JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioner has preferred present petition under Articles 14, 16, 21, 23 and 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the inaction on the part of respondent authorities with below mentioned relief/s:- "18. (A) This Honourable court be pleased to admit and allow the present petition. (AA). Your Lordships may be pleased to issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction declaring the inaction on the part of the respondent authorities in extending the benefit contained in the Finance Department circular dated 16.07.2019 ordering payment of minimum of the pay scale of the post to the petitioner with effect from 01.01.2019 as discriminatory and arbitrary and thus violative of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India; (AB). Your Lordships may be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction commanding the respondent authorities to extend the benefits contained in Finance Department Circular dated 16.07.2019 to the petitioner with effect from 01.01.2019;" AB 1. Your Lordships may be pleased to issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction, to quash and set aside the communication dated 30.05.2023 (Annexure- T(Colly.) issued by respondent no.4; (B) This Honorable Court may be pleased to issue appropriate writ, order or direction to regularize services of the present petitioner as peon in Social Welfare Branch of Ahmedabad District Panchayat. (C) The Resolution dated 27.8.2002 passed by the Executive Committee of Ahmedabad District Panchayat bearing Resolution No.256 and Resolution dated 21.10.2003 passed by the Ahmedabad District Panchayat Executive Committee bearing Resolution No. 19 be implemented and appropriate writ, order or direction be passed to the same effect. (D) This Honourable Court may be pleased to issue appropriate writ, order or direction in allowing the petitioner to work at the post where the petitioner is presently working. (DA). Pending final hearing of the petition, Your Lordships may be pleased to direct the respondent authorities to pay the petitioner the minimum of the pay scale of the post against which he is appointed as a parttimer with effect from 01.01.2019; (E) During the pendency and/or final disposal of the petition present petitioner may be allowed to continue at the post where presently the petitioner is working and appropriate writ, order or direction may pleased be issued to the same effect. (F) To award cost of this petition. (G) This Honourable Court be pleased to grant any other and further reliefs as may be deemed fit in the facts and circumstances of the case." 2. The short facts giving rise to present petition are that the petitioner was appointed on 10.6.1991 as peon by the District Social Welfare Officer, District Panchayat, Ahmedabad. Thereafter, the present petitioner has worked regularly without any brake and as the present petitioner has worked continuously for more than 8 years, the Ahmedabad District Panchayat in its Executive Committee meeting has passed one Resolution bearing No. 256 on 27.8.2002, that as per the Government Circular dated 26.12.1980 the petitioner's services require to be regularized. 2.1 Thereafter, various communications have taken place between petitioner and the department and lastly the present petitioner on 2.5.2008 has received communication that the proposal was sent to regularize the services of the present petitioner on 6.4.2005. However, no action has been taken and ultimately order dated 30.5.2023 came to be passed by the respondent authorities and therefore, the petitioner has preferred present petition for extending benefits contained in Finance Department Circular dated 16.7.2019 from 1.1.2019. 3. Heard Mr. Shalin Mehta, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. Aditi Raol, learned Counsel for the petitioner, Ms. R.V. Acharya, learned Counsel for the respondent No.2 and Ms. Dharitri Pancholi, learned Government Pleader for the respondent No.4. 4. Mr. Shalin Mehta, learned Senior Counsel has referred to and relied upon the decision of the coordinate bench of this Court dated 19.7.2022 passed in Special Civil Application No.6852 of 2020 and another decision of the division bench of this Court dated 11.8.2023 passed in Letters Patent Appeal No.724 of 2023 and allied matters. 4.1 Relying upon the aforesaid decisions of this Court, Mr. Shalin Mehta, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner is entitled for the benefits contained in Finance Department Circular dated 16.7.2019 from 1.1.2019. 4.1 Relying upon the aforesaid decisions of this Court, Mr. Shalin Mehta, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner is entitled for the benefits contained in Finance Department Circular dated 16.7.2019 from 1.1.2019. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that the order dated 19.7.2022 passed in Special Civil Application No.6852 of 2020 granting benefits of Circular dated 16.7.2019 to petitioner came to be challenged by the State of Gujarat before the division bench of this Court by way of preferring Letters Patent Appeal No.724 of 2023 and allied appeals and the division bench vide order dated 11.8.2023 allowed the said appeal qua category no.1 which was carved out in Special Civil Application No. 6852 of 2020 and allied matters and for the remaining categories the said Letters Patent Appeal came to be dismissed and therefore, the petitioner is entitled to get benefits contained in Finance Department Circular dated 16.7.2019 from 1.1.2019. 