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2025 DIGILAW 1000 (HP)

Sanjeev Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh

2025-05-14

RAKESH KAINTHLA

body2025
JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. 1. The petitioners have filed the present petition for quashing of F.I.R. No.54/2022, dated 22.03.2022, registered at Police Station Barmana, Tehsil Sadar, District Bilaspur, H.P. for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 306 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code (“in short IPC”) and the consequential proceedings arising therefrom. 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the informant had gone to Anandpur on 10.03.2022 with the Truck bearing registration No. HP-24D-1272. He returned to his home on 12.03.2022 at 10:30 pm. He was informed by Anil Kumar that Savitri Devi (since deceased) had called him and told him that petitioners - Sanjeev Kumar, Kala Devi and Anjana Kumari had given beatings to her. They also threatened and abused her. The informant was told by his father at about 07:00 am that Savitri Devi had been missing since 13.03.2022. Search was made for Savitri Devi, but she could not be found. The matter was reported to police, and a missing report was registered on 14.03.2022. The dead body of Savitri Devi was found on 22.03.2022. The police registered the FIR and conducted the investigation. The postmortem examination of the dead body was conducted, and a report was issued stating that the hanging pattern was symptomatic and consistent with partial suicidal hanging. The viscera were preserved and sent for chemical analysis. However, no alcohol or poison was detected in the viscera. As per the final report, the death had taken place due to strangulation caused by compression of the neck. The petitioners had abused and threatened Savitri Devi, and she committed suicide due to the threats and abuses. Hence, the charge sheet was filed before the Court. 3. Being aggrieved by the filing of the charge-sheet, the petitioners have approached this Court, asserting that they are innocent and were falsely implicated. The petitioners had a verbal altercation with the deceased over keeping the woods, which lasted for less than five minutes. Petitioner No.1 intervened and took the other petitioners inside the house. The deceased also went to her home. She left her home on 13.03.2022. A missing report was lodged on 14.03.2022, and the dead body was recovered on 22.03.2022. The time lapse between the incident and the recovery of the dead body rules out the abetment of suicide. Police did not conduct a proper investigation. The deceased also went to her home. She left her home on 13.03.2022. A missing report was lodged on 14.03.2022, and the dead body was recovered on 22.03.2022. The time lapse between the incident and the recovery of the dead body rules out the abetment of suicide. Police did not conduct a proper investigation. A false case for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 306 and 34 of the IPC was made out against the petitioners. The statements of the witnesses recorded by the police do not show that the petitioners had beaten, abused and threatened the deceased. There are material contradictions in the statements of the witnesses. The dead body recovered by the police did not belong to Savitri Devi. No DNA analysis was conducted. There is no evidence to show that the petitioners had abetted the commission of the suicide by the deceased. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR be quashed. 4. The petition is opposed by respondent No.1 by filing a reply. The contents of the FIR were reproduced in the reply. It was asserted that the informant had specifically stated that Savitri Devi committed suicide due to a quarrel with the petitioners. A supplementary charge sheet has been filed, which shows that the DNA profile obtained from the tooth of Savitri Devi matched the DNA profile of Subhash Chand. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 5. A separate reply was filed by respondent No.2 denying the contents of the petition. It was asserted that a thorough investigation was conducted by the police, and the charge sheet was filed against the petitioners. There is sufficient material before the Court to connect the petitioners to the commission of a crime. The deceased remained in shock after 12.03.2022. There is no material contradiction in the statements recorded by the police. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 6. I have heard Mr. Aditya Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for respondent No.1-State and M/s. Suchitra Sen, Legal Aid Counsel and Deepa, learned counsel for respondent No.2. 7. Mr. Aditya Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted that the petitioners are innocent and they were falsely implicated. There is nothing on record to connect the petitioners with the commission of crime. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for respondent No.1-State and M/s. Suchitra Sen, Legal Aid Counsel and Deepa, learned counsel for respondent No.2. 7. Mr. Aditya Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted that the petitioners are innocent and they were falsely implicated. There is nothing on record to connect the petitioners with the commission of crime. No eyewitness reported the exact words used during the quarrel. The time elapsed between the incident and the recovery of the dead body would rule out the abetment by the petitioners. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR be ordered to be quashed. He relied upon Sanju @ Sanjay Singh Sengar Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2002) AIR (SCW) 2023 & Shabir Hussain Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., (2021) 3 Apex Court Judgments (SC) 250 in support of his submission. 8. Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for respondent No.1/State, submitted that the police conducted the investigation and found sufficient material to file a charge-sheet against the petitioners. The deceased had called Anil Kumar and informed him about her mental condition, which shows that the deceased was stressed due to the quarrel with the petitioners. The quarrel was the proximate cause of the commission of suicide. He prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 9. M/s Suchitra Sen, Legal Aid Counsel & Deepa, learned counsel, for respondent No.2, adopted the submission of learned Deputy Advocate General, and prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 10. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 11. The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.”(emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1) it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.” 12. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre- empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and ( vi ) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably ( State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 )” 13. It was held in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, that the power to quash a complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly and not routinely. It was observed: - “29. It is settled law that the power of quashing of a complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, and while exercising this power, the Court must believe the averments and allegations in the complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly held that, save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court should not be used in a routine manner according to its whims or caprice.” 14. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court should not be used in a routine manner according to its whims or caprice.” 14. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15. The FIR was registered for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC. Section 306 of the IPC provides for the abetment of suicide. This section was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kumar @ Shiva Kumar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 216 : [2024] 3 SCR 329 : 2024 INSC 156 as under: “64. Suicide is distinguishable from homicide since it amounts to the killing of self. This Court in M. Mohan v. State, (2011) 3 SCC 626 went into the meaning of the word suicide and held as under: 37. The word “suicide” in itself is nowhere defined in the Penal Code, however, its meaning and import are well known and require no explanation. “Sui” means “self” and “cide” means “killing” thus implying an act of self- killing. In short, a person committing suicide must commit it by himself, irrespective of the means employed by him in achieving his objective of killing himself. 65. In Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2001) 9 SCC 618 , this Court delved into the meaning of the word ‘instigate’ or ‘instigation’ and held as under: 20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do “an act”. To satisfy the requirement of instigation though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes instigation must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. The present one is not a case where the accused had by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide in which case an instigation may have been inferred. A word uttered in a fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation. 66. Thus, this Court held that to ‘instigate’ means to goad, urge, provoke, incite or encourage to do ‘an act’. A word uttered in a fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation. 66. Thus, this Court held that to ‘instigate’ means to goad, urge, provoke, incite or encourage to do ‘an act’. To satisfy the requirement of ‘instigation’, it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or that the words or act should necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. But, a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. Where the accused by his act or omission or by his continued course of conduct creates a situation in that the deceased is left with no other option except to commit suicide, then instigation may be inferred. A word uttered in a fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation. 67. Again, in the case of Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State, (2009) 16 SCC 605 , this Court elaborated further and observed that to constitute ‘instigation’, a person who instigates another has to provoke, incite, urge or encourage the doing of an act by the other by ‘goading’ or ‘urging forward’. This Court held as follows: 17. Thus, to constitute “instigation”, a person who instigates another has to provoke, incite, urge or encourage the doing of an act by the other by “goading” or “urging forward”. The dictionary meaning of the word “goad” is “a thing that stimulates someone into action; provoke to action or reaction” (see Concise Oxford English Dictionary); “to keep irritating or annoying somebody until he reacts” (see Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, 7th Edn.). 18. Similarly, “urge” means to advise or try hard to persuade somebody to do something or to make a person to move more quickly and or in a particular direction, especially by pushing or forcing such a person. Therefore, a person who instigates another has to “goad” or “urge forward” the latter with the intention to provoke, incite or encourage the doing of an act by the latter. 68. Therefore, a person who instigates another has to “goad” or “urge forward” the latter with the intention to provoke, incite or encourage the doing of an act by the latter. 68. Thus, this Court has held that in order to prove that the accused had abetted the commission of suicide by a person, the following has to be established: (i) the accused kept on irritating or annoying the deceased by words, deeds or wilful omission or conduct which may even be a wilful silence until the deceased reacted or pushed or forced the deceased by his deeds, words or wilful omission or conduct to make the deceased move forward more quickly in a forward direction; and (ii) that the accused had the intention to provoke, urge or encourage the deceased to commit suicide while acting in the manner noted above. Undoubtedly, the presence of mens rea is the necessary concomitant of instigation. 69. In Amalendu Pal alias Jhantu v. State of West Bengal, (2010) 1 SCC 707 , this Court after referring to some of the previous decisions held that it has been the consistent view that before holding an accused guilty of an offence under Section 306 IPC, the court must scrupulously examine the facts and circumstances of the case and also assess the evidence adduced before it in order to find out whether the cruelty and harassment meted out to the victim had left the victim with no other alternative to put an end to her life. It must be borne in mind that in a case of alleged abetment of suicide, there must be proof of direct or indirect act(s) of incitement to the commission of suicide. Merely on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the deceased to commit suicide, conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC would not be sustainable. Thereafter, this Court held as under: 13. In order to bring a case within the purview of Section 306 IPC there must be a case of suicide and in the commission of the said offence, the person who is said to have abetted the commission of suicide must have played an active role by an act of instigation or by doing certain act to facilitate the commission of suicide. Therefore, the act of abetment by the person charged with the said offence must be proved and established by the prosecution before he could be convicted under Section 306 IPC. 70. Similar is the view expressed by this court in Ude Singh (supra). 