JUDGMENT : TARLADA RAJASEKHAR RAO, J. 1. Both the Second Appeals i.e., S.A. No.563 of 2025 and S.A. No. 575 of 2025 are disposed of by this common Judgment. 2. These Second Appeals i.e. S.A.No. 563 of 2025 is filed against A.S. No. 8 of 2016, on the file of the VII Additional District Judge, Prakasam District at Ongole, in confirming the judgment and decree dated 26.12.2014, made in O.S. No.361 of 2007, on the file of the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Ongole, and S.A.No. 575 of 2025 is filed against A.S. No. 32 of 2015, on the file of the VII Additional District Judge, Prakasam District at Ongole in confirming the judgment and decree dated 26.12.2014 made in O.S. No.361 of 2007, on the file of the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Ongole; are filed by the Plaintiff in the suit O.S. No 361 of 2007 on the file of the Principal Senior Civil Judge Ongole Plaintiff/Tenant. 3. Suit O.S. No. 810 of 2006, on the file of the I Additional Junior Civil Judge was filed for eviction against the defendant, who is the plaintiff in Suit O.S. No. 361 of 2007, on the file of the Principal Senior Civil Judge. The latter suit was filed for specific performance against the plaintiff in O.S. No. 810 of 2006. Subsequently, the eviction suit was transferred to the Court of the Principal Senior Civil Judge and renumbered as O.S. No. 45 of 2009. Both matters were clubbed together and disposed of by a common judgment dated 26.12.2014. The suit for specific performance was dismissed, and the eviction suit was decreed. 4. Defendant/Owner filed suit for eviction and Plaintiff/Tenant filed suit for Specific Performance against each other. For better understanding, the parties will be referred to as per their ranking in the Trial Court. In the Trial Court the parties were referred as Plaintiff/Tenant and Defendant/Owner. 5. A.S No. 8 of 2016 is filed against judgment and Decreed dated 26.12.2014 in O.S No. 361 of 2007 and A.S No. 32 of 2015 is filed against judgment and Decreed dated 26.12.2014 in O.S No.145 of 2009, both the appeals were dismissed by VII Additional District Judge, Prakasam District at Ongole vide Judgment and Decree dated 31.12.2024. 6. Aggrieved by the commons order in both the appeals the present Second Appeals filed under Section 100 CPC. 7. 6. Aggrieved by the commons order in both the appeals the present Second Appeals filed under Section 100 CPC. 7. The case of the Plaintiff/Tenant is that Defendant is the owner of the suit schedule property that he obtained sale deed from his father-in-law vide registered sale deed dated 19.05.1997 by name Devathu Musala Rao and the Plaintiff/Tenant was in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property as a lessee. Devathu Musala Rao subsequently sold four shops located around the property to his daughter-in-law, and the Plaintiff/Tenant later purchased these four shops. When the Defendant expressed an intention to sell the property, the Plaintiff/Tenant offered Rs.4,00,000 and paid Rs.3,90,000/- towards the sale consideration. An agreement of sale was executed by the defendant/owner on 06.03.2005, but the sale deed has not been executed, despite the Plaintiff/Tenant being ready and willing to fulfill the terms of the contract. As a result, the Plaintiff/Tenant has been compelled to file a suit for specific performance. 8. The case of the defendant/owner in nutshell is that Plaintiff/Tenant is the tenant of his father-in-law, who purchased the leased property through a registered sale deed dated 19.05.1997. The tenancy continued with a monthly rent of Rs. 1,100 as per the lease agreement signed by the Plaintiff/Tenant on 01.04.2003. The father-in-law, currently residing in Bangalore due to employment, has been collecting the rent. The tenancy reportedly ended on 31.03.2006; however, the Plaintiff/Tenant has not vacated the property and has been delaying rental payments. Consequently, a statutory legal notice was issued on 01.06.2006 (marked as Ex A2) under the Transfer of Property Act to initiate eviction proceedings. In response, the Plaintiff/Tenant sent a reply notice on 14.07.2006, asserting that there is no landlord-tenant relationship and that the defendant/owner is entitled to damages of Rs. 100 per month. Additionally, it is the specific defence in the suit filed by the Plaintiff/tenant is that the Plaintiff/Tenant has forged the signature defendant/owner. 9. The trial court has framed the following issues for trial and it is expedient to extract the same as the argument in the second appeal is based upon the issues framed by the trial Court. 1. Whether the Plaintiff is entitle to evict the defendant from the suit schedule premises? 2. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to recover Rs. 31,900/- towards rent and damages ? 3. To what relief? 10. 