4.2 In view of the above facts, Mr. Shalin Mehta, learned Senior Counsel urges before the Court that present petition may be allowed and communication/order dated 30.5.2023 may be quashed and set aside. 5. On the other hand, Ms. Ravi Acharya, learned Counsel for the respondent No.2 and Ms. Dharitri Pancholi, learned Assistant Government Pleader for respondent No.4 have strongly objected present petition. 5.1 Learned Assistant Government urges before this Court that the prayer made in the petition cannot be granted while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. She has further submitted that the impugned decision of the respondent is in consonance with the prevailing policy and the circular and therefore, no interference is required to be called for in present petition. 5.2 Respondent No.2 has filed an affidavit-in-reply wherein it is mentioned that:- "4. I say and submit that the petitioner has filed the present petition for extending the benefits of Finance Department Circular dated 16/7/2019 with effect from 1/1/2019, and further to regularize services of the petitioner as a Peon in Social Welfare branch of Ahmedabad District Panchayat. The petitioner was appointed on 10/6/1991 as Waterman and thereafter as peon with effect from 4/5/1993. The petitioner was appointed on 10/6/1991 as Waterman and thereafter as peon with effect from 4/5/1993. Since the petitioner had worked continuously from 4/5/1993 for a period of 9 years, his case was considered by the answering respondent herein for regularizing his services and therefore, Resolution No.256 dated 27/8/2002 was passed by the answering respondent herein." 5.3 Thereafter, respondent No.3 also filed an affidavit-in-reply in compliance of oral order dated 26.4.2023 and objected present petition. 5.4 In view of the above facts, learned advocate and learned Assistant Government Pleader for the respondents urge before this Court that the petitioner is not entitled for the benefits as prayed for in the petition and therefore, this Court may not entertain present petition and the petition may be dismissed. 6. I have considered the averments made in present petition. I have also gone through the relevant material and documents placed on record. 7. It appears that the petition came to be admitted vide order dated 10.9.2008 and thereafter, the petition came to be listed before the coordinate bench of this Court on 26.4.2024 and during the course of hearing, the Court directed respondent No.3 to decide the proposal forwarded by respondent No.2 as expeditiously as possible and preferably within period of 4 weeks. 8. In compliance of the direction, concerned respondent has decided the proposal forwarded by the department and ultimately rejected the proposal forwarded by the department. 9. The issue involved in present petition is now not remained res-integra, as the same was decided by this Court in group of petitions being Special Application No. 6852 of 2020 and allied matters. In the said decision the Court has carved out eight categories in paragraph No.4 which read as under:- "(1) Challenge to the entitlement of the benefit of the circular because of the rejection of cases those persons who are appointed for less than four hours. (2) Rejection on the ground that the petitioners have approached the Court belatedly after termination. (3) Rejection on the ground that such persons who are appointed on fixed pay basis and for 29 days in a month with one day’s artificial break are not entitled to the benefit of the Circular dated 16.7.2019. (4) Rejection on the ground that the persons working on outsourcing by virtue of the GRs dated 10.2.2006, 1.4.2010 and 25.4.2012 cannot get the benefit of the Circular dated 16.7.2019. (4) Rejection on the ground that the persons working on outsourcing by virtue of the GRs dated 10.2.2006, 1.4.2010 and 25.4.2012 cannot get the benefit of the Circular dated 16.7.2019. This included a category of persons engaged on project work. (5) Denial of the benefit of the Circular dated 16.7.2019 on the ground that there are no orders of appointments issued to the petitioners. (6) Denial of the benefit of the Circular dated 16.7.2019 on the ground that the petitioners are part time employees who were appointed after 31.5.2012 and are therefore, not entitled to get the benefit of the circular dated 16.7.2019 as there was a complete ban on engaging part time employees as per the GR dated 25.4.2012. (7) Denial of the benefit to such Class-IV employee on the ground that they are not working on sanctioned posts. (8) Persons whose cases are rejected on the ground that they are working with the Panchayat." 10. Thereafter, the Court allowed the petitions on 19.7.2022. Relevant observations made in paragraph Nos. 21 and 22 by the Court read as under:- "21. The denial of the benefit of the Circular dated 16.7.2019 for those who were working on 29 days basis or on outsourcing or project workers is also misconceived as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Abdul Kadir and another v. Director General of Police reported in 2009(6) SCC 611 , paragraph Nos.16 to 18 and 22 read as under: “16. We may next consider the challenge to the procedure of annual termination and reappointment introduced by the circular dated 17.3.1995. The PIF Scheme and PIF Additional Scheme were introduced by Government of India. The scheme does not contemplate or require such periodical termination and re-appointment. Only ex-servicemen are eligible to be selected under the scheme and that too after undergoing regular selection process under the Scheme. They joined the scheme being under the impression that they will be continued as long as the PIF Additional Scheme was continued. The artificial annual breaks and re-appointments were introduced by the state agency entrusted with the operation of the Scheme. This Court has always frowned upon artificial breaks in service. 