JUDGMENT : DEVASHIS BARUAH, J. 1. Heard Mr. D. Das, the learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. K. Mohammad, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner. Mr. S. Tapin, the learned Government Advocate, Arunachal Pradesh appears on behalf of the respondent No. 1; Mr. T.J. Mahanta, the learned Senior Counsel, who is also the Standing Counsel of the Gauhati High Court, Principal Seat assisted by Mr. A. Baruah, the learned counsel appears on behalf of the respondent No. 2; Mr. M. Pertin, the learned Senior Counsel who is also the Standing Counsel of the Gauhati High Court, Itanagar Permanent Bench assisted by Mr. M. Pertin, the learned counsel appears on behalf of the respondent Nos. 3 and 4; Mr. S.R. Rabha, the learned Standing Counsel appears on behalf of the respondent No. 5. 2. The present proceedings raises an important question of law on the aspect, as to whether, a member of the Ministerial Staff of the District Judiciary can be allowed to go on deputation by the District and Sessions Judge without the approval and prior information of the High Court. FACTS OF CASE AS STATED IN THE WRIT PETITION 3. The petitioner herein was appointed to the post of Peshkar vide an order dated 21.12.2015, pursuant to a selection made by the Recruitment Cell of the Gauhati High Court, on the basis of an advertisement dated 18.07.2013. The petitioner was posted in the Establishment of the learned Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate- cum-Civil Judge (Senior Division), Aalo, West Siang District (hereinafter referred to as, “CJM, Aalo”). 4. An Advertisement was issued on 26.12.2023 by the Arunachal Pradesh State Human Rights Commission (hereinafter referred to as, “the respondent No. 5”) for filling up of 4 (four) posts of Assistant by 100% appointment on deputation or by Analogous posts of Officers in the Pay Matrix-5. The petitioner, having eligibility, sought approval for applying for the appointment on deputation to the post of the Assistant from the CJM, Aalo vide an application dated 22.01.2024. The CJM, Aalo forwarded the petitioner’s application dated 22.01.2024 to the District and Sessions Judge, Aalo, West Siang District, Arunachal Pradesh. 5. At this stage, it is very pertinent to take note of that there was no Officer appointed at that point of time as the District and Sessions Judge, Aalo, West Siang District, Arunachal Pradesh. The CJM, Aalo forwarded the petitioner’s application dated 22.01.2024 to the District and Sessions Judge, Aalo, West Siang District, Arunachal Pradesh. 5. At this stage, it is very pertinent to take note of that there was no Officer appointed at that point of time as the District and Sessions Judge, Aalo, West Siang District, Arunachal Pradesh. However, the charge to the said post of District and Sessions Judge, Aalo, West Siang District, Arunachal Pradesh was given to the Officer who was holding the post of District and Sessions Judge, East Siang District, Pasighat namely one Mr. Tageng Padoh. Upon receipt of the said application which was forwarded, the said Officer namely, Mr. Tageng Padoh put a note in the said application dated 22.01.2024 stating “ Controlling Officer may comply with the prescribed form of certification with NOC of the applicant to go on deputation”. On the basis of such authorization given by the said officer, namely Mr. Tageng Padoh, the District and Sessions Judge (In-charge), Aalo, West Siang District, the CJM, Aalo certified the application of the petitioner on 25.01.2024 and on the basis thereof, the petitioner submitted the application to the Secretary of the respondent No. 5 on 30.01.2024. 6. The respondent No. 5 pursuant to the said application sought for various documents from the CJM, Aalo vide the communication dated 10.06.2024 which included: 1. Annual Performance Assessment Report (APAR) for the last five years. 2. Vigilance Clearance Certificate. 3. Integrity Certificate issued by the Head of the Department. 4. Pay Matrix Level as on date and the date of entry in the present Pay matrix level. 5. The promotion order of the applicant to the post held at present. 7. The CJM, Aalo forwarded all the said documents as sought for vide the communication dated 10.06.2024 to the Under Secretary of the respondent No. 5 vide a communication dated 21.06.2024. The records reveal that on 09.09.2024, the respondent No. 5 appointed the petitioner to the post of Assistant for a period of 3 (three) years initially on deputation basis w.e.f. the date of her joining the post of Assistant to the Secretary of the respondent No. 5. Pursuant thereto, on 18.09.2024, the Officer namely Mr. The records reveal that on 09.09.2024, the respondent No. 5 appointed the petitioner to the post of Assistant for a period of 3 (three) years initially on deputation basis w.e.f. the date of her joining the post of Assistant to the Secretary of the respondent No. 5. Pursuant thereto, on 18.09.2024, the Officer namely Mr. Tageng Padoh who was still holding the charge of the post of the District And Sessions Judge, Aalo, West Siang District released the petitioner from the Establishment of the CJM, Aalo with immediate effect for her to join her new Department. 