JUDGMENT : SOUMITRA SAIKIA, J. 1. This writ petition is filed by the petitioner who is presently serving as LDA-cum-Typist at Barbaruah ICDS Project till date. The petitioner was initially appointed on 17.05.1996 as Grade-III staff on ad-hoc basis in the Office of the Divisional Programme Officer, ICDS Cell, Sonitpur at Tezpur in fixed pay of Rs. 900/- per month. In the year 2000- 01, the petitioner was called for appearing in the Oral Interview of the LDA Post where he secured 6 th position in the merit list. After his selection, he was attached to the office of the Divisional Programme Officer, ICDS Cell at Sonitpur as LDA-cum-Typist and subsequently he was posted in the office of the CDPO at Majuli. Thereafter, he was again transferred and posted in the Office of Child Development Project Officer, Barbaruah ICDS Project, Dibrugarh. 2. Pursuant to a writ petition being W.P(C) No. 8691/2004 being filed by one Narbada Chetri who claimed to have secured 2 nd position in the merit list but was not appointed, this Court passed orders dated 14.11.2013 directing the concerned authority to cancel the appointment of the petitioner and in his place appoint the petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 8691/2004 namely Smti Narbada Chetri. Since the directions was not complied, the Cont. Case No. 341/2005 was also subsequently filed. 3. In pursuance to the order passed by this Court by order dated 25.01.2007, petitioner’s appointment was cancelled vide order dated 25.01.2007 and in his place Smti Narbada Chetri was appointed. The petitioner being aggrieved, assailed the said order dated 25.01.2007 by filing W.P.(C) No. 1014/2007. The Co-ordinate Bench of this Court by order dated 14.11.2013 allowed the writ petition and directed the respondent authority to cancel the appointment of the said Smti Narbada Chetri and appoint the petitioner in her place. Accordingly, the petitioner was appointed as LDA-cum-Typist at ICDS Project, Barbaura vide letter dated 13.03.2014. 4. The grievance raised before this Court by the petitioner is that he was discharged from service on 25.01.2007 and subsequently reinstated in service on 13.03.2014 but his service benefits and financial entitlements in the interregnum period was not granted. Accordingly, the petitioner was appointed as LDA-cum-Typist at ICDS Project, Barbaura vide letter dated 13.03.2014. 4. The grievance raised before this Court by the petitioner is that he was discharged from service on 25.01.2007 and subsequently reinstated in service on 13.03.2014 but his service benefits and financial entitlements in the interregnum period was not granted. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that thee directions contained in the order dated 14.11.2013 to appoint the petitioner in the facts and circumstances of the Court will have to be understood to be a directions to re-instate the petitioner and with full service benefits and back wages. Being aggrieved, the present writ petition has been filed praying for direction to the respondents to release his salary, pay and other service benefits for the interregnum period. 5. The respondents have contested the case by filing an affidavit. The respondents state that since the petitioner was appointed by order dated 13.03.2014 and joined in his service on 23.07.2014 in Barburah ICDS Project as LDA-cum-Typist, he is entitled to draw his salary from the date of his joining which is 23.07.2014. It is stated that the Finance Department did not allow any financial benefit to the petitioner for the period of his earlier appointment as LDA-cum-Typist in Barbaruah ICDS Project, Dibrugarh which was cancelled by order dated 25.01.2007. 6. The learned counsel for the parties have been heard. Pleadings available on record have been carefully perused. The Judgment of the Co-ordinate Bench by Judgment and Order dated 14.11.2013 passed in W.P. (C) No. 1014/2007 has also been carefully perused. 7. The Co-ordinate Bench upon examination of the matter in its entirety came to a conclusion that the present writ petitioner was never arrayed as a party in the writ petition being W.P(C) No. 861/2004 and that the select list got expired after lapse of three (3) years by efflux of time and also there was no direction passed by this Court to the effect that the appointment of the present petitioner was to be cancelled to make way for the appointment of the private respondent therein namely Smti Narbada Chetri. The Co-ordinate Bench came to the conclusion that the order of removal of the petitioner was issued in complete non-application of mind by the authorities and also before issuing the order of cancellation of appointment, no opportunity of hearing was granted to the petitioner. The Co-ordinate Bench came to the conclusion that the order of removal of the petitioner was issued in complete non-application of mind by the authorities and also before issuing the order of cancellation of appointment, no opportunity of hearing was granted to the petitioner. In that view of the matter, the writ petition was