17. They joined the scheme being under the impression that they will be continued as long as the PIF Additional Scheme was continued. The artificial annual breaks and re-appointments were introduced by the state agency entrusted with the operation of the Scheme. This Court has always frowned upon artificial breaks in service. 17. When the ad-hoc appointment is under a scheme and is in accordance with the selection process prescribed by the scheme, there is no reason why those appointed under the scheme should not be continued as long as the scheme continues. Ad-hoc appointments under schemes are normally co-terminus with the scheme (subject of course to earlier termination either on medical or disciplinary grounds, or for unsatisfactory service or on attainment of normal age of retirement). Irrespective of the length of their ad hoc service or the scheme, they will not be entitled to regularization nor to the security of tenure and service benefits available to the regular employees. In this background, particularly in view of the continuing Scheme, the ex-serviceman employed after undergoing selection process, need not be subjected to the agony, anxiety, humiliation and vicissitudes of annual termination and reengagement, merely because their appointment is termed as ad hoc appointments. 17. We are therefore of the view that the learned Single Judge was justified in observing that the process of termination and reappointment every year should be avoided and the appellants should be continued as long as the Scheme continues, but purely on ad hoc and temporary basis, co- terminus with the scheme. The circular dated 17.3.1995 directing artificial breaks by annual terminations followed by fresh appointment, being contrary to the PIF Additional Scheme and contrary to the principles of service jurisprudence, is liable to be is quashed. 22. We are conscious of the fact that the issue is a matter of policy having financial and other implications. But where an issue involving public interest has not engaged the attention of those concerned with policy, or where the failure to take prompt decision on a pending issue is likely to be detrimental to public interest, courts will be failing in their duty if they do not draw attention of the concerned authorities to the issue involved in appropriate cases. While courts cannot be and should not be makers of policy, they can certainly be catalysts, when there is a need for a policy or a change in policy.” 21.1. It is worthwhile to reproduce paras 44 and 48 of the decision in the case of Umadevi (Supra) which read as under: “44. The concept of 'equal pay for equal work' is different from the concept of conferring permanency on those who have been appointed on ad hoc basis, temporary basis, or based on no process of selection as envisaged by the Rules. This Court has in various decisions applied the principle of equal pay for equal work and has laid down the parameters for the application of that principle. The decisions are rested on the concept of equality enshrined in our Constitution in the light of the directive principles in that behalf. But the acceptance of that principle cannot lead to a position where the court could direct that appointments made without following the due procedure established by law, be deemed permanent or issue directions to treat them as permanent. Doing so, would be negation of the principle of equality of opportunity. The power to make an order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before this Court, would not normally be used for giving the go-by to the procedure established by law in the matter of public employment. Take the situation arising in the cases before us from the State of Karnataka. Therein, after the Dharwad decision, the Government had issued repeated directions and mandatory orders that no temporary or ad hoc employment or engagement be given. Some of the authorities and departments had ignored those directions or defied those directions and had continued to give employment, specifically interdicted by the orders issued by the executive. Some of the appointing officers have even been punished for their defiance. It would not be just or proper to pass an order in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 or 32 of the Constitution or in exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India permitting those persons engaged, to be absorbed or to be made permanent, based on their appointments or engagements. It would not be just or proper to pass an order in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 or 32 of the Constitution or in exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India permitting those persons engaged, to be absorbed or to be made permanent, based on their appointments or engagements. Complete justice would be justice according to law and though it would be open to this Court to mould the relief, this Court would not grant a relief which would amount to perpetuating an illegality. 