1. Whether the Plaintiff is entitle to evict the defendant from the suit schedule premises? 2. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to recover Rs. 31,900/- towards rent and damages ? 3. To what relief? 10. The trial Court has dismissed the Suit filed for Specific Performance and decreed the suit for eviction after considering the documentary and oral evidence of both the parties with the following observations: The plaintiff/tenant was not able to prove the essential terms of the contract, namely continuous readiness and willingness at all stages from the date of the agreement until the issuance of the notice by the defendant/owner (Ex. A2 dated 01.06.2006). The plaintiff/tenant never offered the balance sale consideration of Rs. 10,000/-, there was no sale agreement executed by the defendant/owner and the said document is rank forgery and the suit has been filed by the Plaintiff/tenant as an afterthought by forging the suit document after one year, following the eviction suit filed by the defendant/owner. The plaintiff/tenant did not issue any notice to the defendant/owner, nor was any documentary evidence produced regarding the payment of the sale consideration. The suit document (Ex. A1) is five years old. It is evident that the plaintiff/tenant has approached the court with unclean hands and lacks uberrima fides (utmost good faith). 11. The lower appellate Court confirmed the judgment of the trial Court, echoing similar observations after discussing and extracting admissions from the plaintiff/tenant and citing a judgment of the common high court in Parapati Garamma (Died) by LRs. Vs. Sidapana Ratnalamma, 2007 (3) ALD 769 for the proposition that in a suit for Specific Performance the parties are expected to approach the court with clean hands while praying for a discretionary relief and dismissed the appeals filed by the Plaintiff/tenant. 12. Now the present Second Appeal are filed under Section 100 CPC, on the following substantial grounds: 1. Whether the appellate court is right in dismissing the appeal without following the provisions of order 41 rule 31 of CPC while deciding the appeal under section 96 of CPC. 2. Whether the court below are justified in not considering section 32 (c) AP Rent Control Act while deciding the matter when the tenant took objection with regard to amenability of suit before civil court since the rent as on the date of filing of the suit. 13. 2. Whether the court below are justified in not considering section 32 (c) AP Rent Control Act while deciding the matter when the tenant took objection with regard to amenability of suit before civil court since the rent as on the date of filing of the suit. 13. Among five significant grounds, two are considerable while the other three are innocuous which are extracted above. The appellant's counsel has emphasised his argument on just one ground, specifically that the appellate court delivered the judgment without complying with Order 41 Rule 31 of the CPC. In support of this contention the counsel relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in Mallory Mallappa (Dead) through Legal Representatives Vs. Kuruvathappa and others , (2020) 4 SCC 313 . 14. In the referred judgment the Apex court has observed thus: “that the judgment of the first appellate court has to set out points for consideration, record the decision thereon and give it own reasons. Even when the first appellate court affirms the judgment of the trial court, it is required to comply with requirement of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC and non-observance of this requirement leads to infirmity in the judgment of the first appellate court.” 15. It is further observed in the same para, “No doubt, when the Appellate Court agrees with the views of the trial Court on evidence, it need not restate effect of evidence or reiterate reasons given by the trial Court. Expression of a general agreement with the reasons given by the trial Court would ordinarily suffice.” 16. By framing the point for consideration, which is extracted here under, the lower appellate court has assigned its own reasons concurring with the trial court's reasons: “Whether the appellant is entitled for allowance of both the appeals, setting aside the Common Judgment and Decrees made in O.S. No: 361 of 2007 and in O.S. No: 145 of 2009 on the file of court of the Principal Senior Judge Ongole?” 17. The second ground that raised by the appellant regarding maintainability of civil suit. A civil court is ousted to adjudicate a tenancy case and is considered to have become coram non judice under section 32 (c) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1960. The second ground that raised by the appellant regarding maintainability of civil suit. A civil court is ousted to adjudicate a tenancy case and is considered to have become coram non judice under section 32 (c) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1960. This is the case even though the tenant objected to the amenability of the suit before the civil court, given the rent in question at the time the civil suit was filed. 