JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The petitioners have filed the present petition for quashing of FIR no. 524 of 2017 dated 24.12.2017 for the commission of offences punishable under Section 506 of IPC and Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Corruption) Act (SC & ST Act), at Police Station Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur and subsequent criminal case no. 3-ST/7 of 2018 titled State of H.P. versus Rajeev Mahajan pending before learned Special Judge, Sirmaur at Nahan. 2. The informant-victim made a complaint to the police asserting that he belongs to Scheduled Castes. He was serving as a labourer on 13.12.2014 with the contractor. His services were placed with the company on 03.07.2015. He was being asked to perform the duty for 12 hours instead of the stipulated time. He was being given Rs. 7,000/- instead of his salary of Rs.7,700/-. Other benefits were also not provided to him. Whenever he was on leave, he was asked to write an apology letter or he was marked absent. When the informant protested, he was threatened. His services were terminated. He talked to the officers and they promised to re-engage him. When no action was taken, he talked to the owner of the company. The officers got annoyed and started harassing the informant. He was being taunted and insulted in the presence of his colleagues. He was called on 12.11.2016 with the co-workers to the main gate. General Manager Rajiv Mahajan and HR Ravinder Chauhan came to the gate and stated that anyone who would complain against them would be treated in the same manner as the informant. He was also insulted in the name of his caste. When the informant protested that nothing should be said about his caste, he was slapped and told to resign. The police registered the FIR No. 524/2017 and conducted the investigation. After the completion of the investigations, the charge sheet was prepared and presented before the Court for the commission of offences punishable under Section 506 of IPC and Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of SC & ST Act. 3. The petitioners filed the present petition to quash the FIR and the consequent proceedings. It was asserted that the FIR was registered with the ulterior motive. The informant was removed due to his indiscipline, carelessness and incompetence. 3. The petitioners filed the present petition to quash the FIR and the consequent proceedings. It was asserted that the FIR was registered with the ulterior motive. The informant was removed due to his indiscipline, carelessness and incompetence. He filed a false FIR against the petitioner after a gap of more than one year. The ingredients of Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Corruption) Act are not satisfied in the present case. 07 witnesses have made the statement before the Court; however, no one has deposed against the petitioners. The informant demanded Rs.7,00,000/-for settling the matter and a CRMMO No. 1165 of 2022 was also filed; however, the victim demanded Rs.15,00,000/- and a job for himself and his wife after the filing of the petition. The Court had passed an order asking the S.P. to submit the report. Subsequently, an order to register an FIR against the informant was passed by the Court. The FIR is a result of vengeance and the informant is taking advantage of his caste. The matter was earlier investigated and nothing was found in the complaint. The present FIR was lodged after one year and one month, which shows the falsity of the FIR. There is a labour dispute between the parties and the FIR has been lodged to pressurize the petitioners. The informant compromised the matter before the Labour Inspector and the informant took three months' salary. Thereafter, he approached every forum to build the pressure. The incident had not taken place in the presence of any person. The continuation of the proceedings is an abuse of the process of law. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR be quashed. 4. A status report was filed reproducing the contents of the FIR. It was asserted that Surinder Kumar, Raman Dhiman and Dinesh Kumar have corroborated the version of the informant regarding the abuse in the name of caste. No evidence was found against Ravinder Chauhan and he was cited in column no. 12. 5. Respondent No. 2 filed a reply reproducing the contents of the FIR. It was asserted that Cr.MMO No. 1165 of 2022 was filed, which was dismissed by the Court holding that there was no reason for the Court to exercise its inherent power. No evidence was found against Ravinder Chauhan and he was cited in column no. 12. 5. Respondent No. 2 filed a reply reproducing the contents of the FIR. It was asserted that Cr.MMO No. 1165 of 2022 was filed, which was dismissed by the Court holding that there was no reason for the Court to exercise its inherent power. The petitioner had abused and beaten the victim and discriminated against him based on his caste. There was no misuse of the provisions of the SC&ST Act. The findings recorded in the earlier proceedings constitute res judicata and it is not permissible to re-agitate the matter before this Court. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 6. I have heard Mr. Nitin Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. R.P Singh, learned Deputy Advocate General for respondent no. 1 and Mr. N.K. Tomar, learned counsel for respondent no. 2/informant. 7. Mr. Nitin Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners are innocent and they were falsely implicated. The FIR was lodged after a delay of one year for which, no proper explanation was provided. The litigation is pending between the parties and the FIR is a counter-blast to the litigation. It was filed to pressurize the present petitioners; hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and FIR be quashed. 