JUDGMENT : MANISH CHOUDHURY, J. 1. The instant criminal appeal from Jail under Section 383, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [‘CrPC’ or ‘the Code’, for short] is preferred against a Judgment and Order dated 21.12.2020 passed by the Court of learned Sessions Judge, Karbi Anglong at Diphu in Sessions Case no. 41/1998. By the Judgment and Order dated 21.12.2020, the accused-appellant has been convicted for the offence of murder under Section 302, Indian Penal Code [IPC] and he has been sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/-, in default of payment of fine, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year. It has been ordered that the period of detention already undergone by the accused-appellant shall be set-off under Section 428, CrPC. 2. The First Information Report [FIR] was lodged before the Officer In-Charge, Diphu Police Station on 17.09.1994 by one Pramod Lele as the informant stating about an incident which occurred at around 08-30 p.m. on 16.09.1994. In the FIR, the informant had inter-alia alleged that at around 08-30 p.m. on 16.09.1994, one Khagen Daimari, a cook in Geeta Ashram, was assaulted on head from behind by someone and Khagen Daimari was admitted to Diphu Civil Hospital. The FIR further mentioned that there was severe bleeding throughout the night. It further mentioned that Khagen Daimari was coming from a nearby village to Geeta Ashram and he was assaulted at a place just outside the boundary of the Ashram. 3. On receipt of the FIR, the Officer In-Charge, Diphu Police Station registered the same as Diphu Police Station Case no. 190/1994 for the offence under Section 325, IPC and thereafter, entrusted the investigation to one Md. Badrul Islam, an Officer attached to Diphu Police Station at that time. 4. The Investigating Officer [I.O.], Md. Badrul Islam [P.W.5] on being entrusted with the investigation, proceeded to Diphu Civil Hospital, at first, to question the injured, Khagen Daimari. But, he could not record the statement of the injured as he was in an unconscious state. Thereafter, he proceeded to the place of occurrence for inspection and interrogation of the witnesses. It has emerged from the testimony of the I.O., P.W.5 that on interrogating the witnesses, he learnt that the accused-appellant [hereinafter also referred to as ‘the appellant’, at places, for short] had committed the incident. Thereafter, he proceeded to the place of occurrence for inspection and interrogation of the witnesses. It has emerged from the testimony of the I.O., P.W.5 that on interrogating the witnesses, he learnt that the accused-appellant [hereinafter also referred to as ‘the appellant’, at places, for short] had committed the incident. Then, he went to the appellant’s house situated nearby and seized a wooden ural mari [wooden rice stamper] from his house by a Seizure List [Ext.-1]. The I.O. then apprehended the appellant and took him to the Police Station where he was interrogated. 5. Information was received in the meantime that the injured died at Diphu Civil Hospital on 18.09.1994. The I.O. then proceeded to Diphu Civil Hospital and held inquest on the deadbody of the deceased at Diphu Civil Hospital itself through the Sub-Divisional Health Officer, Diphu Civil Hospital. The Sub-Divisional Health Officer, Diphu Civil Hospital prepared an Inquest Report, Ext.-3 which was exhibited by the I.O. during his testimony before the Court with his signature therein. 6. On 18.09.1994, the I.O. also made a prayer before the jurisdictional Court to add Section 302, IPC in Diphu Police Station Case no. 190/1994 [corresponding G.R. Case no. 479/1994]. When the appellant was forwarded to the Court after his arrest on 18.09.1994 with prayers to remand him to judicial custody and to record his statement under Section 164, CrPC, the jurisdictional Court on 18.09.1994 remanded the appellant to judicial custody. When the appellant was produced from judicial custody on 19.09.1994, the then Additional District Magistrate endorsed the matter to Mr. G. Bothra, Magistrate to record the confessional statement of the appellant. On receipt of the case records of G.R. Case no. 479/1994, the Magistrate recorded the confessional statement of the appellant on 19.09.1994 itself and thereafter, sent the case records to the trying Magistrate by an Order dated 19.09.1994. 7. The I.O. after collecting the confessional statement recorded under Section 164, CrPC and the Post-Mortem Examination [PME] Report; and completing investigation into the case, Diphu Police Station Case no. 190/1994; submitted a charge-sheet under Section 173[2], CrPC vide Charge-Sheet no. 74/1994 [Ext.-4] on 30.11.1994 finding sufficient incriminating materials against the appellant for commission of the offence under Section 302, IPC. 8. On submission of the Charge-Sheet in connection with Diphu Police Station Case no. 190/1994 [corresponding G.R. Case no. 190/1994; submitted a charge-sheet under Section 173[2], CrPC vide Charge-Sheet no. 74/1994 [Ext.-4] on 30.11.1994 finding sufficient incriminating materials against the appellant for commission of the offence under Section 302, IPC. 8. On submission of the Charge-Sheet in connection with Diphu Police Station Case no. 190/1994 [corresponding G.R. Case no. 479/1994], the case records were forwarded to the Court of Sessions by an Order of Commitment dated 18.09.1994 as the offence under Section 302, IPC is exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor was accordingly notified. The appellant was directed to appear before the Court of Sessions on 20.10.1994. 9. On receipt of the case records of G.R. Case no. 479/1994, the case was registered as Sessions Case no. 41/1998. On appearance of the appellant before the Court of learned Additional District Magistrate, Diphu, a charge under Section 302, IPC was framed against the appellant on 31.05.2002 after hearing the learned counsel for the parties; and upon perusal of the materials on record. When the charge was read over and explained to the appellant, he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. The charge against the appellant was to the effect that at around 08-30 p.m. on 16.09.1994, he intentionally caused the murder of Khagen Daimari, a cook in Geeta Ashram, with a wooden ural mari [wooden rice stamper] at a place near Geeta Ashram. 10. During the course of the trial, the prosecution side examined six nos. of witnesses and seven nos. of documentary evidence, in addition to a material exhibit, a wooden ural mari [wooden rice stamper] as Mat. Ext.