48. It was then contended that the rights of the employees thus appointed, under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, are violated. It is stated that the State has treated the employees unfairly by employing them on less than minimum wages and extracting work from them for a pretty long period in comparison with those directly recruited who are getting more wages or salaries for doing similar work. The employees before us were engaged on daily wages in the concerned department on a wage that was made known to them. There is no case that the wage agreed upon was not being paid. Those who are working on daily wages formed a class by themselves, they cannot claim that they are discriminated as against those who have been regularly recruited on the basis of the relevant rules. No right can be founded on an employment on daily wages to claim that such employee should be treated on a par with a regularly recruited candidate, and made permanent in employment, even assuming that the principle could be invoked for claiming equal wages for equal work. There is no fundamental right in those who have been employed on daily wages or temporarily or on contractual basis, to claim that they have a right to be absorbed in service. As has been held by this Court, they cannot be said to be holders of a post, since, a regular appointment could be made only by making appointments consistent with the requirements of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The right to be treated equally with the other employees employed on daily wages, cannot be extended to a claim for equal treatment with those who were regularly employed. That would be treating unequals as equals. The right to be treated equally with the other employees employed on daily wages, cannot be extended to a claim for equal treatment with those who were regularly employed. That would be treating unequals as equals. It cannot also be relied on to claim a right to be absorbed in service even though they have never been selected in terms of the relevant recruitment rules. The arguments based on Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution are therefore overruled.” 21.2. Reading the aforesaid paras of the judgment make it clear that a distinction was drawn between claiming regularization and claiming pay parity. It is the concept of “equality” which would bind the State to cure the deficiency by giving minimum of a pay-scale to a Daily Wager as is given to a regularly selected employee. 21.3. In the case of State of Punjab v. Jagjit Singh and others reported in 2017(1) SCC 148 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court while examining the legality of the Full Bench decision of the Punjab High Court, held as under: “58. In our considered view, it is fallacious to determine artificial parameters to deny fruits of labour. An employee engaged for the same work, cannot be paid less than another, who performs the same duties and responsibilities. Certainly not, in a welfare state. Such an action besides being demeaning, strikes at the very foundation of human dignity. Any one, who is compelled to work at a lesser wage, does not do so voluntarily. He does so, to provide food and shelter to his family, at the cost of his self respect and dignity, at the cost of his self worth, and at the cost of his integrity. For he knows, that his dependents would suffer immensely, if he does not accept the lesser wage. Any act, of paying less wages, as compared to others similarly situate, constitutes an act of exploitative enslavement, emerging out of a domineering position. Undoubtedly, the action is oppressive, suppressive and coercive, as it compels involuntary subjugation. 59. We would also like to extract herein Article 7, of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966. Any act, of paying less wages, as compared to others similarly situate, constitutes an act of exploitative enslavement, emerging out of a domineering position. Undoubtedly, the action is oppressive, suppressive and coercive, as it compels involuntary subjugation. 59. We would also like to extract herein Article 7, of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966. The same is reproduced below:- “Article 7 The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work which ensure, in particular: (a) Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with: (i) Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind, in particular women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work; (ii) A decent living for themselves and their families in accordance with the provisions of the present Covenant; (b) Safe and healthy working conditions; (c) Equal opportunity for everyone to be promoted in his employment to an appropriate higher level, subject to no considerations other than those of seniority and competence; (d) Rest, leisure and reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay, as well as remuneration for public holidays.” India is a signatory to the above covenant, having ratified the same on 10.4.1979. There is no escape from the above obligation, in view of different provisions of the Constitution referred to above, and in view of the law declared by this Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India, the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ constitutes a clear and unambiguous right and is vested in every employee – whether engaged on regular or temporary basis. 