71. In Rajesh v. State of Haryana, (2020) 15 SCC 359 , this Court after referring to Sections 306 and 107 of the IPC held as follows: 9. Conviction under Section 306 IPC is not sustainable on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused, which led or compelled the person to commit suicide. In order to bring a case within the purview of Section 306 IPC, there must be a case of suicide and in the commission of the said offence, the person who is said to have abetted the commission of suicide must have played an active role by an act of instigation or by doing certain act to facilitate the commission of suicide. Therefore, the act of abetment by the person charged with the said offence must be proved and established by the prosecution before he could be convicted under Section 306 IPC. 72. Reverting back to the decision in M. Mohan (supra), this Court observed that abetment would involve a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. Delineating the intention of the legislature and having regard to the ratio of the cases decided by this Court, it was concluded that in order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It would also require an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no other option and that this act of the accused must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he committed suicide. 73. It would also require an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no other option and that this act of the accused must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he committed suicide. 73. Sounding a note of caution, this Court in State of West Bengal v. Orilal Jaiswal, (1994) 1 SCC 73 observed that the court should be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case as well as the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end her life by committing suicide. If it transpires to the court that the victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life quite common to the society to which the victim belonged and such petulance, discord and differences were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual to commit suicide, the conscience of the court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty.” 16. This position was reiterated in Rohini Sudarshan Gangurde v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 INSC 519 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1701 wherein it was observed: “8. Reading these sections together would indicate that there must be either an instigation or an engagement or intentional aid to the ‘doing of a thing’. When we apply these three criteria to Section 306, it means that the accused must have encouraged the person to commit suicide or engaged in a conspiracy with others to encourage the person to commit suicide or acted (or failed to act) intentionally to aid the person to commit suicide. 9. In S.S. Chheena v. Vijay Kumar Mahajan, (2010) 12 SCC 190 , this court explained the concept of abetment along with the necessary ingredient for an offence under Section 306 of IPC as under: “25. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. The intention of the legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by this Court is clear that in order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and that act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he committed suicide.” 10. In Amalendu Pal v. State of West Bengal, (2010) 1 SCC 707 , this court explained the parameters of Section 306 in the following words: “12. Thus, this Court has consistently taken the view that before holding an accused guilty of an offence under Section 306 IPC, the court must scrupulously examine the facts and circumstances of the case and also assess the evidence adduced before it in order to find out whether the cruelty and harassment meted out to the victim had left the victim with no other alternative but to put an end to her life. It is also to be borne in mind that in cases of alleged abetment of suicide, there must be proof of direct or indirect acts of incitement to the commission of suicide. Merely on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the person to commit suicide, conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC is not sustainable. 13. In order to bring a case within the purview of Section 306 IPC there must be a case of suicide and in the commission of the said offence, the person who is said to have abetted the commission of suicide must have played an active role by an act of instigation or by doing certain act to facilitate the commission of suicide. Therefore, the act of abetment by the person charged with the said offence must be proved and established by the prosecution before he could be convicted under Section 306 IPC.” 11. Therefore, the act of abetment by the person charged with the said offence must be proved and established by the prosecution before he could be convicted under Section 306 IPC.” 11. In Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2001) 9 SCC 618 , while explaining the meaning of ‘Instigation’, this court stated that: “20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do “an act”. To satisfy the requirement of “instigation”, though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes “instigation” must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. Where the accused had, by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct, created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide, in which case, an “instigation” may have to be inferred. A word uttered in a fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow, cannot be said to be instigation.” 12. These principles and necessary ingredients of Section 306 and 107 of the Penal Code, 1860 were reiterated and summarized by this court in the recent case of Gurucharan Singh v. State of Punjab, (2020) 10 SCC 200 .” 17. A similar view was taken by this Court in Devender Singh (supra) wherein it was observed: 39. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vipin Jaiswal vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2013) 3 SCC 684 , held that the prosecution is required to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased was subjected to cruelty and harassment by the accused. It was observed from the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and in particular PW-1 and PW-4 therein that they had made general allegations of harassment by the accused towards the deceased and had not brought any evidence and specific acts of cruelty or harassment by the accused on the deceased. It was held that the onus was on the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the ingredients of Section 498-A IPC. The relevant portion of the judgment reads as under: - “7. In any case, to hold an accused guilty of both the offences under Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC, the prosecution is required to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by the accused. The relevant portion of the judgment reads as under: - “7. In any case, to hold an accused guilty of both the offences under Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC, the prosecution is required to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by the accused. From the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, and in particular PW 1 and PW 4, we find that they have made general allegations of harassment by the appellant towards the deceased and have not brought into evidence any specific acts of cruelty or harassment by the appellant on the deceased. 