-1. After closure of evidence from the prosecution side, the appellant was examined under Section 313[1][b], CrPC. In his reply, the appellant claimed the case to be a false one. When the appellant was asked whether he would adduce any evidence in his support, he declined to adduce any defence evidence. Therafter, the learned Trial Court after hearing the learned counsel for the parties; and upon evaluation of the evidence/materials on record; proceeded to deliver the afore-mentioned Judgment and Order of conviction and sentence against the appellant. Hence, the present criminal appeal. 11. We have heard Mr. B. Prasad, learned Amicus Curiae for the appellant and Mr. R.R. Kaushik, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the respondent State. 12. Mr. Hence, the present criminal appeal. 11. We have heard Mr. B. Prasad, learned Amicus Curiae for the appellant and Mr. R.R. Kaushik, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the respondent State. 12. Mr. Prasad, learned Amicus Curiae appearing for the appellant has submitted that the case of the prosecution is based on circumstantial evidence as there was no eye-witness to the alleged incident of assault on Khagen Daimari on 16.09.1994. He has submitted that the prosecution has mainly relied on the confessional statement of the appellant recorded under Section 164, CrPC [Ext.-6] and the extra-judicial confessions allegedly made by the appellant before three of the prosecution witnesses. The prosecution side has also relied on the recovery of a wooden ural mari [rice stamper] to project the same as the weapon of assault. It is his contention that the confessional statement [Ext.-6] cannot be admitted into evidence in view of infraction of the statutory prescriptions contained in Section 164, CrPC read with Section 281, CrPC. Further, the alleged extra-judicial confessions attributed to the appellant cannot be acted upon as the testimony of the witnesses who deposed about such extra-judicial confessions do not inspire any confidence to regard their testimony as trustworthy ones. The manner of recovery of the wooden ural mari [wooden rice stamper] was also doubtful. He has contended that none of the events has not been established by the prosecution by cogent and reliable evidence resulting in several missing links in the chain of circumstances. He has, thus, contended that the Judgment and Order of conviction and sentence is unsustainable in law and is liable to be set aside. 13. Au contraire, Mr. Kaushik, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent State has submitted that the Magistrate who recorded confessional statement of the appellant deposed before the Court as P.W.6 and from his testimony as well as from the confessional statement, Ext.-6, it would clearly emerge that there was no procedural violation in recording the confessional statement of the appellant and as such, the same can be acted upon. There was recovery of a wooden ural mari [wooden rice stamper] from the house of the appellant and the medical evidence was consistent with the said wooden ural mari [wooden rice stamper] as a weapon of assault. There was recovery of a wooden ural mari [wooden rice stamper] from the house of the appellant and the medical evidence was consistent with the said wooden ural mari [wooden rice stamper] as a weapon of assault. There is no ground to disbelieve the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, who deposed about the making of extra-judicial confessions before them by the appellant. He has contended that as the prosecution side has been able to bring home the charge against the appellant and there is no missing link in the chain of circumstances, the impugned Judgment and Order does not require any interference. 14. We have given due consideration to the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the evidence/materials available in the case records of Sessions Case no. 41/1998, in original. 15. As mentioned above, the prosecution side examined six nos. of prosecution witnesses. However, the informant, Pramod Lele who lodged the FIR was not examined. The FIR lodged by Pramod Lele on the basis of which the investigation was initiated, was also not exhibited by the prosecution. 16. P.W.1 deposed to the effect that he knew the appellant and at the relevant time, he was working as a Teacher in Geeta Ashram. As regards the incident, P.W.1 stated that the incident occurred on 16.09.1994 and on that day, after having meal, he went to bed at around 08-30 p.m. At that point, he heard a voice calling ‘Ashram Bura, Ashram Bura’. Having heard the voice, he went out of his house. P.W.1 deposed that at that time, the appellant came to him to tell that the appellant had killed ‘Ashram Bura’, that is, Khagen Daimari, who was a cook in Geeta Ashram. P.W.1 further deposed that he was told by the appellant that the deceased was killed with a wooden ural mari [wooden rice stamper] on the road heading towards Geeta Ashram. Then, he informed the matter to the Superintendent of the Hostel, Pramod Lele and Pramod Lele came along with some local boys and all of them went the spot. The accused was also present with them. They found Khagen Daimari lying on the ground with an injury on his head and they saw blood oozing out from the injured part. P.W.1 further stated that the appellant explained that he had killed with a wooden ural mari [wooden rice stamper]. The accused was also present with them. They found Khagen Daimari lying on the ground with an injury on his head and they saw blood oozing out from the injured part. P.W.1 further stated that the appellant explained that he had killed with a wooden ural mari [wooden rice stamper]. Then, they took Khagen Daimari to hospital for treatment. P.W.1 further stated that after waiting for two-three hours, he left the hospital and it was on the next day, he heard that Khagen Daimari had died. The appellant stayed at his home. In the meantime, Pramod Lele lodged the FIR and Police personnel came for investigation and arrested the appellant, who confessed his guilt before the Police personnel. The wooden ural mari [wooden rice stamper] was brought before the Police personnel and the Police seized it. P.W.1 stated that he did not sign the seizure list seizing the wooden ural mari [wooden rice stamper]. In cross-examination, P.W.1 stated that the accused used to reside in a quarter near their school. He was not aware of any kind of quarrel between appellant and the deceased. He further deposed that the victim went to the house of the appellant and lied in wait secretly. The appellant asked the victim to wait but the victim did not wait. Then, the appellant followed the victim and killed the victim as if the victim was a child-lifter. P.W.1 stated that at the relevant time, there was rumour going on about child-lifters in and around Diphu. P.W.1 supposed that the incident was accidental and had the victim been not lying in wait concealing himself in the house of the appellant at night, the incident would not have occurred. He further deposed that the victim was not killed voluntarily. 