Partha Sarthy, J.—Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the respondents. 2. The petitioner has filed the instant writ application for setting aside the order of punishment contained in the letter dated 25.10.2010 issued by the Disciplinary Authority-cum- Chief General Manager, State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur, Main Branch, Jaipur, as also for setting aside the order dated 22.12.2012 passed by the Appellate Authority-cum-Managing Director, SBBJ, Jaipur, whereby the appeal preferred by the petitioner was dismissed. 3. The case of the petitioner, in brief, is that he was posted as Clerk-cum-Cashier from April 1994 to 23.07.2001 in the RBlock Branch, Patna of the State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Bank’). An FIR was lodged being Sachivalay P.S. Case No. 101 of 2008 by the Branch Manager against the account holder of Account No. 01190020210 ie Apoorva Mukherjee, and the then Branch Manager when the account was opened. 4. As per allegations in the FIR one Ranjana Mishra had approached the Branch with a Special Term Deposit receipt having a maturity value of Rs. 50,309/-, requesting for payment of the maturity amount through the newly opened account. On verification of the records, it transpired that the amount had been debited on 22.5.2001 and credited to the savings bank account opened by Apoorva Mukherjee. On further inquiry it was found that amounts from different inoperative accounts and deposits had been transferred to this account of Apoorva Mukherjee and a total sum of Rs. 3,09,000/- was withdrawn in cash. 5. The Vigilance Cell of the Bank, upon investigation, found that while the petitioner was posted as Clerk in the R-Block Branch of the Bank, three cheques had been presented by Apoorva Mukherjee before him on 11.06.2001 and 14.06.2001. On the basis of the investigation conducted by the Vigilance Cell of the Bank, a departmental proceeding was initiated against the petitioner wherein a memo of charge was issued on 21.1.2010 to which the petitioner replied. 6. The Inquiry Officer submitted his report on 23.6.2010 finding all the three charges to have been proved against the petitioner. A copy of the inquiry report was provided to the petitioner to which he filed his reply. 7. 6. The Inquiry Officer submitted his report on 23.6.2010 finding all the three charges to have been proved against the petitioner. A copy of the inquiry report was provided to the petitioner to which he filed his reply. 7. Having gone through the inquiry report, the petitioner’s reply as also the other materials in the departmental proceeding, by order dated 25.10.2010, the Disciplinary Authority-cum-Chief General Manager imposed the penalty of reduction of basic pay by three stages with cumulative effect on the petitioner. The basic pay of the petitioner was fixed at Rs. 21,700/ as on 1.10.2010, Rs. 22,500/ w.e.f. 1.10.2011, Rs. 23,300/ w.e.f. 1.10.2012 and the basic pay of Rs. 24,100/ w.e.f. 1.10.2013. It was further ordered that the petitioner will not be eligible for promotion during the said period. The petitioner preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority/Managing Director which was rejected on 22.2.2012. It is against this order of punishment and the order rejecting the appeal preferred by the petitioner that the instant application has been preferred. 8. It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the penalty imposed on the petitioner is disproportionate to that imposed on the other six staff members. So far as the others are concerned Smt. Sumitra Mandal, Branch Manager, Sri S.K. Singh, the Accountant and Smt. Leena Singh, the Assistant Manager were all penalized only with the penalty of ‘censure’. Further Dilip Kumar and Ashok, Clerks of the bank, were given ‘warning’ and Smt. Ranjana Kumari, the Clerk, were given the penalty of reduction of three increments. Learned counsel submitted that the role performed by the petitioner was more or less similar to the other six staff members. However, imposition of the penalty on the petitioner, as stated above was disproportionate, discriminatory and fit to be set aside. 9. The application is opposed by learned counsel appearing for the Bank. It was submitted that at the relevant time the petitioner was posted as Clerk-cum-Cashier in the R-Block Branch of the Bank. In the fraudulent transaction he verified the cheques before debiting the account of Apoorva Mukherjee. The said account had recently been opened on 18.5.2001 and not following the books of instructions and the Bank's guidelines, the cheques were debited in the new account by the petitioner on 11.6.2001 and 14.6.2001. In the fraudulent transaction he verified the cheques before debiting the account of Apoorva Mukherjee. The said account had recently been opened on 18.5.2001 and not following the books of instructions and the Bank's guidelines, the cheques were debited in the new account by the petitioner on 11.6.2001 and 14.6.2001. It was further submitted that it is for this reason that the petitioner offered to make good the financial loss, by his letter, brought on record as Annexure-A to the counter affidavit. 