits, we are governed by the yardstick of preponderance of probabilities. The fact in issue in the suit is whether Ext.A2 application under Section 20 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1961, was in fact preferred by the plaintiffs on 12.09.1978. One aspect to be borne in mind is that, going by the pleadings, Ext.A2 was handed over to the Tahsildar. There is no quarrel with respect to the fact that an application for reference under Section 20 of the Act was preferred in respect of the second extent of property having an extent of 1.10 acres covered by award no.26/1978. If that be so, as rightly observed by this Court in Ext.A7 judgment, it is only logical to think that an application for reference in respect of the first item of property, covered by award no.20/1978, would also have been preferred by the plaintiffs, especially when the first item is having a larger extent of 2.80 acres, when compared to the lesser extent of 1.10 acres of the second item of property. This aspect, which was found by a learned Single Judge in Ext.A7 judgment, was taken stock of by the learned Sub Judge to answer the issue in favour of the plaintiffs. 13. The second aspect to be noted is with respect to the adverse inference drawn. Before addressing the facts, it is relevant to notice the legal position in this regard. The first judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents is a decision of the Bombay High Court in T.S.Murugesam Pillai(supra). The relevant findings are contained in paragraph no.14 of the judgment, which is extracted herebelow: “14. A practice has grown up in Indian procedure of those in possession of important documents of information lying by, trusting to the abstract doctrine of the onus of proof and failing accordingly to furnish to the Courts the best material for its decision. The relevant findings are contained in paragraph no.14 of the judgment, which is extracted herebelow: “14. A practice has grown up in Indian procedure of those in possession of important documents of information lying by, trusting to the abstract doctrine of the onus of proof and failing accordingly to furnish to the Courts the best material for its decision. With regard to third parties, this may be right enough: they have no responsibility for the conduct of the suit; but with regard to the parties to the suit it is, in their Lordships' opinion, an inversion of sound practice for those desiring to rely upon a certain state of facts to withhold from the Court the written evidence in their possession which would throw light upon the proposition. The present is a good instance of this bad practice. It is proved in the case by the first witness that "the mutt has regular fair day-books; they are not now before the Court; ledgers are also maintained in the mutt." These ledgers and day-books were in the possession of the defendants or those of them who were heads of the institution and they are not put in evidence. The proposition that these defendants challenged was that the expenses incurred had been incurred for the mutt and were necessary for its purposes. The best assistance to a Court of justice would have been a scrutiny of these documents and their Lordships feel free to conclude that - if they had been by their entries confirmatory of the defendants' view the defendants would have- brought them into Court. This part of the case, which in their Lordships' view is of considerable importance, is not referred to in the High Court.” 14. This dictum is relied upon by the Supreme Court in Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar(supra). Extracts of the above observations contained in T.S.Murugesam Pillai(supra) is seen quoted with approval to find as follows: “Even if the burden of proof does not lie on a party the Court may draw an adverse inference if he withholds important documents in his possession which can throw light on the facts at issue. Extracts of the above observations contained in T.S.Murugesam Pillai(supra) is seen quoted with approval to find as follows: “Even if the burden of proof does not lie on a party the Court may draw an adverse inference if he withholds important documents in his possession which can throw light on the facts at issue. It is not, in our opinion, a sound practice for those desiring to rely upon a certain state of facts to withhold from the Court the best evidence which is in their possession which could throw light upon the issues in controversy and to rely upon the abstract doctrine of onus of proof.” 15. Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar (supra) was cited with approval by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kamakshi Builders(supra). The relevant findings in paragraph no.18 of the judgment is that adverse inference is liable to be drawn against DW2 therein, for not having produced a letter, on the premise that the same, if produced, would have gone against the interests of respondent no.1. 16. It could therefore safely be concluded that, irrespective of the burden of proof, the party who is in possession of the best evidence, which can throw light to the fact in issue, has a duty to produce the same; and if the same is not done, it will be quite within the limits of law to draw adverse inference against such party. 17. Coming to the facts, although Exts.B1 and B2 files were produced by the defendants, the files were found to be incomplete and not in order. As a matter of fact, this finding was entered into by this Court vide Ext.A7 judgment, way back in 1990. It was found that the files produced was not complete and that several letters and other relevant materials are missing. Even then, the appellant/State has not chosen to produce the relevant records before the trial court. This is especially so, with respect to a register which is admittedly maintained in the office of the 2nd defendant, wherein entries with respect to the receipt of applications for reference under Section 20 is made. The fact that such a register is being maintained is deposed to by the official witness, DW1. However, the relevant register was not produced. This is especially so, with respect to a register which is admittedly maintained in the office of the 2nd defendant, wherein entries with respect to the receipt of applications for reference under Section 20 is made. The fact that such a register is being maintained is deposed to by the official witness, DW1. However, the relevant register was not produced. Going by the dictum laid down in the three judgments afore-referred, adverse inference drawn by the learned trial Judge can only be sustained, dehors the question as to the burden of proof, since, the defendants in the suit (appellants herein) are possessed of the best evidence on the fact in issue. In the context of burden of proof also, one aspect is liable to be noted. The primary burden is upon the plaintiffs to establish that an application in terms of Section 20 of the Land Acquisition Act was in fact preferred. Ext.A2, which according to the plaintiff is such an application, which was produced. Ext.A2 refers to the fact that the intimation in terms of Section 20(2)(b) was received only on 07.08.1978. There is no proof with respect to issuance of Ext.A2, inasmuch as the same was physically handed over, going by the plaintiffs' case. An observation made by the learned Single Judge in Ext.A7 in this regard is relevant, which is extracted here below. “The copy of Ext.P3 produced, by its appearance, appears to be several years old. It is not possible to reject the contention that the application Ext.P3 was not made in time. The fact that in the connected award 26/78 petitioners had been moving promptly, is an indication that they would not have forgotten about the award 20/78.” 