8. At this stage, it is very pertinent to mention that in the entire process, i.e. from the date of submission of the application by the petitioner dated 22.01.2024 till 18.09.2024, the Gauhati High Court on the Administrative side was kept in dark. On 18.09.2024, the copy of the release order was marked to the Registrar, Gauhati High Court, Itanagar Permanent Bench, Yupia for information. On the basis of the order of release dated 18.09.2024, the CJM, Aalo issued the release order dated 20.09.2024, whereby the petitioner was released from the Establishment of the CJM, Aalo w.e.f. 20.09.2024 (F/N) to enable her to join in the Establishment of the respondent No. 5. The CJM, Aalo also did not find it appropriate to even mark a copy of that release order to the Gauhati High Court. 9. The petitioner thereupon submitted the joining report to the Secretary of the respondent No. 5 on 23.09.2024. The respondent No.5 duly acknowledged the joining of the petitioner on 23.09.2024 vide the communication dated 09.10.2024 issued to the Principal Secretary (Home), Government of Arunachal Pradesh, Itanagar by the Under Secretary of the respondent No. 5. 10. Pursuant thereto, on 28.11.2024, the District and Sessions Judge, Aalo, West Siang District issued an order whereby the release order of the petitioner was recalled/revoked with immediate effect and directed the petitioner to join the Office of the CJM, Aalo within 7 (seven) days from the date of the said order. The said order dated 28.11.2024 has been impugned in the instant proceedings. It is very pertinent, however, to take note of that this impugned order dated 28.11.2024 was issued by one Mr. Jaweplu Chai, who was the incumbent duly appointed to the post of the District and Sessions Judge, West Siang District, Aalo. 11. The said order dated 28.11.2024 has been impugned in the instant proceedings. It is very pertinent, however, to take note of that this impugned order dated 28.11.2024 was issued by one Mr. Jaweplu Chai, who was the incumbent duly appointed to the post of the District and Sessions Judge, West Siang District, Aalo. 11. The petitioner, on coming to learn about the said order dated 28.11.2024 submitted a representation on 03.12.2024, for reconsideration of the revocation/recall order dated 28.11.2024. The respondent No. 5 also issued a similar communication on the same day i.e. on 03.12.2024, requesting the District and Sessions Judge, West Siang District, Aalo to reconsider the recall/revocation of the release order of the petitioner. The respondent No. 4 i.e. the District and Sessions Judge, West Siang District thereupon, vide a communication dated 04.12.2024, rejected the representation of the petitioner as well as the request so made by the respondent No. 5 for reconsideration of the impugned order dated 28.11.2024 vide a communication dated 04.12.2024 and the respondent No. 4 further directed the petitioner to join her office i.e. the office of the CJM, Aalo immediately. It is relevant to take note of that in the said communication dated 04.12.2024, it was mentioned that the said request for reconsideration cannot be done in view of the fact that the said impugned order of recall/revocation of the release order was issued upon the directions of the Gauhati High Court on the Administrative side. 12. The petitioner thereupon submitted a representation dated 06.12.2024 to the respondent No. 2 seeking reconsideration of the revocation/recall order dated 28.11.2024. The grounds stated in the said representation were that the petitioner has personal difficulties in carrying out the work at Aalo, in view of the fact that her mother-in- law is a widow residing alone in Itanagar and suffers from daily old- age ailments and requires constant care. Additionally, the petitioner in the representation also stated that managing small children alone in Aalo without the husband's constant presence poses challenge and revoking her services from the respondent No. 5 would deprive her children of the love of the father. 13. Additionally, the petitioner in the representation also stated that managing small children alone in Aalo without the husband's constant presence poses challenge and revoking her services from the respondent No. 5 would deprive her children of the love of the father. 13. The said representation so submitted to the respondent No. 2 was rejected and duly informed to the petitioner by the Registrar of the Itanagar Permanent Bench of the Gauhati High Court vide a communication dated 10.12.2024 and the petitioner was further directed to join the office of the CJM, Aalo immediately. The petitioner, however, did not join but continued with the services with the respondent No. 5. 14. A show cause notice was issued on 10.12.2024 asking, as to why, disciplinary proceedings should not be initiated against her. The petitioner submitted a reply on 17.12.2024 stating that she was fully acquainted and comfortable with the office protocols and administrative functioning of the respondent No. 5 and further she attended Human Rights Capacity Building Trainings at National Human Rights Commission, New Delhi, jointly invested by the respondent No. 5 and the National Human Rights Commission, which would benefit the State. She further stated that she was released vide an order dated 18.09.2024 by the District and Sessions Judge, Aalo and thereupon, the recall/revocation order was made without any fault of the petitioner. 