17. P.W.2 deposed that he knew the appellant as the appellant was related to him. He also knew the deceased, who was a cook in Geeta Ashram. As regards the incident, P.W.2 deposed to the effect that the incident occurred in front of Geeta Ashram. At the relevant time, he was sleeping in his house and hearing noise, he went out of his house and proceeded to the spot. There was a gathering of people and he found Khagen Daimari lying on the ground sustaining an injury on his head. He saw that blood was oozing out of the injury. At the relevant time, he was sleeping in his house and hearing noise, he went out of his house and proceeded to the spot. There was a gathering of people and he found Khagen Daimari lying on the ground sustaining an injury on his head. He saw that blood was oozing out of the injury. He found that the appellant was also present at the spot and the appellant told him that the appellant had killed the deceased with a wooden ural mari [wooden rice stamper]. The deceased was taken to a hospital for further treatment but he [P.W.2] did not stay at the hospital. It was on the next day, he heard that Khagen Daimari had died. He came to the hospital and also went to the Police Station on that day. The appellant was in his residence. The wooden ural mari [wooden rice stamper] was brought by the appellant and the same was seized by the Police. He identified the wooden ural mari [wooden rice stamper] as Mat. Ext.-1 and exhibited the Seizure List as Ext.-1 with his thumb impression therein. He further stated that he did not see the incident and he had heard about it only after the occurrence. He further stated that the appellant did not come to the hospital at night on that day. He further stated that the appellant thought Khagen Daimari as a child-lifter and did not kill him intentionally. 18. P.W.3 stated that he knew the appellant, who used to reside near Geeta Ashram. He knew Khagen Daimari as a cook in Geeta Ashram. P.W.3 deposed that Khagen Daimari was killed by the appellant in an incident occurred at around 07-00 p.m. and he was informed by other members that Khagen Daimari was assaulted. On the next day, Khagen Daimari died and the news of death was informed to him by others. He went to the hospital along with one Bipun Hazarika [not a witness]. The I.O. came to Geeta Ashram and called the persons to ask about the person who had killed Khagen Daimari. At that time, the appellant was also called by the I.O. and there, he confessed before the I.O. that he had killed Khagen Daimari. The appellant told the Police that the deceased was killed by a Lathi as the deceased was roaming nearby after cooking the meal. 19. At that time, the appellant was also called by the I.O. and there, he confessed before the I.O. that he had killed Khagen Daimari. The appellant told the Police that the deceased was killed by a Lathi as the deceased was roaming nearby after cooking the meal. 19. P.W.4 was serving as the Medical & Health Officer–I at Diphu Civil Hospital on 17.09.1994. He testified that on 17.09.1994, he performed the post- mortem examination on the deadbody of the deceased and on examination of the deadbody, he found the following : - External Appearance : A male deadbody aged about 55 years. Rigor Mortis present with short structure. White complexion with intra-cranial injuries as described hematoma and fracture is present. Description : Multiple cranial bone fracture, Right temporal bone and parital bone depression present and hematoma of the temporal bone. Intra-cranial hematoma present over the partal lobe and temporal lobe. Opinion : In my opinion the death is due to shock and hemorrhage as a result of intra-cranial injury and injuries are anti-mortem in nature. P.W.4 exhibited the PME Report as Ext.-2 and identified his signature therein as Ext.-2[1]. He also identified the signature of Joint Director of Health Services, Karbi Anglong Diphu in Ext.-2 as Ext.-2[2]. When cross-examined, P.W.4 testified that the injuries sustained by the deceased on his person can be sustained on a fall on hard surface from a high place. 20. P.W.6 was the Magistrate who recorded the confessional statement of the appellant on 19.09.1994. P.W.6 testified about the manner in which he had recorded the confessional statement of the appellant in connection with Diphu Police Station Case no. 190/1994, registered under Section 325, IPC. He exhibited an Order passed by the Additional District Magistrate as Ext.-5 whereby the case record was endorsed to him for recording the confessional statement of the appellant. He exhibited the confessional statement of the appellant as Ext.-6 and his signatures therein as Ext.-6[1] to Ext.-6[6]. He also exhibited an Order dated 19.09.1994 [Ext.-7] which he had passed, Ext.-6 to transmit the case records to the trying Magistrate after recording the confessional statement of the appellant. P.W.6 did not, however, exhibit the thumb impressions of the appellant in the confessional statement, Ext.-6. He also exhibited an Order dated 19.09.1994 [Ext.-7] which he had passed, Ext.-6 to transmit the case records to the trying Magistrate after recording the confessional statement of the appellant. P.W.6 did not, however, exhibit the thumb impressions of the appellant in the confessional statement, Ext.-6. The testimony of P.W.6 as regards the manner in which he had recorded the confessional statement of the appellant would be discussed in a later part of the order when we would consider its acceptability or otherwise. 