60. Having traversed the legal parameters with reference to the application of the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’, in relation to temporary employees (daily-wage employees, ad-hoc appointees, employees appointed on casual basis, contractual employees and the like), the sole factor that requires our determination is, whether the concerned employees (before this Court), were rendering similar duties and responsibilities, as were being discharged by regular employees, holding the same/corresponding posts. This exercise would require the application of the parameters of the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ summarized by us in paragraph 42 above. This exercise would require the application of the parameters of the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ summarized by us in paragraph 42 above. However, insofar as the instant aspect of the matter is concerned, it is not difficult for us to record the factual position. We say so, because it was fairly acknowledged by the learned counsel representing the State of Punjab, that all the temporary employees in the present bunch of appeals, were appointed against posts which were also available in the regular cadre/establishment. It was also accepted, that during the course of their employment, the concerned temporary employees were being randomly deputed to discharge duties and responsibilities, which at some point in time, were assigned to regular employees. Likewise, regular employees holding substantive posts, were also posted to discharge the same work, which was assigned to temporary employees, from time to time. There is, therefore, no room for any doubt, that the duties and responsibilities discharged by the temporary employees in the present set of appeals, were the same as were being discharged by regular employees. It is not the case of the appellants, that the respondent-employees did not possess the qualifications prescribed for appointment on regular basis. Furthermore, it is not the case of the State, that any of the temporary employees would not be entitled to pay parity, on any of the principles summarized by us in paragraph 42 hereinabove. There can be no doubt, that the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ would be applicable to all the concerned temporary employees, so as to vest in them the right to claim wages, at par with the minimum of the pay-scale of regularly engaged Government employees, holding the same post. 61. In view of the position expressed by us in the foregoing paragraph, we have no hesitation in holding, that all the concerned temporary employees, in the present bunch of cases, would be entitled to draw wages at the minimum of the pay-scale (at the lowest grade, in the regular pay- scale), extended to regular employees, holding the same post.” 21.4. In no uncertain terms did the Hon’ble Supreme Court observe that an employee engaged in the same work cannot be paid less than another who performs the same duties and responsibilities such an action is demeaning, strikes at the very foundation of human dignity. 21.5. In no uncertain terms did the Hon’ble Supreme Court observe that an employee engaged in the same work cannot be paid less than another who performs the same duties and responsibilities such an action is demeaning, strikes at the very foundation of human dignity. 21.5. The stand of the State therefore that in case of belated challenge, or working for less than four hours, working for 29 days, or on a project, persons engaged on outsourcing, persons whose engagement is without an appointment orders, or not working on sanctioned posts or working in Panchayats is again a stand of the State setting at naught the very purpose for which the Circular was brought forth. The rejection of cases on such grounds akin thereto is bad and deserves to be set aside. 21.6. Therefore, the practice of applying artificial break by itself would tantamount to unfair labour practice and State since being a model employer cannot be said to canvas an argument that short tenure appointment or appointment on 29 days basis is an appointment which would not get the benefit of the Resolution dated 16.7.2019. The continuation of the appointees on these posts itself would indicate that they are in need as the work is of perennial nature. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has always frowned upon artificial break of service and on the principles of parity in pay scales such employees working on a project basis are entitled to the benefits of the Circular dated 16.7.2019. It does not lie in the mouth of the State to deny the benefits of Circular dated 16.7.2019 to Panchayat Employees on the ground that the Resolution does not apply to them. The Resolution would apply to such Panchayat employees as reading the Circular of 16.7.2019 specifically indicates that the same would apply to all such agencies and instrumentalities of the State and not doing so would run counter to the decision in the case of of Hon’ble Supreme Court Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni (Supra). 22. For all the aforesaid reasons as discussed hereinabove considering the categories namely 8 in number, the petitioners are held to be entitled to the benefit of Circular dated 16.7.2019 and, therefore, all these petitions are allowed and the rejections if any, on these grounds as mentioned hereinabove are quashed and set aside." 