10. It is further submitted by learned counsel for the Bank that so far as the allegations levelled against the petitioner are concerned, the same were different from the six other staff members as mentioned in paragraph no. 18 of the writ application. The designation, work done and the role played in the transaction are distinct and different. On presentation the petitioner debited the three cheques causing loss to the bank and which amount was subsequently deposited by the petitioner to make good the loss. It is finally submitted that the counter affidavit gives the details of the roles played by the other six staff members distinguishing them from the role played by the petitioner. For these reasons, there is no merit in the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the order of punishment in the petitioner's case is disproportionate to that of the six other staff members. It is submitted that there is no merit in the writ application and the same be dismissed. 11. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record. 12. The relevant facts in brief are that the petitioner was posted as Clerk-cum-Cashier in the R-Block Branch at Patna of the Bank in April 1994 to 23.7.2001. As a result of defalcation of the amounts from different inoperative accounts including special terms deposit accounts etc. to an account opened in the name of Apoorva Mukherjee, an FIR came to be registered being Sachivalya P.S. Case no.101 of 2008 against the account holder Apoorva Mukherjee as also the branch manager of the year 2001 when the said account was opened. 13. to an account opened in the name of Apoorva Mukherjee, an FIR came to be registered being Sachivalya P.S. Case no.101 of 2008 against the account holder Apoorva Mukherjee as also the branch manager of the year 2001 when the said account was opened. 13. In course of investigation, it transpired that while the account in the name of Apoorva Mukherjee was opened on 18.5.2001, three cheques drawn on the said account was presented to the petitioner on 11.6.2001 and 14.6.2001 for debit which the petitioner cleared disobeying the directions contained in paragraph nos. 14 and 15 of Chapter 3 of the Bank's Instructions and the Bank's Guidelines issued from time to time. These facts lead to initiation of a departmental proceeding against the petitioner and others under Regulations 68(2)(i) of the State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur (Officers') Service Regulations, 1979, wherein the Chief Manager, Zonal Office Delhi, was appointed the Inquiry Authority. He was to conduct an inquiry and to submit his report to the disciplinary authority, i.e. the Chief General Manager, Jaipur. 14. The petitioner was served with the Memorandum of Charges on 2.1.2008 to which he filed his reply. The articles of charges are reproduced herein below for ready reference. “ARTICLE OF CHARGE.I: A Savings Bank account No.01190020210 was opened in the name of Shri Apoorva Mukharjee and a cheque book was issued in the account without getting it entered in the cheque book register. A sum of Rs.3,09,000/- was fraudulently withdrawn through cheques by presenting them for payment in cash on the counter by a third party. Shri Nageshwar Choudhary did not scrutinize the cheques with due diligence when presented on the counter by third party in the newly opened account of Shri Apoorva Mukharjee even though the cheques were for large amounts (Cheque for Rs.1,01,000/- was posted by him on 11.06.2001 and for Rs.55,000/- and Rs.51,000/- posted on 14.06.2001). ARTICLE OF CHARGE II: Shri Nageshwar Choudhary offered to make good the financial loss occurred due to fraudulent entries made in the S.B. Account No.01190020210 of Shri Apoorva Mukharjee. For this purpose, he sent an authority letter on 12.06.2008 by Fax from Muzaffarpur Branch to 'R' Block branch, Patna addressed to Shri Y.D. Sharma, Investigating Officer. It is alleged that Shri Nageshwar Choudhary unauthorisedly debited the amount of cheques mentioned in Article No.I above and misappropriated the same. For this purpose, he sent an authority letter on 12.06.2008 by Fax from Muzaffarpur Branch to 'R' Block branch, Patna addressed to Shri Y.D. Sharma, Investigating Officer. It is alleged that Shri Nageshwar Choudhary unauthorisedly debited the amount of cheques mentioned in Article No.I above and misappropriated the same. ARTICLE OF CHARGE III: Shri Nageshwar Choudhary by his aforesaid acts of omission and commission has misused his official position, violated prescribed instructions, displayed gross negligence, showed lack of due care, devotion and diligence in discharge of his duties and failed to protect Bank's interest thereby causing a loss of Rs.2,07,000/- to the Bank which.constitute an act of gross misconduct in terms of Para 5(J) of Memorandum of Settlement on Disciplinary Action procedure for the workmen staff dated 10.04.2002 circulated vide Head Office Circular No.PER/40/2002-2003 dated 14.08.2002.” 15. The Inquiry Officer submitted his report dated 23.6.2010 finding all the charges against the petitioner to have been proved. 16. Perusal of the inquiry report would show that the Inquiry Officer, in coming to his conclusion in the inquiry report took into consideration the statement of the petitioner accepting the fact that he had debited the account and cleared the cheques. It was the duty of the petitioner to scrutinize the same. The petitioner agreed to make good the financial loss which had occurred due to fraudulent transactions made in the savings bank account of Apoorva Mukherjee. He communicated his said undertaking by writing a letter dated 12.6.2008 addressed to the Investigating Officer. Large number of documents to prove the charges were exhibited and proved by the bank authorities before the Inquiry Officer. 