JUDGMENT : V.Gopala Krishna Rao, J. This Appeal, under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure [for short ‘the C.P.C.’], is filed by the Appellant/defendant challenging the Decree and Judgment, dated 07.01.2002, in O.S. No.25 of 1995 passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Anakapalli [for short ‘the trial Court’]. The first Respondent herein is the plaintiff in the said Suit. The first respondent/plaintiff died during the pendency of the appeal, the second respondent was brought on record as L.R. of first respondent/ plaintiff. 2. The respondent/plaintiff filed the Suit for recovery of possession of the plaint schedule property and for recovery of damages to a tune of Rs.5,00,000/-. 3. Both the parties in the Appeal will be referred to as they are arrayed before the trial Court. 4. The brief averments of the plaint, in O.S. No.25 of 1995, are as under: In the year 1959, the suit schedule land was given for lease for 10 years to M/s.Caltex India Limited, Visakhapatnam by Sri P.V.G.Raju. In the year 1960 Sri P.V.G.Raju sold the said plaint schedule land to the plaintiff under the cover of registered sale deed. The lease that was given by Sri P.V.G.Raju to M/s.Caltex India Limited, Visakhapatnam had expired on 22.09.1969, thereafter at the request of M/s.Caltex India Limited, the plaintiff extended the term of lease for another 10 years, subsequently the name of M/s.Caltex India Limited was changed as Caltex Oil Refinery India Limited by virtue of order dated 09.05.1978 issued under Section 396 of Companies Act 1956. The undertaking of Caltex Refining India Limited stood transferred and vested in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited and the lease agreement dated 10.01.1972 was renewed for a further term of 10 years and beyond 23.09.1989 there was no extension of lease. Therefore, the Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited should vacate the suit schedule land and deliver the same to the plaintiff. The said land is required for the personal occupation of the plaintiff. Inspite of several requests by oral and also through notices, the defendant did not vacate and deliver the vacant possession of the plaint schedule property. The plaintiff issued notice dated 11.02.1991 under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act demanding the defendant to deliver vacant possession of the plaint schedule property, the defendant gave reply dated 28.03.1991 without vacating the plaint schedule property. The plaintiff issued notice dated 11.02.1991 under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act demanding the defendant to deliver vacant possession of the plaint schedule property, the defendant gave reply dated 28.03.1991 without vacating the plaint schedule property. The plaintiff also got issued notice dated 14.07.1994, the defendant sent reply dated 27.07.1994 without vacating the plaint schedule property. Any piece of land in the vicinity of the suit schedule land is fetching a minimum of Rs.10/- per square meter as rent. Since the defendant failed to vacate and deliver the vacant possession of the plaint schedule property, the plaintiff is constrained to file the suit. 5. The defendant filed a written statement by denying the averments mentioned in the plaint and further contended as under: - The suit is barred by principles of estopple, waiver and acquiescence and the suit is barred by law of limitation. The notice issued under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act and notice dated 14.07.1994 are not valid and proper. The predecessor-in-interest of the defendant Caltex India Limited in order to set up retails outlets for petroleum products and motor accessories acquired a lease-hold interest of the plaint schedule land. Pursuant of the said lease, the Caltex India Limited was in possession of the said land and constructed structures, installed underground tanks, pumps and other equipment thereon and set up a retails outlet for sales of petroleum products and motor accessories and service stations and has been running the public utility since then. By and under the Caltex Limited and on the undertaking in India of Caltex India Limited ordinance 1976, the right, title and interest of the Caltex India Limited stand transferred to and vested in the Central Government. The said ordinance was subsequently replaced by the Act 17 of 1977. By a notification GSR 963 E dated 30.12.1976 under Section 9 of the said Act, the Central Government directed to vest the said right, title and interest to the Government Company M/s.Caltex Oil Refining (India) Limited and subsequently amalgamated with Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited. When the premises was purchased