21. From an analysis of the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, it has emerged that it was mainly the prosecution witnesses, P.W.1, P.W.2 and P.W.3 who deposed about the extra-judicial confessions purportedly made by the appellant before them. As regards the confessional statement, it was P.W.6 who testified about it. 22. From the testimony of the Autopsy Doctor, P.W.4, it can be noticed that there was multiple cranial bone fracture. There was presence of depression in right temporal bone and parital bone. Hematoma was present in the temporal bone and intra-cranial hematoma was present over the partal lobe and temporal lop. The death of the deceased was due to shock and hemorrhage as a result of intra-cranial injury and the injuries were found to be anti-mortem in nature. At the same time, the Autopsy Doctor had opined that the injuries sustained by the deceased could be possible to sustain if the person falls on hard surface from a high place. 23. When the appellant was examined under Section 313[1][b], CrPC, his plea was clear denial. He had also denied about making of any extra-judicial confessions and the judicial confession. Thus, because of the appellant’s such denial at the stage of 313, CrPC, the extra-judicial confession and the judicial confession had become retracted ones. It is contended by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor that such retraction was a belated one. 24. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [‘the Evidence Act’ for short] has made confession on the part of an accused admissible in evidence and it can be acted upon. Confession ordinarily, can be of two categories, namely, [i] extra-judicial confession; and [ii] judicial confession. The confessions which are made by an accused or a person suspected of committing a crime ordinarily, before a person or persons are considered to be extra-judicial confessions. Confession ordinarily, can be of two categories, namely, [i] extra-judicial confession; and [ii] judicial confession. The confessions which are made by an accused or a person suspected of committing a crime ordinarily, before a person or persons are considered to be extra-judicial confessions. The confessions which are made before a Magistrate or a Court in the course of judicial proceedings are termed as judicial confessions. 25. Before considering the issue of admissibility or inadmissibility of the statement of the appellant [Ext.-6] recorded under Section 164, CrPC, it would be appropriate to refer to some of the relevant provisions governing the procedure of recording of confessions and statements, as contained in Section 164, CrPC and Section 281, CrPC. For the purpose of the issue raised herein, the provisions contained in Section 164[4], CrPC and Section 281[3][4][5], CrPC are found to be of relevance and import. The same are, therefore, quoted hereinbelow for ready reference :- Section 164 : Recording of confessions and statements .– [4] Any such confession shall be recorded in the manner provided in Section 281 for recording the examination of an accused person and shall be signed by the person making the confession; and the Magistrate shall make a memorandum at the foot of such record to the following effect :- I have explained to [name] that he is not bound to make a confession and that, if he does so, any confession he may make, may be used as evidence against him and I believe that this confession was voluntarily made. It was taken in my presence and hearing, and was read over to the person making it and admitted by him to be correct, and it contains a full and true account of the statement made by him. Section 281 : Record of examination of accused. [3] The record shall, if practicable, be in the language in which the accused is examined or, if that is not practicable, in the language of the Court. [4] The record shall be shown or read to the accused, or, if he does not understand the language in which it is written, shall be interpreted to him in a language which he understands, and he shall be at liberty to explain or add to his answers. [4] The record shall be shown or read to the accused, or, if he does not understand the language in which it is written, shall be interpreted to him in a language which he understands, and he shall be at liberty to explain or add to his answers. [5] It shall thereafter be signed by the accused and by the Magistrate or presiding Judge, who shall certify under his own hand that the examination was taken in his presence and hearing and that the record contains a full and true account of the statement made by the accused. 26. It is found from the discussion made above and the materials on record, the appellant was taken into custody and thereafter, arrested on 17.09.1994 and on 18.09.1994, the appellant was produced before the jurisdictional Court. On being so produced, the appellant was remanded to custody. On 18.09.1994, the I.O. made a prayer for recording the confessional statement of the appellant. On 19.09.1994, the Additional District Magistrate vide his Order dated 19.09.1994 [Ext.-5] endorsed the case record to the Magistrate, P.W.6 to record the confessional statement of the appellant. The confessional statement of the appellant [Ext.-6] was recorded by the Magistrate, P.W.6 on 19.09.1994. Therefore, it is relevant to examine the testimony of P.W.6 at this juncture. 27. In his testimony, P.W.6 deposed that pursuant to the Order dated 19.09.1994 [Ext.-5], the case record and the appellant were produced before him. Accordingly, he explained the matter of confession to the appellant and also explained to the appellant that he P.W.6 was not a Police Officer but a Magistrate. The appellant was told that he was not bound to give any confessional statement, but if he did so, it might be used as evidence against him. P.W.6 further stated that thereafter, the appellant was given three hours time for reflection. During the reflection period, the appellant was kept in an adjacent room under the supervision of a peon. On completion of the reflection period, the appellant was again produced before him for recording the confessional statement. P.W.6 further testified that he again explained the matter of confession to the appellant and also cautioned him that he was not bound to give confessional statement. P.W.6 stated to have explained the necessary requirements to the appellant before recording the confessional statement. P.W.6 further testified that he again explained the matter of confession to the appellant and also cautioned him that he was not bound to give confessional statement. P.W.6 stated to have explained the necessary requirements to the appellant before recording the confessional statement. P.W.6 further deposed that in spite of cautioning the appellant, the appellant intended to give the confessional statement voluntarily. Finding the appellant ready to give confessional statement voluntarily, he proceeded to record the confessional statement. After completing recording of the confessional statement, P.W.6 gave a certificate stating the confession was voluntarily made and it was taken in his presence. After recording the confessional statement, he sent the case record to the original court. During cross-examination, P.W.6 admitted that the name of the Police Officer who brought the appellant before him was not mentioned in his Order [Ext.