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2024 DIGILAW 998 (ALL)

Durga Prasad v. State of U. P.

2024-04-08

J.J.MUNIR

body2024
JUDGMENT : Hon'ble J.J. Munir, J.-The petitioner is a Senior Clerk in the employ of the Nagar Palika Parishad, Siswa Bazar, District Maharajganj. He was appointed to a Class-III post in the regular cadre on 22.2.1989 in accordance with rules. A complaint was lodged by one Shesh Nath, a resident of Senani Nagar, Ward No. 12, Nagar Palika Parishad, Siswa Bazar, District Maharajganj with the District Magistrate, Maharajganj on 13.2.2023, where the crux of the allegation was that the civil work, that had already been done, was re-advertised by the President and the Executive Officer of the Nagar Palika Parishad for a fresh contract through e-tendering. The District Magistrate, Maharajganj directed an inquiry to be made into the complaint by a Committee comprising the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Nichlaul, Maharajganj and the Executive Engineer, Jal Nigam (Rural). This was apparently a preliminary inquiry ordered by the District Magistrate into the complaint aforesaid. The Committee comprising the Sub Divisional Magistrate and the Executive Engineer submitted an inquiry report dated 16.2.2023 to the District Magistrate, Maharajganj. The District Magistrate, on the basis of the aforesaid inquiry report, addressed a memo dated 17.2.2023 to the Principal Secretary, Government of U.P. in the Department of Urban Development, saying that the report dated 27.1.2023 submitted by the Committee constituted by him showed that the Senior Clerk (the petitioner here), the Executive Officer, the President and the Junior Engineer (P.W.D.) advertised civil works that had already been done, inviting e-tenders for the purpose, which constitutes financial irregularity, and that the e-tender publication was in violation of para No. 6 of Government Order No. 1319/ ukS -9-21-45 t 21 dated 30.6.2021. It was said to be in violation of the aforesaid Government Order because it constituted a violation of the directions carried in paragraph No. 6, which would be observed in the matter of process of accepting tenders. The letter also reported that the Collector on his part had directed the cancellation of those tenders. The memo dated 17.2.2023 addressed to the Government said that vide Office Memo No. 2855-LBA-2022-23 dated 28.6.2022, Office Memo No. 778-LBA-2022-23 dated 14.11.2022 and Office Memo No. 282-LBA-2022-23 dated 19.12.2022, a letter had been issued for holding disciplinary proceedings against the President, Nagar Palika Parishad for violation of rules that he committed, besides irregularities, and proceedings on the basis of said letter were pending. The District Magistrate finally reported to the Principal Secretary that on the basis of the preliminary inquiry report submitted by the Committee constituted by him, he was recommending initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the Executive Officer, the petitioner and the President of the Nagar Palika Parishad. It was also said that a copy of the preliminary inquiry report submitted by the Committee was enclosed. 2. In response to Memo No. 384-LBA-2022-23 dated 17.2.2023, last mentioned, addressed to the Principal Secretary, the Special Secretary to the Government in the Department of Urban Development addressed Memo No. 838/ ukS-6-23 dated 16.5.2023, saying that the petitioner was a Senior Clerk belonging to the Non-Centralized Service. His Appointing Authority was the Executive Officer/President of the Nagar Palika Parishad. The Special Secretary, therefore, said in his letter that he had been directed to say that the Appointing Authority should be directed to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner and the Government informed about the proceedings taken. A copy of the aforesaid memo dated 16.5.2023 issued by the Special Secretary addressed to the District Magistrate, Maharajganj was marked to the Executive Officer of the Nagar Palika Parishad with instructions that the Secretary be informed about steps taken in the matter at the earliest. 3. Acting on the aforesaid direction by the State Government carried in the memo dated 16.5.2023, the President of the Nagar Palika Parishad proceeded to pass the impugned order dated 30.5.2023, suspending the petitioner from service pending inquiry on the selfsame allegations that were reported by the Committee holding the preliminary inquiry. The President ordered that a departmental inquiry shall be held against the petitioner by a three-member Committee comprising the Executive Officer, functioning as its Chairman, besides two members, one being a Junior Engineer and the other, Ram Harsh Dube, the Corporator of Ward No. 18, Nagar Palika Parishad, Siswa Bazar, District Maharajganj. 4. Aggrieved by the order of suspension aforesaid, the petitioner has instituted the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. 5. On 22.8.2023, when the petition came up for admission, it was urged on behalf of the petitioner by Mr. 4. Aggrieved by the order of suspension aforesaid, the petitioner has instituted the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. 