18. An amendment was made to Section 32 (c) in the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control (Amendment) Act, 2005 making the Act inapplicable to the tenancy of any premises monthly rent of which exceeds Rs.3,500/- in the Municipal areas and rupees Rs 2,000/- in other areas w.e.f 27.04.2005. The rent as per the averments in the suit is Rs.1,100/- per month. That the question of jurisdiction has to be decided on the basis of averments made in the plaint. In the plaint it is asserted that the rent as Rs.1,100 per month therefore in any event the Rent Controller Court has no Jurisdiction to adjudicate up on, as the rent is Rs.1,100/-. The second issue answered against the appellant in favour of the respondent in second appeal. 19. On the other hand the learned counsel for the respondent refuting the appellants counsel argument has relied on the judgment of the Apex Court Nafees Ahmad & Anr. Vs. Soinuddin & Ors. , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 826 , wherein the apex court has followed another judgment of the apex court in the case of G. Amalorpavam v. R.C. Diocese of Madurai , (2006) 3 SCC 224 , wherein the Apex Court observed that “whether in a particular case, there has been substantial compliance, with the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC should be determined on the nature of the judgment delivered in each case. Non-compliance with the provisions, by itself, may not vitiate the judgment and make it wholly void and may be ignored if there has been a substantial compliance with it.” 20. Non-compliance with the provisions, by itself, may not vitiate the judgment and make it wholly void and may be ignored if there has been a substantial compliance with it.” 20. At para no.14 the Apex Court held that the Appellate Court can decide the appeal without any reference to any proceedings of the courts below and, in doing so, it can simply say that the appellants have not urged anything which would tend to show that the judgment and decree under appeal were wrong. [See: “Thakur Sukhpal Singh” (1963) 2 SCR 733 ] 21. Therefore the argument made by the appellant's counsel is without merit. 22. Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (hereinafter to be called as "the Act") imposes bar in granting relief for specific performance of contract if certain facts are not proved. Sub- section (c) of Section 16 of the Act is relevant in this case which runs as follows: Specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person - Section 16 (c) who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than terms of the performance of which has been prevented or -waived by the defendant. 23. In Smt. Chandrani Vs. Smt. Kamal Rani, (1993) 1 SCC 519 their Lordships have held that mere assertion of readiness and willingness is not sufficient. It must be followed by conduct of the plaintiff. In the present case, no doubt, there is assertion of readiness and willingness but the conduct of the plaintiff is that they were ready to pay only part of the balance consideration amount. 24. In the case of Lourdu Mari David and Ors. Vs. Loniz Chinnaya Arogiaswamy , 1996 (5) SCC 589 , their Lordships have held that it is settled law that the party who seeks to avail of the equitable jurisdiction of Court and specific performance being equitable relief must come to the Court with clean hands. In other words, the party who makes false allegations, or comes with unclean hands is not entitled to the equitable relief. 25. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Motilal Jain Vs. In other words, the party who makes false allegations, or comes with unclean hands is not entitled to the equitable relief. 25. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Motilal Jain Vs. Smt.Ramdasi Devi and others , 2000 (6) SCC 420 , wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that readiness and willingness could not be treated as a strait- jacket formula and that had to be determined from the entirety of facts and circumstances relevant to the intention and conduct of the party concerned. 