by the plaintiff, this defendant continued to be the lessee. Thereafter, a fresh lease agreement was executed in between the plaintiff and this defendant by a registered deed dated 27.12.1979 with certain terms and conditions. When the premises was purchased by the plaintiff, this defendant continued to be the lessee. Thereafter, a fresh lease agreement was executed in between the plaintiff and this defendant by a registered deed dated 27.12.1979 with certain terms and conditions. As per the provisions of Section 7(3) and 9 of the Act, the defendant Corporation has a right to continue in the premises and accordingly advised the plaintiff by its letter dated 28.08.1989 for another 10 years at the time of expiry of the lease agreement. The lease agreement dated 27.12.1979 had not come to an end by 22.09.1989 as the defendant had exercised statutory option under the said Act. The suit was filed suppressing the material facts to mislead the Court. The Court fee and valuation of the suit are not correct. The claim for damages of Rs.5,00,000/- is arbitrary and without any basis, and prayed the Court to dismiss the suit. 6. Based on the above pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues: (i) Whether the notice dated 14.07.1994 issued to the defendant is valid and proper? (ii) Whether the lease agreement dated 27.12.1979 has come to an end by 22.09.1989? (iii) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the delivery of possession of property by evicting the defendant? (iv) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the damages of Rs.5,00,000/-? (v) Whether the suit is barred by principles of estoppel, waiver and acquiescence? (vi) Whether the suit is barred by law of limitation? (vii) Whether the suit is not maintainable in its present form? (viii) To what relief? 7. During the course of trial in the trial Court, on behalf of the Plaintiff, PW1 was examined and Ex.A1 to Ex.A7 were marked. On behalf of the Defendant DW1 was examined and Ex.B1 was marked. 8. After completion of the trial and on hearing the arguments of both sides, the trial Court decreed the suit with costs vide its judgment, dated 07.01.2002, against which the present appeal is preferred by the appellant/defendant in the Suit questioning the Decree and Judgment passed by the trial Court. 9. Heard Sri G.Rama Gopal, learned counsel for appellant and Sri Shireen Sethna Baria, learned counsel for the respondents. 10. 9. Heard Sri G.Rama Gopal, learned counsel for appellant and Sri Shireen Sethna Baria, learned counsel for the respondents. 10. The learned counsel for appellant would contend that the trial Court erred in interpretation of the terms and clauses of the lease deeds entered into between the parties to the suit at various points of time. He would further contend that the learned trial Judge erred in holding that renewal of the lease under Ex.A1 was in pursuance of the statutory option afforded to the appellant corporation under the Act 17 of 1977. He would further contend that the trial Court came to wrong conclusion and decreed the suit and he would further contend that decree and judgment passed by the trial Court is not sustainable under law and the appeal may be allowed. Per contra, the learned counsel for respondents would contend that on appreciation of entire evidence on record, the learned trial Judge rightly decreed the suit and there is no need to interfere with the finding given by the learned trial Judge. 11. The plaintiff in the suit filed cross objections vide C.M.P.No.10756 of 2004 for claiming damages, which were not awarded by the Court below. 12. Having regard to the pleadings in the suit, the findings recorded by the trial Court and in the light of rival contentions and submissions made on either side before this Court, the following point would arise for determination: Whether the trial Court is justified in decreeing the suit and whether the decree and judgment passed by the trial court needs any interference? 13. Point : The appellant is the sole defendant in the suit O.S.No.25 of 1995 on the file of Senior Civil Judge, Anakapalli and the first respondent is the plaintiff in the said suit proceedings, during the pendency of appeal, first respondent/plaintiff died and his son was brought on record as L.R. of the first respondent/ plaintiff. Originally, the suit is instituted for recovery of possession of the plaint schedule property and also for recovery of damages. The learned trial Judge granted the relief of recovery of possession, but no damages were awarded by the learned trial Judge, no appeal or no cross objections are filed by the respondents. 