allowed and the Office order dated 25.01.2007 by which the petitioner’s appointment was cancelled was quashed. The respondents were directed to cancel the appointment of the private respondent and issue appointment order in favour of the petitioner for the post of LDA-cum-Typist at Barbaruah ICDS Project, Dibrugarh within a period of two (2) months from the date of receipt of the certified copy of the Judgment. Liberty was however granted to the authorities to accommodate the private respondent therein to be accommodated in any available vacancies in order to avoid any hardship being caused to her. The direction passed by the Co-ordinate Bench in the writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 1014/2007 earlier filed by the petitioner is extracted below: “5. For the reasons stated in the foregoing, this writ petition succeeds. The office order dated 25.1.2007 issued by the respondent No.2 as well as the letter dated 25.1.2007 issued by the Joint Secretary, Social Welfare, Assam at Annexure-7 and Annexure-6 respectively, are hereby quashed. The respondents are directed to cancel the appointment of the private respondent and issue an appointment order in favour of the petitioner for the post of LDA-cum-Typist at Barbarua IC DS Project, Dibrugarh within a period of two (2) months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment. Nevertheless, it shall be open to the respondent-authorities to accommodate the private respondent to any other available vacancy to avoid any hardship being caused to her.” 8. Upon careful perusal of the Judgment rendered by the Co-ordinate Bench as discussed above as well as the directions contained in the order, it is seen that there is no specific direction by the Co-ordinate Bench to re-instate the petitioner. The respondents were directed to issue an appointment order in favour of the petitioner. In deference to this order by order dated 07.03.2018 both the present petitioner and Smti Narbada Chetri were appointed as LDA-cum-Typist in Barbaruah ICDS Project and Udarbond ICDS Project respectively. The said appointment order also indicated the date of joining by the said incumbents. The respondents were directed to issue an appointment order in favour of the petitioner. In deference to this order by order dated 07.03.2018 both the present petitioner and Smti Narbada Chetri were appointed as LDA-cum-Typist in Barbaruah ICDS Project and Udarbond ICDS Project respectively. The said appointment order also indicated the date of joining by the said incumbents. The petitioner had joined on 23.07.2014 and pursuant to his joining, the petitioner has been working in the said post and drawing his pay and other allowances as permissible. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that by the Judgment and Order dated 14.11.2013 passed in W.P.(C) No. 1014/2007, the petitioner’s order of cancellation was interfered with and the Co-ordinate Bench had in effect directed the re-instatement of the writ petitioner. 9. As discussed above, upon careful perusal of the order passed by the Co-ordinate Bench, it is seen that the order passed by the Co-ordinate Bench does not specifically order for re-instatement of the petitioner rather the cancellation order was set aside and the respondents were directed to issue an appointment order in favour of the petitioner for the post of LDA-cum-Typist at Barbaruah ICDS Project, Dibrugarh. This direction was carried out by the respondents and consequent thereto the petitioner has been appointed and is working as LDA-cum-Typist at Barbaruah ICDS Project Dibrugarh. The petitioner did not prefer any appeal or review against the directions contained in the said Judgment and Order dated 14.11.2013. As such a plain reading of the Judgment and Order dated 14.11.2013 passed in W.P.(C) No. 1014/2007 makes it clear that although the writ petition was allowed, the petitioner was directed to be appointed and no specific direction for re-instatement and/or any backwages or service benefits were directed to be released. 10. Under such circumstances, no further interpretation of the directions passed by this Court vide Judgment and Order dated 14.11.2013 passed in W.P.(C) No. 1014/2007 can be called for at this stage by filing a separate writ petition. It was available to the petitioner to file necessary review petition, if so advised. It is well settled that the Judgments and orders of the Court do not call for any interpretation as in the case of any statutory provision. 11. Reference to the Judgment of the Apex Court rendered in Haryana Financial Corpn. It was available to the petitioner to file necessary review petition, if so advised. It is well settled that the Judgments and orders of the Court do not call for any interpretation as in the case of any statutory provision. 11. Reference to the Judgment of the Apex Court rendered in Haryana Financial Corpn. v. Jagdamba Oil Mills, (2002) 3 SCC 496 is very relevant at this stage. The Apex Court in the said Judgment held that Observations of courts are not to be read as Euclid’s theorems nor as provisions of the statute. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear. Judgments of courts are not to be construed as statutes.The relevant paragraph is extracted below: “ 19. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of courts are not to be read as Euclid’s theorems nor as provisions of the statute. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear. Judgments of courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for Judges to embark upon lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes, their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. v. Horton, 1951 AC 737 : (1951) 2 All ER 1 (HL) (at p. 761) Lord MacDermot observed : (All ER p. 14C-D) “The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima verba of Willes, J., as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished Judge.” 12. In the Judgment rendered by the Co-ordinate Bench, the writ petition was allowed directing the respondents to issue appointment order to the writ petitioner. Such specific directions cannot be interpreted to be read as ‘reinstatement’ so as to enable the petitioner to claim back wages. In the Judgment rendered by the Co-ordinate Bench, the writ petition was allowed directing the respondents to issue appointment order to the writ petitioner. Such specific directions cannot be interpreted to be read as ‘reinstatement’ so as to enable the petitioner to claim back wages. Even otherwise, it is no longer res- integra that claim for backwages are not automatic where termination or discharge was held to be illegal or interfered with as have been done in the facts of the present case. 13. In Divisional Controller, Gujarat SRTC Vs. Kadarbhai J. Suthar, (2007) 10 SCC 561, it was held that claim for back wages are not automatic. There are several considerations required to be taken note of before orders for grant of back wages are required to be issued. From the said Judgment, the relevant paragraph is extracted below: 6. When fixing the back wages several factors need to be noted. It is a well-settled position in law that on the finding that termination was not lawful there is no automatic entitlement to full back wages. In Hindustan Tin Works (P) Ltd. v. Employees, (1979) 2 SCC 80 : 1979 SCC (L&S) 53 a three-Judge Bench of this Court laid down : (SCC p. 86, para 11) “11. In the very nature of things there cannot be a straitjacket formula for awarding relief of back wages. All relevant considerations will enter the verdict. More or less, it would be a motion addressed to the discretion of the Tribunal. Full back wages would be the normal rule and the party objecting to it must establish the circumstances necessitating departure. At that stage the Tribunal will exercise its discretion keeping in view all the relevant circumstances. But the discretion must be exercised in a judicial and judicious manner. The reason for exercising discretion must be cogent and convincing and must appear on the face of the record. When it is said that something is to be done within the discretion of the authority, that something is to be done according to the rules of reason and justice, according to law and not humour. The reason for exercising discretion must be cogent and convincing and must appear on the face of the record. When it is said that something is to be done within the discretion of the authority, that something is to be done according to the rules of reason and justice, according to law and not humour. It is not to be arbitrary, vague and fanciful but legal and regular (See Susannah Sharpe v. Wakefield, 1891 AC 173 : (1886-90) All ER Rep 651 : 60 LJMC 73 : 64 LT 180 : 55 JP 197 : 39 WR 561 : 7 TLR 389, AC at p. 179).” 14. Under such circumstances, the claims of the petitioner is that the order of the Co-ordinate bench passed by the Judgment and Order dated 14.11.2013 in WP(C) No 1014/2007 directing the respondents to issue appointment orders to the petitioner cannot be interpreted as a direction for reinstatement of the petitioner. Such contention of the writ petitioner therefore stands rejected. In any view of the matter, even if the petitioner was reinstated, grant of back wages as discussed above, is not automatic. There are several factors which are required to be considered by the Court before passing specific orders for grant of back wages either in part or in full. No such discussions is found in the Judgment and Order dated 14.11.2013 passed in WP(C) No. 1014/2007. If there is any ambiguity in the order, there are sufficient remedies available to the petition to take recourse to, however, such clarification cannot be sought for by filing a subsequent writ petition that too after a period of seven (7) years and which required any interpretation. The prayer made in the present writ petition therefore cannot be accepted. 15. In view of the discussions above, the writ petition therefore being devoid of any merit, the same stands dismissed. No order as to cost. Interim order if any stands vacated. Pending I.As are also dismissed.