JUDGMENT : (per M.S. Sonak, J.) 1. Heard Mr Sabban for the petitioners, Mr Chavan for respondents 2 and 3 and Mr Deolekar learned AGP for the respondent-State. 2. Rule. The Rule is made returnable immediately at the request of and with the consent of learned counsel for the parties. 3. Mr Sabban points out that the first petitioner has expired, and the second petitioner is the brother of the first petitioner. The third petitioner is the wife of the first petitioner’s deceased brother. Mr Sabban craves leave to delete the first petitioner from the cause title. 4. Accordingly, leave is granted. A necessary amendment is to be carried out in the cause title forthwith. Reverification is dispensed with. 5. The petitioners were the owners of the property admeasuring H.09=35=06 Ares surveyed under No.505/A, Village - Bedisgaon, Taluka- Shahapur, District – Thane (said property). In 1976-77, the respondents took possession of the petitioners’ property and constructed a minor percolation tank despite opposition from the petitioners. By communications dated 10 May 2011, 04 June 2011, 19 July 2011 and 14 July 2011, which have been placed on record by the petitioners, respondents 2 and 3 informed the petitioners that land acquisition proceedings would be initiated following law and compensation would be paid to the petitioners. The communication dated 10 May 2011 and 14 November 2011, addressed by the Deputy Engineer, confirmed that the petitioners’ land was not acquired, though possession was taken over. 6. The petitioners were pursuing the matter of the acquisition, but since the second and third respondents were taking no steps for acquisition and payment of compensation, this petition was instituted seeking the following substantive relief:- “(a) This Hon’ble High Court may be pleased to issue a Writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate Writ, direction or order directing the respondent authorities to inspect & verify the Petitioners land area submerged in the Bedisgaon Percolation Tank Project, about 6 Acres of the Petitioners lands situated at Survey No. 505/A, at Bedisgaon, Taluka - Shahapur, District - Thane, and to acquire the land in accordance with law, the possession of which is already taken in 1976-77.” 7. Mr Asif Abbas Sayyed, Sub-Divisional Water Conservator Officer, has filed an affidavit on behalf of the second respondent. In the affidavit, the main grounds urged are delay and laches. Mr Asif Abbas Sayyed, Sub-Divisional Water Conservator Officer, has filed an affidavit on behalf of the second respondent. In the affidavit, the main grounds urged are delay and laches. There is no denying that the petitioners’ land was taken over for the construction of Bedisgaon Percolation Tank project, and the petitioners’ land had already been submerged. The respondents have contended that according to the prevailing policy, the villagers used to spontaneously give their land free of charge for public works undertaken under the employment guaranteed scheme. The reliance is placed on the Government Resolution (G.R.) dated 26 October 2010, which states that if there is no demand for compensation for considerable time, there is room to assume that the landowners have waived their right to receive compensation. Reliance is also placed on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of the State of Maharashtra Vs. Digambar , (1995) 4 Supreme Court Cases 683 8. Mr Sabban, learned counsel for the petitioners, relied on the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Tukaram Kanha Joshi vs. M.I.D.C. , AIR 2013 SC 565 and Sukh Dutt Ratra Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2022 4 SCC 427 and the decisions of the division bench of this Court in the case of Rajeev Kumar Damodarprasad Bhadani and Ors. Vs. The Executive Engineer, MSEDCL and Ors. , 2024 0 Supreme(Bom) 31 and Vasant B Wale Vs. Vithal M Deshkumh, 2006 (1) Bom.C.R. 669 to submit that in such matters, the rights of land owners whose property has been deprived without following the due process of law cannot be defeated on the grounds of delay and laches. 9. Mr Sabban submitted that there was no delay and laches involved in the facts of this case. He submitted that in theprecedents cited, directions were issued for initiating acquisition proceedings and payment of compensation. 10. On instructions, Mr Sabban stated that the petitioners would not claim any interest from 1975-76, when possession of their property was taken over. He submitted that the petitioners would also withdraw RCS No. 600029 of 2012 (Pandurang Dunda Vishe vs. The State of Maharashtra) filed in the Court of Civil Judge Senior Division at Kalyan. 11. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that this petition was instituted after considerable delay and laches. They submitted that there is no explanation for such delay and laches. 11. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that this petition was instituted after considerable delay and laches. They submitted that there is no explanation for such delay and laches. They submitted that in terms of G.R., where the compensation is not claimed for considerable time, a presumption should be drawn that the landowners have waived their right to compensation. They heavily relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Digambar (supra). 12. Learned counsel for the respondents pointed out that the petitioners instituted RCS No.600029 of 2012 in the Civil Court and obtained an injunction restraining the respondents from repairing the Percolation Tank. They submitted that such a suit and injunction granted therein was wholly misconceived and would even pose a danger to the public interest. Accordingly, they submitted that this petition should be dismissed. 13. The rival contentions now fall for our consideration. 14. At first, we felt that this petition should not be entertained on account of delay and laches. However, we have considered the precedents in Tukaram Kanha Joshi (supra), Sukh Dutt Ratra (supra), and the decision of the co-ordinate bench of this Court in Rajeev Bhadani (supra). In these cases, petitions were instituted after decades of the petitioner’s lands being acquired without due process. Still the Courts held that the petitions could not be dismissed on such grounds. 