14. Before going to deal with the disputed facts, it is pertinent to refer here the admitted facts. The learned trial Judge granted the relief of recovery of possession, but no damages were awarded by the learned trial Judge, no appeal or no cross objections are filed by the respondents. 14. Before going to deal with the disputed facts, it is pertinent to refer here the admitted facts. The admitted facts are the plaintiff purchased the plaint schedule land from one P.V.G.Raju, who was the original owner of the plaint schedule land. The ownership of the plaintiff is not at all disputed by the defendant. It is also not in dispute that prior to purchase of the plaint schedule property by the respondent/plaintiff, Sri P.V.G.Raju leased out the plaint schedule land to M/s.Caltex India Limited for a period of 10 years from 1959 to 1969. During the aforesaid period in the year 1960, the plaintiff herein purchased the plaint schedule land from the said P.V.G.Raju. After purchase of the same, the respondent allowed the Caltex India Limited to continue as a tenant in the plaint schedule land, subsequently, the name of M/s.Caltex India Limited was changed as Caltex Oil Refinery India Limited and the lease was expired by 22.09.1969. It is also not in dispute that at the request of Caltex Oil Refinery India Limited, the plaintiff further leased out the plaint schedule land to the same Refinery India Limited for a period of 10 years commencing from 23.09.1969 to 22.09.1979. It is also not in dispute by the appellant that while the said lease was in force, the Central Government acquired the Caltex India Refinery Limited and amalgamated the same with Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited i.e., the defendant herein. It is also not in dispute that after expiry of lease period on 22.09.1979, the respondent/plaintiff renewed the lease for a further period of 10 years commencing from 23.09.1979 to 22.09.1989 under Ex.A1. 15. The learned counsel for respondent would contend that though the lease was expired by 22.09.1989 and despite of several requests made by the respondent, the appellant did not vacate the plaint schedule land and also did not deliver the possession of the plaint schedule land to the respondent herein. It was contended by the learned counsel for appellant that the period of lease from 23.09.1979 to 22.09.1989 was further extended as per the renewal clause in the lease agreement under Ex.A1. It was contended by the learned counsel for appellant that the period of lease from 23.09.1979 to 22.09.1989 was further extended as per the renewal clause in the lease agreement under Ex.A1. Absolutely, there is no evidence on record to show that the period of lease agreement mentioned in Ex.A1 was extended for further period as pleaded by the appellant. As seen from Ex.A1, which is a basis for filing of the suit by the plaintiff, it was specifically mentioned in condition No.2(e) to deliver up the demised premises at the expiration or sooner determination of the tenancy and to deliver the land restored to its former condition. The terms and conditions in Ex.A1 are binding on between both the parties to the Ex.A1. Admittedly, there is no evidence on record that the lease period mentioned in Ex.A1 was extended for a further period of 10 years. 16. The plaintiff relied on the evidence of PW1, who is none other than the plaintiff. As seen from the evidence of PW1, who is the plaintiff, he deposed about his ownership in respect of suit schedule land and after expiry of the lease period of 10 years, the defendant has to deliver the possession of the property and the lease period was expired by 22.09.1989. The evidence of PW1 further goes to show that there is a grace period of one month which expires by 22.10.1989 and after expiry of grace period, the appellant did not vacate and handover the landed property to the plaintiff. The evidence of PW1 further goes to show that before expiry of the lease period, he himself informed the defendant that he will not extend the lease for further period and requested the defendant to vacate the premises and got issued a notice to the defendant under Ex.A3 demanding to vacate the premises. Ex.A3 notice was issued on 11.02.1991, after receipt of Ex.A3 notice, the defendant issued a reply notice and again the plaintiff issued another notice under Ex.A6 by demanding the defendant to vacate the premises. The evidence of PW1 further goes to show that the plaintiff was aged about 75 years and he wants to settle the family affairs during his life time. As stated supra, during the pendency of appeal first respondent/plaintiff died, his son was brought on record, as second respondent, as a legal representative of first respondent. 