8. Mr. R.P. Singh, learned Deputy Advocate General for respondent no. 1/State submitted that the FIR clearly shows that the petitioners had abused the informant in the name of his caste. The police did not find any material against Ravinder Chauhan and he was kept in Column No.12. The learned Trial Court is seized of the matter; therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 9. Mr N.K. Tomar, learned counsel for respondent no. 2/informant submitted that the petitioners had earlier filed a petition for quashing the FIR based on the compromise; however, the said petition was dismissed. The present petition is barred by the principle of res judicata; therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 10. I have given considerable thought to the submissions at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 11. The present petition is barred by the principle of res judicata; therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 10. I have given considerable thought to the submissions at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 11. The principles of exercising the jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. were laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Supriya Jain v. State of Haryana, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 765 : (2023) 7 SCC 711 wherein it was observed at page 716:- 17. The principles to be borne in mind with regard to the quashing of a charge/proceedings either in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397CrPC or Section 482CrPC or together, as the case may be, has engaged the attention of this Court many a time. Reference to each and every precedent is unnecessary. However, we may profitably refer to only one decision of this Court where upon a survey of almost all the precedents on the point, the principles have been summarised by this Court succinctly. In Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], this Court laid down the following guiding principles : (SCC pp. 482-84, para 27) “27. …27.1. Though there are no limits to the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. 27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere. 27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. 27.4. 27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. 27.4. Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loath to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in the exercise of its inherent powers. 27.5. Where there is an express legal bar enacted in any of the provisions of the Code or any specific law in force to the very initiation or institution and continuance of such criminal proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide specific protection to an accused. 27.6. The Court has a duty to balance the freedom of a person and the right of the complainant or prosecution to investigate and prosecute the offender. 27.7. The process of the court cannot be permitted to be used for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose. 27.8. Where the allegations made and as they appeared from the record and documents annexed therewith to predominantly give rise to and constitute a “civil wrong” with no “element of criminality” and does not satisfy the basic ingredients of a criminal offence, the court may be justified in quashing the charge. Even in such cases, the court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence. 27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice. 27.10. It is neither necessary nor is the court called upon to hold a full-fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction. 27.11. Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot be maintained. 27.12. 27.11. Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot be maintained. 27.12. In the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 228 and/or under Section 482, the Court cannot take into consideration external materials given by an accused for reaching the conclusion that no offence was disclosed or that there was the possibility of his acquittal. The Court has to consider the record and documents annexed therewith by the prosecution. 27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit a continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to deciding the admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie. 27.14. Where the charge sheet, reported under Section 173(2) of the Code, suffers from fundamental legal defects, the Court may be well within its jurisdiction to frame a charge. 27.15. Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court finds that it would amount to an abuse of process of the Code or that the interest of justice favours, otherwise it may quash the charge. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e. to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone, the courts exist. 27.16. These are the principles which individually and preferably cumulatively (one or more) be taken into consideration as precepts to exercise extraordinary and wide plenitude and jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code by the High Court. Where the factual foundation for an offence has been laid down, the courts should be reluctant and should not hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance with the requirements of the offence.” 