15. Sukh Dutt Ratra (supra) and Rajeev Bhadani (supra), after considering the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Digambar (supra) have held that the rights of landowners whose property has been acquired by the State without following the due process of law should not ordinarily be defeated on the ground of delay and laches. These decisions, together with the decision in Tukaram Kana Joshi (supra), hold that the property right may not be a fundamental right. Still, it is a Constitutional right under Article 300A, apart from being a human right under the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1994. 16. In Tukaram Kana Joshi (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the property right is now considered to be not only a Constitutional or statutory right but also a human right. Though it is not a basic feature of the Constitution or a fundamental right, human rights are in the realm of individual rights, such as the right to health, right to livelihood, right to shelter, employment, etc. Though it is not a basic feature of the Constitution or a fundamental right, human rights are in the realm of individual rights, such as the right to health, right to livelihood, right to shelter, employment, etc. Now, human rights are gaining an even greater multi-faceted dimension. The property right is considered very much to be a part of such a new dimension. 17. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further held that delay and laches are one of the facets to deny the exercise of discretion. It is not an absolute impediment. There can be mitigating factors, continuity of cause action, etc. If the whole thing shocks the judicial conscience, the Court should exercise discretion. More so when no third-party interests are involved. The Court noted that no limitation period is prescribed for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226. Therefore, in a case where the demand for justice is compelling, the High Court should exercise its discretion and entertain a petition despite delay. The Court held that where substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have a vested right in the injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 18. Tukaram Kana Joshi (supra) was a case similar to the present one. In it, an illiterate person was deprived of property without following due process of law. This person was denied compensation for decades, though he persistently pursued his case. The Court held that such an act of the State amounts to enriching the State at the cost of poor farmers. The Court noted that a welfare State is bound to pay compensation, and a rejection of a petition for compensation on the ground of delay was improper. 19. In Sukh Dutt Ratra, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that on the grounds of mere delay and laches, the State cannot evade its legal responsibility towards those from whom private property has been expropriated. The Court held that the State should not shield itself behind the ground of delay and laches in such a situation. There cannot be a limitation to doing justice. The Court also held that in the absence of written consent to voluntarily giving up their land, the landowners could not be deprived of compensation in terms of the law. The Court held that the State should not shield itself behind the ground of delay and laches in such a situation. There cannot be a limitation to doing justice. The Court also held that in the absence of written consent to voluntarily giving up their land, the landowners could not be deprived of compensation in terms of the law. The petition was accordingly allowed with costs. 20. The coordinate bench of this Court in Rajeev Bhadani (supra) considered the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Digambar (supra), Tukaram Kanha Joshi (supra) and Sukh Dutt Ratra (supra). It noted that all these decisions involved a gap of a decade between the acquisition or unauthorised taking over of possession and the filing of Writ Petition decades later. The Court held that the State cannot, on the grounds of delay and laches, evade its responsibility towards those from whom the private party has been expropriated. The Court held that the principles of equity must inform how the Court deals with the defence of delay and laches. The Court noted that MSEDCL has benefitted from the petitioner’s property, and there was nothing on record to show that the petitioner had conducted themselves in such a way as to indicate an intention not to claim any compensation. 21. In the present case, the petitioners protested the taking over of their property, followed by written representation seeking compensation. As if this were insufficient, the record shows that respondents 2 and 3 wrote to the petitioners, assuring them of the initiation of acquisition proceedings. This communication accepts that the petitioners’ property was taken over and used for a public purpose. No assertion is made anywhere that the petitioners were paid compensation. 22. After considering all these factors, the petitioners' rights should not be defeated by delay and laches. The facts in the present case are not quite comparable to those in Digambar (supra). Instead, they are closer to those in Tukaram Kana Joshi (supra), Sukh Dutt Ratra (supra), and Rajeev Bhadani (supra). 