JUDGMENT : (Bhargav D. Karia, J.) 1. Heard learned advocate Mr. Paresh M. Dave with learned advocate Mr. Amal P. Dave for the petitioners and learned advocate Mr. Ankit Shah for the respondent No.1 and learned Senior Advocate Mr. Saurabh Soparkar with learned advocate Ms. Gargi R. Vyas for the respondent No.3. 2. The challenge in this Special Civil Application is directed against the order of the Central Government – respondent No.1 dated 17th August 2022, whereby, in exercise of powers conferred in sub-sections (1) and (5) of Section 9A of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 (for the shorts, “the Act”) read with Rules 18, 20 and 23 of the Customs Tariff (Identification, Assessment and Collection of Anti-dumping Duty on Dumped Articles and for Determination of Injury), Rules, 1995 (for short, “the Rules”), the respondent No.1 Central Government has decided not to accept the findings of the Designated Authority in respect of levy of anti-dumping duty with regard to Textured Toughened (Tempered) Glass. The final findings of the Designated Authority were submitted to the Central Government in respect of sunset review investigation for levy of anti-dumping duty concerning the imports of Textured Tempered Coated and Uncoated Glass originating in or exported from China PR. 3. The petitioner company has set up a company at village Govali, District Bharuch for manufacturing sheet glass and various varieties of glass in the year 1994. 4. The petitioner commenced commercial production of a special variety of glass namely “Textured Toughened (Tempered) Glass with a minimum 90.5% transmission and having thickness not exceeding 4.2 mm in March 2010. Such Textured Toughened (Tempered) Glass are used as a component in Solar Photovoltaic Panels and Solar Thermal applications. The petitioner filed an application before the Designated Authority of the Ministry of Commerce and Industries, Government of India, under the Act and the Anti-dumping Duty Rules for imposition of anti-dumping duty on imports of the Textured Toughened (Tempered) Glass as large scale dumping of the said goods was from China and the local buyers and customers were importing and purchasing such goods of Chinese origin because the goods were available below the manufacturing cost in domestic industry at much cheaper price. The petitioner was suffering because demand and sale of the goods was going down continuously and substantially in view of availability of similar goods of Chinese origin at a price which was less than the production cost. The petitioner was suffering because demand and sale of the goods was going down continuously and substantially in view of availability of similar goods of Chinese origin at a price which was less than the production cost. 5. The Designated Authority appointed under Rule 3 of the Rules issued a Notification dated 23rd June 2016 inviting response and data, evidence as well as submissions as regards application from all concerned parties including the Chinese exporters and the local buyers/importers of the subject goods. 6. The respondent No.2 – Designated Authority notified the final findings on 20th June 2017 after giving an opportunity of hearing to all concerned persons to the effect that the subject goods were being exported from China to India below their associated normal value and the domestic industry had suffered material injury by the dumped imports of the subject goods and that anti-dumping duty to the extent specified in the Notification was required to be imposed for safeguarding the interest of the domestic industry. The Central Government, on the basis of the conclusions and recommendations of the Designated Authority, issued Notification dated 18th August 2017 under Section 9A of the Act imposing antidumping duty at the rates/amounts specified under the final findings Notification for the goods originated in or exported from China for a period of five years, as per Section 9A(5) of the Act. Since August 2017 onwards, anti-dumping duty at the rates/amounts specified in the Notification was being levied and collected on imports of the subject goods from China. 7. Since period of five years from the date of imposition of antidumping duty in August, 2017 was coming to end and dumping of the subject goods from China still continued and such dumping was likely to increase when anti-dumping duty would cease after five years, the petitioner made an application under Rule 23(1B) of the Rules read with Section 9A(5) of the Act to extend the period for levy of anti-dumping duty because cessation of the same for subject goods was likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury to the domestic industry. 8. The Designated Authority issued a Notification dated 7th June 2021 initiating sunset review investigation and invited response, objections and submissions with data and evidence from all the interested parties. 9. 8. The Designated Authority issued a Notification dated 7th June 2021 initiating sunset review investigation and invited response, objections and submissions with data and evidence from all the interested parties. 9. The Designated Authority conducted investigation pursuant to the sunset review investigation Notification during the months of August, September, 2021 to April 2022 allowing hearing to all the interested parties, who all participated in the investigation and submitted their evidence, data etc. 10. The Designated Authority published the final findings on 13th May 2022 by issuing a Notification wherein it concluded that the subject goods continued to be exported from China to India at prices below the normal value, resulting in continued dumping and injury. It was also recommended that the imports from such country were significantly undercutting the domestic industry price and the domestic industry had suffered depressing or suppressing effect on its prices and the injury margin was also significantly positive clearly indicating significant price effect on the domestic industry and it was recommended to continue levy of anti-dumping duty at rates/amounts specified in the final findings Notification. 11. The respondent No.1 – Ministry of Finance issued Office Memorandum dated 17th August 2022 stating therein that it had decided not to accept the recommendations of the respondent No.2 – Designated Authority for continuation of anti-dumping duty on the subject goods. The petitioner has, therefore, challenged the Office Memorandum dated 17th August 2022 by filing this petition with a prayer to quash and set aside the same and to grant consequential reliefs in favour of the petitioners. It is also prayed to direct the respondent No.1 to implement recommendations made by the Designated Authority vide final findings Notification dated 13th May 2022 to continue the anti-dumping duty on the subject goods in accordance with the rates/amounts specified in the final findings Notification dated 13th May 2022. 12. The respondent No.3 – All India Solar Industries Association filed Civil Application for joining party which was allowed by order dated 15th September 2022 on the ground that respondent No.3 being the member of the domestic industry cannot be said to be not interested in the subject matter of controversy of the petition and outcome thereof, more particularly, when it participated in the investigation process regarding levy of anti-dumping duty which culminated into impugned decision. 13. Learned advocate Mr. 13. Learned advocate Mr. Paresh Dave appearing for the petitioner submitted that the impugned Office Memorandum just contained a cryptic decision in not accepting the recommendations without recording any ground or reason for the same. It was submitted that no hearing was also given to the petitioner and similarly situated persons before its decision for rejecting conclusion and recommendations of the expert body constituted for investigating into the matter relating to anti-dumping duty. 13.1 Learned advocate Mr. Dave submitted that imposition of anti-dumping duty vide Notification No.38/2017-Cus(ADD) dated 18th August 2017 has come to an end on 18th August 2022 and the petitioner company, which is a domestic manufacturing company of the subject goods, is without any protection from large scale dumping of the subject goods from China PR. 13.2 It was submitted that the subject goods continued to be exported to India at a price below normal value resulting into continued dumping and the domestic industry had been consistently suffering losses due to price effect of the dumped import from China PR and also imports coming from related company of one of the Chinese company in Malaysia. 13.3 It was, therefore, submitted that respondent No.1 has unreasonably and arbitrarily decided not to accept the recommendations of the Designated Authority resulting into grave injury and irrepairable loss to be suffered by the petitioner as a result of the continued dumping of the subject goods and the petitioner would not be in a position to sustain and continue their manufacturing activity in respect of the subject goods without protection of the anti-dumping duty for nullifying the margin of dumping to a certain extent in respect of imports of the subject goods from China PR and other countries. 13.4 It was submitted that the Designated Authority, in the Notification dated 13th May 2022, while recording the final findings, has considered the submissions made by the domestic industries and thereafter, arrived at conclusion and after examining the information provided by all the interested parties on confidential basis with regard to the sufficiency of the confidentiality claim and after examining the determination of normal value, export price and dumping margin and the provisions relating to non-market economy countries as well as the submissions made by the foreign producers/exporters/importers and other interested parties, recommended for continued imposition of anti-dumping duty on the subject goods from China PR. It was, therefore, submitted that in the Office Memorandum, without considering an exhaustive final findings recorded by the Designated Authority, it is stated only in one line that the Central Government has decided not to accept the recommendations in exercise of powers conferred under sub-sections (1) and (5) of Section 9A of the Act read with Rules 18, 20 and 23 of the Rules. 