17. The petitioner was served with a copy of the inquiry report with an opportunity to file his reply/comments. The petitioner filed his reply. Having considered the contents of the inquiry report together with the petitioner's reply, the Disciplinary Authority/ Chief General Manager was pleased to pass the order of punishment dated 25.10.2010 imposing the penalty of “reduction of pay scale by three stages with cumulative effect” in terms of the SBBJ (Officers’) Service Regulations, 1979. The appeal preferred by the petitioner was rejected and the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority upheld by order dated 22.2.2012 passed by the Appellant Authority/Managing Director. 18. The appeal preferred by the petitioner was rejected and the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority upheld by order dated 22.2.2012 passed by the Appellant Authority/Managing Director. 18. So far as the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that inspite of the charges having been proved against the other six staff members, they were not penalized in the manner that the petitioner was penalized, it may be stated here that the respondents have replied to the said contention in paragraph nos. 8 to12 of their counter affidavit giving the roles of the six other staff members and contending that the responsibilities assigned to the petitioner and the lapse in carrying out his duties were much more compared to others. The same had lead to direct loss being suffered by the Bank and the petitioner realizing the same had by his letter dated 12.6.2008 offered to make good the financial loss suffered by the Bank. 19. At this stage, it would be relevant to refer to the judgment relied on by the learned counsel for the respondents- Bank in the case of Administrator, Union Territory of Dadra & Nagar Haveli vs. Gulabhia M. Lad: (2010) 5 SCC 775 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has dealt with the scope of judicial review in disciplinary matters and referred to a number of precedents therein. Relevant paragraphs of the judgment are reproduced herein below for ready reference:— “9. The scope of judicial review in disciplinary matters has come up for consideration before this Court time and again. It is worthwhile to refer to some of these decisions. In B.C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India this Court held: (SCC p. 762, para 18) "18. A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/ appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof." 10. In DG, RPF vs. Sai Babu, this Court stated the legal position thus: (SCC p. 334, para 6) "6. ... Normally, the punishment imposed by a disciplinary authority should not be disturbed by the High Court or a tribunal except in appropriate cases that too only after reaching a conclusion that the punishment imposed is grossly or shockingly disproportionate, after examining all the relevant factors including the nature of charges proved against, the past conduct, penalty imposed earlier, the nature of duties assigned having due regard to their sensitiveness, exactness expected of and discipline required to be maintained, and the department/establishment in which the delinquent person concerned works." 11. In United Commercial Bank vs. P.C. Kakkar, this Court on review of a long line of cases and the principles of judicial review of administrative action under English law summarised the legal position in the following words: (SCC p. 376, paras 11-13) "11. The common thread running through in all these decisions is that the court should not interfere with the administrator's decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards. In view of what has been stated in Wednesbury case the court would not go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator open to him and the court should not substitute its decision to that of the administrator. The scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision-making process and not the decision. 12. To put it differently, unless the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the court/tribunal, there is no scope for interference. The scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision-making process and not the decision. 12. To put it differently, unless the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the court/tribunal, there is no scope for interference. Further, to shorten litigation it may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment by recording cogent reasons in support thereof. In the normal course if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate it would be appropriate to direct the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed. 13. In the case at hand the High Court did not record any reason as to how and why it found the punishment shockingly disproportionate. Even there is no discussion on this aspect. The only discernible reason was the punishment awarded in M.L. Keshwani case. As was observed by this Court in Balbir Chand vs. Food Corporation of India Ltd. even if a co-delinquent is given lesser punishment it cannot be a ground for interference. Even such a plea was not available to be given credence as the allegations were contextually different." 