JUDGMENT Mr. Vinod S. Bhardwaj, J.(Oral) Challenge in the present writ petition is to the order dated 01.08.1996 passed by respondent No.2-Commissioner, Faridkot Division, Faridkot, whereby the claim of the petitioner-Transport Corporation was restricted to a period of three years prior to the institution of proceedings for eviction and recovery. 2. As per the averments contained in the present writ petition, the petitioner-Corporation is owner of shop No.4 situated on Court Road Bathinda and that a public auction was held on 19.03.1986 for giving the aforesaid shop on lease. Respondent No.1-Dev Raj, participated in the same and submitted a bid of Rs. 1,525/- per month, however, the highest bid was submitted by one Bhushan Kumar for an amount of Rs. 1,600/- per month. However, notwithstanding the submission of the highest bid by another bidder, respondent No.1 forcefully and illegally occupied the aforesaid shop on 20.03.1986. A number of oral as well as written requests were made to respondent No.1 to handover the vacant possession of the shop which had been illegally occupied by him. Respondent No.1, however, filed a civil suit No.760/17.11.1988 before the Sub-Judge IInd Class, Bathinda and an ex parte stay was granted by the Civil Court. A written statement and reply to the application for interim injunction was filed by the petitioner-Corporation whereupon the interim stay was vacated by the Sub-Judge IInd Class, Bathinda vide order dated 19.05.1990. The said order was challenged by respondent No.1 in Civil Appeal No.46 dated 25.07.1990 before the District Judge, Bathinda. The same was also dismissed on 29.01.1991. 3. The petitioner-Corporation thereafter filed a petition under Sections 4 and 7 of the Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction & Recovery) Act, 1973 before the Collector, Sub-Division, Bathinda, for eviction of respondent No.1-Dev Raj from the shop in question as well as for recovery of Rs. 1,47,016/- as arrears towards unauthorized usage and occupation of the premises for the period from 01.03.1986 to 31.03.1991. The interest on the said amount was also prayed for. 4. Evidence was led before the Collector, Sub-Division, Bathinda whereupon the petition filed by the petitioner was allowed vide order dated 19.10.1993 and it was also held entitled to recover the rent @ Rs. 1,600/- per month plus usual charges. Respondent No.1 was also held liable to pay a sum of Rs. 1,47,106/- as claimed in the head-note of the petitioner and subject to statutory deduction. 5. 1,600/- per month plus usual charges. Respondent No.1 was also held liable to pay a sum of Rs. 1,47,106/- as claimed in the head-note of the petitioner and subject to statutory deduction. 5. Aggrieved of the said order passed by the Collector, Sub-Division, Bathinda, respondent No.1 preferred an appeal before the Commissioner, Faridkot Division, Faridkot. The said appeal was partially allowed and it was held that the petitioner-Corporation is entitled to arrears for use and occupation of the shop by respondent No.1 but confined the arrears for a period of three years preceding to the date on which the claim was represented by the petitioner-Corporation to Sub-Divisional Officer. 6. Aggrieved thereof, the present writ petition had been filed claiming that respondent No.1-Dev Raj had forcibly and illegally occupied the shop in question despite the highest bid having been offered by one Bhushan Kumar @ Rs. 1,600/- per month. Hence, the rent/value thereof stood determined. The highest bidder namely Bhushan Kumar however could not take possession of the said shop on account of an interim order passed by the Civil Court. The petition for eviction and rent was filed after the dismissal of the appeal by the Appellate Court and without any delay. The petitioner-Corporation was thus entitled to claim all arrears. It is argued that an act of Court should prejudice none. Once the petitioner-Corporation was restrained from taking possession of the premises, its interest and rights could not be held as having been rendered remediless. The petitioner- Corporation was thus entitled to the arrears for the entire duration when respondent No.1-Dev Raj remained in unlawful and unauthorized possession of the shop. It is submitted that respondent No.2-Commissioner, Faridkot Division, Faridkot, was thus in an error in allowing the appeal preferred by respondent No.1 and in holding that the claim beyond the period of three years preceding to the date on which the claim was represented by the petitioner-Corporation before the Sub-Divisional Officer would be time-barred. 