15. Subsequent thereto, the respondent No. 4 finding that the reply of the petitioner was not satisfactory, a disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the petitioner vide an order dated 19.12.2024 and a Memorandum of Charges/Charge Sheet was submitted against the petitioner. The petitioner submitted her written statement of defense in the said disciplinary proceedings and it is under such circumstances, the petitioner has approached this Court challenging the order dated 28.11.2024 as well as assailed the disciplinary proceedings which have been initiated against the petitioner. 16. The writ petition upon being filed, vide an order dated 06.03.2025, this Court issued notice. The petitioner though prayed for an interim order for stay of the disciplinary proceedings, however, vide a detailed order dated 06.03.2025, the said disciplinary proceedings was not stayed. STAND OF THE RESPONDENT NO.1 17. 16. The writ petition upon being filed, vide an order dated 06.03.2025, this Court issued notice. The petitioner though prayed for an interim order for stay of the disciplinary proceedings, however, vide a detailed order dated 06.03.2025, the said disciplinary proceedings was not stayed. STAND OF THE RESPONDENT NO.1 17. The stand of the respondent No. 1 in the affidavit-in-opposition filed on 19.05.2025 is that the petitioner's deputation as Assistant to the respondent No. 5 and the subsequent revocation of the release order pertains to service management under the control of the Judicial Administration. It was mentioned that the Law Department of the Government of Arunachal Pradesh plays no role in transfer, posting or deputation matters of the Court staff. Such decisions lie entirely within the administrative jurisdiction of the High Court and the District Judiciary. It was further mentioned that as per the Arunachal Pradesh State District Court Services Rules, 2013 (for short, “the Rules of 2013”), administrative control of Group C staff (including matters of recruitment, transfer, deputation and discipline) rests with the District and Sessions Judge and Group A and Group B rest with the High Court. At Paragraph No. 9 of the said affidavit, it was mentioned that the Rules of 2013 was forwarded to the Registrar General of the Gauhati High Court vide the letter dated 15.03.2011 for obtaining the approval of the Hon’ble Chief Justice of the Gauhati High Court and the Gauhati High Court vide the letter dated 13.11.2013 had sent the approved copy of the Service Rules to the Secretary (Law). 18. It was averred that the approval of the Home Department is not required to release the petitioner nor the communicated letter dated 21.02.2025 is meant for any approval for release. This aspect of the matter would assume importance while this Court will be dealing with the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondent No. 5. Be that as it may, Paragraph No. 9 of the said affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondent No. 1 is reproduced herein under: “9. That with regards to the statement made in paragraphs-23 and 24 of the writ petition, the answering respondents begs to state that no case has been made out against the present respondent. Be that as it may, Paragraph No. 9 of the said affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondent No. 1 is reproduced herein under: “9. That with regards to the statement made in paragraphs-23 and 24 of the writ petition, the answering respondents begs to state that no case has been made out against the present respondent. Further, as per the Arunachal Pradesh State District Court Services Rules, 2013, administrative Control of Group “C” staff (including matters of recruitment, transfer, deputation and discipline) rests with the District & Sessions Judge and Group “A” and “B” rest with the Hon’ble Gauhati High Court. Therefore, the issues raised in the writ petition do not fall within the administrative purview of the Law Department and may be dealt with by the appropriate judicial authority. It is however, pertinent to mention that, the Arunachal Pradesh District Service Rules of 2013 was forward to the Registrar General of Hon’ble High Court vide letter dated Jud-1/2000 Vol-I dated 15.03.2011 (Annexure-A) for obtaining the approval of the Chief Justice of Gauhati High Court and the Hon’ble Court High Court vide letter dated No. HCVII-06/2011/8978/RC dated 13.11.2013 (Annexure-B) had sent the approved copy of the Service Rules to the Secretary (Law). Furthermore, it be mentioned here that, as communicated by the Home department, the approval of the Home department is not required to release the petitioner nor the communicated letter dated 21.02.2025 is meant for an approval for release. In response to the letter dated 21.02.2025, the Home department has already communicated their opinion vide letter dated 01.04.2025 and 13.05.2025 (Annexure-C-series).” (Emphasis supplied on the underlined portion) STAND OF THE RESPONDENT NO.2 19. The respondent No. 2 filed its affidavit-in-opposition on 14.05.2025, wherein it was mentioned that the Gauhati High Court in its administrative side, had issued a Notification dated 01.06.2011 wherein it was categorically mentioned that no application made by any member of the staff of the Principal Seat at Guwahati for going on deputation would be entertained except with the specific approval of the Administrative Committee. It was mentioned that the said decision was given effect to from 11.04.2011. In that context, it was mentioned that the Subordinate