16. In our considered opinion, the evidence of DW 1 (the appellant) and Ext.D-19 cast a reasonable doubt on the prosecution story that the deceased was subjected to harassment or cruelty in connection with the demand for dowry. In our view, the onus was on the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the ingredient of Section 498-A IPC and the essential ingredient of offence under Section 498-A is that the accused, as the husband of the deceased, has subjected her to cruelty as defined in the Explanation to Section 498- A IPC. Similarly, for the Court to draw the presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act that the appellant had caused dowry death as defined in Section 304-B IPC, the prosecution has to prove besides the demand of dowry, harassment or cruelty caused by the accused to the deceased soon before her death. Since the prosecution has not been able to prove beyond reasonable doubt this ingredient of harassment or cruelty, neither of the offences under Sections 498- A and 304-B IPC has been made out by the prosecution.” 40. As per the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vipin Jaiswal’s case (supra), in the absence of any specific allegation, like, the date, or time of the incident much credence to the testimonies of PW-1 and PW-3 cannot be given, as the prosecution has failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased was treated with cruelty and harassment by the accused persons in connection with demand of dowry. xxx 56. A plain reading of the aforesaid provisions reveals that to justify the framing of charges under Section 306 IPC, the following ingredients must be established: (i) death due to suicide ; (ii) accused abets the commission of suicide. 57. xxx 56. A plain reading of the aforesaid provisions reveals that to justify the framing of charges under Section 306 IPC, the following ingredients must be established: (i) death due to suicide ; (ii) accused abets the commission of suicide. 57. The word ‘suicide’ is not defined in IPC. However, the meaning and import thereof was considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gangula Mohan Reddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2010) 1 SCC 750 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the word ‘suicide’ is not defined in the Indian Penal Code. However, its meaning and import is well known. The word ‘sui’ means ‘self’ and ‘cide’ means ‘killing’. In other words, the act must have been so intended to push the deceased into a situation that the deceased is driven to commit suicide. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 17 held as under: “17. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. The intention of the Legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by this court is clear that in order to convict a person under section306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and this act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he committed suicide.” 58. What is abetment, was considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.S. Chheena vs. Vijay Kumar Mahajan and another, (2010) 12 SCC 190 and elaborated the meaning of ‘abetment’ in paras 25 of the judgment as under: “25. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. The intention of the legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by this Court is clear that in order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. The intention of the legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by this Court is clear that in order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and that act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he committed suicide. 26. In the instant case, the deceased was undoubtedly hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences which happen in our day- to-day life. The human sensitivity of each individual differs from the other. Different people behave differently in the same situation”. 59. What is ‘instigation’, was considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramesh Kumar vs. State of Chattisgarh, (2001) 9 SCC 618 and defined the meaning of instigation in para 20 of its report, which reads thus: “20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do "an act". To satisfy the requirement of instigation though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes instigation must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. The present one is not a case where the accused had by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide in which case an instigation may have been inferred. A word uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation.” 60. In Sanju alias Sanjay Singh Sengar vs. State of M.P., (2002) 5 SCC 371 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court gave interpretation to the words ‘abetment’ and ‘instigation’ in the following manner: “6. A word uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation.” 60. In Sanju alias Sanjay Singh Sengar vs. State of M.P., (2002) 5 SCC 371 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court gave interpretation to the words ‘abetment’ and ‘instigation’ in the following manner: “6. Section 107 I.P.C defines abetment to mean that a person abets the doing of a thing if he firstly, instigates any person to do that thing; or secondly, engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or thirdly, intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. 9. In Mahendra Singh v. State of M.P., 1995 Supp. (3) SCC 731 , the appellant was charged for an offence under Section 306 I.P.C basically based upon the dying declaration of the deceased, which reads as under: (SCC p.731, para1) "My mother-in-law and husband and sister-in-law (husband's elder brother's wife) harassed me. They beat me and abused me. My husband Mahendra wants to marry a second time. He has illicit connections with my sister-in- law. Because of these reasons and being harassed, I want to die by burning.” 10. This Court, considering the definition of 'abetment' under Section 107 I.P.C., found that the charge and conviction of the appellant for an offence under Section 306 is not sustainable merely on the allegation of harassment to the deceased. This Court further held that neither of the ingredients of abetment is attracted on the statement of the deceased. 