5. On 22.8.2023, when the petition came up for admission, it was urged on behalf of the petitioner by Mr. Aditya Prakash Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner, that the Collector was intermeddling in the affairs of the Nagar Palika Parishad and it was because of his interference, a power that he did not enjoy under the provisions of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916 (for short, the Act of 1916), that the impugned suspension order had been passed. He argued that the District Magistrate had limited powers in matters concerning an elected Nagar Palika. These were limited by sub-Section (1-A) of Section 34 of the Act of 1916. Likewise, the Government's powers are also limited by the provisions of sub-Section (1-B) of Section 34. It was urged that disciplinary action was taken at the instance of the District Magistrate by the President and not by the President himself in the exercise of his independent discretion. This Court thought that there was some force in the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner and proceeded to pass an order on 22.8.2023, asking the District Magistrate, Maharajganj to explain by his affidavit, his authority to interfere in the Nagar Palika matters. A detailed order was passed, so as to enable the District Magistrate to know what the submissions were, that the petitioner advanced, questioning his suspension from service pending inquiry by the President. The order dated 22.8.2023 reads: ''In so far as the suspension order impugned is concerned, learned Counsel for the Nagar Palika Parishad will seek instructions and indicate whether the charges against the petitioner mentioned in the impugned order are serious that is to say, serious in substance and content, not merely in form, so as to possibly invite the imposition of a major penalty in the event of these being proved at the inquiry. The Collector, Maharajganj appears to be wholesomely intermeddling in the affairs of the Nagar Palika, Maharajganj directing cancellation of contracts and setting up inquiry committees which is a jurisdiction not all vested in the Collector under any of the provisions of the U.P. Municipalities Act. The Collector has no powers of general supervision over a Nagar Palika which is an elected body part of the local self-Government. Mr. The Collector has no powers of general supervision over a Nagar Palika which is an elected body part of the local self-Government. Mr. Girijesh Kumar Tripathi has drawn the attention of this Court to Section 34 of the U.P. Municipalities Act which by virtue of sub-Section (1-A) empowers the District Magistrate within the local limits of his district by order in writing to prohibit the execution or further execution of a resolution or order passed by a Municipality or a Committee thereof, if in his opinion such resolution or order is of a nature which tends to cause danger to human life, health or safety or a riot or affray. The nature of the District Magistrate powers under sub-Section (1-A) of Section 34 is, therefore, prima facie confined to situations generally affecting the citizens, their life, health, safety and law and order. It does not appear to confer any visitorial or supervisory powers on the Collector to interfere with disciplinary matters of the Nagar Palika or the wisdom of their resolutions, on the basis as if the Collector were, an authority, superintending the functioning of the Nagar Palika. That kind of jurisdiction seems to be vested in the State Government under sub-Section (1-B) of Section 34 acting suo moto or on a report or complaint. The Government may nullify resolutions of the Municipality or restrain their execution, if prejudicial to public interest or made in abuse of powers or flagrant breach of any provision of the law. This power is not at all vested in the Collector. He may no doubt, report matters to the State Government like any other complainant, but cannot issue orders to the Chairman himself to take disciplinary action against his employees or nullify resolutions or force the chairman to change them. Let the Collector, Maharajganj explain by his affidavit his authority, upon which he dwells to interfere in the Nagar Palika matters in the sense indicated in this order. The Collector will file his affidavit on or before 29.8.2023. Lay as fresh again on 29.8.2023. Let a copy of this order be communicated to the Collector, Maharajganj by the Registrar (Compliance) within 48 hours.'' 6. A personal affidavit was filed by the District Magistrate on 29.8.2023 and the matter was adjourned to 30.8.2023, when it was again adjourned to 5.9.2023. On 5.9.2023, a supplementary-affidavit was filed on behalf of the petitioner. Let a copy of this order be communicated to the Collector, Maharajganj by the Registrar (Compliance) within 48 hours.'' 