Judiciary, including the District Courts of Arunachal Pradesh is under the Supervisory and Administrative control of the Gauhati High Court. It was mentioned that the said decision was given effect to from 11.04.2011. In that context, it was mentioned that the Subordinate Judiciary, including the District Courts of Arunachal Pradesh is under the Supervisory and Administrative control of the Gauhati High Court. Therefore, by parity of reasoning and administrative discipline, the same principles laid down by the Administrative Committee are applicable mutatis mutandis to the Subordinate Courts in Arunachal Pradesh as well. 20. It was also mentioned that in another meeting of the Administrative Committee held on 25.05.2011, it was resolved that the Registrar General will notify the staff of the Gauhati High Court about the decision that without the approval of the Administrative Committee, no member of the staff of the Principal Seat of the Gauhati High Court would be allowed to go on deputation. It was categorically stated that the petitioner was not appointed on deputation to the post of Assistant under the respondent No. 5 after following all due process inasmuch as, the petitioner did not obtain the requisite No Objection Certificate from the Competent Authority, i.e. the Gauhati High Court. It was mentioned that the deputation of the petitioner lacks compliance with the established procedure and is therefore not legally sustainable. At Paragraph No. 11 of the said affidavit-in-opposition, it was mentioned that the sole ground for issuance of the revocation order dated 28.11.2024 was that it was done pursuant to the directions from the Gauhati High Court. The said revocation was necessitated due to the petitioner's failure to obtain the requisite No Objection Certificate through the proper channel and in absence of prior concurrence or approval of the Gauhati High Court. STAND OF THE RESPONDENT NO. 4 21. The respondent No. 4 filed an affidavit-in-opposition on 14.05.2025 wherein it was stated that irregularity have been committed and the Rules and Norms have been violated while applying for appointment on deputation to the post of Assistant by the petitioner, as the Court was already in dearth of staffs, for which, the staffs could not have been sent on deputation to other Departments. The respondent No. 4 provided the working strength of the Establishment of the District and Sessions Judge, West Siang District as detailed out in the communication dated 14.09.2024 as well as 17.09.2024 which were a part of Annexure-A series. The respondent No. 4 provided the working strength of the Establishment of the District and Sessions Judge, West Siang District as detailed out in the communication dated 14.09.2024 as well as 17.09.2024 which were a part of Annexure-A series. A perusal of the said documents would show that releasing the petitioner was not in the interest of administration of the establishment of the District and sessions Judge, West Siang District, Aalo. It was also mentioned that in the history of Arunachal Pradesh Judiciary since separation in the year 2010, till date no staffs have been sent on deputation to other Departments, on account of the dearth of staffs in the Judiciary. It was also mentioned that on account of the limited staffs, there has been a requirement of making and adjusting them to do various multi- task by the Judiciary to run the Courts, and on account of the petitioner having been allowed to go on deputation, the Court of the CJM, Aalo was facing huge dearth of staffs. 22. The respondent No. 4 in its affidavit-in-opposition enclosed the reply sent by Sri Tageng Padoh who was the incumbent District and Sessions Judge (In-charge), West Siang District, Aalo who had issued the release order. This Court had perused the said reply so submitted dated 27.09.2024 wherein the concerned District and Sessions Judge had justified the release order on the basis of the CCS Rules/Office Memorandum dated 30.08.2024 and had further stated that he was ready to recall the release order provided, if the Registrar, Itanagar Permanent Bench furnished to him the related documents/rules to obtain prior approval from the Gauhati High Court. The said Officer further went to the extent to state that he did not have any grounds to recall it, unless he is convinced that the prior approval was required. 23. The respondent No. 4 further justified in the affidavit-in-opposition that the impugned order of revocation of the release order was justified as the same was not done with the concurrence and approval of the Gauhati High Court. The respondent No. 4 further justified that the disciplinary action was also taken on account of the petitioner having not joined the post in the Office of the CJM, Aalo, in spite of various directions being issued from time to time. STAND OF THE RESPONDENT NO.5 24. The respondent No. 4 further justified that the disciplinary action was also taken on account of the petitioner having not joined the post in the Office of the CJM, Aalo, in spite of various directions being issued from time to time. STAND OF THE RESPONDENT NO.5 24. The respondent No. 5 had filed an affidavit-in-opposition on 03.04.2025 wherein, apart from stating the facts which have been already mentioned herein above in the writ petition, it was categorically mentioned that the petitioner, along with a few officials of the State