13.5 Learned advocate Mr. Dave invited the attention of this Court to the provisions of Section 9A of the Customs Tariff Act, which provides for levy of anti-dumping duty on dumped articles. Referring to sub-section (1) of Section 9A of the Act, it was submitted that the Central Government may, by notification in the Office Gazette, impose an anti-dumping duty not exceeding the margin of dumping in relation to such article, upon dumping in relation to importation of such article into India where such article is imported at less than its normal value. A reference was also made to sub-section (5) of Section 9A of the Act, which provides that the anti-dumping duty imposed, unless and until revoked earlier, cease to have effect on the expiry of five years from the date of such imposition and if the Central Government, in review, is the opinion that the cessation of such duty is likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury, it may, from time to time, extend the period of such imposition for a further period of five years. It was, therefore, submitted that as the Designated Authority, which is also a limb of the Central Government, has recommended to continue the anti-dumping duty on the subject goods, the respondent No.1 could not have issued a memorandum by not accepting the recommendations of the Designated Authority without assigning any reason. 13.6 Learned advocate Mr. Dave invited the attention of this Court to Rule 3 of the Rules, which provides for appointment of the Designated Authority. It provides that the Central Government by Notification, in Official Gazette, to appoint a person not below the rank of a Joint Secretary to the Government of India or such other person as that the Government may think fit. Dave invited the attention of this Court to Rule 3 of the Rules, which provides for appointment of the Designated Authority. It provides that the Central Government by Notification, in Official Gazette, to appoint a person not below the rank of a Joint Secretary to the Government of India or such other person as that the Government may think fit. Referring to Rule 4 of the Rules which stipulates the duties of the Designated Authority, it was submitted that it is the duty of the Designated Authority to submit its findings, provisional or otherwise to the Central Government as to normal value, export price and the margin of dumping in relation to the article under investigation and the injury or threat of injury to an industry established in India and to recommend to the Central Government the amount of antidumping duty and the date of commencement of such duty to review the need for continuance of anti-dumping duty. It was, therefore, submitted that the respondent No.2 – Designated Authority is required to discharge the duties as the Central Government for the purpose of levy of anti-dumping duty and therefore, the Central Government ought to have accepted the recommendations of the Designated Authority. Reference was also made to Rule 23 of the Rules which provides to review. Sub-rule (1B) of Rule 23 of the Rules was referred so as to demonstrate that the recommendations of the Designated Authority to continue the anti-dumping duty after completion of five years and Sub-rule (3) of Rule 23 of the Rules provides that subject to sub-rule (2), the provisions of Rules, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 shall apply mutatis mutandis in the case of review. It was, therefore, submitted that some procedure with regard to investigation to be carried out at the time of making recommendations to impose antidumping duty will have to be applied while conducting investigation in the subset review also. It was submitted that the Designated Authority has conducted sunset review as per sub-rule (3) of Rule 23 of the Rules and made recommendations to continue the anti-dumping duty and therefore, the Designated Authority was required to continue the levy of anti-dumping duty on cessation of the same on expiry of five years on 18th August 2022. 13.7 It was submitted by learned advocate Mr. 13.7 It was submitted by learned advocate Mr. Dave that as per Section 9C of the Act, an appeal against the order of determination or review thereof shall lie to the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal constituted under Section 129 of the Customs Act, 1962 in respect of the existence, degree and effect of any subsidy or dumping in relation to import of any article or import of any article into India in such increased quantities and under such condition so as to cause or threatening to cause serious injury to domestic industry requiring imposition of safeguard duty in relation to import of that article. It was, therefore, submitted that when the Designated Authority would not have recommended to continue the anti-dumping duty on the subject goods, then the order passed by the Designated Authority would not have been challenged by way of appeal before the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT). It was submitted that as per the settled legal position, the power to levy the anti-dumping duty is with the Central Government and unless and until the order by the Central Government is passed accepting the final recommendations of the Designated Authority, the same cannot be challenged before the CESTAT. It was, therefore, submitted that the Central Government, in the impugned Office Memorandum, without assigning any reason or ground, not accepting the final recommendations of the Designated Authority, has deprived the petitioner from challenging the same before the CESTAT. 13.8 Referring to and relying upon the above case law, it was submitted that the matter may be remanded back to the respondent No.1 to give an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and thereafter, to pass a detailed reasoned order for not accepting the recommendations of the Designated Authority. 14. On the other hand, learned senior advocate Mr. S. N. Soparkar with learned advocate Ms. Gargi Vyas appearing for respondent no.3 and advocate Mr. 14. On the other hand, learned senior advocate Mr. S. N. Soparkar with learned advocate Ms. Gargi Vyas appearing for respondent no.3 and advocate Mr. Ankit Shah appearing for the respondent No.1 – Union of India submitted that there are two steps for levy of anti-dumping duty under the provisions of the Act and the Rules and the first step involves a quasi-judicial process wherein the Designated Authority provides full opportunity to all the interested parties to present their side of the case and accordingly, issues its final findings as to whether imposition of anti-dumping duty ought to be recommended or not as per the Rules and the second step involves legislative decision by the Central Government whether or not to accept the recommendations in terms of Section 9A of the Act read with Rule 18 of the Rules. It was, therefore, submitted that there is no requirement for the Central Government either under the Act or Rules to give a reasoned order, as the said function of the Central Government is legislative in nature. 14.1 It was submitted that Section 9A(1) of the Act, which is in consistent with Article 19 of WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM), provides legislative discretion to the Central Government as to whether to impose or not to impose anti-dumping duty in general public interest. 14.3 It was submitted that on perusal of Section 9A read with Rules stipulates an administrative discretion granted to the Central Government to decide to impose or not to impose antidumping duty. It was submitted that plain reading of Section 9A(1) of the Act gives a discretion to the Central Government as the word “may” is used in both the Act and the Rules and not the word “shall” and therefore, the Central Government may disagree with the final findings and recommendations given by the Designated Authority. It was submitted that there is no jurisdictional error committed by the respondent No.1 in issuing the impugned Office Memorandum as the said Notification is not issued while exercising quasi-judicial powers, but it is a legislative power to levy the anti- dumping duty or not and therefore, the decision not to issue a Notification for imposing/continuing the anti-dumping duty by not accepting the recommendations of the Designated Authority in general public interest cannot be the subject matter of the judicial review in this petition. It was submitted that the legal provisions of the Act and the Rules does not provide that the recommendations of the Designated Authority are binding on the Central Government. 14.4 In support of his submissions, reliance was placed on the various decisions to demonstrate the distinction between functions to be performed by the Designated Authority and the Union of India. It was submitted that while exercising the legislative function in the nature of policy decision as to levy of anti-dumping duty or not, it is a settled law that the principles of natural justice have no role to play. Reference was made to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Balco Employees Union (Regd) vs. Union of India and others reported in 2002 (2) SCC 333 . Reliance was also placed on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Indian Express Newspaper (Bombay) (P) Ltd. vs. Union of India reported in 1985 (1) SCC 641 , wherein it is held that subordinate legislation cannot be questioned on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of the Designated Authority vs. M/s. The Andhra Petrochemicals Limited reported in (2020) (373) ELT 740 (SC) and the decision of this Court in the case of Alembic Ltd vs. Union of India reported in (2013) (291) ELT 327 (Guj), wherein it is held that the Designated Authority follows a prescribed quasi-judicial procedure, where a determination on whether to impose or not to impose anti-dumping duty takes place. However, the proceeding culminates with a recommendation; the Central Government finally decides whether to impose such a duty, the extent of such duty, and its duration and therefore, the Central Government is required to ascertain factors other than presented before the Designated Authority which enables the Designated Authority to come to the conclusion as to whether anti-dumping duty is required to be imposed or not. But the Central Government is required to ascertain various factors to come to the conclusion whether despite such recommendations, anti-dumping duty should be imposed or not. But the Central Government is required to ascertain various factors to come to the conclusion whether despite such recommendations, anti-dumping duty should be imposed or not. It was, therefore, submitted that decision of the Central government not to impose anti-dumping duty, irrespective of the recommendations of the Designated Authority, is a sovereign/legislative function and has a general application on the public at large, rather than on any particular individual entity. 14.5 Reliance was placed on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shri Sitaram Sugar Co. Ltd. vs. Union of India reported in 1990 (3) SCC 223 , wherein the Constitutional Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while considering the determination of the price of the sugar in terms of sub-section 3(3- C) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, in respect of sale price of the sugar by each individual producer, it was held that when the function is treated as legislative, a party affected by the order has no right to notice and hearing, unless, of course, the statute so requires. 