6. A personal affidavit was filed by the District Magistrate on 29.8.2023 and the matter was adjourned to 30.8.2023, when it was again adjourned to 5.9.2023. On 5.9.2023, a supplementary-affidavit was filed on behalf of the petitioner. The case was heard awhile and then adjourned to 13.9.2023, when the learned Counsel for the Nagar Palika Parishad was not present. It was then adjourned to 19.9.2023. On the said date, Mr. Rakesh Pande, Senior Advocate appeared on behalf of the Nagar Palika Parishad and sought a week's time to file a counter-affidavit. It was granted, adjourning the matter to 5.10.2023. On 5.10.2023, a counter-affidavit was filed on behalf of respondent Nos. 3 and 4 in Court and the petitioner promptly filed a rejoinder, also in Court on that day. Both these affidavits were taken on record and on the request of learned Senior Advocate appearing for the Nagar Palika Parishad, the case was adjourned to 9.10.2023. On 9.10.2023, the parties addressed the Court at substantial length on the issues arising and on that date, it was argued by Mr. Aditya Prakash Verma that the power of suspension under Section 77B(5) of the Act of 1916 can be exercised by the Nagar Palika by a special resolution supported by not less than 2/3rds of the members constituting the Nagar Palika Parishad. It was also argued that the District Magistrate did not have jurisdiction in the matter under Section 34(1-A) of the Act of 1916 to interfere in disciplinary matters of the Palika's employees. 7. On 5.10.2023, while admitting the petition to hearing, which proceeded forthwith, the Court recorded the crux of the submissions advanced by learned Counsel and reserved judgment. It was also recorded by the Court that prima facie the contention that a special resolution was required to be passed in order to suspend an employee of the Nagar Palika pending inquiry under Section 77B(5) of the Act of 1916 appears to be correct, and stayed the operation of the order of suspension till delivery of judgment. It was, however, made clear that the inquiry would go on and brought to its logical conclusion, wherein the petitioner shall cooperate. 8. Heard Mr. Aditya Prakash Verma, learned Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Rakesh Pande, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. It was, however, made clear that the inquiry would go on and brought to its logical conclusion, wherein the petitioner shall cooperate. 8. Heard Mr. Aditya Prakash Verma, learned Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Rakesh Pande, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Ashok Kumar Tiwari, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent Nos. 3 and 4 and Mr. Girijesh Kumar Tripathi, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 and 2. 9. We have carefully considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel for the parties wholesomely, that is to say, the ones recorded in the orders made at the early stages and those made at the Bar, when the matter was argued finally. We have also perused the record, including the personal affidavit filed by the District Magistrate, Maharajganj. 10. This Court is of opinion that before considering the submissions advanced by Mr. Aditya Prakash Verma, learned Counsel for the petitioner about the issue if an order of suspension against an employee of the Nagar Palika Parishad of the petitioner's rank must always be founded on the strength of a special resolution passed by the members of the Municipal Board by not less than 2/3rds of their strength, another issue also argued by parties requires consideration. The said issue is about the powers of the District Magistrate and the State Government to interfere in the disciplinary matters of employees of the Nagar Palika Parishad not belonging to the Centralized Service and whose Appointing Authority is the President of the Nagar Palika. The only source of power available to the District Magistrate and the State Government to interfere with the functioning of the Nagar Palika, or interfere in their Establishment, is traceable to Section 34 of the Act of 1916. Section 34 of the Act aforesaid reads: 34. The only source of power available to the District Magistrate and the State Government to interfere with the functioning of the Nagar Palika, or interfere in their Establishment, is traceable to Section 34 of the Act of 1916. Section 34 of the Act aforesaid reads: 34. Power of the State Government or the Prescribed Authority or the District Magistrate to prohibit execution or further execution of resolution or order of [Municipality].- (1) [The Prescribed Authority may], by order in writing, prohibit the execution or further execution of a resolution or order passed or made under this or any other enactment by a [Municipality] or a committee of a [Municipality] or a Joint Committee or any officer or servant of a [Municipality] or of a Joint Committee [if in its opinion] such resolution or order is of a nature to cause or tend to cause obstruction, annoyance or injury to the public or to any class or body of persons lawfully employed [* * *] and may prohibit the doing or continuance by any person of any act in pursuance for or under cover of such resolution or order. 