Human Rights Commission, were sent for in-room training for a period of 3 (three) days on Human Rights at the National Human Rights Commission, Delhi and the training was conducted from 18.11.2024 to 20.11.2024. The respondent No. 5 further stated in the affidavit-in-opposition that the disciplinary proceedings so initiated against the petitioner was not in consonance with Rule 21 of the CCS(CCA) Rules, 1965 inasmuch as the respondent No. 5 being the Borrowing Authority only had the power to initiate disciplinary proceedings during that period. It was further mentioned that in terms with the Office Memorandum dated 17.06.2010, the Lending Department is to give 3 (three) months advance notice to the Borrowing Department and without the said being done, the question of revocation of the release order does not arise. It was further stated specifically at Paragraph No. 18 of the affidavit-in-opposition of the respondent No. 5 that the respondent No. 5 cannot release the petitioner, without prior approval of the State Government. This statement made in Paragraph No. 18, however, appears to be contrary to the stand taken by the respondent No. 1 i.e. the State of Arunachal Pradesh as would be apparent from Paragraph No. 9 of the affidavit-in-opposition of the respondent No. 1, which has been already quoted herein above. 25. It is further seen from the records that the petitioner had filed affidavit-in-reply to the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondent Nos. 2 and 4 on 30.05.2025, reiterating the petitioner's stand in the writ petition. SUBMISSIONS MADE BY THE LEARNED COUNSELS FOR THE PARTIES 26. Mr. D. Das, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that the petitioner applied through proper channel and was issued a release order on 18.09.2024 by the District and Sessions Judge, Aalo, West Siang District, who is the Appointing Authority of the petitioner. SUBMISSIONS MADE BY THE LEARNED COUNSELS FOR THE PARTIES 26. Mr. D. Das, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that the petitioner applied through proper channel and was issued a release order on 18.09.2024 by the District and Sessions Judge, Aalo, West Siang District, who is the Appointing Authority of the petitioner. He therefore submitted that in terms with Rule 3(3) of the Rules of 2013, the District and Sessions Judge of the District is the Appointing Authority of the petitioner and therefore, the release order so issued was in accordance with law, and there was no necessity of obtaining any approval from the Gauhati High Court. 27. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that though the Rules of 2013 do not contain any specific provision for deputation, but taking into account Rule 29 of the Rules of 2013, the laws, rules and orders which are for the time being, applicable to members of the State Civil Services in the State of Arunachal Pradesh would also apply insofar as the petitioner is concerned. He therefore submitted that in the State of Arunachal Pradesh, the Central F.R. & S.R. is applicable and in that regard, he referred to Section V of Appendix 5 of the F.R. & S.R. which relates to deputation within India. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted drawing attention to the said Section V of the F.R. & S.R. which contains the standard terms of deputation, that in respect of Non-Gazetted Government Servants, the power of deputation may be exercised by the Heads of the Department and the petitioner being a Non-Gazetted Officer, the District and Sessions Judge, who is the head of the Establishment, wherein the petitioner works, would have the power to send the petitioner on deputation to any other Department of the State or any other Autonomous Body of the State of Arunachal Pradesh. 28. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that the concerned District and Sessions Judge who issued the release order dated 18.09.2024 had therefore justified the release order as would be seen from his reply dated 27.09.2024. 28. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that the concerned District and Sessions Judge who issued the release order dated 18.09.2024 had therefore justified the release order as would be seen from his reply dated 27.09.2024. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the Gauhati High Court, though have filed an affidavit stating that the resolutions so adopted in respect to the Principal Seat shall apply to the District Judiciary, but there being no specific instruction in that regard issued, the District Judge was not in error in issuance of the release order dated 18.09.2024. 29. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the revocation of the release order, vide the impugned order dated 28.11.2024 was not at all justified, taking into account that after the petitioner had joined her services with the respondent No. 5 and almost after 2 (two) months, the revocation order has been issued, that too without notice to the petitioner. 30. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the impugned order of revocation was issued on the dictates of the Gauhati High Court, that too without affording any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner whose rights have been affected, for which, this Court should interfere with the impugned order of revocation on the ground of violation of the principles of natural justice. On the aspect of violation of the principles of natural justice, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to the judgments of the Supreme Court in the case of D.K. Yadav Vs. J.M.A. Industries, (1993) 3 SCC 259 and Sahara India (Firm), Lucknow Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Central & Another, (2008) 14 SCC 151 . 31. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of West Bengal & Another Vs. Nripendra Nath Bagchi, (1966) SCC 447 as well as the in the case of R.M. Gurjar & Another Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Central & Another, (2008) 14 SCC 151 . 31. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of West Bengal & Another Vs. Nripendra Nath Bagchi, (1966) SCC 447 as well as the in the case of R.M. Gurjar & Another Vs. The High Court of Gujarat and Others, (1992) 4 SCC 10 on the aspect pertaining to Article 235 and Article 236 of the Constitution of India and submitted that though the High Court has the control over the Subordinate Judiciary, but the High Court having allowed the Rules of 2013 to be made, thereby empowering the District and Sessions Judge to be the appointing authority, the District and Sessions Judge of the District had the authority to send the petitioner on deputation on presumed delegation of power conferred upon District and Sessions Judge to release the petitioner. 32. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that as the impugned order of revocation is bad in law, the deputation of the petitioner to the respondent No. 5, therefore, is in accordance with law. Referring to Rule 20 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, the learned Senior Counsel therefore submitted that as the deputation is valid, it is only the Borrowing Department i.e. the respondent No. 5 who has the jurisdiction to initiate any disciplinary action and not the Parent Department. 33. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that even if it is assumed that the High Court had the sole authority and the District and Sessions Judge did not have the authority, to allow the petitioner to go on deputation, then also what happened is only a case of irregularity which can very well be regularized by post-facto concurrence and approval by the High Court on the Administrative side and in that regard, referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Siraj Ahmad Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Another, (2020) 19 SCC 480 . 34. The learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner further submitted that in the absence of any rules or regulations, the District and Sessions Judge being the appointing authority had the authority to send the petitioner on deputation and in that regard, referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Prasar Bharati & Others Vs. The learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner further submitted that in the absence of any rules or regulations, the District and Sessions Judge being the appointing authority had the authority to send the petitioner on deputation and in that regard, referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Prasar Bharati & Others Vs. Amarjeet Singh & Others, (2007) 9 SCC 539. 35. Mr. T.J. Mahanta, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Gauhati High Court, Principal Seat submitted that the proposition so submitted on behalf of the petitioner, if allowed, would impact the powers of the High Court conferred under Article 227 of the Constitution of India as well as under Article 235 and Article 236 of the Constitution of India. The learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Gauhati High Court submitted that the Constitution of India had specifically delineated the powers which have been conferred upon the Executive, the Legislature as well as the Judiciary. The doctrine of separation of powers and the need for having an independent Judiciary is not only the ethos of the Constitution of India, but is also apparent from a reading of Article 50 of the Constitution of India. Chapter VI of the Constitution of India deals with the District Judiciary and the provisions have been so made to achieve the abode object of insulating even the District Judiciary from the influence of the Executive and the Legislature. 36. The learned Senior Counsel therefore submitted that a reading of Article 235 of the Constitution of India would show that power has been vested in the High Court solely in respect to the control over the District Courts and the Courts subordinate thereto. Referring to Article 236 of the Constitution of India, the learned Senior Counsel submitted that the said control which is mandated under Article 235 of the Constitution of India would also apply to the Ministerial Staff of the District Judiciary. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that the word “control” used in Article 235 of the Constitution of India has been dealt with by the Supreme Court from time to time and it settled now that the word “control” have been used in a comprehensive sense and includes the control of the High Court over the District Judiciary and the persons manning them both on the Judicial and the Administrative side. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that this control so conferred by the Constitution of India upon the High Court would stand negated if the proposition so submitted by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner is accepted. 37. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that if the submissions so made by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner are to be accepted, then the High Court would be denuded of the power of control over the District Judiciary, both on the Judicial side as well as the Ministerial side and the District Judges on its own can transfer/release any officer or staff working under its Establishment. 38. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the submissions so made by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, on the question of violation of the principles of natural justice, is not a pleaded case of the petitioner. Be that as it may, the learned Senior Counsel further submitted that on one hand, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner had questioned the control of the High Court under Article 235 of the Constitution of India and have made various submissions in that regard and thereupon have made submissions on the violation of the principles of natural justice. He therefore submitted that when the petitioner herein have challenged the action on the part of the Respondent Authorities on merits, the question of raising the plea of violation of the principles of natural justice cannot be permitted. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the law is well settled to the effect that there are exceptions to the principles of natural justice and one of such is the doctrine of useless formality. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that this is a specific case where the very release order was not nonest and as such, there would be no useful purpose of giving any notice before revocation of the release order. He further submitted that insofar as the disciplinary proceeding is concerned, the petitioner has been afforded due opportunities. In support of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Aligarh Muslim University & Others Vs. Mansoor Ali Khan, (2000) 7 SCC 529. 39. Mr. S.R. Rabha, the learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 5 supported the case of the petitioner. In support of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Aligarh Muslim University & Others Vs. Mansoor Ali Khan, (2000) 7 SCC 529. 39. Mr. S.R. Rabha, the learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 5 supported the case of the petitioner. He submitted that the initiation of the departmental proceedings against the petitioner was nonest, taking into account that the petitioner is under deputation with the respondent No. 5. The learned Standing Counsel referring to the Office Memorandum dated 17.06.2010 submitted that without a notice of 3 (three) months, the question of recalling the petitioner does not arise. Additionally, the learned Standing Counsel also submitted that the respondent No. 5 had spent days in training the petitioner after she had joined and in that regard, the respondent No. 5 had sent the petitioner to Delhi to attend in-room training in the National Human Rights Commission. He therefore submitted that the revocation of the release order is required to be interfered with. POINTS FOR CONSIDERATION 1. Whether the District and Sessions Judge could have issued the release order dated 18.09.2024 without the approval of and information to the Gauhati High Court and if the District and Sessions Judge had no authority, what is the status and effect of the release order dated 18.09.2024? 2. Whether the order of revocation dated 28.11.2024 calls for any interference? 3. Whether the petitioner was entitled to a notice prior to revocation of the release order vide the order dated 28.11.2024? 4. Whether the disciplinary actions so initiated against the petitioner are required to be interfered with? ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION FIRST POINT FOR CONSIDERATION 40. For the purpose of deciding the first point for consideration, this Court finds it relevant to take note of Chapter VI of Part VI of the Constitution of India, which starts with the heading “SUBORDINATE COURTS”. Chapter VI of the Constitution of India contains 6 (six) Articles. Article 233 of the Constitution of India deals with appointment of District Judges. Article 233A of the Constitution of India starts with the heading “Validation of appointments of, and judgments, etc., delivered by certain District Judges”. Article 234 of the Constitution of India relates to recruitment of persons other than District Judges to the Judicial Service. Article 233 of the Constitution of India deals with appointment of District Judges. Article 233A of the Constitution of India starts with the heading “Validation of appointments of, and judgments, etc., delivered by certain District Judges”. Article 234 of the Constitution of India relates to recruitment of persons other than District Judges to the Judicial Service. It stipulates that appointment of persons other than District Judges to the Judicial Services of a State shall be made by the Governor of the State in accordance with the Rules made by him in that behalf after consultation with the State Public Service Commission and with the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to such State. 