14.6 Thereafter, reliance was placed on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and another vs. Cynamide India Ltd and another reported in 1987 (2) SCC 720 , wherein it is held that the legislative action, plenary or subordinate, is not subject to rules of natural justice. It was further held that there are several instances of the legislature requiring the subordinate legislating authority to give public notice and public hearing like levying a municipal rate, in which the substantial non-observance of the statutorily prescribed mode of observing natural justice may have the effect of invalidating the subordinate legislation. Such right given is in the nature of a concession which is not to detract from the character of the activity as legislative and not-quasi-judicial and therefore, where the legislature has not chosen to provide for any notice or hearing, no one can insist upon it, and it will not be permissible to read natural justice into such legislative activity. It was, therefore submitted that the Central Government is required to ascertain various other factors and to strike a balance between the competing interests of different segments of economy to ensure pubic welfare at large and thus, to come to a conclusion whether despite such recommendations by the Designated Authority, anti-dumping duty should be imposed or not. It was, therefore submitted that the Central Government is required to ascertain various other factors and to strike a balance between the competing interests of different segments of economy to ensure pubic welfare at large and thus, to come to a conclusion whether despite such recommendations by the Designated Authority, anti-dumping duty should be imposed or not. Such a decision by the Central Government is not amenable to appeal. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of Eveready Industries Ltd vs. Union of India reported in (2019) (367) ELT 53 (Del). 14.7 Reliance placed on the WTO Agreement which does not put restrictions on whether the procedure to impose anti-dumping duty should be one step process or otherwise and in view of the provisions of Section 9A of the Act and the Rules, India has adopted two step process that involves quasi-judicial function resulting into recommendations of imposition of anti-dumping duty or not by the Designated Authority and the legislative/policy making function that by the Central Government to impose antidumping duty or not taking all the relevant facts and factors and into account including public interest. 14.8 It was, therefore, submitted that the Central Government has taken a decision not to accept the final findings of the Designated Authority after taking into account all factors including the larger public interest and factors such as various trade remedial measures in force on the subject item and imports. It was, therefore, submitted that no interference may be made in the impugned Office Memorandum issued by the respondent No.1 for not accepting the recommendations of the Designated Authority to continue the anti-dumping duty on the subject goods. 14.9 Learned advocate Mr. Ankit Shah provided a copy of noting of the respondent No.1 while taking decision for not extending the anti-dumping duty imposed on the subject goods in a sealed cover. 14.9 Learned advocate Mr. Ankit Shah provided a copy of noting of the respondent No.1 while taking decision for not extending the anti-dumping duty imposed on the subject goods in a sealed cover. On perusal of noting, it appears that the respondent No.1, after considering the final findings of the Designated Authority and the data made available with regard to various factors like price undercutting and price underselling, diversion and huge capacity of export, market share, capacity expansion, etc., formed an opinion after considering the impact of anti-dumping duty on the imports of the subject goods to encourage domestic manufacturing on solar PV modules by raising tariff of 14% for the solar PV modules imported into India with effect from 1st April 2022 and the production link incentive for PV modules and PV cell manufacturing was also announced by the Ministry of NRE and accordingly, as the subject goods is a key raw material in manufacturing Solar PV modules, wherein the petitioner holds a monopoly to cater 30% of the domestic demand and therefore, an assurance given to the shareholders that irrespective of the continuation or discontinuation of the anti-dumping duty with regard to the margins, the sustaining of margins are based on the economy and scalability increased due to demand and continuation of the anti-dumping duty would create uncertainty for the PV module manufacturers for another two years as suggested by the Designated Authority would create uncertainty for the module manufacturers for raw material sourcing and capacity expansion. In such circumstances, the respondent No.1 has decided not to extend the anti-dumping duty in spite of the recommendations by the Designated Authority. Learned advocate Mr. Shah, therefore, submitted that a conscious decision is taken by the respondent No.1 in view of the settled legal position. 14.10 Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Soparkar submitted that in view of the stand taken by the respondent No.1 and the noting placed on record, no interference may be made and the petition deserves to be dismissed. In support of his submissions, reliance was placed on the following decisions: Sr. 14.10 Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Soparkar submitted that in view of the stand taken by the respondent No.1 and the noting placed on record, no interference may be made and the petition deserves to be dismissed. In support of his submissions, reliance was placed on the following decisions: Sr. No. Particulars 1 Jindal Poly Film Ltd vs. Designated Authority and another reported in 2018 SCC Online (Del) 2 Balco Employees and others vs. Union of India and others reported in (2002) 2 SCC 333 3 Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Pvt Ltd and others vs. Union of India and others reported in (1985) 1 SCC 641 4 Reliance Industries Ltd vs. Designated Authority and others reported in (2006) 10 SCC 368 5 Delegated Authority and others vs. Andhra Petrochemicals Ltd reported in (2020) 10 SCC 209 6 Alembic Ltd vs. Union of India reported in 2011 SCC Online Guj 7686 7 Shri Sitaram Sagar Co. Ltd. vs. Union of India reported in (1990) 2 SCC 223 8 Union of India vs. Cynamide India Ltd reported in (1987) 2 SCC 720 9 Eveready Industries India Ltd vs. Union of India reported in 2019 SCC Online (Del) 7865 10 Deepak Fertilizers & Petrochemicals vs. Designated Authority reported in 2006 (88) DRJ 70 (DB) 11 Indian Spinners Association vs. Designated Authority reported in 2000 SCC Online CEGAT 1071 12 Saurashtra Chemicals Ltd vs. Union of India reported in 2000(118) ELT 305 13 Haridas Exports vs. All India Float Glass Manufacturers’ Assn. reported in (2002) 6 SCC 600 14 Association of Synthetic Fibre Industry vs. J. K. Industries Ltd. reported in 2006 (199) ELT 196 15 Automotive Tyre Manufacturers Asson. vs. Designated Authority reported in (2011) 2 SCC 258 16 Realstrips Ltd vs. Union of India (SCA No.4495/2022 decided on 2nd September 2022) 15. Having heard the learned advocates for the respective parties and considering the facts of the case and the settled legal position, as stated hereinabove, a similar question came up for consideration before this Court in the case of Realstrips Limited vs. Union of India (R/Special Civil Application No.4495 of 2022 decided on 2nd September 2022), wherein during the course of sunset review investigation and in respect of continuation of the countervailing duty, the Central Government straightway issued a Notification deciding the same. Whereas in the facts of the case, the Central Government has decided not to extend the additional anti-dumping duty on the subject goods on completion of five years in spite of the recommendations made by the Designated Authority. In both the scenario, the decision of the Central Government was under challenged. 14.11 Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Soparkar for the respondent No.3 has relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Swiss Ribbons Pvt Ltd vs. Union of India and others reported in (2019) 4 SCC 17 , to submit that the scope of judicial review of an economic legislation is very minimal as it is held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that the legislation must be given free play in the joints when it comes to economic legislation. The Hon’ble Apex Court referred to and relied upon the American decisions in paras 17 to 24, which reads as under: “17. In the United States, at one point of time, Justice Stephen Field‘s dissents of the 19th Century were translated into majority opinions in the early 20th Century. This was referred to as the Lochner era, in which the U.S. Supreme Court, over a period of 40 years, consistently struck down legislation which was economic in nature as such legislation did not, according to the Court, square with property rights. As a result, a large number of minimum wage laws, maximum hours of work in factories laws, child labour laws, etc. were struck down. The result, as is well known, is that President Roosevelt initiated a courtpacking plan in which he sought to get authorization from Congress to 22 appoint additional judges to the Supreme Court, who would have then overruled the Lochner line of precedents. As it turned out, that became unnecessary as Justice Roberts switched his vote so that a 5:4 majority from 1937 onwards upheld economic legislation. It is important to note that the dissents of Justice Holmes and Justice Brandeis now became the law. 18. Holmes, J. had, in his dissent in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), stated: (SCC OnLine US SC paras 48-49 : US pp. 75-76) “48. This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country does not entertain. 18. Holmes, J. had, in his dissent in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), stated: (SCC OnLine US SC paras 48-49 : US pp. 75-76) “48. This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country does not entertain. If it were a question whether I agreed with that theory, I should desire to study it further and long before making up my mind. But I do not conceive that to be my duty, because I strongly believe that my agreement or disagreement has nothing to do with the right of a majority to embody their opinions in law. It is settled by various decisions of this court that state constitutions and state laws may regulate life in many ways which we, as legislators, might think as injudicious, or, if you like, as tyrannical, as this, and which, equally with this, interfere with the liberty to contract. Sunday laws and usury laws are ancient examples. A more modern one is the prohibition of lotteries. The liberty of the citizen to do as he likes so long as he does not interfere with the liberty of others to do the same, which has been a shibboleth for some well-known writers, is interfered with by school laws, by the Post Office, by every state or municipal institution which takes his money for purposes thought desirable, whether he likes it or not. The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer‘s Social Statics. The other day, we sustained the Massachusetts vaccination law. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11. United 23 States and state statutes and decisions cutting down the liberty to contract by way of combination are familiar to this court. Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197. Two years ago, we upheld the prohibition of sales of stock on margins or for future delivery in the constitution of California. Otis v. Parker, 187 U. S. 606. The decision sustaining an eight hour law for miners is still recent. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366. Some of these laws embody convictions or prejudices which judges are likely to share. Some may not. But a constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez faire. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366. Some of these laws embody convictions or prejudices which judges are likely to share. Some may not. But a constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez faire. It is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar or novel and even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United States. 49. General propositions do not decide concrete cases. The decision will depend on a judgment or intuition more subtle than any articulate major premise. But I think that the proposition just stated, if it is accepted, will carry us far toward the end. Every opinion tends to become a law. I think that the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and fair man necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our people and our law. It does not need research to show that no such sweeping condemnation can be passed upon the statute before us. A reasonable man might think it a proper measure on the score of health. Men whom I certainly could not pronounce unreasonable would uphold it as a first instalment of a general regulation of the hours of work. Whether in the latter 24 aspect it would be open to the charge of inequality I think it unnecessary to discuss. 19. Similarly, in New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262 (1932), Justice Brandeis echoed Justice Holmes as follows: ? “48. The discoveries in physical science, the triumphs in invention, attest the value of the process of trial and error. In large measure, these advances have been due to experimentation. In those fields experimentation has, for two centuries, been not only free but encouraged. Some people assert that our present plight is due, in part, to the limitations set by courts upon experimentation in the fields of social and economic science; and to the discouragement to which proposals for betterment there have been subjected otherwise. In those fields experimentation has, for two centuries, been not only free but encouraged. Some people assert that our present plight is due, in part, to the limitations set by courts upon experimentation in the fields of social and economic science; and to the discouragement to which proposals for betterment there have been subjected otherwise. There must be power in the States and the Nation to remould, through experimentation, our economic practices and institutions to meet changing social and economic needs. I cannot believe that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, or the States which ratified it, intended to deprive us of the power to correct the evils of technological unemployment and excess productive capacity which have attended progress in the useful arts. 49. To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country. This Court has the power to prevent an experiment. We may strike down the statute which embodies it on the ground that, in our opinion, the measure is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. We have power to do this, because the due process clause has been held by the Court applicable to matters of substantive law as well as to matters of procedure. But in the exercise of this high power, we must be ever on our guard, lest we erect our prejudices into legal principles. If we would guide by the light of reason, we must let our minds be bold.” 20. The Lochner doctrine was finally buried in Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1962), where the Supreme Court held: “5. Both the District Court in the present case and the Pennsylvania court in Stone adopted the philosophy of Adams v. Tanner, and cases like it, that it is the province of courts to draw on their own views as to the morality, legitimacy, and usefulness of a particular business in order to decide whether a statute bears too heavily upon that business and, by so doing, violates due process. Under the system of government created by our Constitution, it is up to legislatures, not courts, to decide on the wisdom and utility of legislation. There was a time when the Due Process Clause was used by this Court to strike down laws which were thought unreasonable, that is, unwise or incompatible with some particular economic or social philosophy. In this manner, the Due Process Clause was used, for example, to nullify laws prescribing maximum hours for work in bakeries, Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905), outlawing yellow dog contracts, ? Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1 (1915), setting minimum wages for women, Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U. S. 525 (1923), and fixing the weight of loaves of bread, Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U. S. 504 (1924). This intrusion by the judiciary into the realm of legislative value judgments was strongly objected to at the time, particularly by Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis. Dissenting from the Court‘s invalidating a state statute which regulated the resale price of theatre and other tickets, Mr. Justice Holmes said, ‘I think the proper course is to recognize that a state Legislature can do whatever it sees fit to do unless it is restrained by some express prohibition in the Constitution of the United States or of the State, and that Courts should be careful not to extend such prohibitions beyond their obvious meaning by reading into them conceptions of public policy that the particular Court may happen to entertain. And, in an earlier case, he had emphasized that, The criterion of constitutionality is not whether we believe the law to be for the public good‘ [Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 567, 570 (1923) (dissenting opinion)]. 6. The doctrine that prevailed in Lochner, Coppage, Adkins, Burns, and like cases - that due process authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional when they believe the legislature has acted unwisely - has long since been discarded. We have returned to the original constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws. As this Court stated in a unanimous opinion in 1941, ‘We are not concerned... with the wisdom, need, or appropriateness of the legislation. [Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. We have returned to the original constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws. As this Court stated in a unanimous opinion in 1941, ‘We are not concerned... with the wisdom, need, or appropriateness of the legislation. [Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. Western Reference & Bond Assn., 313 U. S. 236, 246 (1941)]’ Legislative bodies have broad scope to experiment with economic problems, and this Court does not sit to, ‘subject the state to an intolerable supervision hostile to the basic principles of our government and wholly beyond the protection which the general clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to secure’ [Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 388 (1932)]. It is now settled that States ‘have power to legislate against what are found to be injurious practices in their internal commercial and business affairs, so long as their laws do not run afoul of some specific federal constitutional prohibition, or of some valid federal law’ [Lincoln Federal Labor Union, etc. v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 536 (1949)]. 7. In the face of our abandonment of the use of the “vague contours” [Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 535 (1923)] of the Due Process Clause to nullify laws which a majority of the Court believed to be economically unwise, reliance on Adams v. Tanner is as mistaken as would be adherence to Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, overruled by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937). Not only has the philosophy of Adams been abandoned, but also this Court, almost 15 years ago, expressly pointed to another opinion of this Court as having “clearly undermined” Adams. [Lincoln Federal Labor Union, etc. v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949)]. We conclude that the Kansas Legislature was free to decide for itself that legislation was needed to deal with the business of debt adjusting. Unquestionably, there are arguments showing that the business of debt adjusting has social utility, but such arguments are properly addressed to the legislature, not to us. v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949)]. We conclude that the Kansas Legislature was free to decide for itself that legislation was needed to deal with the business of debt adjusting. Unquestionably, there are arguments showing that the business of debt adjusting has social utility, but such arguments are properly addressed to the legislature, not to us. We refuse to sit as a ‘super-legislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation,’ [Day- Brite Lighting, Inc., v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1923)] and we emphatically refuse to go back to the time when courts used the Due Process Clause ‘to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought’ [Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955)]. Nor are we able or willing to draw lines by calling a law ‘prohibitory’ or ‘regulatory.’ Whether the legislature takes for its textbook Adam Smith, Herbert Spencer, Lord Keynes, or some other is no concern of ours. The Kansas debt adjusting statute may be wise or unwise. But relief, if any be needed, lies not with us, but with the body constituted to pass laws for the State of Kansas. 