1 [(1A) The District Magistrate may, within the limits of his district, by order in writing, prohibit the execution or further execution of a resolution or order passed or made under this or any other enactment by a] [Municipality] or a committee of a [Municipality] or a Joint Committee or any officer or servant of a [Municipality] or of a Joint Committee if in his opinion such resolution or order is of a nature to cause or tend to cause danger to human life, health or safety, or a riot or affray, and may prohibit the doing or continuance by any person of any act, in pursuance of or under cover of such resolution or order. [(1B) the State Government may, on its own motion or on report or complaint received by order prohibit the execution or further execution of a resolution or order passed or made under this or any other enactment by a] [Municipality] or a committee of a [Municipality] or a Joint Committee or any officer or servant of a [Municipality] or of a Joint Committee, if in its opinion such resolution or order is prejudicial to the public interest, [or has been passed or made in abuse of powers or in flagrant breach of any provision of any law for the time being in force,] and may prohibit the doing or continuance by any person of any act in pursuance of or under cover of such resolution or order. [(2) Where an order is made under sub-section (1) or (1-A)] [* * *], a copy thereof with a statement of the reasons for making it, shall forthwith be forwarded by the Prescribed Authority or the District Magistrate through the Prescribed Authority, as the case may be, to the State Government which may thereupon, if it thinks fit, rescind or modify the order. (3) [* * *] (4) Where the execution or further execution of a resolution or order is prohibited by an order made under sub-section (1), (1-A) or (1-B) and continuing in force, it shall be the duty of the [Municipality], if so required by the authority making the order under the said sub-sections to take any action which it would have been entitled to take, if the resolution or order had never been made or passed, and which is necessary for preventing any person from doing or continuing to do anything under cover of the resolution or order of which the further execution is prohibited. 11. Before proceeding to consider the powers of the District Magistrate and the State Government to interfere with the affairs of a Nagar Palika Parishad, it is necessary to advert to the personal affidavit that the District Magistrate has filed in compliance with this Court's order made on the day that the writ petition first came up for admission. 12. A perusal of the affidavit filed by Satendra Kumar, District Magistrate, Maharajganj, shows that he has not issued any orders to the President of the Nagar Palika regarding disciplinary action to be taken against the petitioner. 12. A perusal of the affidavit filed by Satendra Kumar, District Magistrate, Maharajganj, shows that he has not issued any orders to the President of the Nagar Palika regarding disciplinary action to be taken against the petitioner. Instead, he has made recommendations for departmental proceedings to be taken against the petitioner that he sent to the Government, in accordance with the provisions of sub-Sections (1-A) and (1-B) of Section 34 of the Act of 1916. The State Government, on the District Magistrate's report, have instructed the Appointing Authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings. Regarding the part of this Court's order, where we have said that the District Magistrate appears to be wholesomely intermeddling in the affairs of the Nagar Palika, directing cancellation of contracts and setting up an Inquiry Committee, a jurisdiction not vested in him, in paragraph No. 7 of his personal affidavit, the District Magistrate has attempted to justify his authority to direct a cancellation of the tender on the basis of some Government Order dated 27.2.2018, and another, dated 27.6.2019, because the work involved was done utilizing funds provided under the 14th Central Finance Commission, the State Finance Commission and the State Infrastructure Development Fund. 13. We need not go into that issue, because that part of our order was to ascertain the permissible level of interference by the District Magistrate in the Palika's affairs, which is an elected, independent and a constitutional body in its own right. What is relevant here is the explanation about the matter if the District Magistrate directed any action to be taken against the petitioner, an employee of the Nagar Palika Parishad; apparently, he did not. However, he did make a report against the petitioner based on a preliminary inquiry directed by him, purportedly in exercise of powers under those Government Orders that authorize him to manage funds provided by the Finance Commissions, both the Central and the State, and the Infrastructure Development Fund. We do not know if it was indeed so. The letter, that was written by the District Magistrate to the Principal Secretary, does not show to its face that it was about the mismanagement or misutilization of funds provided by the Finance Commission or the Development Fund by the Nagar Palika. We do not know if it was indeed so. The letter, that was written by the District Magistrate to the Principal Secretary, does not show to its face that it was about the mismanagement or misutilization of funds provided by the Finance Commission or the Development Fund by the Nagar Palika. It appears to be a letter that was based on a complaint received from a resident of the town about misconduct by the petitioner, besides the President, the Executive Officer and the Junior Engineer, in issuing fresh e-tenders for some civil work that was allegedly already completed. The District Magistrate did definitely recommend the Government initiation of disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner, amongst others. There is, therefore, no doubt that the District Magistrate did not himself direct the President, but made recommendations to the State Government to direct initiation of disciplinary action against the petitioner. 