-7]. In the confessional statement [Ext.-6], he had mentioned that he recorded the confessional statement at 03-00 p.m. after expiry of three hours which was given for reflection. He did not mention the name of the Peon in his Order [Ext.-7] under whose supervision the appellant was kept in an adjacent room for reflection. He also did not mention in the Order [Ext.-7] that the appellant was kept in an adjacent room for retraction. 28. Recording of confession of an accused under Section 164 of the Code is considered to be a very solemn act. It has been repeatedly observed that in discharging his duty under Section 164, CrPC, the Magistrate must take care to ensure that the procedural safeguards prescribed in Section 164 and Section 281 of the Code are fully adhered to. The Magistrate has to fully satisfy himself that confessional statement which the accused wants to make is in fact in substance voluntary. 29. When keeping the prescriptions contained in sub-section [4] of Section 164, CrPC and sub-sections [3][4]&[5] of Section 281, CrPC in mind, the confessional statement [Ext.-6] of the appellant and the testimony of the recording Magistrate [P.W.6] are examined, it has emerged that only thumb expressions of the appellant were obtained in the records of the case by the recording Magistrate [P.W.6] and there was no signature of the appellant in the confessional statement [Ext.-6]. The recording Magistrate [P.W.6] did not mention the reason for not obtaining the signatures of the appellant in the confessional statement [Ext.-6] and for obtaining only the thumb impressions. 30. The recording Magistrate [P.W.6] did not mention the reason for not obtaining the signatures of the appellant in the confessional statement [Ext.-6] and for obtaining only the thumb impressions. 30. It is for the Court to presume the existence of any fact which is likely to have happened and for drawing such presumption of fact, the Court shall have regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct, etc. in addition to the facts of the case. Taking into account all the attending facts, the only possible presumption that can be drawn from the thumb impressions of the appellant in the confessional statement [Ext.-6] is that the appellant is an illiterate person and is lacking the capacity to sign. The recording Magistrate, P.W.6 had recorded the entire confessional statement of the appellant in English language, which is obviously not the language in which the appellant was examined. P.W.6 did not testify about the language with which the appellant was conversant with or about the language which the appellant understood. P.W.6 did not testify whether the appellant was conversant with or understood the English language. P.W.6 did not say anything about the language he used to elicit the answers from the appellant regarding his voluntariness to make confession. 31. A mandate is entrenched in sub-section [4] of Section 281, CrPC to the effect that if the accused person does not understand the language in which it is written, then, it shall be interpreted to him in a language which he understands. There is no reflection either in the case record pertaining to the confessional statement [Ext.-6] that the recording Magistrate [P.W.6] had interpreted the questions and answers he had written in the record and the confessional statement he had recorded in a language understood by the appellant or in his testimony. 32. Section 463 of the Code has provided for situations in case of non-compliance with the provisions contained in Section 164 or Section 281 of the Code. 32. Section 463 of the Code has provided for situations in case of non-compliance with the provisions contained in Section 164 or Section 281 of the Code. If any Court before which a confession or other statement or other statement of an accused person recorded, or purporting to be recorded under Section 164 or Section 281, is tendered, or has been received, in evidence finds that any of the provisions of either of such sections have not been complied with by the Magistrate recording the statement, it may, notwithstanding anything contained in Section 91 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [1 of 1872], take evidence in regard to such non-compliance, and may, if satisfied that such non-compliance has not injured the accused in his defence on the merits and that he duly made the statement recorded, admit such statement. Sub-section [2] of Section 463 of the Code has made the provision applicable also to the courts of appeal, reference and revision. 33. In Dhanajaya Reddy vs. State of Karnataka , (2001) 4 SCC 9 , the necessity to comply with all the provisions of Section 164, CrPC, more particularly, sub- section [4] thereof and the conditions prescribed in sub-section [5] of Section 281, CrPC and the consequence of non-compliance of those provisions and conditions came up for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The non-compliance alleged therein was with regard to non- signing of the confessional statement by the accused. It has been observed to the effect that besides ensuring that the confessional statement being made before him is voluntary and without pressure, the Magistrate must record the confession in the manner laid down by the section. Omission to comply with the mandatory provisions, one of such being as incorporated in sub-section [4] of Section 164 is likely to render the confessional statement inadmissible. The words ‘shall be signed by the person making the confession’, are mandatory in nature and the Magistrate recording the confession has no option. Mere failure to get the signature of the person making the confession may not be very material if the making of such statement is not disputed by the accused but in cases where the making of the statement itself is in controversy, the omission to get the signature is fatal. Mere failure to get the signature of the person making the confession may not be very material if the making of such statement is not disputed by the accused but in cases where the making of the statement itself is in controversy, the omission to get the signature is fatal. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has gone on to hold that compliance with sub-section [4] of Section 164 of the Code is mandatory and its non- compliance renders the confession not admissible or reliable. It is held to be a settled position of law that if a part of confession is excluded under any provision of law, the entire confessional statement in all its parts, including the admission of minor incriminating facts must be excluded unless proof of it is permitted by some other section, such as Section 27 of the Evidence Act. 34. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kehar Sing vs. State [Delhi Administration] , (1988) 3 SCC 609 , has held that the compliance with sub- section [2] of Section 164, CrPC being mandatory and imperative, its non- compliance renders the confession inadmissible in evidence. The Hon’ble Court has approved the decision in Nazir Ahmed vs. King Emperor , AIR 1936 PC 253[2] , wherein it was held that if a statute has conferred a power to do an act and has laid down the method in which that power has to be exercised, it necessarily prohibits the doing of the act in any other manner than that which has been prescribed. A Magistrate, therefore, cannot in the course of investigation record a confession except in the manner laid down in Section 164 of the Code. 35. In the present case, the recording Magistrate, P.W.6 did not make any mention in what manner the mandate contained in sub-section [4] of Section 281 of the Code was complied with. For compliance of the said mandate, he had the obligation to interpret to the appellant the contents of the confessional statement in a language which the appellant would understand since he had recorded the confessional statement in English language. For compliance of the said mandate, he had the obligation to interpret to the appellant the contents of the confessional statement in a language which the appellant would understand since he had recorded the confessional statement in English language. The question of making it curable under Section 463, CrPC would not arise because after interpretation of the contents of the confessional statement to the appellant in a language the accused understands the accused has been provided a valuable right in that he would, thereafter, have the liberty also to explain or to add to his answers. Such a right can be availed by the accused only after interpretation of his statement which has been recorded in a language not conversant or understood by him, in a language he understands. In the event the condition precedent of interpretation of the confessional statement in a language with which the accused is conversant or understood by him is not adhered to, the accused is clearly prevented from the opportunity to either to explain or to add to his answers. It would amount to a violation of the procedural safeguards designed to ensure the accused person’s understanding and voluntary participation. Such non- compliance directly affects the admissibility and evidentiary value of the confessional statement as it removes the element of voluntariness on the part of the accused. Therefore, in the event of failure on the part of the recording Magistrate to interpret the records in a language understood by the accused, the same is clearly prejudicial to the accused and such non- compliance goes to the root of the matter as it becomes extremely difficult to verify if the alleged confessional statement accurately reflects the words of the accused. Such kind of omission gives rise to a situation of lack of clarity seriously undermining voluntariness and reliability of the confession and such omission cannot be cured under the provisions of Section 463, CrPC. 36. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the clear view that non-compliance of the mandate contained in sub-section [4] of Section 164 and sub-section [4] of Section 281 of the Code, which are mandatory, has rendered the confession purportedly made by the appellant before P.W.6 inadmissible. 36. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the clear view that non-compliance of the mandate contained in sub-section [4] of Section 164 and sub-section [4] of Section 281 of the Code, which are mandatory, has rendered the confession purportedly made by the appellant before P.W.6 inadmissible. We are of the unhesitant view that the principle enunciated in Dhanajaya Reddy [supra] that if a part of the confessions is excluded under any provision of law, the entire confessional statement in all its parts must be excluded is also applicable in respect of the confessional statement [Ext.-6] involved in this case proprio vigore. 37. It is true that an extra-judicial confession, if voluntary and true and made in a fit state of mind, can be relied upon by the Court. The confession will have to be proved like any other fact. The value of the evidence as to confession, like any other evidence, depends upon the veracity of the witness to whom it has been made. The value of the evidence as to the confession depends on the reliability of the witness who gives the evidence. It depends on the nature of the circumstances, the time when the confession was made and the credibility of the witnesses who speak to such a confession. It can be acted upon if the words spoken to by the witness are clear, unambiguous and unmistakably convey that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime and nothing is omitted by the witness which may militate against it. After subjecting the evidence of the witness to a rigorous test on the touchstone of credibility, the extra-judicial confession can be accepted and can be the basis of a conviction if it passes the test of credibility. 