8. Nor is the statute‘s exception of lawyers a denial of equal protection of the laws to non-lawyers. Statutes create many classifications which do not deny equal protection; it is only - invidious discrimination which offends the Constitution. The business of debt adjusting gives rise to a relationship of trust in which the debt adjuster will, in a situation of insolvency, be marshalling assets in the manner of a proceeding in bankruptcy. The debt adjuster‘s client may need advice as to the legality of the various claims against him remedies existing under state laws governing debtor-creditor relationships, or provisions of the Bankruptcy Act - advice which a non-lawyer cannot lawfully give him. If the State of Kansas wants to limit debt adjusting to lawyers, the Equal Protection Clause does not forbid it. We also find no merit in the contention that the Fourteenth Amendment is violated by the failure of the Kansas statute‘s title to be as specific as appellee thinks it ought to be under the Kansas Constitution. (emphasis supplied) 21. In this country, this Court in R.K. Garg v. Union of India, (1981) 4 SCC 675 has held: “8. We also find no merit in the contention that the Fourteenth Amendment is violated by the failure of the Kansas statute‘s title to be as specific as appellee thinks it ought to be under the Kansas Constitution. (emphasis supplied) 21. In this country, this Court in R.K. Garg v. Union of India, (1981) 4 SCC 675 has held: “8. Another rule of equal importance is that laws relating to economic activities should be viewed with greater latitude than laws touching civil rights such as freedom of speech, religion etc. It has been said by no less a person than Holmes, J., that the legislature should be allowed some play in the joints, because it has to deal with complex problems which do not admit of solution through any doctrinaire or strait-jacket formula and this is particularly true in case of legislation dealing with economic matters, where, having regard to the nature of the problems required to be dealt with, greater play in the joints has to be allowed to the legislature. The court should feel more inclined to give judicial deference to legislative judgment in the field of economic regulation than in other areas where fundamental human rights are involved. Nowhere has this admonition been more felicitously expressed than in Morey v. Doud [351 US 457 : 1 L Ed 2d 1485 (1957)] where Frankfurter, J., said in his inimitable style: In the utilities, tax and economic regulation cases, there are good reasons for judicial self-restraint if not judicial deference to legislative judgment. The legislature after all has the affirmative responsibility. The courts have only the power to destroy, not to reconstruct. When these are added to the complexity of economic regulation, the uncertainty, the liability to error, the bewildering conflict of the experts, and the number of times the judges have been overruled by events — self-limitation can be seen to be the path to judicial wisdom and institutional prestige and stability.’ The Court must always remember that ? legislation is directed to practical problems, that the economic mechanism is highly sensitive and complex, that many problems are singular and contingent, that laws are not abstract propositions and do not relate to abstract units and are not to be measured by abstract symmetry’; ‘that exact wisdom and nice adaption of remedy are not always possible’ and that ‘judgment is largely a prophecy based on meagre and uninterpreted experience’. Every legislation, particularly in economic matters is essentially empiric and it is based on experimentation or what one may call trial and error method and therefore it cannot provide for all possible situations or anticipate all possible abuses. There may be crudities and inequities in complicated experimental economic legislation but on that account alone it cannot be struck down as invalid. The courts cannot, as pointed out by the United States Supreme Court in Secretary of Agriculture v. Central Roig Refining Company [94 L Ed 381 : 338 US 604 (1950)] be converted into tribunals for relief from such crudities and inequities. There may even be possibilities of abuse, but that too cannot of itself be a ground for invalidating the legislation, because it is not possible for any legislature to anticipate as if by some divine prescience, distortions and abuses of its legislation which may be made by those subject to its provisions and to provide against such distortions and abuses. Indeed, howsoever great may be the care bestowed on its framing, it is difficult to conceive of a legislation which is not capable of being abused by perverted human ingenuity. The Court must therefore adjudge the constitutionality of such legislation by the generality of its provisions and not by its crudities or inequities or by the possibilities of abuse of any of its provisions. If any crudities, inequities or possibilities of abuse come to light, the legislature can always step in and enact suitable amendatory legislation. That is the essence of pragmatic approach which must guide and inspire the legislature in dealing with complex economic issues. * * * 19. It is true that certain immunities and exemptions are granted to persons investing their unaccounted money in purchase of Special Bearer Bonds but that is an inducement which has to be offered for unearthing black money. Those who have successfully evaded taxation and concealed their income or wealth despite the stringent tax laws and the efforts of the tax department are not likely to disclose their unaccounted money without some inducement by way of immunities and exemptions and it must necessarily be left to the legislature to decide what immunities and exemptions would be sufficient for the purpose. It would be outside the province of the Court to consider if any particular immunity or exemption is necessary or not for the purpose of inducing disclosure of black money. It would be outside the province of the Court to consider if any particular immunity or exemption is necessary or not for the purpose of inducing disclosure of black money. That would depend considerations upon based diverse on fiscal practical and economic necessity and administrative expediency and would also involve a certain amount of experimentation on which the Court would be least fitted to pronounce. The Court would not have the necessary competence and expertise to adjudicate upon such an economic issue. The Court cannot possibly assess or evaluate what would be the impact of a particular immunity or exemption and whether it would serve the purpose in view or not. There are so many imponderables that would enter into the determination that it would be wise for the Court not to hazard an opinion where even economists may differ. The Court must while examining the constitutional validity of a legislation of this kind, ?be resilient, not rigid, forward looking, not static, liberal, not verbal and the Court must always bear in mind the constitutional proposition enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Munn v. Illinois [94 US 13], namely, ‘that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies’. The Court must defer to legislative judgment in matters relating to social and economic policies and must not interfere, unless the exercise of legislative judgment appears to be palpably arbitrary. The Court 32 should constantly remind itself of what the Supreme Court of the United States said in Metropolis Theater Company v. City of Chicago [57 L Ed 730 : 228 US 61 (1912)] : 12. ... The problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations, illogical it may be, and unscientific. But even such criticism should not be hastily expressed. What is best is not always discernible, the wisdom of any choice may be disputed or condemned. Mere error of government are not subject to our judicial review. It is true that one or the other of the immunities or exemptions granted under the provisions of the Act may be taken advantage of by resourceful persons by adopting ingenious methods and devices with a view to avoiding or saving tax. Mere error of government are not subject to our judicial review. It is true that one or the other of the immunities or exemptions granted under the provisions of the Act may be taken advantage of by resourceful persons by adopting ingenious methods and devices with a view to avoiding or saving tax. But that cannot be helped because human ingenuity is so great when it comes to tax avoidance that it would be almost impossible to frame tax legislation which cannot be abused. Moreover, as already pointed out above, the trial and error method is inherent in every legislative effort to deal with an obstinate social or economic issue and if it is found that any immunity or exemption granted under the Act is being utilized for tax evasion or avoidance not intended by the legislature, the Act can always be amended and the abuse terminated. We are accordingly of the view that none of the provisions of the Act is violative of Article 14 and its constitutional validity must be upheld.”(emphasis supplied) 22. Likewise, in Bhavesh D. Parish v. Union of India, (2000) 5 SCC 471 , this Court held: “26. The services rendered by certain informal sectors of the Indian economy could not be belittled. However, in the path of economic progress, if the informal system was sought to be replaced by a more organized system, capable of better regulation and discipline, then this was an economic philosophy reflected by the legislation in question. Such a philosophy might have its merits and demerits. But these were matters of economic policy. They are best left to the wisdom of the legislature and in policy matters the accepted principle is that the courts should not interfere. Moreover in the context of the changed economic scenario the expertise of people dealing with the subject should not be lightly interfered with. The consequences of such interdiction can have largescale ramifications and can put the clock back for a number of years. The process of rationalization of the infirmities in the economy can be put in serious jeopardy and, therefore, it is necessary that while dealing with economic legislations, this Court, while not jettisoning its jurisdiction to curb arbitrary action or unconstitutional legislation, should interfere only in those few cases where the view reflected in the legislation is not possible to be taken at all. * * * 30. * * * 30. Before we conclude there is another matter which we must advert to. It has been brought to our notice that Section 45-S of the Act has been challenged in various High Courts and a few of them have granted the stay of provisions of Section 45-S. When considering an application for staying the operation of a piece of legislation, and that too pertaining to economic reform or change, then the courts must bear in mind that unless the provision is manifestly unjust or glaringly unconstitutional, the courts must show judicial restraint in staying the applicability of the same. Merely because a statute comes up for examination and some arguable point is raised, which persuades the courts to consider the controversy, the legislative will should not normally be put under suspension pending such consideration. It is now well settled that there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutional validity of any legislation, unless the same is set aside after final hearing and, therefore, the tendency to grant stay of legislation relating to economic reform, at the interim stage, cannot be understood. The system of checks and balances has to be utilized in a balanced manner with the primary objective of accelerating economic growth rather than suspending its growth by doubting its constitutional efficacy at the threshold itself.” 