14. A perusal of sub-Section (1-B) of Section 34 shows that the State Government is invested with the power suo motu or on a report or a complaint received by them to prohibit the execution or further execution of a resolution or order passed by the Nagar Palika under the Act of 1916 or any other law or by a Committee of the Nagar Palika or an officer or servant or a Joint Committee of the Palika, if in the State Government's opinion, such resolution or order is: (1) prejudicial to public interest; (2) has been passed in abuse of powers; and, (3) is one made in flagrant breach of any provision of any law for the time being in force. Apart from prohibiting the execution or the further execution of a resolution of the Nagar Palika, or one of its Committees or Officers on the specified grounds alone, the State Government have the further power to prohibit the doing or continuance of any act by any person acting in pursuance of or under cover of the resolution or order, the execution or further execution whereof has been prohibited by the State Government. 15. It is, no doubt, true that the District Magistrate, seized with information that he gathered through the Committee that he constituted, could make a report to the State Government for taking of action under Section 34(1-B) of the Act of 1916. He could not issue directions to the President himself. 15. It is, no doubt, true that the District Magistrate, seized with information that he gathered through the Committee that he constituted, could make a report to the State Government for taking of action under Section 34(1-B) of the Act of 1916. He could not issue directions to the President himself. He did not issue any directions to the President of the Nagar Palika Parishad, as already remarked. Notwithstanding the District Magistrate's report in the matter, the powers of the State Government vis-a-vis a Nagar Palika Parishad are clearly spelt out by sub-Section (1-B) of Section 34 of the Act of 1916. There are two distinct parts to the exercise of the power under sub-Section (1-B) of Section 34 by the State Government. The first is what kind of power can be exercised by the State Government, or so to speak, the nature of the power or the nature of directions that can be made. The other is the grounds on which such power can be exercised or directions made. The two are not to be confounded. The power under sub-Section (1-B) of Section 34 is the power to prohibit the execution or further execution of a resolution or order passed or made by the Nagar Palika, which extends to a Committee or a Joint Committee or an Officer or servant of such Nagar Palika. The other power that can be exercised by the State Government is to prohibit the doing or continuance by any person of an act in compliance with the resolution or under its cover, the execution whereof has been prohibited by the State Government. The second facet of the power is, therefore, consequential to the first, or one necessary to give effect to the first. Apart from the prohibition of execution or further execution of a resolution or order passed by the Nagar Palika or a Committee or an Officer thereof, or the prohibition of an act or its continuance in compliance with such resolution, the State Government does not have general powers of such supervision over a Nagar Palika under Section 34(1-B) as may entitle it to issue directions to the Nagar Palika, mandatory in nature, to do a particular act, or take some particular action in accordance with the directions of the State Government. 16. 16. In the opinion of this Court, the crux of the matter is whether the State Government, given the nature of the power that it can exercise under sub-Section (1-B) of Section 34, could direct the President of the Nagar Palika Parishad to initiate the disciplinary proceedings against an employee of the Nagar Palika, whose Appointing Authority was the President. We do not think so. 17. Accepting for the District Magistrate, the freedom to make a report to the State Government of the kind that he did, though we are not particularly impressed with the explanation given by him, in our opinion, the State Government could not have issued a direction to the President of the Nagar Palika Parishad to the effect that the District Magistrate should communicate to the petitioner's Appointing Authority, that is to say, the President of the Municipality, the State Government's direction that the Appointing Authority should initiate departmental proceedings against the petitioner and post the Government on the proceedings taken in compliance. This direction, that was routed through the District Magistrate to the petitioner's Appointing Authority or the President of the Nagar Palika Parishad, was in the nature of a mandate or an injunction mandatory in form, commanding the taking of a particular action, in this case, the initiation of disciplinary proceedings by the President, the competent Appointing and Disciplinary Authority of the petitioner's. A second or a repeat look at the provisions of sub-section (1-B) of Section 34 of the Act of 1916 clearly shows that the powers of the State Government are limited to prohibit the execution or further execution of resolutions passed by the Nagar Palika, or orders made by one of their Officers or resolutions passed by a Committee of theirs. The only other power is to ensure that no one acts in compliance with the resolution of the Nagar Palika, the execution or the further execution whereof has been prohibited by the State Government. There is no power vested in the State Government under Section 34 (1-B) to issue directions of the kind that the Government have done to the President of the Nagar Palika routed through the District Magistrate, Maharajganj vide order dated 16.5.2023. 