17. The evidence of PW1 further goes to show that the plaintiff was aged about 75 years and he wants to settle the family affairs during his life time. As stated supra, during the pendency of appeal first respondent/plaintiff died, his son was brought on record, as second respondent, as a legal representative of first respondent. 17. As seen from the evidence of DW1, who is the sales officer in the defendant company, the agreement in between both the parties to the suit is not at all disputed by the defendant. It is also not in dispute that the lease period will expire by 1989. Though he stated in his evidence that in the second period of lease is from 1989 to 1999 i.e., he exercised the statutory option, there is no evidence on record to show that the defendant exercised the statutory option of renewal of lease. In cross examination DW1 pleaded ignorance in almost all the crucial aspects. DW1 admits in cross examination that he has no personal knowledge about the lease and the lease period was expired and ever since September 1989 he come across with several letters demanding the defendant for delivery of vacant possession of the lease hold premises. The own admissions of DW1 clearly goes to show that after expiry of lease period, the plaintiff who is aged about 75 years made several efforts by way of issuing registered notices and making oral demand for obtaining possession of his self acquired property. Furthermore, the evidence on record clearly goes to show that after completion of lease period and after availing grace period of one month, the defendant failed to deliver the premises to the owner of the plaint schedule land i.e., PW1. Furthermore, the lease period was expired by 22.10.1989. As noticed supra, as per the own admissions of DW1, the plaintiff made several demands to vacate the plaint schedule land, the documentary evidence clearly goes to show that from 11.02.1991 onwards, the plaintiff issued legal notices by demanding the defendant to deliver the vacant possession of plaint schedule land, after waiting considerable period of 4 years, as last resort, the plaintiff, who is aged about 75 years approached the Court for seeking relief of recovery of possession of his property. As stated supra, the ownership of the plaintiff is not at all disputed by the defendant. 18. As stated supra, the ownership of the plaintiff is not at all disputed by the defendant. 18. The learned counsel for appellant would contend that the trial Court failed to understand the object of the provisions of Act 17 of 1977. The evidence on record reveals that as per the Act, the appellant is entitled to exercise option for one more term for a period of 10 years, originally after expiry of renewal from 23.09.1969 to 22.09.1979, the lease was extended for a further period of 10 years from 23.09.1979 to 22.09.1989 under Ex.A1 as per the Act. The evidence on record also goes to show that original lease by Sri P.V.G.Raju was from 23.09.1959 to 22.09.1969, from Sri P.V.G.Raju the plaintiff purchased the plaint schedule property in the year 1960 and after purchase of the same the tenant was permitted to continue in the premises under the same lease and the defendant is continuing in the possession of the plaint schedule land from 1959 onwards, altogether the appellant continued as a lessee for a period of 30 years and as per the recitals of Ex.A1, the lease was expired by 22.09.1989, therefore, the appellant cannot exercise the option of one more term i.e., further period of 10 years. There is no recital in Ex.A5 that the lease under Ex.A1 was renewed under a renewal clause in the original lease agreement and the defendant is entitled to exercise the option to continue as a lease for another period of 10 years. Ex.A5 is the letter addressed by Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited to the respondent/ plaintiff. In Ex.A5 letter, the appellant clearly stated that they are always ready and willing to negotiate with the plaintiff in regard to a fresh terms for the purpose of new lease of the premises. But, there is no evidence on record that the appellant negotiate the plaintiff for fresh terms for the purpose of entering new lease agreement. In fact, there is no evidence on record to show that the appellant made several efforts to extend the lease period for further 10 years. As per the evidence of PW1 the lease under Ex.A1 was renewed as per the renewal clause. In fact, there is no evidence on record to show that the appellant made several efforts to extend the lease period for further 10 years. As per the evidence of PW1 the lease under Ex.A1 was renewed as per the renewal clause. The material on record establishes that the original lease from 1969 to 1979 was extended for a period of 10 years from 1979 to 1989 under Ex.A1 and the lease period under Ex.A1 was expired by 