23. The reliance on the G.R. is also entirely misplaced. By such GRs, neither can the State nor its instrumentalities dilute Constitutional guarantees of Article 300A nor deprive the land owners of the compensation where the land owners property is taken over without following the due process of law. 23. The reliance on the G.R. is also entirely misplaced. By such GRs, neither can the State nor its instrumentalities dilute Constitutional guarantees of Article 300A nor deprive the land owners of the compensation where the land owners property is taken over without following the due process of law. A general G.R. raising presumptions that the landowners have waived their right to receive compensation for their property if such demand was not raised for considerable time will not pass the Constitutional muster. Constitutional rights cannot be restricted by issuing such G.Rs. In Sukh Dutt Ratra (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that in the absence of written consent to give up their land voluntarily, the landowners were entitled to compensation in terms of the law. The decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court cannot be defeated by issuing G.Rs. to the effect that a presumption should be drawn about the landowners waiving their rights to receive compensation if the demand for compensation is not made within a reasonable time. The G.R. also does not refer to what should be such a reasonable time. 24. In any event, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that delay and laches cannot be the sole grounds for denying landowners whose lands have been acquired without following due process of law- compensation relief. In this case, we do not propose to ignore the delay involved. There is, however, a distinction between mere delay and laches. Laches is not mere physical running of time. To establish laches, the opposite party/State has to plead and establish some parallel rights being created and make out a case in which it would be inequitable to displace such parallel rights at this point. In this case, the petitioners do not seek any dismantling of the Percolation Tank and restoration of their lands. The petitioners only seek compensation with respect to their lands, which were taken over without following the due process of law. The petitioners have also agreed to waive interest from 1975 to date. 25. In any event, on account of the delay, the petitioners could be deprived of interest for the delayed period. Mr Subban has already stated that the petitioners will not claim any interest on the compensation amount from the date their property was taken over till today. The petitioners have also agreed to waive interest from 1975 to date. 25. In any event, on account of the delay, the petitioners could be deprived of interest for the delayed period. Mr Subban has already stated that the petitioners will not claim any interest on the compensation amount from the date their property was taken over till today. An affidavit has also been filed by Mr Namdev Kashinath Vishe, who is the power of attorney holder of the petitioners to the effect that no interest will be claimed. A power of attorney dated 05 May 2012 has been produced for our perusal. In any event, apart from the affidavit, we record Mr Sabban’s statement, which is made based on instructions from the petitioners that no interest would be claimed from the date of the possession till today on the compensation that might be awarded to the petitioners. 26. Regarding the contention based on RCS No. 600029 of 2012 instituted by the petitioners, Mr Sabban, on instructions, has stated that this suit will be withdrawn immediately. An affidavit/undertaking regarding the withdrawal of the civil suit has been filed today in this court. The undertaking refers to the suit filed in the City Civil Court at Kalyan. However, there is no City Civil Court in Kalyan. Therefore, Mr Sabban clarifies that the reference to “City Civil Court” should be construed as reference to the Court of Civil Judge Senior Division at Kalyan. 27. The undertaking filed on behalf of the petitioners on 17 January 2025 is taken on record and accepted as an undertaking to this Court. The undertaking regarding withdrawal of the suit is accepted and based on this undertaking and at the request of Mr Sabban, RCS No. 600029 of 2012 is allowed to be withdrawn and is disposed of as withdrawn. The interim order made in the said suit will no longer survive, and the same stands vacated. This judgment/order should be produced before the concerned learned Civil Judge Senior Division so that the suit can be marked off as disposed. 28. At this stage, we note that the petitioners should not have been advised to file suit of this nature. The suit, no doubt, shows that the petitioners, under mistaken legal advice, were taking steps regarding their lands taken over without due process. 28. At this stage, we note that the petitioners should not have been advised to file suit of this nature. The suit, no doubt, shows that the petitioners, under mistaken legal advice, were taking steps regarding their lands taken over without due process. However, the civil courts should not grant an injunction restraining the state and its instrumentalities in repairing the Percolation Tanks and Bandharas. Such restraint orders are not in the public interest because serious consequences can ensue if no repairs are carried out to such projects. Be that as it may, the petitioners have now withdrawn the suit based on correct legal advice, and consequently, the injunction can no longer operate. 29. The respondents are directed to initiate and complete land acquisition proceedings within one year of today regarding the petitioners’ property, which is the subject of this petition. The compensation amount must be paid to the Petitioners and legal representatives of Pandurang Dunda Vishe within this period. The concerned undersecretaries of the Government departments would be personally responsible for compliance. The Petitioners, who have now waived their right to receive interest as above, must not be forced to wait even longer or institute contempt petitions. 30. Learned AGP submits that there would be confusion as to whether the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, or the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, would apply to acquisition proceedings. The old Act already stands repealed. Therefore, it is evident that the acquisition will have to be under the new Act. In the peculiar facts of the present case, we see no option than to take this view. 31. The Rule is made absolute in the above terms without any cost order. 32. All concerned to act on the authenticated copy of this order/judgment.