JUDGMENT : (Ashutosh Kumar, J.) Heard Mr. Bharat Bhushan, learned Advocate for the sole appellant and Mr. Abhimanyu Sharma, learned APP for the State. 2. The appellant has been convicted under Sections 302, 341 and 323 of the IPC vide judgment dated 27.04.2017 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Khagaria in connection with Sessions Trial No. 287 of 2015, arising out of Khagaria P.S. Case No. 338 of 2015. By order dated 08.05.2017, he has been sentenced to undergo life imprisonment, to pay a fine of Rs. 5000/- and in default of payment of fine to further suffer S.I. for six months for the offence under Section 302 of the IPC. 3. No separate sentence has been awarded to the convict for the offence under Sections 341 and 323 of the IPC. 4. The appellant is alleged to have killed his own younger brother in the night of 26.05.2015. The FIR was lodged by the wife of the deceased, viz., Rubi Devi (P.W.6). She has alleged that at about 6.00 P.M. on 25.05.2015, for no good reason, her sister-in-law i.e. the wife of the appellant hit her by a sharpnel. She was taken by her husband (deceased) to hospital for treatment. When the couple came back, the appellant is said to have met them at the door and slapped the deceased. The reason attributed is that he did not want Rubi Devi to be treated for such minor injury. Thereafter, the appellant is said to have taken out a dagger from his pocket, seeing which the deceased ran out of the house. The appellant is then said to have chased him. The deceased was hit thrice by the dagger. With the help of villagers, P.W. 6 took her husband to a hospital but no sooner they had reached the gate of the hospital, the deceased had succumbed to the injuries. 5. However, P.W.6 was under treatment in the hospital at the time of recording of the fardbeyan. This fardbeyan was recorded on 26.05.2015 at 7.45 AM at Sadar Hospital, Khagaria in the Surgical Ward No. 2. 6. On the basis of the aforenoted fardbeyan of P.W.6, a case vide Khagaria P.S. Case No. 338 of 2015 dated 26.05.2015 was registered for investigation for offences under Sections 341, 323, 324, 307, 302 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code. 7. 6. On the basis of the aforenoted fardbeyan of P.W.6, a case vide Khagaria P.S. Case No. 338 of 2015 dated 26.05.2015 was registered for investigation for offences under Sections 341, 323, 324, 307, 302 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code. 7. The police after investigation submitted chargesheet against the appellant, whereupon the appellant was tried. 8. The Trial Court after having examined nine witnesses on behalf of the prosecution, convicted and sentenced the appellant as aforesaid. 9. At the Trial, Narayan Sahni (P.W. 1), a signatory to the FIR and father of the deceased; Mukesh Sahni (P.W. 2), a co-villager; Arjun Sahni (P.W. 4) and Sanjeet Sahni (P.W. 5), known to the family of the deceased, turned hostile. They had no idea about the occurrence. 10. The father-in-law of the deceased, viz., Shyam Sahni (P.W. 3) only claimed to have heard on telephone that his son-in-law had been killed by his brother. Beyond this, he had nothing to offer to the Trial Court. 11. The only person who has supported the prosecution case is the informant (wife of the deceased). She has alleged that after returning from the hospital along with her husband, the appellant slapped the deceased in the courtyard. When the deceased saw a dagger in the hand of the appellant, he ran for safety but was chased. 12. The occurrence is said to have taken place about 50 meters away from the house of P.W. 6, which is located near the shop of one Tuna Chaurasia. Interestingly the investigator never recorded his statement nor was he brought by the prosecution to the witness-stand to prove the case. 13. When confronted, P.W. 6 reiterated that no sooner had the deceased stepped inside the house, he was stabbed by the appellant. This statement, according to P.W. 6, was also made by her when asked by the investigator. 14. However, she had not told the police that after being injured, the deceased ran for saving his life and the appellant threatened everybody not to restrain him or else he would stab others as well. 15. Dr. Purusottam Kumar Singh (P.W. 8) had conducted the post-mortem examination on the deceased on 26.05.2015 at 11.00 A.M. He had found three incised wounds on the body of the deceased. All the three of the injuries were on different regions of the chest. 15. Dr. Purusottam Kumar Singh (P.W. 8) had conducted the post-mortem examination on the deceased on 26.05.2015 at 11.00 A.M. He had found three incised wounds on the body of the deceased. All the three of the injuries were on different regions of the chest. Blood and blood clots were present in the left side of the chest cavity and in the left lung. The pulmonary vessels were found to be cut. The left ventricle was incised. All the visceras were found to be pale. The cause of death was assessed to be hemorrhage and shock due to the above noted three incised wounds. The time fixed for death was 24 hours from the post-mortem examination. 