18. There is no power vested in the State Government under Section 34 (1-B) to issue directions of the kind that the Government have done to the President of the Nagar Palika routed through the District Magistrate, Maharajganj vide order dated 16.5.2023. 18. A reading of the impugned order dated 30.5.2023 unmistakenably shows that the President of the Nagar Palika Parishad, Siswa Bajar, District Maharajganj surrendered her jurisdiction and the exercise of independent discretion under Section 77B, to place the petitioner under suspension pending inquiry, to the State Government's fiat, carried in the memo/order dated 16.5.2023. Though attempted to be argued during the course of hearing that the President had not acted on the dictate and command of the State Government, the contention is difficult to accept. On the face of it, the impugned order says that in reference to the order dated 16.5.2023, issued by the Special Secretary to the Government, the following charges are framed against the petitioner: 19. After the charges, the impugned order carries a direction constituting a three-member Inquiry Committee followed by the direction, placing the petitioner under suspension. Though it was urged, as already noticed, by Mr. Rakesh Pande, learned Senior Advocate that the President by her remark that the charges are framed with reference to the Government Order dated 16.5.2023, did act by applying her mind independently to the matter, the contention is difficult to accept. The impugned order, for one, has to be read together with the directions issued by the State Government, which are mandatory in form and direct the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner, attended with directions to submit a compliance report. These two read together do eliminate any possibility of the President acting with an independent mind, in exercise of her discretion, to place the petitioner under suspension or initiate departmental proceedings against him. She has just obeyed the State Government mechanically. If there had been any shadow of doubt indeed, which Mr. Rakesh Pande attempted to create by the phraseology of the impugned order saying: we cannot accept it on a realistic understanding of the wide difference in the stature and the authority of the State Government on one hand and a small town Municipality on the other. If there had been any shadow of doubt indeed, which Mr. Rakesh Pande attempted to create by the phraseology of the impugned order saying: we cannot accept it on a realistic understanding of the wide difference in the stature and the authority of the State Government on one hand and a small town Municipality on the other. Though the law limits the power of the State Government, and rightfully so, to intermeddle with the affairs of an elected Nagar Palika, the fact that cannot be lost sight of is that the sovereign is one who is habitually obeyed. The State Government's unlawful command in this case has been carried out by the President of the Nagar Palika, as a matter of habitual obedience; and not because it is countenanced by law. Rather, it is contrary to the law. 20. The point that arises here squarely fell for consideration before this Court decades ago in Shujaat Ullah Khan v. State of U.P. and others, 1966 All LJ 499. In Shujaat Ullah Khan (supra), while judging the legality of an order passed by the State Government under Section 34(1-B) of the Act of 1916, prohibiting the execution of a resolution passed by the Municipal Board on 28.11.1959, exonerating the petitioner of charges laid against him, it was held by W. Broom, J.: 4. It is clear that the only order that can be passed by the State Government under this sub-section is a prohibitory order to prevent something being done in the future. It is not open to the Government, acting under this sub-section, to give any positive direction such as has been given in the present case, where the Government has ordered the Board to reconsider its report and to make a further enquiry and take a fresh decision. The resolution passed by the Board on 28-11-59, exonerating the Executive Officer and dropping the charges against him, exhausted itself as soon as it was passed, for the charges were straight away dropped and the Executive Officer stood exonerated. There remained nothing to be done in the future and there was nothing left for ''execution or further execution'' that could be prohibited by the State Government under Sec. 34(1-B). : 21. There remained nothing to be done in the future and there was nothing left for ''execution or further execution'' that could be prohibited by the State Government under Sec. 34(1-B). : 21. The aforesaid interpretation of the provisions of Section 