12. Similar is the judgment in Gulam Mustafa v. State of Karnataka, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 603 wherein it was observed:- 26. Although we are not for verbosity in our judgments, a slightly detailed survey of the judicial precedents is in order. Similar is the judgment in Gulam Mustafa v. State of Karnataka, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 603 wherein it was observed:- 26. Although we are not for verbosity in our judgments, a slightly detailed survey of the judicial precedents is in order. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, this Court held: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice.” (emphasis supplied) 13. It was laid down in CBI v. Aryan Singh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379, that the High Court cannot conduct a mini-trial while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. The allegations are required to be proved during the trial by leading evidence. It was observed: 10. From the impugned common judgment and order passed by the High Court, it appears that the High Court has dealt with the proceedings before it, as if, the High Court was conducting a mini-trial and/or the High Court was considering the applications against the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court on conclusion of trial. From the impugned common judgment and order passed by the High Court, it appears that the High Court has dealt with the proceedings before it, as if, the High Court was conducting a mini-trial and/or the High Court was considering the applications against the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court on conclusion of trial. As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. The High Court in the common impugned judgment and order has observed that the charges against the accused are not proved. This is not the stage where the prosecution/investigating agency is/are required to prove the charges. The charges are required to be proved during the trial based on the evidence led by the prosecution/investigating agency. Therefore, the High Court has materially erred in going into detail in the allegations and the material collected during the course of the investigation against the accused, at this stage. At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider “whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not”. 11. One other reason pointed out by the High Court is that the initiation of the criminal proceedings/proceedings is malicious. At this stage, it is required to be noted that the investigation was handed over to the CBI pursuant to the directions issued by the High Court. That thereafter, on conclusion of the investigation, the accused persons have been charge-sheeted. Therefore, the High Court has erred in observing at this stage that the initiation of the criminal proceedings/proceedings is malicious. Whether the criminal proceedings was/were malicious or not, is not required to be considered at this stage. The same is required to be considered at the conclusion of the trial. In any case, at this stage, what is required to be considered is a prima facie case and the material collected during the course of the investigation, which warranted the accused to be tried. 14. This position was reiterated in Abhishek v. State of M.P. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1083 wherein it was observed: 12. In any case, at this stage, what is required to be considered is a prima facie case and the material collected during the course of the investigation, which warranted the accused to be tried. 14. This position was reiterated in Abhishek v. State of M.P. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1083 wherein it was observed: 12. The contours of the power to quash criminal proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. are well defined. In V. Ravi Kumar v. State represented by Inspector of Police, District Crime Branch, Salem, Tamil Nadu [ (2019) 14 SCC 568 ], this Court affirmed that where an accused seeks quashing of the FIR, invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court, it is wholly impermissible for the High Court to enter into the factual arena to adjudge the correctness of the allegations in the complaint. In Neeharika Infrastructure (P). Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra [Criminal Appeal No. 330 of 2021, decided on 13.04.2021], a 3-Judge Bench of this Court elaborately considered the scope and extent of the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. It was observed that the power of quashing should be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases, such standard not being confused with the norm formulated in the context of the death penalty. It was further observed that while examining the FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the Court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made therein, but if the Court thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, and more particularly, the parameters laid down by this Court in R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab ( AIR 1960 SC 866 ) and State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [(1992) Supp (1) SCC 335], the Court would have jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint. 15. It is apparent from these judgments that power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. can be exercised to prevent the abuse of process or secure the ends of justice. The Court can quash the F.I.R. if the allegations do not constitute an offence or make out a case against the accused. However, it is not permissible for it to conduct a mini-trial to arrive at such findings. 16. The Court can quash the F.I.R. if the allegations do not constitute an offence or make out a case against the accused. However, it is not permissible for it to conduct a mini-trial to arrive at such findings. 