12. In Union of India vs. S.S. Ahluwalias, this Court reiterated the legal position as follows: (SCC p. 261, para 8) "8. ... The scope of judicial review in the matter of imposition of penalty as a result of disciplinary proceedings is very limited. The court can interfere with the punishment only if it finds the same to be shockingly disproportionate to the charges found to be proved." 13. In State of Meghalaya vs. Mecken Singh N. Marak this Court stated: (SCC p. 584, para 14) "14. In the matter of imposition of sentence, the scope for interference is very limited and restricted to exceptional cases. The jurisdiction of the High Court, to interfere with the quantum of punishment is limited and cannot be exercised without sufficient reasons. The High Court, although has jurisdiction in appropriate case, to consider the question in regard to the quantum of punishment, but it has a limited role to play. It is now well settled that the High Courts, in exercise of powers under Article 226, do not interfere with the quantum of punishment unless there exist sufficient reasons therefor. The punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority unless shocking to the conscience of the court, cannot be subjected to judicial review. It is now well settled that the High Courts, in exercise of powers under Article 226, do not interfere with the quantum of punishment unless there exist sufficient reasons therefor. The punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority unless shocking to the conscience of the court, cannot be subjected to judicial review. In the impugned order of the High Court no reasons whatsoever have been indicated as to why the punishment was considered disproportionate. Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. The mere statement that it is disproportionate would not suffice." (Emphasis supplied) 20. With respect to the exercise of discretion in imposition of punishment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held in the aforesaid case of Administrator, Union Territory of Dadra & Nagar Haveli vs. Gulabhia M. Lad (supra) that imposition of punishment is dependent on a host of factors including the nature of duties assigned, the gravity of misconduct, the responsibility of the accused, the position that the delinquent holds etc. Relevant paragraph numbers 14 and 15 of the judgments are quoted herein below for ready reference:— “14. The legal position is fairly well settled that while exercising the power of judicial review, the High Court or a Tribunal cannot interfere with the discretion exercised by the disciplinary authority, and/or on appeal the appellate authority with regard to the imposition of punishment unless such discretion suffers from illegality or material procedural irregularity or that would shock the conscience of the court/tribunal. The exercise of discretion in imposition of punishment by the disciplinary authority or appellate authority is dependent on host of factors such as gravity of misconduct, past conduct, the nature of duties assigned to the delinquent, responsibility of the position that the delinquent holds, previous penalty, if any, and the discipline required to be maintained in the department or establishment he works. Ordinarily the court or a tribunal would not substitute its opinion on reappraisal of facts. 15. In a matter of imposition of punishment where joint disciplinary enquiry is held against more than one delinquent, the same or similarity of charges is not decisive but many factors as noticed above may be vital in decision making. A single distinguishing feature in the nature of duties or degree of responsibility may make a difference insofar as award of punishment is concerned. A single distinguishing feature in the nature of duties or degree of responsibility may make a difference insofar as award of punishment is concerned. To avoid multiplicity of proceedings and overlapping adducing of evidence, a joint enquiry may be conducted against all the delinquent officers but imposition of different punishment on proved charges may not be impermissible if the responsibilities and duties of the codelinquents differ or where distinguishing features exist. In such a case, there would not be any question of selective or invidious discrimination.” (Emphasis Supplied) 21. So far as the facts of the instant case are concerned, the Court finds that there is no procedural illegality or irregularity in the conduct of the proceedings against the petitioner. 22. With respect to the allegation of discrimination on the punishment imposed on the petitioner compared to the six other employees, details of whom has been given by the petitioner in the writ application, the respondents have explained the conduct, the duties assigned and the role played by the other employees. They have also explained that so far as this petitioner is concerned, it was he who cleared the three cheques, causing loss to the tune of Rs 3,09,000/ to the bank and as per his communication in writing the petitioner was also agreeable to make good the financial loss suffered by the bank. 23. In the opinion of the Court, the petitioner has not made out any case for interference in the order of punishment impugned in the instant writ application. The Court finds no merit in the case of the petitioner. 24. The application is dismissed.