26. A learned single of the common High Court in the judgment in Baddam Prathap Reddy vs. Chennadi Jalapathi Reddy , 2008 (5) ALD 200 after referring the Form Nos. 47 and 48 of CPC together with Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, Sections 54 and 55 of the Transfer of Property Act, and placing reliance of Apex court judgements held in the following: A study of four decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the appellant namely, Abdul Khader Rowther v. P.K. Sara Bai, (1989) 4 SCC 313 : AIR 1990 SC 682 , Syed Dastagir (supra), Pushparani S. Sundaram (supra) and Manjunath Anandappa(supra), would show that if the requirement of sending a communication or notice demanding execution of sale deed is not complied with prior to filing of the suit, it would weaken the case of plaintiff for enforcing specific performance of contract in respect of immovable property. If a notice is issued by the plaintiff, it itself would - to a large extent, might lead to an inference that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. Mere allegation that the plaintiff was ready and wiling to perform his part of the contract would not be sufficient for enforcement of the contract. In Pushparani S. Sundaram (supra) it was held….Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act requires that not only there be a plea of readiness and willingness but it has to be proved so. It is not in dispute that except for a plea there is no other evidence on record to prove the same except the two circumstances. It is true that mere absence of a plaintiff coming in the witness box by itself may not be a factor to conclude that he was not ready and willing in a given case as erroneously concluded by the High Court. It is true that mere absence of a plaintiff coming in the witness box by itself may not be a factor to conclude that he was not ready and willing in a given case as erroneously concluded by the High Court. But in the present case, not only the plaintiff has not come in the witness box, but not even sent any communication or notice to the defendant about his willingness to perform his part of the contract. 27. Let it be seen from the judgment, whether the suit filed by the plaintiff/tenant was in accordance with law. On reviewing the judgment warily no notice was issued as contemplated under Form Nos. 47 and 48 of CPC together with Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, which is mandatory under the law. A reply notice got issued on 14.07.2006 (marked as Ex A3) by the Plaintiff/tenant to the statutory notice dated 01.06.2006 (marked as Ex A2) issued by the defendant/owner. No notice was issued by the Plaintiff/tenant before filing of the suit for specific performance as contemplated under law. 28. In the case of Thiruvengadam Pillai Vs. Navaneethammal and another, (2008) 4 SCC 530 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has specifically observed that when the execution of an unregistered document putforth by the plaintiff was denied by the defendants, it was for the defendants to establish that the document was forged or concocted, is not sound proposition. It is the burden was on the plaintiff to prove that the defendant had executed the agreement and not on the defendant to prove the negative. 29. The defendant/owner has denied his signature. Hence, it is the duty of the plaintiff/tenant to prove the alleged unregistered agreement in terms of the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act. The same has not been done in the present case. The plaintiff/tenant has failed to prove the very execution of the document by the defendants and receipt of advance amount of Rs.3,90,000/-. In the absence of the same, the suit filed by the plaintiffs for the relief of specific performance is not maintainable. 30. Technicality alone by itself ought not to permit the High Court to decide the issue since justice oriented approach, is the call of the day presently. See judgment in Kulwant Kaur & Ors. vs Gurdial Singh Mann (Dead) by LRs. 30. Technicality alone by itself ought not to permit the High Court to decide the issue since justice oriented approach, is the call of the day presently. See judgment in Kulwant Kaur & Ors. vs Gurdial Singh Mann (Dead) by LRs. and Others, (2001) 4 SCC 262 (at para 33 of the judgment) 31. In view of my above discussions, it is determined that the plaintiff has approached the Court with unclean hands and, as such, is not entitled to receive discretionary relief under the current facts and circumstances of this case. Given that the appellant has acknowledged his status as a tenant, this court has found no irregularities or illegalities in the judgments rendered by either the trial court or the appellate court. 32. Accordingly, the substantial grounds presented have been duly addressed by this Court, the second appeals are hereby dismissed. 33. When the judgment is pronounced, there is no representation for the respondents. 34. Learned counsel for the appellant requested this Court to grant some time to vacate the appellant from the shop. 35. It appears that request is genuine. Appellant is directed to vacate from the shop within a period of six months from today. As a sequel, interlocutory applications, if any pending in this Writ Petition shall stand closed.