18. This being the position, to which the defendants have been sensitized even prior to the institution of the suit, this Court is of the opinion that, the burden has certainly shifted to the defendants to adduce the best evidence, which should have thrown light to the question as to whether Ext.A2 application was received in the office, as claimed by the plaintiffs. This Court, therefore, concludes that drawing adverse inference against the appellants by the trial court is only to be sustained. 19. This Court, therefore, concludes that drawing adverse inference against the appellants by the trial court is only to be sustained. 19. Coming to the question of the limitation urged, the issue can be put to rest by holding that the situation is governed by Section 20(2) (b); and not Section 20(2)(a), as canvassed by the learned counsel for the appellants. Section 20(2) (a) applies in a case where, the person making an application under Section 20 was present or represented before the Collector at the time when award was made, in which case, the reference application has to be filed within six weeks from the date of award. It is the appellants’ case that the plaintiffs were represented before the District Collector, wherefore, Section 20(2)(a) will apply. However, it remains an indisputable fact that notice under Section 20(2)(b) has been issued to the plaintiffs, which has been referred to in Ext.A2 application itself. That apart, there is a specific pleading to this effect in the plaint, which has not been denied by the defendants in the written statement. The solitary denial is to the effect that Ext.A2 application has not been received in the office of the 2nd defendant. There is no denial with respect to the fact that a notice under Section 20(2)(b) was issued by the 2nd defendant Collector and was received by the plaintiffs on 07.08.1978. If that fact is established, is it not a sure pointer to the fact that plaintiffs or any one among them were not present or represented at the time when the award was made? The answer which occurs in the mind of this Court is only to the affirmative. Thus, if the fact situation is to be governed by Section 20(2)(b), there arises no question of limitation. Even assuming that the situation is to be governed by Section 20(2)(a), it is only reasonable to interpret and hold that six weeks from the date of Collector's award means six weeks from the date of receipt of the award; an interpretation to the contrary would sometimes defeat very valuable rights of the parties, as is sought to be canvassed in the instant facts, where Ext.A2 application is allegedly filed on the day next, from the date of expiry of six weeks from the date of award; and not from the date of receipt of the award. In the circumstances, the said contention based on the limitation will also stand repelled. 20. The third contention is with respect to Ext.C1 affidavit. Ext.C1 is an affidavit in support of an application for amendment. There, what is stated is that the petitioners therein have omitted to include the property comprised in resurvey no.65/7, in their statement before the Land Acquisition Court. The statement only refers to the properties comprised in survey nos. 65/1 and 65/2 and one comprised in 65/7 is omitted. The affidavit also explains that the same is only an omission, since in the statement filed before the L.A. Officer, as also, in the petition filed before the District Collector, properties comprised in re-survey no.65/7 are also included in the properties acquired. Accordingly, in the affidavit, the claimants would claim that they are entitled to enhanced compensation with respect to property comprised in re-survey no.65/7, as well. 21. First of all, this Court finds that, Ext.C1 does not support in any manner the contention of the defendants/appellants. Secondly, it speaks of the omission with respect to re-survey no.65/7, whereas, the subject property involved in the suit is comprised in re-survey no.65/2. This affidavit has to be read in conjunction with the contention of the parties and the observations in Ext.A7 judgment to the effect that the parties were under the impression that L.A.R.No.85/1982 covered all the survey numbers, whereas, it did not do so in fact, as observed by the learned Single Judge. This Court is of the opinion that, Ext.C1, by itself, cannot tilt the balance in favour of the appellants/defendants. That apart, this Court can only endorse the submissions made by the learned counsel for the respondents that the other evidence, having a clear bearing upon the issue, cannot be eschewed relying Ext.C1 alone. The issue was considered in the right perspective by the learned Sub Judge, which findings are also to be confirmed. 22. Apart from all these aspects on the merits, this Court is not quite happy with the instant appeal preferred by the State, which is duty bound to safeguard all the constitutional guarantees of its citizens. It is not in dispute that the property having an extent of 2.80 acres covered by award no.20/1978 has been acquired. 22. Apart from all these aspects on the merits, this Court is not quite happy with the instant appeal preferred by the State, which is duty bound to safeguard all the constitutional guarantees of its citizens. It is not in dispute that the property having an extent of 2.80 acres covered by award no.20/1978 has been acquired. It is one thing to say that the compensation as fixed by the Government officials has been awarded/offered to the claimants vide the award referred above. It is, however, equally important to state that the right of the claimants under Section 20 is an important right, especially in the context of Article 300 A of the Constitution. Section 20 only enables the claimants to seek a reference to a court of law to adjudicate as regards the correctness of the compensation granted. It is even in respect of this opportunity that the mighty Government wants to stand in the way of the claimants, by sticking on technical grounds of limitation etc. The Government should have, in all grace, complied with the impugned judgment, which was rendered in the year 1995, instead of carrying the instant appeal, which occasioned a delay of more than 25 years, thereby depriving the parties (respondents herein) of their legitimate due, pursuant to a reference under Section 20 of the Act. The State should have been sensitive to the substantive rights of the parties flowing from Article 300 A, as also, the relevant provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, when pitted against technical considerations of limitation etc. raised in this appeal. 23. The upshot of the above discussion is that this appeal is devoid of any merit and the same would stand dismissed. All pending interlocutory applications will also stand dismissed.