16. On being questioned by the defence, P.W. 8 had clarified before the Court that the time of death is ascertained mainly on the basis of presence of rigormortis on the dead body. The dead body was identified to him by Chowkidar (6/1) Biro Paswan (not examined) and Narayan Sahni (P.W. 1). He agreed to the suggestion that there could be a possibility that the deceased would have died by around 11.00 A.M. on 25.05.2015 only. 17. Out of sheer necessity, in order to test the time of the occurrence, we have examined the evidence of Dr. Krishna Mohan Prasad (P.W. 7), who had treated the wife of the deceased (P.W. 6) in the first instance. P.W. 6 presented herself before P.W. 7 on 25.05.2015 at about 8.50 P.M. It was quite late in the evening. There was a lacerated wound on her forehead which was bleeding. The patient (P.W. 6) had come to P.W. 7 in a state of vesovegal attack. However, the lacerated wound on the forehead of P.W. 6 was found to be simple, caused by hard and blunt substance. 18. P.W. 7 was not at all sure whether such injury was inflicted by another agency or it was due to fall on a blunt substance. However, when he had examined P.W. 6, she was still bleeding from her wound. 19. The inquest report but is not on record. 20. What has caused doubt in our minds, especially when the only evidence against the appellant is the statement of the wife of the deceased, that the timing suggested of the death does not match with the records available. 21. 19. The inquest report but is not on record. 20. What has caused doubt in our minds, especially when the only evidence against the appellant is the statement of the wife of the deceased, that the timing suggested of the death does not match with the records available. 21. If P.W. 6 is to be believed entirely, the deceased died sometimes in the night of 25.05.2015 only. By that time, the deceased, P.W. 6 and others had already reached the hospital. Treatment was meted out to P.W. 6 in the hospital. This would have happened in all likelihood in the night of 25.05.2015 only. In that case, there was no reason for waiting for the whole night and then lodging the fardbeyan on the next day i.e. on 26.05.2015 at 11.00 A.M. 22. We reiterate that the deceased had died in the night of the occurrence only. 23. There is yet another reason why we are not very sure as to the veracity of the statement made by P.W. 6. 24. P.W. 6 was injured by a sharpnel and was in a state of veso-vegal attack. Though the injury on her person was found to be simple but she came back home along with her husband (deceased) injured and invested. 25. There is quite a possibility of P.W. 6 being in a state of consternation in making any coherent statement. Nonetheless, in her fardbeyan lodged on the next day, she did not talk of the deceased having been struck first by the dagger inside the courtyard. 26. This makes for a big departure from the prosecution case. 27. If that were so, then perhaps in the event of the deceased having run away from the house for safety, there would have been blood trails. 28. Nothing of that kind was found by the investigator. 29. That apart, the distance from the house of P.W. 6 and the shop of Tuna Chaurasia, where the occurrence is said to have taken place, is about 50 meters, which distance is dotted by the houses of villagers. 30. We quite appreciate that it was very late in the night and therefore, there could be a possibility of no crowd on that village road. Nonetheless, if a co-villager is stabbed to death, it would definitely attract the attention of the local residents. Nothing of this kind appears to have happened. 31. 30. We quite appreciate that it was very late in the night and therefore, there could be a possibility of no crowd on that village road. Nonetheless, if a co-villager is stabbed to death, it would definitely attract the attention of the local residents. Nothing of this kind appears to have happened. 31. There is yet another flip-side to the story. 32. There is nothing on record nor are we very convinced that if it were the case of the deceased having run out of the house for saving himself, P.W. 6 also would have followed him, perhaps to provide some safety or to see what is being done by the appellant. 33. Did she elect to go out of her house in an injured condition to only see how the fight ended? 34. There appears to be some doubt about it. More so, when nothing very serious had happened. It was a dispute between two brothers over a trifle. If the dispute was long standing or deep enough to propell an elder brother to attack the younger brother, then we have no evidence for the same. The brothers lived around the common court-yard. There was a general conversation between the husband (deceased) and his wife. The husband had asked his wife the reason for her not going to her own brother who had come to his village home. The wife is said to have responded that she had married the deceased not for leaving him and going to her mother’s house. This, in normal course, would not have attracted any ire from anyone of the family members; but merely overhearing this conversation, the wife of the appellant, who was sitting nearby threw a sharpnel which hit P.W. 6 on her head. It was only natural that the deceased, the husband, would get her treated. 35. Can that be the reason for the deceased to be killed by his brother? 36. Either the appellant was overtaken by rage or was insane or had an uncontrollable temper and he did not know what was he up to. 37. Did the slain brother resist? 