7. Written statement on behalf of respondent No.1-Dev Raj had been filed, wherein it was alleged that true facts have not been disclosed by the petitioner-Corporation. In the auction held on 19.03.1986, respondent No.1 had given a bid of shop No.22 which was accepted by the petitioner- Corporation at a monthly rent of Rs. 1,000/- and pursuant to the same, he had deposited a sum of Rs. In the auction held on 19.03.1986, respondent No.1 had given a bid of shop No.22 which was accepted by the petitioner- Corporation at a monthly rent of Rs. 1,000/- and pursuant to the same, he had deposited a sum of Rs. 6,000/- as rent for six months vide receipt No. B-84- 86219 dated 19.03.1986 and Rs. 3,360/- as security vide receipt No. B/84- 86221 dated 19.03.1986; however, the possession of the said shop was not available with the petitioner-Corporation as the same was occupied by one another Dev Raj who was doing the business as a cloth merchant under the name and style of M/s. Bhagi Bander Cloth Store. Despite the acceptance of the bid by the petitioner-Corporation, the possession of shop No.22 could not be delivered to respondent No.1 and the same remained under the occupation of said Dev Raj. The petitioner-Corporation thereafter gave possession of shop No.4, which was lying vacant, to respondent No.1 on the premise that till the time shop No.22 is not vacated, he may use the same. However, shop No.22 could not be got vacated from the said Dev Raj and the possession of the same could not be delivered to respondent No.1 despite acceptance of the bid submitted by respondent No.1 for the same. 8. During the proceedings under the Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction & Recovery) Act, 1973 before the Collector, Sub-Division, Bathinda, the said factual aspect has been admitted by Gopal Singh, Clerk of the petitioner-Corporation, in his cross-examination including admission about the failure on the part of the petitioner-Corporation in delivering the possession of shop No.22. It is further submitted that the petitioner- Corporation also could not claim rent which is time-barred in the proceedings under Section 7 of the Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction & Recovery) Act, 1973 before the Collector, Sub-Division, Bathinda, and that there is no illegality or perversity in the order passed by the Divisional Commissioner, Faridkot in the appeal. 9. During the pendency of the present writ petition, the petitioner- Corporation was also directed to file an affidavit about the status as to whether the dues upheld by the Divisional Commissioner, Faridkot, had been recovered or not. 9. During the pendency of the present writ petition, the petitioner- Corporation was also directed to file an affidavit about the status as to whether the dues upheld by the Divisional Commissioner, Faridkot, had been recovered or not. In compliance thereto, an affidavit dated 11.08.2016 was filed by the Managing Director, PEPSU Road Transport Corporation, and it was submitted that the Deputy Commissioner, Faridkot, had issued a recovery notice to the Tehsildar, Bathinda vide order dated 01.08.1996 and that the recovery proceedings have not been completed and that no steps have been taken for effecting the recovery of the amount. Further despite a lapse of nearly 08 years even thereafter, the position has not improved and the status remains the same. Hence despite lapse of 28 years of issuance of recovery notice, no recovery has been done so far. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner-Corporation however contends that the order passed by the Divisional Commissioner, Faridkot, suffers from failure to appreciate the statutory provision. Respondent No.1/occupant-Dev Raj, having taken into possession of the shop and continued to enjoy the said occupation under the interim order passed by the Civil Court, the claim made by the petitioner-Corporation could not be ousted as time-barred. The period during which the stay in question was in operation ought to have been taken into consideration by the Divisional Commissioner. 11. Controverting the same, learned counsel for respondent No.1 submits that there was no restraining order that had been passed by the Civil Court and that the order was only to the effect that respondent No.1 be not dispossessed except in due process of law. Hence, there was no prohibition against the petitioner-Corporation from seeking possession of the said premises in accordance with law and also for seeking recovery of dues, if any. He contends that the petitioner-Corporation inordinately delayed initiation of proceedings before the Collector, Sub-Division Bathinda and that now they cannot be allowed to claim benefit thereof. Hence, there was no prohibition against the petitioner-Corporation from seeking possession of the said premises in accordance with law and also for seeking recovery of dues, if any. He contends that the petitioner-Corporation inordinately delayed initiation of proceedings before the Collector, Sub-Division Bathinda and that now they cannot be allowed to claim benefit thereof. It is further argued that the factual aspect as regards the petitioner being a highest bidder of shop No.22 and having been permitted to occupy shop No.4 on account of failure on the part of petitioner-Corporation in delivering the possession of shop for which the bid had been submitted by respondent No.1 by the witness of the Corporation itself shows that it is not a case where respondent No.1 is a rank encroacher on the said property and was rather in permissive possession of the shop in question. He further places reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of 'New Delhi Municipal Committee v. Kalu Ram' reported as (1976) 3 SCC 407 . The operative part of the same reads thus: "3. As would appear from the terms of the section, it provides a summary procedure for the recovery of arrears of rent. It was