34(1-B) of the Act of 1916 by this Court and the nature of powers that could be exercised by the State Government thereunder was approved by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Municipal Board, Kannauj v. State of U.P. and others, (1972) 3 SCC 345 . In Municipal Board, Kannauj (supra), it was held by the Supreme Court: ''5. The only point of substance urged by the Board before this Court was that the provisions of Section 34(1-B) of the Act were incapable of application to an order of dismissal. The contention was that, when an order of dismissal is passed, the order operates by its own force and no further steps are necessary to implement such an order. It was submitted that the sub-section applied only to those cases where the resolution of the Board or order required some steps to be taken to effectuate the resolution or the order and not when the resolution or order was effective by its own force. In other words, where on the passing of the resolution or order it exhausted itself, the State Government could hardly ''prohibit the execution or further execution'' of that resolution or order; and, therefore, where the State Government interfered by prohibiting the execution or further execution of the resolution or order, it really intended to cancel or set aside the resolution or order which, in the submission of the petitioner, was beyond the powers of the State Government. It appears to us that there is considerable force, in this submission. 6. Section 34 is in that part of Chapter II of the Act which deals with the subject ''Control of Board''. The marginal note to the section is ''Power of the State Government or the Prescribed Authority or the District Magistrate to prohibit execution of or further execution of resolution or order of the Board''. Sub-sections (1) and (1-A) deal with the powers of the Prescribed Authority and the District Magistrate in this respect. The marginal note to the section is ''Power of the State Government or the Prescribed Authority or the District Magistrate to prohibit execution of or further execution of resolution or order of the Board''. Sub-sections (1) and (1-A) deal with the powers of the Prescribed Authority and the District Magistrate in this respect. Sub-section (1-B) deals with the powers of the State Government and is as follows: ''(1-B) The State Government may, of its own motion or on report or complaint received by order prohibit the execution or further execution of a resolution or order passed or made under this or any other enactment by a board or a committee of a board or a joint committee or any officer or servant of a board or of a joint committee, if in its opinion such resolution or order is prejudicial to the public interest, or has been passed or made in abuse of powers or in flagrant breach of any provision of any law for the time being in force, and may prohibit the doing or continuance by any person of any act in pursuance of or under cover of such resolution or order. 7. It should be noted that the words italicised above were inserted by an amendment which came into force on November 30, 1964, that is to say, much after the order of dismissal by the Executive Officer had been passed, though before the order of the State Government, dated May 12, 1965. Before the amendment, the State Government could pass the order of prohibition of execution only when, in its opinion, the resolution or order was prejudicial to the public interest but, after the amendment, such an order could also be made by the State Government if, in its opinion, the resolution or order was made in abuse of powers or in flagrant breach of any provision of any law for the time being in force. It was contended on behalf of the Board that it was not competent for the State Government in this case to make the order on the ground that the order of dismissal was in flagrant breach of a provision of the law for the time being in force. It was contended on behalf of the Board that it was not competent for the State Government in this case to make the order on the ground that the order of dismissal was in flagrant breach of a provision of the law for the time being in force. But that point is only of academic interest, because the order itself shows that it had been passed also on the ground that the order of dismissal was prejudicial to the public interest. We assume, therefore, that the State Government was satisfied that the order of dismissal passed by the Executive Officer was prejudicial to the public interest. The question, however, is whether, after the order of dismissal had been passed on April 9, 1964, the State Government had the power virtually to set aside or cancel the order under the cover of purporting ''to prohibit the execution or further execution of that order''. In our opinion, that sub-section does not clothe the State Government with such a power. The resolution of the Board or the order of a duly authorised officer of the Board is not liable to be cancelled or set aside under this section. All that could be done under it is to prohibit the execution or further execution of the resolution or order, or the doing or continuance by any person of any act in pursuance of or under cover of such resolution or order. Where the resolution or order does not require any acts to be