11. In Ramesh Kumar V. State of Chhattisgarh, (2001) 9 SCC 618 , this Court while considering the charge framed and the conviction for an offence under Section 306 I.P.C. on the basis of dying declaration recorded by an Executive Magistrate , in which she had stated that previously there had been quarrel between the deceased and her husband and on the day of occurrence she had a quarrel with her husband who had said that she could go wherever she wanted to go and that thereafter she had poured kerosene on herself and had set fire. Acquitting the accused this Court said: (SCC p.620) "A word uttered in a fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation. If it transpires to the court that a victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life quite common to the society to which the victim belonged and such petulance, discord and differences were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual in a given society to commit suicide, the conscience of the court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the accused charged for abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty." 12. Reverting to the facts of the case, both the courts below have erroneously accepted the prosecution story that the suicide by the deceased is the direct result of the quarrel that had taken place on 25th July 1998 wherein it is alleged that the appellant had used abusive language and had reportedly told the deceased 'to go and die'. For this, the courts relied on a statement of Shashi Bhushan, brother of the deceased, made under Section 161 Cr.P.C. when reportedly the deceased, after coming back from the house of the appellant, told him that the appellant had humiliated him and abused him with filthy words. The statement of Shashi Bhushan, recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. is annexed as annexure P3 to this appeal and going through the statement, we find that he has not stated that the deceased had told him that the appellant had asked him 'to go and die'. Even if we accept the prosecution story that the appellant did tell the deceased 'to go and die', that itself does not constitute the ingredient of 'instigation'. The word 'instigate' denotes incitement or urging to do some drastic or unadvisable action or to stimulate or incite. The presence of mens rea, therefore, is the necessary concomitant of instigation. It is common knowledge that the words uttered in a quarrel or a spur of the moment cannot be taken to be uttered with mens rea. It is in a fit of anger and emotion. Secondly, the alleged abusive words, said to have been told to the deceased were on 25 th July 1998 ensued by quarrel. The deceased was found hanging on 27 th July 1998. It is in a fit of anger and emotion. Secondly, the alleged abusive words, said to have been told to the deceased were on 25 th July 1998 ensued by quarrel. The deceased was found hanging on 27 th July 1998. Assuming that the deceased had taken the abusive language seriously, he had enough time in between to think over and reflect and, therefore, it cannot be said that the abusive language, which had been used by the appellant on 25 th July 1998 drove the deceased to commit suicide. Suicide by the deceased on 27 th July 1998 is not proximate to the abusive language uttered by the appellant on 25 th July 1998. The fact that the deceased committed suicide on 27 th July 1998 would itself point out that it is not the direct result of the quarrel taking place on 25 th July 1998 when it is alleged that the appellant had used abusive language and also told the deceased to go and die. This fact had escaped the notice of the courts below.” 61. In Chitresh Kumar Chopra vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2009) 16 SCC 605 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that there should be an intention to provoke, incite or encourage the doing of an act by the latter. Each person has his own idea of self-esteem and self- respect. Therefore, it is impossible to lay down any straitjacket formula in dealing with such cases. Each case has to be decided on the basis of its own facts and circumstances. It is apt to reproduce paras 16 and 17 of the judgment which read thus:- “16. Speaking for the three-Judge Bench, in Ramesh Kumar Case (2001) 9 SCC 618 , R.C. Lahoti, J. (as His Lordship then was) said that instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do "an act". To satisfy the requirement of "instigation", though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes "instigation" must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. To satisfy the requirement of "instigation", though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes "instigation" must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. Where the accused had, by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct, created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide, in which case, an "instigation" may have to be inferred. A word uttered in a fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow, cannot be said to be instigation. 17. Thus, to constitute "instigation", a person who instigates another has to provoke, incite, urge or encourage the doing of an act by the other by "goading" or "urging forward". The dictionary meaning of the word "goad" is "a thing that stimulates someone into action: provoke to action or reaction" (See: Concise Oxford English Dictionary); "to keep irritating or annoying somebody until he reacts" (See: Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary - 7th Edition).” 62. In Praveen Pradhan vs. State of Uttaranchal and another, (2012) 9 SCC 734 , it was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the offence of abetment by instigation depends upon the intention of the person who abets and not upon the act which is done by the person who has abetted. The abetment may be by instigation, conspiracy or intentional aid as provided under Section 107 IPC. A reasonable certainty to incite the consequences must be capable of being spelt out. A continued course of conduct which creates such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option but to commit suicide would satisfy the ingredients of instigation to commit suicide or abetment of suicide. It is apt to reproduce paras 16 to 18 of the judgment which read as under: - “16. This Court in Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh, while dealing with a similar situation observed that what constitutes ‘instigation’ must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequences. A reasonable certainty to incite the consequences must be capable of being spelt out. More so, a continued course of conduct is to create such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option but to commit suicide. 17. A reasonable certainty to incite the consequences must be capable of being spelt out. More so, a continued course of conduct is to create such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option but to commit suicide. 17. The offence of abetment by instigation depends upon the intention of the person who abets and not upon the act which is done by the person who has abetted. The abetment may be by instigation, conspiracy or intentional aid as provided under Section 107 IPC. However, the words uttered in a fit of anger or omission without any intention cannot be termed as instigation. (Vide: State of Punjab v. Iqbal Singh, AIR 1991 SC 1532 ; Surender v. State of Haryana, (2006) 12 SCC 375 ; Kishori Lal v. State of M.P., AIR 2007 SC 2457 and Sonti Rama Krishna v. Sonti Shanti Sree, (2009) 1 SCC 554 ) 18. In fact, from the above discussion it is apparent that instigation has to be gathered from the circumstances of a particular case. No straight-jacket formula can be laid down to find out as to whether in a particular case, there has been instigation which force the person to commit suicide. In a particular case, there may not be direct evidence in regard to instigation which may have direct nexus to suicide. Therefore, in such a case, an inference has to be drawn from the circumstances and it is to be determined whether circumstances had been such which in fact had created the situation that a person felt totally frustrated and committed suicide. More so, while dealing with an application for quashing of the proceedings, a court cannot form a firm opinion, rather a tentative view that would evoke the presumption referred to under Section 228 Cr.P.C.”