38. It has been held in Sahadevan and another vs. State of Tamil Nadu , (2012) 6 SCC 403 , that in case of circumstantial evidence, the onus lies upon the prosecution to prove the complete chain of events which shall undoubtedly point towards the guilt of the accused. In case of circumstantial evidence, where the prosecution relies upon an extra-judicial confession, the Court has to examine the same with a greater degree of care and caution. It is held to be a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that extra-judicial confession is a weak piece of evidence. In case of circumstantial evidence, where the prosecution relies upon an extra-judicial confession, the Court has to examine the same with a greater degree of care and caution. It is held to be a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that extra-judicial confession is a weak piece of evidence. Wherever the Court, upon due appreciation of the entire prosecution evidence, intends to base a conviction on an extra- judicial confession, it must ensure that the same inspires confidence and is corroborated by other prosecution evidence. If the extra-judicial confession suffers from material discrepancies or inherent improbabilities and does not appear to be cogent as per the prosecution version, it may be difficult for the Court to base a conviction on such a confession. In such circumstances, the Court would be fully justified in ruling such evidence out of consideration. It has been observed in Balwinder Singh vs. State of Punjab , 1995 Supp (4) SCC 259 , that an extra-judicial confession by its very nature is rather a weak type of evidence and requires appreciation with a great deal of care and caution. Where an extra-judicial confession is surrounded by suspicious circumstances, its credibility becomes doubtful and it loses its importance. It has been held as well settled in Pakkirisamy vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (1997) 8 SCC 158 , that it is a rule of caution where the Court would generally look for an independent and reliable corroboration before placing any reliance upon an extra-judicial confession. 39. Reverting back to the facts of the case, it is found on a closure scrutiny of the testimony of P.W.3 that he was not the person before whom the appellant had confided anything as regards the assault on the deceased. P.W.3 appeared to have gathered the knowledge only from some other persons and his source of knowledge was not the appellant. The two prosecution witnesses, P.W.1 and P.W.2 had testified that the appellant had made confessions to them separately. From the testimony of P.W.1, it would emerge that he was the first person before whom the appellant had made the confession. According to P.W.2, the appellant made the confession only before him at the place where Khagen Daimari was found lying on the ground sustaining an injury on the hand and many persons assembled around him. From the testimony of P.W.1, it would emerge that he was the first person before whom the appellant had made the confession. According to P.W.2, the appellant made the confession only before him at the place where Khagen Daimari was found lying on the ground sustaining an injury on the hand and many persons assembled around him. It was not in the testimony of P.W.1 that it was the appellant who called ‘Ashram Bura, Ashram Bura’. When the testimony of P.W.1 is looked at in its entirety, it is noticed that P.W.1 had gone on to make embellishments by deposing about the manner and the reason for which the appellant had purportedly ‘killed’ Khagen Daimari when only confession that was allegedly made by the appellant to him was limited to ‘killing’ of Khagen Daimari by a wooden ural mari [wooden rice stamper]. It has also emerged that from the testimony of P.W.1 that there was no prior animosity between the appellant and the deceased. 40. The veracity as regards the extra-judicial confession allegedly made by the appellant before P.W.1 and P.W.2 is also to be tested with the truthful nature of the confession. Both P.W.1 and P.W.2 testified to the effect that the appellant confessed before them separately that he had ‘killed’ the deceased, Khagen Daimari whereas at that time when such confession was allegedly made, Khagen Daimari was very much alive and not ‘killed’. Khagen Daimari at that point of time was only lying injured with an injury on the head. It has not emerged from the evidence on record that these two witnesses, P.W.1 and P.W.2 were close confidante of the appellant before whom the appellant would easily confide. 41. The recovery of the wooden ural mari [wooden rice stamper] cannot be held to be a circumstance in the chain of circumstances in the absence of corroborative reliable evidence that the wooden ural mari [wooden rice stamper] was used in assaulting Khagen Daimari on the date of the incident. Conspicuously, the length and breadth of the wooden ural mari [rice stamper] were not mentioned in the Seizure List, Ext.-1. While P.W.1 deposed to the effect that the wooden ural mari [wooden rice stamper] was brought to the Police, he did not mention who had brought it to the Police. Conspicuously, the length and breadth of the wooden ural mari [rice stamper] were not mentioned in the Seizure List, Ext.-1. While P.W.1 deposed to the effect that the wooden ural mari [wooden rice stamper] was brought to the Police, he did not mention who had brought it to the Police. On the other hand, P.W.2 deposed that when the wooden ural mari [wooden rice stamper] was brought to the Police personnel by the appellant, it was then seized by the Police. A wooden ural mari [wooden rice stamper] is a kitchen tool which is ordinarily available in a household and as such, mere recovery of a wooden ural mari [wooden rice stamper] either from the house of the appellant or being handed over by the appellant alone, without any inculpatory evidence, cannot be an incriminating circumstance against the appellant in the chain of circumstances in the case based on circumstantial evidence. 42. The prosecution has not brought any evidence on record that at any point of time, prior to the incident, the appellant and the deceased were seen together. The conduct of the appellant in and around the time when Khagen Daimari was lying injured at a public place also assumes significance. From the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, more particularly, P.W.1 and P.W.2, it has emerged that the appellant was with them and near the injured, Khagen Daimari at the time of the incident on 16.09.1994. 43. It is trite to say that mere abscondance of an accused does not lead to be firm conclusion about his involvement in a crime. Similarly, mere presence of an accused at the scene of the crime also does not lead to a firm conclusion about his non-involvement in the crime. Yet, the appellant’s presence with the other persons near the injured and his subsequent presence in his house even after the death of the deceased is a fact, which is to be taken into consideration along with the other facts and circumstances. 