argued that since section 7 did not put a time limit for taking steps under that section and as the limitation prescribed for a suit to recover the amount did not apply to a proceeding under this section, the High Court was in error in upholding the respondent's objection. In support of his contention that a debt remained due though barred by limitation, Mr. Hardy relied on a number of authorities, both Indian and English. We do not consider it necessary to refer to these decisions because the proposition is not disputed that the statute of limitation bars the remedy without touching the right. Section 28 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 which was in force at the relevant time however provided that the right to any property was extinguished on the expiry of the period prescribed by the Act for instituting a suit for possession of the property. But on the facts of this case no question of a suit for possession of any property arises and section 28 has no application. But on the facts of this case no question of a suit for possession of any property arises and section 28 has no application. It is not questioned that a creditor whose suit is barred by limitation, if he has any other legal remedy permitting him to enforce his claim, would be free to avail of it. But the question in every such case is whether the particular statute permits such a course. Does Section 7 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958 create a right to realise arrears of rent without any limitation of time? Under Section 7 the Estate Officer may order any person who is in arrears of rent 'payable' in respect of any public premises to pay the same within such time and in such instalments as he may specify in the order. Before however the order is made, a notice must issue calling upon the defaulter to show cause way such order should not he made and, if he raised any objection, the Estate Officer must consider the same and the evidence produced in support of it. Thus the Estate Officer has to determine upon hearing the objection the amount of rent in arrears which is 'payable.' The word 'payable' is somewhat indefinite in import and its meaning must he gathered from the context in which it occurs. 'Payable' generally means that which should be paid. If the person in arrears raises a dispute as to the amount, the Estate Officer in determining the amount payable cannot ignore the existing laws. If the recovery of any amount is barred by the law of limitation, it is difficult to hold that the Estate Officer could still insist that the said amount was payable. When a duty is cast on an authority to determine the arrears of rent, the determination must be in accordance with law. Section 7 only provides a special procedure for the realisation of rent in arrears and does not constitute a source or foundation of a right to claim a debt otherwise time-barred. When a duty is cast on an authority to determine the arrears of rent, the determination must be in accordance with law. Section 7 only provides a special procedure for the realisation of rent in arrears and does not constitute a source or foundation of a right to claim a debt otherwise time-barred. Construing the expression "any money due" in Section 186 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913 the Privy Council held in Hans Raj Gupta and others v. Official Liquidators of the Dehradun Mussorie Electric Tramway Company LTD., that this meant moneys due and recoverable in a suit by the company, and observed: "it is a section which creates a special procedure for obtaining payment of moneys; it is not a section which purports to create a foundation upon which to base a claim for payment. It creates no new rights." We are clear that the word "payable" in Section 7, in the context in which its occurs (sic) "legally recoverable." Admittedly a suit to recover the arrears instituted on the day the order under Section 7 was made would have been barred by limitation. The amount in question was therefore irrecoverable. This being the position, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs." 12. The said judgment was also followed by this Court in the matter of 'Narinder Nath Sharma v. Commissioner, Ambala Division, Ambala and others' reported as 2015 SCC Online P&H 20483. The operative part of the same reads thus: "8. As per Article 52 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation is three years from the date when the arrears become due and Article 112 of the Act provides that to file any suit (except a suit before the Supreme Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction) by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the period of limitation would be thirty years. Admittedly, in this case the application under Section 7 of the Act for recovery of arrears of rent is not filed by the State of Haryana but by the Panchayat Samiti, a local body, therefore, the judgment in M/s Northern India Catrers Pvt. Ltd.'s case (supra) would not be of any help to respondent No.3 as in that case, the Punjab Government had constructed Mountview Hotel, Chandigarh and leased it out w.e.f. 25.09.1953 to M/s Northern India Catrers Pvt. Ltd. for a period of six years at an annual rent of Rs. 72,000/-, which