. 63. Similar issue came up for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Kerala and others vs. S. Unnikrishnan Nair and others, AIR 2015 SC 3351 and it was observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraphs 9, 11, 12, 13 and 17 as under: - “9. Mr. 63. Similar issue came up for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Kerala and others vs. S. Unnikrishnan Nair and others, AIR 2015 SC 3351 and it was observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraphs 9, 11, 12, 13 and 17 as under: - “9. Mr. Prashant Bhushan, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Nos.1 and 2, per contra, would contend that the High Court has justifiably quashed the investigation, for Haridath, the deceased, was holding a superior rank and there is nothing to suggest that the respondents had instigated him or done any activity that had left the deceased with no option but to commit suicide. He has placed reliance upon Netai Dutta vs. State of West Bengal, (2005) 2 SCC 659 and M. Mohan vs. State, Represented by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, (2011) 3 SCC 626 11. The aforesaid provision was interpreted in Kishori Lal v. State of M.P . by a two-Judge Bench and the discussion therein is to the following effect:- “Section 107 IPC defines abetment of a thing. The offence of abetment is a separate and distinct offence provided in IPC. A person abets the doing of a thing when (1) he instigates any person to do that thing; or (2) engages with one or more other persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing; or (3)intentionally aids, by act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. These things are essential to complete abetment as a crime. The word “instigate” literally means to provoke, incite, urge on or bring about by persuasion to do anything. The abetment may be by instigation, conspiracy or intentional aid, as provided in the three clauses of Section 107. Section 109 provides that if the act abetted is committed in consequence of abetment and there is no provision for the punishment of such abetment, then the offender is to be punished with the punishment provided for the original offence. “Abetted” in Section 109 means the specific offence abetted. Therefore, the offence for the abetment of which a person is charged with the abetment is normally linked with the proved offence.” 12. In Analendu Pal Alis Jhantu v. State of West Bengal, (2010) 1 SCC 707 dealing with the expression of abetment the Court observed:- “The expression “abetment” has been defined under Section 107 IPC which we have already extracted above. In Analendu Pal Alis Jhantu v. State of West Bengal, (2010) 1 SCC 707 dealing with the expression of abetment the Court observed:- “The expression “abetment” has been defined under Section 107 IPC which we have already extracted above. A person is said to abet the commission of suicide when a person instigates any person to do that thing as stated in clause Firstly or to do anything as stated in clauses Secondly or Thirdly of Section 107 IPC. Section 109 IPC provides that if the act abetted is committed pursuant to and in consequence of abetment then the offender is to be punished with the punishment provided for the original offence. Learned counsel for the respondent State, however, clearly stated before us that it would be a case where clause Thirdly of Section 107 IPC only would be attracted. According to him, a case of abetment of suicide is made out as provided for under Section 107 IPC.” 13. As we find from the narration of facts and the material brought on record in the case at hand, it is the suicide note which forms the fulcrum of the allegations and for proper appreciation of the same, we have reproduced it herein-before. On a plain reading of the same, it is difficult to hold that there has been any abetment by the respondents. The note, except saying that the respondents compelled him to do everything and cheated him and put him in deep trouble, contains nothing else. The respondents were inferior in rank and it is surprising that such a thing could happen. That apart, the allegation is really vague. It also bafÒes reason, for the department had made him the head of the investigating team and the High Court had reposed complete faith in him and granted him the liberty to move the court, in such a situation, there was no warrant to feel cheated and to be put in trouble by the officers belonging to the lower rank. That apart, he has also put the blame on the Chief Judicial Magistrate by stating that he had put pressure on him. He has also made the allegation against the Advocate. 17. That apart, he has also put the blame on the Chief Judicial Magistrate by stating that he had put pressure on him. He has also made the allegation against the Advocate. 17. We have quoted in extenso from the said judgment and we have no hesitation in stating that the suicide note therein was quite different, and the Court did think it appropriate to quash the proceedings because of the tenor and nature of the suicide note. Thus, the said decision is distinguishable regard being had to the factual score exposited therein.” 64. Thus, what can be taken to be settled is that the abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. 65. In Amalendu Pal alias Jhantu vs. State of West Bengal, AIR 2010 Supreme Court 512 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that harassment must be coupled with some positive action proximate to the time of occurrence. In the absence of proof of such proximate action on the part of the accused, he or she cannot be convicted under Section 306 IPC. In order to bring a case within the purview of Section 306 IPC, there must be a case of suicide and for the commission of such an offence, the person who is said to have abetted the commission of the offence of suicide must have played an active role by an act of instigation or by doing certain act to facilitate the commission of offence of suicide. Therefore, the act of abetment by a person charged with the said offence must be proved and established by the prosecution before he could be convicted under Section 306 IPC. Paragraph 16 of the said report is reproduced as under: - “16. In order to bring a case within the purview of Section 306 of IPC there must be a case of suicide and in the commission of the said offence, the person who is said to have abetted the commission of suicide must have played an active role by an act of instigation or by doing certain act to facilitate the commission of suicide. Therefore, the act of abetment by the person charged with the said offence must be proved and established by the prosecution before he could be convicted under Section 306 IPC.” 66. Therefore, the act of abetment by the person charged with the said offence must be proved and established by the prosecution before he could be convicted under Section 306 IPC.” 66. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Randhir Singh and another Versus State of Punjab, (2004) 13 SCC 129 has reiterated the legal position as regards Section 306 IPC in paragraphs 12 and 13, which read as thus: - “12. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding that person in doing of a thing. In cases of conspiracy also it would involve the mental process of entering into a conspiracy for the doing of that thing. The more active role which can be described as instigating or aiding the doing of a thing is required before a person can be said to be abetting the commission of an offence under Section 306 of IPC. 13. In State of West Bengal v. Orilal Jaiswal, AIR (1994) SC 141 8 this Court has observed that the courts should be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case and the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end the life by committing suicide. If it transpires to the Court that a victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life quite common to the society to which the victim belonged and such petulance discord and differences were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual in a given, society to commit suicide, the conscience of the Court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty.” 67. Therefore, what is required is that unless there is a positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused persons, which alone compels the person to commit suicide, conviction under Section 306 IPC is not sustainable. The legal position has recently been reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mariano Anto Bruno and another Versus Inspector of Police, AIR 2022 Supreme Court 4994 , wherein, vide paragraphs 25 and 26, it was observed as under:- “25. The ingredients of Section 306 IPC have been extensively laid out in M. Arjunan Vs. The legal position has recently been reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mariano Anto Bruno and another Versus Inspector of Police, AIR 2022 Supreme Court 4994 , wherein, vide paragraphs 25 and 26, it was observed as under:- “25. The ingredients of Section 306 IPC have been extensively laid out in M. Arjunan Vs. State, represented by its Inspector of Police which are as under:- “The essential ingredients of the offence under Section 306 I.P.C. are (i) the abetment; (ii) the intention of the accused to aid or instigate or abet the deceased to commit suicide. The act of the accused, however, insulting the deceased by using abusive language will not, by itself, constitute the abetment of suicide. There should be evidence capable of suggesting that the accused intended by such an act to instigate the deceased to commit suicide. Unless the ingredients of instigation/ abetment to commit suicide are satisfied, the accused cannot be convicted under Section 306 I.P.C.” 26. In order to convict an accused under Section 306 IPC, the state of mind to commit a particular crime must be visible with regard to determining culpability. With regard to the same, a two-judge bench of this Court in Ude Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Haryana observed as under: - “16. In cases of alleged abetment of suicide, there must be proof of direct or indirect act/s of incitement to the commission of suicide. It could hardly be disputed that the question of the cause of suicide, particularly in the context of an offence of abetment of suicide, remains a vexed one, involving multifaceted and complex attributes of human behaviour and responses/ reactions. In the case of accusation for abetment of suicide, the Court would be looking for cogent and convincing proof of the act/s of incitement to the commission of suicide. In the case of suicide, mere allegation of harassment of the deceased by another person would not suffice unless there be such action on the part of the accused which compels the person to commit suicide; and such an offending action ought to be proximate to the time of occurrence. Whether a person has abetted in the commission of suicide by another or not, could only be gathered from the facts and circumstances of each case. 16.1. Whether a person has abetted in the commission of suicide by another or not, could only be gathered from the facts and circumstances of each case. 16.1. For the purpose of finding out if a person has abetted the commission of suicide by another; the consideration would be if the accused is guilty of the act of instigation of the act of suicide. As explained and reiterated by this Court in the decisions above referred, instigation means to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do an act. If the persons who committed suicide had been hypersensitive and the action of the accused is otherwise not ordinarily expected to induce a similarly circumstanced person to commit suicide, it may not be safe to hold the accused guilty of abetment of suicide. But, on the other hand, if the accused by his acts and by his continuous course of conduct creates a situation which leads the deceased perceiving no other option except to commit suicide, the case may fall within the four corners of Section 306 IPC. If the accused plays an active role in tarnishing the self-esteem and self-respect of the victim, which eventually draws the victim to commit suicide, the accused may be held guilty of abetment of suicide. The question of mens rea on the part of the accused in such cases would be examined with reference to the actual acts and deeds of the accused and if the acts and deeds are only of such nature where the accused intended nothing more than harassment or snapshot of anger, a particular case may fall short of the offence of abetment of suicide. However, if the accused kept on irritating or annoying the deceased by words or deeds until the deceased reacted or was provoked, a particular case may be that of abetment of suicide. Such being the matter of delicate analysis of human behaviour, each case is required to be examined on its own facts, while taking note of all the surrounding factors having bearing on the actions and psyche of the accused and the deceased.” 18. It was not disputed in the petition that the petitioners had quarrelled with the deceased. The police recorded the statement of Anil Kumar in which he stated that he had called Savitri Devi, who revealed that she had a quarrel with her neighbours on 11.03.2022. It was not disputed in the petition that the petitioners had quarrelled with the deceased. The police recorded the statement of Anil Kumar in which he stated that he had called Savitri Devi, who revealed that she had a quarrel with her neighbours on 11.03.2022. She was distressed, and her head was aching badly. She was sad and wanted to end her life. She was in litigation with the petitioners. Anil Kumar counselled her and advised her not to do anything. He again tried to call her, but his call was not picked up. 19. This was the statement made by the deceased regarding her state of mind after the incident. It clearly shows that the deceased was distressed due to the quarrel with the petitioner, and she wanted to end her life. Therefore, there is sufficient material on record to show the involvement of the petitioners in the commission of crime. 