11. 22. For all the aforesaid reasons as discussed hereinabove considering the categories namely 8 in number, the petitioners are held to be entitled to the benefit of Circular dated 16.7.2019 and, therefore, all these petitions are allowed and the rejections if any, on these grounds as mentioned hereinabove are quashed and set aside." 11. Against the said decision of the coordinate bench of this Court, the respondent State of Gujarat has preferred Letters Patent Appeal No.724 of 2023 and allied matters before the Division Bench of this Court and vide order dated 11.8.2023, the said Appeal came to disposed of. Relevant observations made by the Division Bench of this Court read as under:- "32. In light of the above discussion, we reached at an irresistible conclusion that the opinion drawn by the learned Single Judge in paragraph ‘17’ of the judgment impugned, giving interpretation to Clause-1 of the Circular dated 16.07.2019 to grant benefit of regular pay to the part-time employees working for less than four hours, is based on wrong assumptions. However, in view of the arguments of the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents – writ petitioners in light of the facts of the instant case, as the writ petitioners – respondents herein are covered by the Circular dated 16.07.2019 as they have demonstrated to have been working for six hours or more in a day in different departments of the State Government, we hold that the interpretation of the Circular dated 16.07.2019 in respect to those part-time employees who were/are working for less than four hours in a day, would not arise, in the instant case. 33. For the above, the judgment and order dated 19.07.2022 of the learned Single Judge, in the case of the writ petitioners – respondents herein, is modified with the observation that the issue with regard to the applicability of the Circular/ Government Resolution dated 16.07.2019 with regard to the part-time employees working for less than four hours, is left open for examination by this Court in an appropriate case. The observations made by us hereinabove on the opinion drawn by the learned Single Judge in paragraph ‘17’ of the judgment impugned that the circular cannot be restricted to one category of part-time employees, shall not be treated as a binding precedent, inasmuch as, the issue of interpretation of the contents of the Circular dated 16.07.2019, has not arisen in the instant case, in principle. It is further clarified that the observations made hereinabove with regard to the interpretation of the Circular dated 16.07.2019 was only an effort to arrive at a just decision in the facts and circumstances of the instant case. 34. In view of the above, while modifying the judgment and order dated 19.07.2022 passed by the learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application No.6852 of 2020 and allied matters, to the above extent, with respect to the respondents herein – writ petitioners, these bunch of appeals are disposed of. In view of the disposal of the main appeals, the connected Civil Applications also stand disposed of." 12. Hence, the issue involved in present petition has already been decided by this Court in Special Application No. 6852 of 2020 and allied matters on 19.7.2022, more particularly in paragraph No. 4 this Court has carved out 8 categories and ultimately, petition came to be allowed and the benefits were extended to the concerned petitioners. The said findings came to be challenged by the respondent State of Gujarat before the Division Bench of this Court by way of preferring Letters Patent Appeal No. 724 of 2023 and allied matters and after considering the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties and after going through the records, the division bench has allowed the said Letters Patent Appeal qua category no.1 which was carved out in Special Civil Application No. 6852 of 2020 and allied matters and for the remaining categories the said Letters Patent Appeal came to be dismissed and no interference was called for. 13. In view of the above discussion, I am of the opinion that present petition requires to be allowed. 14. 13. In view of the above discussion, I am of the opinion that present petition requires to be allowed. 14. So far as prayer made in paragraph No. 18(AA) and (AB) are concerned, the respondent authorities are hereby directed to pay all the consequential benefits to the petitioner from 1.1.2019 as per Government Circular dated 16.7.2019 as observed by this Court while allowing group of petitions being Special Civil Application No. 6852 of 2020 and confirmed vide Letters Patent Appeal No.724 of 2023 and allied matters within period of four weeks from the date of receipt of copy of the order. 15. So far as prayer for regularization of service of the petitioner is concerned, the respondent No.2 has passed two resolutions in favour of the petitioner, which is subject to final outcome of the other group of petitions, which are pending before this Court. Therefore, it is open for the petitioner that as and when the said group of petitions are decided, the petitioner may make appropriate representation to respondent No.2 and respondent No.2 will take appropriate decision in accordance with law, in light of two resolutions passed by respondent No.2. 16. Accordingly present petition is hereby allowed. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. Direct service is permitted.