was lateron reduced to Rs. 50,000/-. A formal lease deed was executed on 21.03.1959 and on 27.08.1959, the Punjab Government offered to sell the hotel to the lessee for Rs. 12,00,000/-. Since the negotiations were going on, the lease was extended upto 31.12.1959. However, since the negotiations for the sale of the hotel failed because the lessee did not pay the agreed amount and also did not vacate the premises, therefore, the Estate Officer-cum-Collector, Capital Project, Chandigarh, started eviction proceedings under the Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1959. Those proceedings were challenged on the ground that the relevant provisions of that Act were unconstitutional being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The plea of the lessee failed in the High Court but succeeded in the Supreme Court and while the appeal was pending before the Supreme Court, Chandigarh was declared a Union Territory and the properties belonging to the Punjab Government became the properties of the Central Government by virtue of the States Reorganization Act, 1966 and as a result thereof, the hotel came to be owned by the Central Government. The Chandigarh Administration again offered to sell the hotel to the lessee but the matter could not be finalized. Thereafter, the Chandigarh Administration started eviction proceedings and recovery of the damages from 01.01.1960 to 30.11.1968. Since it was the proceedings initiated by the Central Government, therefore, Article 112 of the Limitation Act, 1963 was made applicable, which is not the situation in the present case in which the petition under Section 7 of the Act has been filed by the Panchayat Samiti, a local body, and not by the Government much-less the Central/State Government. Since it was the proceedings initiated by the Central Government, therefore, Article 112 of the Limitation Act, 1963 was made applicable, which is not the situation in the present case in which the petition under Section 7 of the Act has been filed by the Panchayat Samiti, a local body, and not by the Government much-less the Central/State Government. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I am of the considered opinion that the case of the petitioner is covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in New Delhi Municipal Committee's case (supra) and, thus, it is held that respondent No.3 cannot claim arrears of rent beyond a period of three years from the petitioner." 13. No other judgment has been cited by either of the parties. 14. I have heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respective parties at length and have gone through the documents available on record. 15. The initial order granting the alleged interim stay has however not been placed on record and that the orders of dismissal of the application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with section 151 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and subsequent dismissal of Civil Appeal by the District Judge, Bathinda, have been placed on record. Hence, the contention of the learned counsel for respondent No.1 to the effect that no restraining order had been passed by the Civil Court remains uncontroverted. It is also evident that even though the written statement taking these objections was filed in the year 1999 and it made a specific reference to the statement got recorded on behalf of the Corporation to not take possession except in due process of law, no replication was filed to dispute or deny the said fact as well. Under the said circumstances, this Court is of the opinion that the petitioner-Corporation was always entitled to seek eviction/recovery of the payable rent from an occupant, in accordance with law and that there was no prohibition imposed upon the petitioner-Corporation, however, despite there being no bar, the petitioner-Corporation chose not to approach the competent Court for seeking enforcement of its rights. The ratio of the judgments cited by the learned counsel for respondent No.1 would be hence applicable to the facts of the present case. The order passed by the Divisional Commissioner, Faridkot, thus cannot be said to suffer from any illegality or perversity. 16. The ratio of the judgments cited by the learned counsel for respondent No.1 would be hence applicable to the facts of the present case. The order passed by the Divisional Commissioner, Faridkot, thus cannot be said to suffer from any illegality or perversity. 16. Even otherwise, it is evident that despite the orders having been passed in the year 1996, the present writ petition was filed in the year 1999 and there has hardly been any effective steps taken by the petitioner- Corporation to recover the dues that could be recovered by the petitioner- Corporation. A copy of this order be also placed before the Government to determine the reasons as to why the public recovery could not be effected for a period of nearly 28 years by the revenue officials and to determine the administrative lapse 17. The impugned order thus cannot be said to be illegal, perverse or suffering from any failure to appreciate the evidence adduced on record or warranting any interference in a judicial review by this Court. The present writ petition is accordingly dismissed.