20. It was submitted that the allegations in the FIR and charge sheet are false, and there are various contradictions in the statements of the prosecution witnesses. This submission will not help the petitioners. The Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. cannot conduct a mini- trial to determine the truthfulness of falsehood of the allegation. This position was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, wherein it was held : - “13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra). 14. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra). 14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi) Department of Home, (2019) 11 SCC 706 : 2018 INSC 1060. “ 14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23. In Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23, this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16) “16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same is not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [ Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365 ] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc. or not.” 21. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC, cannot conduct a mini-trial. It was observed at page 397: “17. This Court, in a series of judgments, has held that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is not supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference can be made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379 . This Court, in a series of judgments, has held that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is not supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference can be made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379 . The relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7) 6. … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482 CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. … 7. … At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider ‘whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not’.” 22. A similar view was taken in Dineshbhai Chandubhai Patel v. State of Gujarat , (2018) 3 SCC 104 : (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 683 : 2018 SCC OnLine SC 6 , wherein it was observed at page 111: “29. [Ed.: Paras 29 and 30 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./2/2018 dated 31-1-2018.]. The High Court, in our view, failed to see the extent of its jurisdiction, which it possesses to exercise while examining the legality of any FIR complaining commission of several cognizable offences by the accused persons. In order to examine as to whether the factual contents of the FIR disclose any prima facie cognizable offences or not, the High Court cannot act like an investigating agency and nor can it exercise the powers like an appellate court. The question, in our opinion, was required to be examined keeping in view the contents of the FIR and prima facie material, if any, requiring no proof. 30. [Ed.: Paras 29 and 30 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./2/2018 dated 31-1-2018.]. At this stage, the High Court could not appreciate the evidence, nor could it draw its own inferences from the contents of the FIR and the material relied on. It was more so when the material relied on was disputed by the complainants and vice versa. 30. [Ed.: Paras 29 and 30 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./2/2018 dated 31-1-2018.]. At this stage, the High Court could not appreciate the evidence, nor could it draw its own inferences from the contents of the FIR and the material relied on. It was more so when the material relied on was disputed by the complainants and vice versa. In such a situation, it becomes the job of the investigating authority at such stage to probe and then of the court to examine the questions once the charge-sheet is filed along with such material as to how far and to what extent reliance can be placed on such material. 31. In our considered opinion, once the court finds that the FIR does disclose the prima facie commission of any cognizable offence, it should stay its hand and allow the investigating machinery to step in to initiate the probe to unearth the crime in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the Code. 32. The very fact that the High Court, in this case, went into the minutest details in relation to every aspect of the case and devoted 89 pages of judgment to quash the FIR in part led us to draw a conclusion that the High Court had exceeded its powers while exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code. We cannot concur with such an approach of the High Court. 33. The inherent powers of the High Court, which are obviously not defined as being inherent in its very nature, cannot be stretched to any extent and nor can such powers be equated with the appellate powers of the High Court defined in the Code. The parameters laid down by this Court while exercising inherent powers must always be kept in mind, else it would lead to committing the jurisdictional error in deciding the case. Such is the case here. 34. On perusal of the three complaints and the FIR mentioned above, we are of the considered view that the complaint and FIR, do disclose a prima facie commission of various cognizable offences alleged by the complainants against the accused persons and, therefore, the High Court instead of dismissing the application filed by the accused persons in part should have dismissed the application as a whole to uphold the entire FIR in question.” 23. A charge sheet has been filed before the Court. A charge sheet has been filed before the Court. The learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P. , (2023) 8 SCC 734 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, the learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was observed: “At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating officer might have collected forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any discharge case is made out or not.” 24. Reliance was placed upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sanju @ Sanjay Singh Sengar Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2002) AIR (SCW) 2023 & Shabir Hussain Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., (2021) 3 Apex Court Judgment (SC) 250. However, these judgments will not help the petitioners’ case because of the categorical statement made by Anil Kumar in the present case. Thus, no advantage can be derived from the cited judgments. 25. No other point was urged. 26. In view of the above, the present petition fails and the same is dismissed. The observation made hereinabove shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.