22.09.1989, after exercising one month grace period also the appellant failed to vacate the plaint schedule land and failed to handover the lease hold property to the respondent/plaintiff and after receipt of legal notices from the plaintiff, the appellant failed to vacate the premises and failed to deliver the premises to the plaintiff. After 4 years, the plaintiff, as a last resort, approached the trial Court and filed a suit for recovery of possession of the plaint schedule land. The trial Court while ordering the delivery of property to the plaintiff, 2 months’ time is granted to the appellant to deliver vacant possession of the plaint schedule land, that time is suffice to the appellant to make alternative arrangements. In fact, there is no evidence on record that there was a condition in Ex.A1 that the lease period under Ex.A1 will be renewed automatically for a further period of 10 years, if the appellant wants to renew the Ex.A1 lease for further 10 years, and it has to be renewed on the existing monthly rent. Admittedly, there is no evidence on record to show that the defendant made efforts for renewal of Ex.A1 lease deed for further period of 10 years. Therefore, the defendant cannot be continued as a tenant. Furthermore, the plaintiff never agreed to extend the lease period which was specified in Ex.A1. In Ex.A1 letter the appellant specifically stated that they are ready and willing to negotiate to a fresh terms of another lease, but no efforts are made by the appellant and that the lease was not extended further period of 10 years and the tenancy was also terminated by afflux of time on the midnight of 22.09.1989. In Ex.A1 letter the appellant specifically stated that they are ready and willing to negotiate to a fresh terms of another lease, but no efforts are made by the appellant and that the lease was not extended further period of 10 years and the tenancy was also terminated by afflux of time on the midnight of 22.09.1989. In the case on hand, the plaintiff waited for a period of 4 years after expiry of lease period, despite of issuance of legal notices by the plaintiff, the defendant failed to handover the premises and that by issuing Ex.A6 notice, the plaintiff terminated the tenancy of the defendant. The plaintiff in the suit filed cross objections vide C.M.P.No.10756 of 2004 for claiming damages, which were not awarded by the Court below. Before the trial Court, the cross objector has not adduced any relevant evidence for claiming damages. No material is placed before the trial Court to arrive quantum of damages. The leaned counsel for respondent would contend that the appellant corporation cannot have the luxury of continuing as a tenant without paying rent. It is well settled that : “The obligation to pay the rent flows from the existence of lease between the petitioner and the respondent. The obligation would cease only when such relationship comes to an end either through the acts of parties or orders of Court. Even a misdemeanor on the part of a landlord does not relieve the tenant of his obligation to pay the rents. Payment of rent being the sine qua non of a lease, a declaration by a tenant, of the intention not to pay the rents, by itself would bring an end to the lease”. On considering all aspects, the learned trial Judge rightly granted a liberty to the plaintiff to recover damages by filing a separate suit. On appreciating the entire evidence on record, the learned trial Judge rightly ordered delivery of possession of the plaint schedule property to the plaintiff in the suit, I do not find any illegality in the decree and judgment passed by the trial Court in ordering the recovery of possession of plaint schedule property. Therefore, the decree and judgment passed by the trail Court is perfectly sustainable under law and it requires no interference. There are no merits in the cross objections filed by the plaintiff. The point is answered accordingly. 19. Therefore, the decree and judgment passed by the trail Court is perfectly sustainable under law and it requires no interference. There are no merits in the cross objections filed by the plaintiff. The point is answered accordingly. 19. In the result, the Appeal Suit is dismissed confirming the decree and Judgment dated 07.01.2002, in O.S.No.25 of 1995 passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Anakapalli. I.A.No.2 of 2004 (Cross objections No.36000 of 2004) filed by the plaintiff is dismissed. Two (2) months time is granted to the appellant to deliver the vacant possession of the plaint schedule land to the 2nd respondent herein. The parties are directed to bear their own costs in the appeal. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in the Appeal shall stand closed.