23. In DG of Foreign Trade v. Kanak Exports, (2016) 2 SCC 226 , this Court has held: “109. Therefore, it cannot be denied that the Government has a right to amend, modify or even rescind a particular scheme. It is well settled that in complex economic matters every decision is necessarily empiric and it is based on experimentation or what one may call trial and error method and therefore, its validity cannot be tested on any rigid prior considerations or on the application of any straitjacket formula. In Balco Employees’ Union v. Union of India [Balco Employees’ Union v. Union of India, (2002) 2 SCC 333 ], the Supreme Court held that laws, including executive action relating to economic activities should be viewed with greater latitude than laws touching civil rights such as freedom of speech, religion, etc. In Balco Employees’ Union v. Union of India [Balco Employees’ Union v. Union of India, (2002) 2 SCC 333 ], the Supreme Court held that laws, including executive action relating to economic activities should be viewed with greater latitude than laws touching civil rights such as freedom of speech, religion, etc. that the legislature should be allowed some play in the joints because it has to deal with complex problems which do not admit of solution through any doctrine or straitjacket formula and this is particularly true in case of legislation dealing with economic matters, where having regard to the nature of the problems greater latitude require to be allowed to the legislature.” 24. It is with this background, factual and legal, that the constitutional validity of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 has to be viewed.” 15. In the case of Realstrips Limited (supra), considering the facts of the case, this Court, on analysis of the obligation emanating from the treaty, international treaty obligation and construction of the statutory provisions which have the origin from the treaty covenants, observed, as held by the Hon’ble Apex Court, as under: “5.2.1 The Supreme Court in Commissioner of Customs, Bangalore Vs. G.M. Exports and Ors. [ (2016) 1 SCC 91 ] surveyed various decisions to summarise the following principles – "23. A conspectus of the aforesaid authorities would lead to the following conclusions: (1) Article 51(c) of the Constitution of India is a Directive Principle of State Policy which states that the State shall endeavour to foster respect for international law and treaty obligations. As a result, rules of international law which are not contrary to domestic law are followed by the courts in this country. This is a situation in which there is an international treaty to which India is not a signatory or general rules of international law are made applicable. It is in this situation that if there happens to be a conflict between domestic law and international law, domestic law will prevail. This is a situation in which there is an international treaty to which India is not a signatory or general rules of international law are made applicable. It is in this situation that if there happens to be a conflict between domestic law and international law, domestic law will prevail. (2) In a situation where India is a signatory nation to an international treaty, and a statute is passed pursuant to the said treaty, it is a legitimate aid to the construction of the provisions of such statute that are vague or ambiguous to have recourse to the terms of the treaty to resolve such ambiguity in favour of a meaning that is consistent with the provisions of the treaty. (3) In a situation where India is a signatory nation to an international treaty, and a statute is made in furtherance of such treaty, a purposive rather than a narrow literal construction of such statute is preferred. The interpretation of such a statute should be construed on broad principles of general acceptance rather than earlier domestic precedents, being intended to carry out treaty obligations, and not to be inconsistent with them. (4) In a situation in which India is a signatory nation to an international treaty, and a statute is made to enforce a treaty obligation, and if there be any difference between the language of such statute and a corresponding provision of the treaty, the statutory language should be construed in the same sense as that of the treaty. This is for the reason that in such cases what is sought to be achieved by the international treaty is a uniform international code of law which is to be applied by the courts of all the signatory nations in a manner that leads to the same result in all the signatory nations. 5.2.2 While applying the domestic legislation, which has originated with reference to the international treaty, the application of the provisions has to conform the principles agreed in the treaty. In G.M. Exports (supra), it was observed, "48. We have already held that this would fly in the face of all the judgments referred to in paragraphs 15 to 22 hereinabove, and principles (3) and (4) of paragraph 23 of this judgment which speak of how domestic legislation must be construed when it is made in furtherance of an international treaty. We have already held that this would fly in the face of all the judgments referred to in paragraphs 15 to 22 hereinabove, and principles (3) and (4) of paragraph 23 of this judgment which speak of how domestic legislation must be construed when it is made in furtherance of an international treaty. In particular, in the facts of these cases, it would also ignore the effect of Article 18.4 of the WTO Agreement, which expressly states that all the signatory member nations have to make their laws "conform" to the provisions of the WTO Agreement, something which the Central Government itself states in its internet website which deals with the law of anti-dumping." Attendant Aspects Canvassed (a) Whether sovereign power exercised 6. Before analysing the scheme stemming from Section 9, in particular Section 9(6), 9(7) read with Section 9-B of the Act read with Rules, more particularly Rule 24 of the Rules, certain incidental aspects and submissions raised by both the sides may be dealt with. 6.1 On behalf of the respondent it was claimed that issuance of Notification dated 1.2.2022 rescinding the countervailing duty was in exercise of sovereign power by the Government. Thereby, it was sought to be suggested that once the sovereign power is exercised by the Central Government, the rescinding of the duty was justified, at whatever stage it was done. 6.1.1 The submissions were based on the misconception of sovereign power of the state and the attributes of sovereignty. 6.1.2 The concept of sovereignty is an all time assertion of authority by the nation country to the outside world. The concept of sovereignty is in its essence that the country is independent in its all actions, decisions, reactions and in taking its own stand as a nation before the outside world. It signifies that the State will have the final authority to make or enact laws of the governance in all spheres. 6.1.3 There would be no gainsaying that when the Parliament enacts laws, it exercises the sovereign power. The Customs Tariff Act, 1975 and the Rules of 1995 are themselves the product of a sovereign exercise by our Parliament. The authority of the provisions in the enactment not only binds the subjects it governs, but also binds the authorities functioning and playing role thereunder, including the Central Government. The Customs Tariff Act, 1975 and the Rules of 1995 are themselves the product of a sovereign exercise by our Parliament. The authority of the provisions in the enactment not only binds the subjects it governs, but also binds the authorities functioning and playing role thereunder, including the Central Government. There cannot be any separate limb sovereign power exercise, distinct from the enactment and the rules and the functional mandate flowing therefrom. It would be paradoxical and unpalatable to claim that State could disregard the obligations flowing from provisions of particular law or Act to initiate and assert its sovereign power to breach them. 6.1.4 There cannot be separation of concept of sovereignty by the State to claim that in its sovereign power it could disregard and discard the mandates in the statute which is enacted by itself in exercise of such power, on the other hand to assert that there is an independent power in the nature of sovereign power to act de hors the governing statute. It is absurd to suggest that the State will disregard its own laws to act independent of legal requirements, thereby acting sovereign. (b) No public interest in abstract 6.2 Emphasis was laid by learned Additional Solicitor General that the Notification in question rescinding the countervailing duty was issued in public interest. According to him various inputs were taken into account before issuing the Notification. There is a hollowness in the submission inasmuch as while no facts or details were given as to how the public interest is made to subserve, on the other hand the abstract plea and general concept of public interest would be irrelevant. 6.2.1 When the countervailing duty was imposed, it was by following the procedure in law, undertaking the investigation to determine the aspects of subsidy and injury as provided. This itself was an exercise in public interest. The case of the petitioner is that the Notification of the Central Government is in disregard to the compliance of procedure to be undertaken in law. Abiding by the provisions of law and following the statutory prescriptions is by themselves in public interest. The first step to sub- serve public interest is to follow the statutory mandates. Therefore the submission based on public interest is not well-conceived. Abiding by the provisions of law and following the statutory prescriptions is by themselves in public interest. The first step to sub- serve public interest is to follow the statutory mandates. Therefore the submission based on public interest is not well-conceived. 