44. Motive for commission of an offence assumes greater importance in cases based on circumstantial evidence than the cases based on direct evidence. It is true that failure to prove motive in cases resting on circumstantial evidence is not fatal by itself and, at the same time, absence of motive in a case based on circumstantial evidence is a factor which weighs in favour of the accused. It is true that failure to prove motive in cases resting on circumstantial evidence is not fatal by itself and, at the same time, absence of motive in a case based on circumstantial evidence is a factor which weighs in favour of the accused. In the case in hand, the prosecution side has not been able to establish such facts wherefrom a motive for the accused to commit the offence could be reasonably inferred and the same becomes an additional missing link in the chain of circumstances. The prosecution has failed to establish anything wherefrom it can be inferred that by committing the act, the appellant would have gained anything. 45. From the medical evidence in the form of testimony of the Autopsy Doctor, P.W.4 and the PME Report, Ext.-2, it has not clinchingly emerged that the death of the deceased had resulted from an act of homicide. As per the testimony of the Autopsy Doctor, the injuries sustained by the deceased on his person were possible to sustain also from a fall on hard surface from a high place. 46. In Aloke Nath Dutta and others vs. State of West Bengal , (2007) 12 SCC 230 , it has been held that to act on a confession, the Court has to satisfy itself in regard to: [i] voluntariness of the confession; [ii] truthfulness of the confession; and [iii] corroboration. In a three-Judges Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramanand @ Nandlal Bharti vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2022 (5) SCR 162 , after considering all the important precedent, it is held, in sum and substance, that an extra-judicial confession by its very nature is rather a weak type of evidence and requires appreciation with great deal of care and caution. Where an extra-judicial confession is surrounded by suspicious circumstances, its credibility becomes doubtful and it loses its importance, like the case in hand. The Courts generally look for an independent reliable corroboration before placing any reliance upon an extra- judicial confession. In the case in hand, we fail to find any independent reliable evidence to corroborate the extra-judicial confessions allegedly made before the prosecution witnesses, P.W.1 and P.W.2 to place reliance on them to proceed further, more particularly, when those were retracted ones. 47. In the case in hand, we fail to find any independent reliable evidence to corroborate the extra-judicial confessions allegedly made before the prosecution witnesses, P.W.1 and P.W.2 to place reliance on them to proceed further, more particularly, when those were retracted ones. 47. Suspicion, however grave it may be, cannot take the place of proof, and there is a large difference between something that ‘may be’ proved, and something that ‘will be proved’. In a criminal trial, suspicion no matter how strong, cannot and must not be permitted to take place of proof. This is for the reason that the mental distance between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is quite large, and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions. In a criminal C case, the court has a duty to ensure that mere conjectures or suspicion do not take the place of legal proof. The large distance between ‘may be’ true and ‘must be’ true, must be covered by way of clear, cogent and unimpeachable evidence produced by the prosecution, before an accused is condemned as a convict, and the basic and golden rule must be applied. In such cases, while keeping in mind the distance between ‘may be’ true and ‘must be’ true, the d court must maintain the vital distance between mere conjectures and sure conclusions to be arrived at, on the touchstone of dispassionate judicial scrutiny, based upon a complete and comprehensive appreciation of all features of the case, as well as the quality and credibility of the evidence brought on record. The court must ensure, that miscarriage of justice is avoided, and if the facts and circumstances of a case so demand, then the benefit of doubt must be given to the accused, keeping in mind that a reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a merely probable doubt, but a fair doubt that is based upon reason and common sense [Ref : Sujit Biswas vs. State of Assam, (2013) 12 SCC 406 ]. 48. Upon evaluation of the evidence on record led by the prosecution in this case, we find that none of the circumstances to complete the chain of circumstances for arriving at an irresistible conclusion that the appellant herein was behind the death of the deceased, has been established by clear, cogent and reliable evidence. 48. Upon evaluation of the evidence on record led by the prosecution in this case, we find that none of the circumstances to complete the chain of circumstances for arriving at an irresistible conclusion that the appellant herein was behind the death of the deceased, has been established by clear, cogent and reliable evidence. The prosecution has not also been able to establish clearly that the death of the deceased was a homicidal one. 49. In the light of the discussions made above and for the reasons assigned therein, more particularly, in view of a number of missing links in the chain of circumstances, we find ourselves in disagreement with the finding of guilt arrived at by the Trial Court. In the administration of criminal justice, it is a golden principle that when two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence. As the prosecution has failed to prove this case against the appellant beyond all reasonable doubt by way of clear, reliable and credible evidence, we find that the Judgment and Order dated 21.12.2020 of conviction and sentence passed by the learned Trial Court is unsustainable law and the same is liable to be set aside. It is accordingly set aside. 50. Consequently, the criminal appeal is allowed. 51. The appellant is to be released from custody forthwith if their custody is not required for any other case or purpose. 52. The records of the Trial Court are to be sent back forthwith. 53. We reiterate the recommendation made by the learned Trial Court regarding disbursement of compensation to the next kith and kin of the deceased under Section 357A, CrPC and the extant Victim Compensation Scheme framed thereunder. We further observe that such enquiry shall be undertaken and completed with expedition, if not completed till date, and thereafter, to award and disburse appropriate compensation thereunder to the victim[s] entitled upon conclusion of such enquiry.