38. It does not appear to be so. 39. 35. Can that be the reason for the deceased to be killed by his brother? 36. Either the appellant was overtaken by rage or was insane or had an uncontrollable temper and he did not know what was he up to. 37. Did the slain brother resist? 38. It does not appear to be so. 39. We are also doubtful for the reason that P.W. 6 never came up with any detail about the assault, giving rise to a thought that perhaps she never followed her husband and therefore did not see what actually had happened. 40. The appellant and the deceased, both, were able bodied persons in their youth. There was no firearm weapons in anyone’s possession. Why would a younger brother be a sitting duck to the uncontrolled temper of an elder brother. 41. All this, therefore, raises doubt whether P.W. 6 has come up with the true version and whether such minor conversation, not involving the appellant or his wife and the soft stand of the deceased, infuriated the appellant, which was the real cause of action. There is no evidence of any land dispute or dispute about the accommodation between the two brothers. 42. Seen in this background, we find P.Ws. 1, 2, 4 and 5 having turned volte face to the prosecution case to be meaningful. Perhaps even after countersigning the fardbeyan, P.W. 1 did not support the prosecution case at the Trial. 43. What has really vexed us is that, if P.W. 6 is to be believed for every narration that she had made, the deceased would have died sometimes late in the night of 25.05.2015. At the time of death, P.W. 6 was in hospital along with her father-in-law and other co-villagers. There was no reason for the fardbeyan to have been lodged only a day after at 11.00 A.M. 44. We must make it clear that we have entertained doubts about the correctness of the version made by P.W. 6 not only for the reason for her making divergent statements at the Trial but on other surrounding factors as well. 45. The learned counsel for the appellant, though, never asked for an application of the principle of falsusin uno falsus in omnibusin canvassing his case but then, it would only be appropriate if we deal with it briefly. 46. 45. The learned counsel for the appellant, though, never asked for an application of the principle of falsusin uno falsus in omnibusin canvassing his case but then, it would only be appropriate if we deal with it briefly. 46. The plea of falsus in uno falsus in omnibus has not been accepted as part of our jurisprudence. Even if major portion of the evidence is found to be deficient, but in case when the residue is sufficient to prove guilt of an accused, his conviction can be maintained. 47. The line of decisions of the Supreme Court clearly state that it is the duty of the Court to separate the grain from chaff. When chaff can be separated from grain, it would be open for the Court to convict an accused, notwithstanding the fact that the evidence has been found to be deficient. 48. There is yet another reason for not accepting the aforenoted principle in Indian Jurisprudence. Such a doctrine would be dangerous to be applied in Indian context, if a prosecution case is rejected outright because a witness was found to be untrue in some respects. It would only lead to justice being deflected. 49. The evidence has to be sifted with care. 50. In order to winnow the actual evidence in terms of the felicitous metaphor of separating the grain from the chaff or truth from the falsehood, we have given anxious consideration to the fact that the lone witness was not very certain as to how the final assault took place. 51. With no background enmity and no real immediate dispute and all other witnesses not supporting the prosecution case, we find the task of separating the truth from the falsehood difficult. 52. Apart from the major departure from the version of P.W. 6 in her fardbeyan and her statement before the Trial Court, we have also taken into account that the P.O. also could not be proved. 53. The fact that the deceased was first hit in the courtyard by a dagger, has also not been proved. The investigator, for no plausible reason, did not examine Tuna Chaurasia and his neighbour Gopal Chaurasia, who could have thrown some light on how the deceased was killed. Cumulatively, the delayed FIR, the lone eye witness whose statement is discrepant and the time of death not being in sync with the records, make us doubt the prosecution case. The investigator, for no plausible reason, did not examine Tuna Chaurasia and his neighbour Gopal Chaurasia, who could have thrown some light on how the deceased was killed. Cumulatively, the delayed FIR, the lone eye witness whose statement is discrepant and the time of death not being in sync with the records, make us doubt the prosecution case. 54. For this reason, we give benefit of doubt to the appellant and acquit him of the charge of murder. 55. The appeal is allowed. 56. The appellant is in jail for the last nine years. He is directed to be released forthwith from jail, if not required or detained in any other case. 57. Let a copy of this judgment be dispatched to the Superintendent of the concerned Jail forthwith for compliance and record. 58. The records of this case be returned to the Trial Court forthwith. 59. Interlocutory application/s, if any, also stand disposed off accordingly.