performed or steps to be taken for the execution or further execution of the resolution or order of the Board or of its Officer, as in the present case, there is really nothing to prohibit. Where the resolution or order does not require any acts to be performed or steps to be taken for the execution or further execution of the resolution or order of the Board or of its Officer, as in the present case, there is really nothing to prohibit. It was contended on behalf of the State that, when the State Government was empowered to order prohibition of the execution of the resolution or order, it was virtually empowered to set aside or cancel the order and, in support of this view, a reference was made to sub-section (4) of that section which provides that it shall be the duty of the Board, if so required by the authority making the order under sub-section (1-B) to take any action which it would have been entitled to take, if the resolution or order had never been made or passed, and which is necessary for preventing any person from doing or continuing to do anything in pursuance of the resolution or order. If the object of the provision was to clothe the State Government with the power to cancel or set aside the resolution of the Board or order, it would have simply said so without resorting to the circumlocution ''prohibit the execution or further execution of the resolution or order''. We do not, therefore, think that sub-section (1-B) read with sub-section (4) applies to any resolution or order which exhausts itself after it is passed or made. That is the view taken by a learned Judge of the Allahabad High Court in Shujaat Ullah Khan v. State of U.P. [1966 ALJ 499]. 8. In that case, a resolution was passed by the Board exonerating Shujaat Ullah Khan, who was the Executive Officer of the Board, from certain charges their had been framed against him. The State Government, thereupon, purporting to act under Section 34(1-B) of the Act, quashed the Board's resolution on the ground that it was illegal, not having been passed by 2/3rds of the members constituting the Board and was otherwise prejudicial to the public interest. This order of the State Government was challenged by Shujaat Ullah Khan on several grounds, one of them being that no order under Section 34(1-B) could be passed, because the resolution of the Board had been fully implemented and nothing remained to be executed in respect thereof. This order of the State Government was challenged by Shujaat Ullah Khan on several grounds, one of them being that no order under Section 34(1-B) could be passed, because the resolution of the Board had been fully implemented and nothing remained to be executed in respect thereof. This contention was accepted by the learned Judge who observed as follows: ''It is clear that the only order that can be passed by the State Government under this sub-section is a prohibitory order to prevent something being done in the future. It is not open to the Government, acting under this sub-section, to give any positive direction such as has been given in the present case, where the Government has ordered the Board to reconsider its report and to make a further enquiry and take a fresh decision. The resolution passed by the Board, exonerating the Executive Officer and dropping the charges against him, exhausted itself as soon as it was passed, for the charges were straightaway dropped and the Executive Officer stood exonerated. There remained nothing to be done in the future and there was nothing left for execution or further execution that could be prohibited by the State Government under Section 34(1-B).'' (Emphasis by Court) 22. The other point that was argued with much vehemence on both sides regarding the power to suspend vesting in the Municipal Board and not the President, which requires a special resolution passed by a majority of 2/3rds Members of the Board under Section 77-B(5) of the Act of 1916 need not be decided, as this cause is being decided on another point. The said question is left open. 23. This then being the position of the law, we are of opinion that the order passed by the State Government on 16.5.2023 is ultra vires Section 34(1-B) of the Act of 1916. Though not under challenge, it has simply to be ignored and held to be of no effect or one binding or obliging the President of the Nagar Palika Parishad. We have elsewhere already held that the President of Nagar Palika Parishad, Siswa Bazar, District Maharjganj passed the impugned order on the dictate and command of the State Government, and that too, a command that is without the authority of law, and for that reason, non est. We have elsewhere already held that the President of Nagar Palika Parishad, Siswa Bazar, District Maharjganj passed the impugned order on the dictate and command of the State Government, and that too, a command that is without the authority of law, and for that reason, non est. The result is that the impugned order passed by the President of the Nagar Palika Parishad, Siswa Bazar, District Maharajganj dated 30.5.2023 cannot survive and must be quashed. 24. In the result, this petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 30.5.2016 passed by the Nagar Palika Parishad, Siswa Bazar, District Maharajganj is hereby quashed. Consequences to follow. 25. Costs easy.