16. It was submitted that there is an inordinate delay in reporting the matter to the police, which is fatal to the prosecution case. This submission is not acceptable It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chanchalpati Das v. State of W.B., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 650 that the delay in reporting the matter cannot be a ground to quash the FIR. It was observed: “16. As regards inordinate delay in filing the complaint, it has been recently observed by this Court in Hasmukhlal D. Vora v. State of Tamil Nadu 2022 SCC Online SC 1732 that though inordinate delay in itself may not be a ground for quashing a criminal complaint, however unexplained inordinate delay must be taken into consideration as a very crucial factor and ground for quashing a criminal complaint.” 17. Therefore, the FIR cannot be quashed on the grounds of delay. 18. The FIR clearly mentions that the petitioners had abused the informant in the name of his caste. The police conducted the investigation and found that petitioners were present near the gate on 12.11.2016 at 2-2:30 pm. Petitioner Rajiv Mahajan abused the victim in the name of his caste. Raman Dhiman and Dinesh Kumar corroborated the version of the petitioner and deposed that Rajiv Mahajan had abused the informant in the name of his caste. These allegations establish the ingredients of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC & ST Act. They have also corroborated the version of the informant that Rajiv Mahajan had threatened the informant which satisfies the requirement of Section 506 of IPC. 19. Heavy reliance was placed upon the memo of settlement, the report made by Additional S.P. to S.P. (Police) regarding the complaint made by the informant, and a letter written to IG (Police) specifying the result of the preliminary inquiry. These are merely photocopies and cannot be looked into in these proceedings. 19. Heavy reliance was placed upon the memo of settlement, the report made by Additional S.P. to S.P. (Police) regarding the complaint made by the informant, and a letter written to IG (Police) specifying the result of the preliminary inquiry. These are merely photocopies and cannot be looked into in these proceedings. It was laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in MCD v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi, (1983) 1 SCC 1 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 115, that the proceedings can be quashed if on the face of the complaint and the papers accompanying the same no offence is constituted. It is not permissible to add or subtract anything. It was observed: “10. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that proceedings against an accused in the initial stages can be quashed only if on the face of the complaint or the papers accompanying the same, no offence is constituted. In other words, the test is that taking the allegations and the complaint as they are, without adding or subtracting anything, if no offence is made out then the High Court will be justified in quashing the proceedings in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the present Code.” 20. Madras High Court also held in Ganga Bai v. Shriram, 1990 SCC OnLine MP 213: ILR 1992 MP 964: 1991 Cri LJ 2018, that the fresh evidence is not permissible or desirable in the proceedings under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. It was observed: “Proceedings under Section 482, Cr.P.C. cannot be allowed to be converted into a full-dressed trial. Shri Maheshwari filed a photostate copy of an order dated 28.7.1983, passed in Criminal Case No. 1005 of 1977, to which the present petitioner was not a party. Fresh evidence at this stage is neither permissible nor desirable. The respondent by filing this document is virtually introducing additional evidence, which is not the object of Section 482, Cr.P.C.” 21. Andhra Pradesh High Court also took a similar view in Bharat Metal Box Company Limited, Hyderabad and Others vs. G. K. Strips Private Limited and another, 2004 STPL 43 AP, and held: “9. This Court can only look into the complaint and the documents filed along with it and the sworn statements of the witnesses if any recorded. While judging the correctness of the proceedings, it cannot look into the documents, which are not filed before the lower Court. This Court can only look into the complaint and the documents filed along with it and the sworn statements of the witnesses if any recorded. While judging the correctness of the proceedings, it cannot look into the documents, which are not filed before the lower Court. Section 482 Cr.PC debars the Court to look into fresh documents, in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa and another, 2002 (1) Supreme 192 . The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as follows: "The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears that on consideration of the allegations, in the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court. When information is lodged at the Police Station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in Court, which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by itself be the basis for quashing the proceedings". 22. A similar view was taken in Mahendra K.C. v. State of Karnataka, (2022) 2 SCC 129 : (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 401 wherein it was observed at page 142: “16. … the test to be applied is whether the allegations in the complaint as they stand, without adding or detracting from the complaint, prima facie establish the ingredients of the offence alleged. At this stage, the High Court cannot test the veracity of the allegations nor for that matter can it proceed in the manner that a judge conducting a trial would, on the basis of the evidence collected during the course of the trial.” 