6.2.2 In any view, even as learned Additional Solicitor General harp on the public interest, not an iota of material was shown or relied on to substantiate as to what were the considerations relating to public interest. (c) Not a policy decision in generic sense 6.3 Proceeding to examine the emptiness in the next submission canvassed by learned Additional Solicitor General that impugned notification rescinding the countervailing duty is in the realm of policy, it is trite that it will not be permissible for the State to implement any purported policy decision when the policy decision is a product to be preceded by statutory exercise for taking such decision, without acting in accordance with provisions of law. 6.3.1 Examining the line of decisions on this count, in K.K. Bhalla Vs. State of M.P. [ (2003) 6 SCC 581 ], the question was regarding grant of lease of land on concessional terms under the MP Nagar Niyam, 1975. The proposal for the said purpose could be made only by the Development Authority and power of the State Government was limited for grant of previous approval thereto and to ultimate grant of lease on concessional terms. It was ruled that none of the relevant provisions enable the State to usurp the jurisdiction of the Development Authority. 6.3.2 The principle was propounded that the statutory authority cannot act contrary to the scheme framed by them or contrary to the purpose for which they were supposed to act under the Scheme. The Supreme Court held that when the State had no role to play in the matter, even advise given by it would be ultra vires, "The State, as noticed hereinbefore, could not implement its purported policy decision as regard allotment of land on concessional rates. Such a direction or even a policy decision in this behalf is ultra vires being contrary to the statutory rules framed by it. Such a direction or even a policy decision in this behalf is ultra vires being contrary to the statutory rules framed by it. An action by way of policy decision or otherwise at the hands of a statutory authority must be in consonance with the statutory rules and no de'hors the same." (para 67) 6.3.3 The Supreme Court referred to its own decision in Punjab SCB Ltd. Vs. Zora Singh [ (2005) 6 SCC 776 ] and in Union of India vs. V. Ramkrishnan [JT 2005 (9) SC 422], and proceeded to observe that passing of an order for unauthorised purpose in unauthorised manner constitutes even malice in law. The Supreme Court in K.K. Bhalla (supra) stated that "when the State has framed rules and adopted a procedure for disposal of land, both the State and JDA were bound thereby. They could not have taken any decision contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith." 6.3.4 The primacy of statutory enactment and the obligation to act in accordance with law by the authorities concerned was stressed by the Apex Court also in Punjab Water Supply & Sewerage Board Vs. Ranjodh Singh & Ors. [ (2007) 2 SCC 491 ]. It was on the context of statutory recruitment rules to be applied to the statutory bodies. It was held that a scheme issued under Article 162 in the nature of policy decision adopted by the State cannot prevail over statutory rules or Article 309 or proviso to Article 309. It was held that the terms and conditions of the service are governed either by statutory rules or article 309 proviso rules, any policy decision adopted by State Government under Article 162 would be illegal and without jurisdiction. 6.3.5 It may be true that the decision of the Central Government in issuing the Notification rescinding the countervailing duty is in the economic area. However, in view that the countervailing duty authorities which would included the Government have to act in accordance with the statutory prescriptions in exercise of their functions and powers, it would not be right to view the Notification to be a pure policy decision. It is the statutory exercise which culminates into the Notification, in which the countervailing authorities have to follow the codified procedure. It is an outcome of quasi- judicial exercise. It involves investigation of facts and determination of jurisdictional elements. It is the statutory exercise which culminates into the Notification, in which the countervailing authorities have to follow the codified procedure. It is an outcome of quasi- judicial exercise. It involves investigation of facts and determination of jurisdictional elements. 6.3.6 When the decision is arrived at after complying with the mandatory statutory provisions, it becomes a statutory decision. It is not a policy decision so simply stated. The judicial review would extend to such decision on the ground that the action of decision or notification issued thereunder is vitiated by non-compliance of statutory requirements. (d) Laying before the Parliament 6.4 There was yet another attempt to submit on part of the respondent that in respect of the impugned Notification, judicial review would not be permissible. Section 7(3) of Customs Tariff Act initially referred to by learned Additional Solicitor General, which contains the provision about laying the Notification issued under Section 7(2) before each house of the Parliament and will come into effect upon approval of the Parliament after modification etc., if any. This Section deals with the Notification in respect of customs duty, which provision is not applicable here. Therefore the entire reliance on Section 7(3) was misconceived. 6.4.1 However, in Sub Section (8) of Section 9, there is provision about laying the Notification before the each house of the Parliament. The provision does not say any further except that 'every Notification issued under this Section shall, as soon as may be after it is issued, be laid before each house of Parliament'. 6.4.2 The Parliament, more often than not, on the subordinate legislation and on the working thereof as well as in respect of the functioning of the authorities under the subordinate legislation, exercises control and supervision by enacting provision in that regard. One of the well known mechanism is to place the rules or notifications before the Parliament, leaving it thereafter for the Parliament to modify, approve or just notice etc. the same. One of such mode is that the rule or notification is placed before the Parliament without providing anything further. 6.4.3 In M.K.Paplah & Sons Vs. The Excise Commissioner & Anr. [ (1975) 1 SCC 492 ] the Supreme Court quoted from Bernard Scwartz's "An Introduction to American Administrative Law", In Britain, Parliamentary control over delegated legislation is exercised through the various forms of 'laying' prescribed in enabling Acts. 6.4.3 In M.K.Paplah & Sons Vs. The Excise Commissioner & Anr. [ (1975) 1 SCC 492 ] the Supreme Court quoted from Bernard Scwartz's "An Introduction to American Administrative Law", In Britain, Parliamentary control over delegated legislation is exercised through the various forms of 'laying' prescribed in enabling Acts. Through them, the legislature is enabled at least in theory to exercise a continuing supervision over administrative rules and regulations." 6.4.4 In M/s. Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd. Vs. State of Hariyana, [ (1979) 2 SCC 196 , referring to its own another decision in Hukum Chand Vs. Union of India [ (1972) 2 SCC 601 ], the Supreme Court noted the observations made in paragraphs 305 to 307 of 7th edition of Craies on statute law, that there are three kinds of laying, which are generally used by legislature, (i) laying without further procedure, (ii) laying subject to negative resolution and (iii) laying subject to affirmative resolution. 6.4.5 I.P. Massey in his 'Administrative Law' [6th Edition, 2005] mentions about laying before the Parliament in different ways, 'Laying' may take various forms: (a) Laying with no further direction,-In this type of laying the rules and regulations come into effect as soon as they are laid. It is simply to inform the House about the rules and regulations. (b) Laying subject to negative resolution.- In this process the rules come into effect as soon as they are placed on the table of the House but shall cease to have effect if annulled by a resolution of the House. (c) Laying subject to affirmative resolution.- This technique may take two shapes – (i) that the rules shall have no effect or force unless approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament; (ii) that the rules shall cease to have effect unless approved by an affirmative resolution. In both these processes, it is the duty of the government to move a resolution. (d) Laying in draft subject to negative resolution.-Such a provision provides that when any Act contains provision for this type of laying the draft rules shall be placed on the table of the House and shall come into force after forty days from the date of laying unless disapproved before that period. (d) Laying in draft subject to negative resolution.-Such a provision provides that when any Act contains provision for this type of laying the draft rules shall be placed on the table of the House and shall come into force after forty days from the date of laying unless disapproved before that period. (e) Laying in draft subject to an affirmative resolution.- In this type of laying the instruments or draft rules shall have no effect unless approved by the House." 6.4.6 Section 9(8) of the Act, as noted above, provides only for placing the notification before each house of the Parliament. There is no further requirement or condition. In the provision of laying of such nature, the underlying idea and intention of the legislature is only to inform the Parliament. The notification is only laid on table and it does not require anything further. It is a laying without further provisions for control. Such rule or notification would become operative from the date it is laid before the House. 6.4.7 In Dai-Ichi Karkaria Limited Vs. Union of India and Others [ (2000) 4 SCC 57 ] the Supreme Court observed that the mere fact of laying the notification before the Parliament does not make substantial difference as regards jurisdiction of the court to pronounce its validity. In that case it was notification under Section 25 of Customs Act required to be laid before the Parliament under Section 159 of the Act. Notification is Quasi-Judicial 6.5. It was another submission in vain on behalf of respondents seeking to assert that notification rescinding the countervailing duty is of legislative character and amounts of exercise of legislative power by the Central Government and therefore, not amenable to judicial review. 6.5.1 The submission is devoid of substance, if we examine the decisions on this score. The decision of the Supreme Court in PTC India Ltd. Vs. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission [ (2010) 4 SCC 603 ] also explain the point. Under the Electricity Act, 2003, the term tariff "is not defined, but includes within its ambit not only the fixation of rates, but also the rules and regulations relating to it. The decision of the Supreme Court in PTC India Ltd. Vs. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission [ (2010) 4 SCC 603 ] also explain the point. Under the Electricity Act, 2003, the term tariff "is not defined, but includes within its ambit not only the fixation of rates, but also the rules and regulations relating to it. As per Section 61 and 62 of the 2003 Act, the appropriate commission shall determine the actual tariff in accordance with the provisions of the Act including the terms and conditions, which may be specified by the appropriate commission under Section 61 of the Act". The Supreme Court observed that if one reads section 62 with Section 64, it is clear that, "although tariff fixation like price fixation is legislative in character, the same under the Act is made appealable vide section 111". It was stated that the provisions of section 61, 62 and 64 indicate the dual nature of functions performed by the regulatory commission, that is, decision making and specifying the terms and conditions for tariff determination. It was stated that tariff fixation under Section 62 when made appealable under section 111, it is rendered quasi-judicial. 6.5.2 In National Thermal Power Corp. Vs. Madhya Pradesh State Electricity Board [ (2011) 15 SCC 580 ], the similar view was expressed that though price fixation is of legislative character, but since an appeal is provided under Section 111 of the Act, it becomes quasi-judicial. 6.5.3 In Reliance Industries Vs. Designated Authorities [ (2006) 10 SCC 368 ], it was held, We do not agree with the Tribunal that the notification of the Central Government under Section 9A is a legislative Act. In our opinion, it is clearly quasi-judicial. The proceedings before the DA is to determine the lis between the domestic industry on the one hand and the importer of foreign goods from the foreign supplier on the other. The determination of the recommendation of the DA and the Government notification on its basis is subject to an appeal before the CESTAT. This also makes it clear that the proceedings before the DA are quasi-judicial. (para 39) 6.5.4 Under Section 9-C of the Customs Tariff Act, appeal lies against the order of determination or review of the countervailing duty before the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal, constitution under Section 129 of the Customs Act, 1962. This also makes it clear that the proceedings before the DA are quasi-judicial. (para 39) 6.5.4 Under Section 9-C of the Customs Tariff Act, appeal lies against the order of determination or review of the countervailing duty before the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal, constitution under Section 129 of the Customs Act, 1962. In view of this, the Notification necessarily takes a quasijudicial colour. In Tata Chemicals Ltd. Vs. Union of India[ (2008) 17 SCC 180 ], it was observed and held that the orders of the designated authority, which were recommendatory, the appeal against the tribunal was premature and that the appeal would lie against determination by challenging notification of the Central Government may pass. Scheme is Quasi-Judicial Process 7. A bare reading and even prima facie analysis of the provisions of Section 9, in particular sub- section (6) and sub-section (7) thereof read with Rule 24 would go to show that the process of issuance of notification to impose the countervailing duty or to revoke the same is based on an inquiry. It is after investigation in respect of applicable factors relating to continuance or recurrence of subsidisation and the injury to the domestic industry, that the opinion will be formed. Only the ascertainment of such aspects after such inquiry about the subsidy etc., would be the basis for issuance of notification by the Central Government. 7.1 Section 9(6) read with Rule 24(2) makes it obligatory with the designated authority shall review the need for continued imposition of countervailing duty and recommend upon investigation to the Central Government for withdrawal of the duty when it comes to conclusion that the injury to the domestic industry is not likely to continue or recur if the said countervailing duty is removed for varied and is therefore no longer warranted. This exercise is the exercise in realm of quasijudicial powers and the decision to be rendered also acquire the character of quasi-judicialness. 7.1.1 The inquiry involves going into the umpteen aspects of aspects relating to the market forces, subsidy from the exporting country, the resultant injury to the domestic industry, in which process the view of the stakeholders are also considered by extending them the opportunity. The contemplation of undertaking an inquiry along with other attendant aspects such as determination of injury and considering the objections etc., are the attributes making the whole process quasi-judicial in nature. The contemplation of undertaking an inquiry along with other attendant aspects such as determination of injury and considering the objections etc., are the attributes making the whole process quasi-judicial in nature. Even when the review process was undertaken under sub-section (6) and (7) of section 9 of the Act, such inquiry is necessary before the recommendation is made by the designated authority and thereafter, which may end up notification by the Central Government. 7.1.2 The Supreme Court discussed the nature of quasi judicial exercise and about the quasi judicial function, in Indian National Congress Vs. Institute of Social Welfare [(2002) 5 SCC 658]. It was observed in para 24 that, "the legal principle as to when an act of statutory authority would be a quasi- judicial act, is that where (a) a statutory authority empowered under a statute to do any act (b) which would prejudicially affect the subject (c) although there is no lis or two contending parties and the contest is between the authority and the subject and (d) the statutory authority is required to act judicially under the statute, the decision of said authority is quasi-judicial." 7.1.3 The Apex Court in Indian National Congress (supra) was considering the question whether while exercising powers under Section 29A of the Representation of People Act, 1951, while registering a political party, the Election Commission exercises quasi judicial power or not. It was held that in view of the requirement under the provisions of Section 29A that the Commission is to give decision only after making an inquiry, the Commission acts quasi judicially and the decision rendered by it is a quasi judicial order. 7.1.4 The Supreme Court observed that what distinguishes an administrative act from a quasi judicial act is, in the case of quasi judicial function under the relevant law, the statutory authority is required to act judicially. In other words, the law requires that an authority before arriving at a decision, must make an inquiry, such a requirement of law makes the authority a quasi judicial authority. In other words, the law requires that an authority before arriving at a decision, must make an inquiry, such a requirement of law makes the authority a quasi judicial authority. It was observed in light of that Section 29A (i) requires for making an application for registration as a political party, further requires as per its sub-sections (2) and (3) to provide the contents of the application and the further sub-section (7) enjoins the Commission to give reasonable opportunity to the representative of the Association or body while registering a political party or refusing the registration. In the scheme of countervailing duty, the investigation and inquiry is similarly envisaged. 7.1.5 The Court further held that in order to make the function quasi judicial and the decision quasi judicial, it is not necessary that there must exist a lis between the parties. It was observed thus – "But there are cases where there is no lis or two contending parties before a statutory authority yet such a statutory authority has been held to be quasi-judicial and decision rendered by it as quasi- judicial decision when such a statutory authority is required to act judicially. In Queen vs. Dublin Corporation (1878) 2 Ir. R. 371, it was held thus: "In this connection the term judicial does not necessarily mean acts of a Judge or legal tribunal sitting for the determination of matters of law, but for purpose of this question, a judicial act seems to be an act done by competent authority upon consideration of facts and circumstances and imposing liability or affecting the rights. And if there be a body empowered by law to enquire into facts, makes estimates to impose a rate on a district, it would seem to me that the acts of such a body involving such consequence would be judicial acts."(Para 27) 7.1.6 In the scheme of imposition etc., of countervailing duty, the investigation and inquiry is contemplated in the similar way. In Reliance Industries (supra), the Supreme Court in terms observed that the notifications regarding countervailing duty are quasijudicial notifications.” 16. It is pertinent to note that the provisions of countervailing duty and the anti-dumping duty are similar in nature and the Notifications under the Act being in quasi-judicial exercise, which are amenable to appeal and the challenge, were held to be subjected to judicial review in the writ jurisdiction also. 17. It is pertinent to note that the provisions of countervailing duty and the anti-dumping duty are similar in nature and the Notifications under the Act being in quasi-judicial exercise, which are amenable to appeal and the challenge, were held to be subjected to judicial review in the writ jurisdiction also. 17. In view of the decision of the Division Bench of this Court, wherein it is held that recommendations of the Designated Authority are not binding on the Central Government and therefore, the Central Government would have its own decision after recommendations of the Designated Authority are made available to it in accordance with the statutory procedure. In the facts of the case, the Central Government, after considering the recommendations of the Designated Authority, has taken a decision not to extend the anti-dumping duty, for which, no interference can be made while exercising writ jurisdiction as it would be in the domain of the Central Government to decide as to whether the anti-dumping duty should be continued in the public interest taking into consideration all the various factors. 18. For the foregoing reasons, this petition, being devoid any merit, is hereby dismissed. Notice is discharged.