23. This position was reiterated in Supriya Jain v. State of Haryana, (2023) 7 SCC 711 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 765 wherein it was held: 13. This position was reiterated in Supriya Jain v. State of Haryana, (2023) 7 SCC 711 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 765 wherein it was held: 13. All these documents which the petitioner seeks to rely on, if genuine, could be helpful for her defence at the trial but the same are not material at the stage of deciding whether quashing as prayed for by her before the High Court was warranted or not. We, therefore, see no reason to place any reliance on these three documents. 24. A similar view was taken in Iveco Magirus Brandschutztechnik GMBH v. Nirmal Kishore Bhartiya, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1258, wherein it was observed: 55. Adverting to the aspect of the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Courts under section 482, Cr. P.C., in a case where the offence of defamation is claimed by the accused to have not been committed based on any of the Exceptions and a prayer for quashing, is made, the law seems to be well settled that the High Courts can go no further and enlarge the scope of inquiry if the accused seeks to rely on materials which were not there before the Magistrate. This is based on the simple proposition that what the Magistrate could not do, the High Courts may not do. We may not be understood to undermine the High Courts' powers saved by section 482, Cr.P.C.; such powers are always available to be exercised ex debito justitiae, i.e., to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the High Courts exist. However, the tests laid down for quashing an F.I.R. or criminal proceedings arising from a police report by the High Courts in the exercise of jurisdiction under section 482, Cr.P.C. not being substantially different from the tests laid down for quashing of a process issued under section 204 read with section 200, the High Courts on recording due satisfaction are empowered to interfere if on a reading of the complaint, the substance of statements on oath of the complainant and the witness, if any, and documentary evidence as produced, no offence is made out and that proceedings, if allowed to continue, would amount to an abuse of the legal process. This too, would be impermissible if the justice of a given case does not overwhelmingly so demand.” (Emphasis supplied) 25. This too, would be impermissible if the justice of a given case does not overwhelmingly so demand.” (Emphasis supplied) 25. Therefore, it is not permissible to look into the material filed by the petitioners with the petition and the Court has to rely upon the FIR and the report submitted by the police. 26. It was submitted that the present petition is barred by the principle of res judicata. This submission cannot be accepted because the principle of res judicata does not apply to the criminal proceedings. However, it was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhisham Lal Verma v. State of U.P., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1399 that a person approaching the High Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. should take all the pleas and it is impermissible to file the petitions in piecemeal. It was observed: 10. In S. Madan Kumar v. K. Arjunan 2006 SCC OnLine Mad 94, the Madras High Court observed that a person who invokes Section 482 Cr. P.C. should honestly come before the Court raising all the pleas available to him at that point of time and he is not supposed to approach the Court with instalment pleas. It was further observed that there may be a change of circumstances during the course of criminal proceedings which would give scope for the person aggrieved to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the Court, but when he is posted with all the facts and circumstances of a case, he cannot withhold part of it for the purpose of filing yet another petition seeking the same relief. 11. We are in complete agreement with these observations of the Madras High Court. Though it is clear that there can be no blanket rule that a second petition under Section 482 Cr. P.C. would not lie in any situation and it would depend upon the facts and circumstances of the individual case, it is not open to a person aggrieved to raise one plea after the other, by invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 Cr. P.C., though all such pleas were very much available even at the first instance. Permitting the filing of successive petitions under Section 482 Cr. P.C. ignoring this principle would enable an ingenious accused to effectively stall the proceedings against him to suit his own interest and convenience, by filing one petition after another under Section 482 Cr. P.C., though all such pleas were very much available even at the first instance. Permitting the filing of successive petitions under Section 482 Cr. P.C. ignoring this principle would enable an ingenious accused to effectively stall the proceedings against him to suit his own interest and convenience, by filing one petition after another under Section 482 Cr. P.C., irrespective of when the cause therefor arose. Such abuse of process cannot be permitted. 27. It was submitted that the second petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is not barred. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anil Khadkiwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2019) 17 SCC 294 in support of this submission. It was held in the cited case that the second petition is maintainable under changed circumstances. It was held in R. Annapurna v. Ramadugu Anantha Krishna Sastry, (2002) 10 SCC 401: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1135: 2000 SCC OnLine SC 1143 that where development had taken place after the rejection of the earlier petition, the second petition is not maintainable. It was observed: 6. There can be no two opinions that the order dated 28-1-1995 has become final. Learned counsel for the respondents made an endeavour to show that it is open to the same parties to move the High Court once again on causes which developed subsequent to 28 -1-1995. We are not considering that contention in the present case, for the second petition for quashing was not made on the strength of anything which developed subsequent to 28-1-1995 but only on the facts which subsisted before that date. If that be so, the High Court had no power to upset the order dated 28-1-1995 with the help of any subsequent order though in this case the High Court did so without being informed of the prior order. 28. In the present case, there is no change in the circumstances and the present petition is not maintainable. 29. It was submitted that the contents of the FIR are false and inherently improbable. This submission cannot be accepted. The contents of the FIR are duly corroborated by the statements of Raman and Dinesh and cannot be said to be false. In the present case, there is no change in the circumstances and the present petition is not maintainable. 29. It was submitted that the contents of the FIR are false and inherently improbable. This submission cannot be accepted. The contents of the FIR are duly corroborated by the statements of Raman and Dinesh and cannot be said to be false. In any case, it was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Maroti, (2023) 4 SCC 298 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1503 that the High Court exercising the power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. cannot examine the truthfulness, sufficiency admissibility of the evidence. It was observed: 21. If FIR and the materials collected disclose a cognizable offence and the final report filed under Section 173(2)CrPC on completion of investigation based on it would reveal that the ingredients to constitute an offence under the POCSO Act and a prima facie case against the persons named therein as accused, the truthfulness, sufficiency or admissibility of the evidence are not matters falling within the purview of exercise of power under Section 482CrPC and undoubtedly they are matters to be done by the trial court at the time of trial. This position is evident from the decisions referred to supra. 22. In the decision in M.L. Bhatt v. M.K. Pandita [M.L. Bhatt v. M.K. Pandita, (2023) 12 SCC 821: 2002 SCC OnLine SC 1300: JT (2002) 3 SC 89], this Court held that while considering the question of quashing of FIR the High Court would not be entitled to appreciate by way of sifting the materials collected in course of investigation including the statements recorded under Section 161CrPC. 23. In the decision in Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab [Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab, (2020) 3 SCC 317 : (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 51], a two-judge Bench of this Court dealt with the question as to the matters that could be considered by the High Court in quashment proceedings under Section 482 CrPC. It was held therein that statements of witnesses recorded under Section 161 CrPC being wholly inadmissible in evidence could not be taken into consideration by the Court while adjudicating a petition filed under Section 482 CrPC. It was held therein that statements of witnesses recorded under Section 161 CrPC being wholly inadmissible in evidence could not be taken into consideration by the Court while adjudicating a petition filed under Section 482 CrPC. In that case, this Court took note of the fact that the High Court was aware that one of the witnesses mentioned that the deceased victim had informed him about the harassment by the accused, which she was not able to bear and hence wanted to commit suicide. Finding that the conclusion of the High Court to quash the criminal proceedings, in that case, was on the basis of its assessment of the statements recorded under Section 161 CrPC, it was held that statements thereunder, being wholly inadmissible in evidence could not have been taken into consideration by the Court while adjudicating a petition filed under Section 482 CrPC. It was also held that the High Court committed an error in quashing the proceedings by assessing the statements recorded under Section 161 CrPC. 30. In the present case, the charge sheet has been filed and it is for the learned Trial Court to see the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P. , (2023) 8 SCC 734 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was observed: “At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and charge-sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence more particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, yet we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating officer might have collected forming part of the charge sheet. We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating officer might have collected forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any case for discharge is made out or not.” 31. Therefore, there is no material to exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.PC. in the present case. 32. In view of the above, the present petition cannot be allowed and the same is dismissed. 33. The observation made hereinabove shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.