41. The Supreme Court in the case of A.C. Thalwal Vs. High Court of H.P. & Others, (2000) 7 SCC 1 observed that the consultation contemplated by Article 234 of the Constitution of India is not a matter of mere formality; it has to be meaningful and effective. The Supreme Court further opined in the said judgment that Judicial Services so referred to in Article 234 of the Constitution of India has to be independent of Executive influence and as such, the Constitution of India has placed them on a pedestal different from other services under the State. This is so in terms with the Constitutional scheme which aims at securing an independent Judiciary which is the bulwark of democracy. The status which the High Court as an institution enjoys in this constitutional scheme and the expertise and the experience which it possesses of Judicial Services command with justification, a place of primacy being assigned to the High Court in the process of consultation. Paragraph No. 15 of the said judgment is reproduced herein below: “ 15. Article 234 of the Constitution of India provides for appointments to the judicial service of the State (excluding District Judges) to be made by the Governor of the State in accordance with the Rules made by him in that behalf after consultation with the State Public Service Commission and the High Court of the State. The consultation is mandatory. The consultation contemplated by Article 234 is not a matter of mere formality; it has to be meaningful and effective. Judicial services have to be independent of executive influence and so the Constitution has placed them on a pedestal different from other services under the State. The consultation is mandatory. The consultation contemplated by Article 234 is not a matter of mere formality; it has to be meaningful and effective. Judicial services have to be independent of executive influence and so the Constitution has placed them on a pedestal different from other services under the State. The constitutional scheme aims at securing an independent judiciary which is the bulwark of democracy. The status which the High Court as an institution enjoys in the constitutional scheme and the expertise and the experience which it possesses of judicial services command with justification a place of primacy being assigned to the High Court in the process of consultation. As observed by the Constitution Bench in Supreme Court Advocates-on- Record Assn. v. Union of India the High Court assumes primacy because of its being best equipped to discharge the greater burden in the process of consultation contemplated by Article 234 of the Constitution; it is not a question of determining who between the two constitutional functionaries is entitled to greater importance or to take the winner’s prize at the end of the debate. Reference may also be had to the law laid down by this Court in Chandramouleshwar Prasad v. Patna High Court and Hari Datt Kainthla v. State of H.P. Rules regarding consultation with the High Court must at the proposal stage be made available to the High Court so that after study, scrutiny and reflection the High Court may be able to offer its advice to the Governor.” 42. Article 235 of the Constitution of India starts with the heading “Control over Subordinate Courts”. A reading of the said Article would show that the control over the District Courts and the Courts Subordinate thereto, including the posting and promotion of, and the grant of leave to, persons belonging to the Judicial Service of the State and holding any post inferior to the post of the District Judge shall be vested in the High Court. 43. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of the State of West Bengal & Another Vs. Nripendra Nath Bagchi, AIR 1966 SC 447 had the occasion to deal with the interplay of the words “control” and “vest”, used in Article 235 of the Constitution of India. 43. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of the State of West Bengal & Another Vs. Nripendra Nath Bagchi, AIR 1966 SC 447 had the occasion to deal with the interplay of the words “control” and “vest”, used in Article 235 of the Constitution of India. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court observed that control was vested in the High Court to effectuate a purpose, namely, the securing of the independence of the Subordinate Judiciary. It was observed that the word “control” was used for the first time in the Constitution of India and it was accompanied by the word “vest”, which is a strong word. The use of the word “control” and then accompanied by the word “vest” indicates that the High Court is made the sole custodian of the control over the Judiciary. The Supreme Court further observed that while Article 227 of the Constitution of India gives the High Court the superintendence over all Courts and Tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, the word “control” in Article 235 of the Constitution of India has to be therefore, given a different meaning and context, or in other words, it includes something in addition to the mere superintendence. Paragraph Nos. 15 and 16 of the said judgment, being relevant, are reproduced herein under: “ 15. We do not accept this construction. The word “control” is not defined in the Constitution at all. In Part XIV which deals with Services under the Union and the States the words “disciplinary control” or “disciplinary jurisdiction” have not at all been used. It is not to be thought that disciplinary jurisdiction of services is not contemplated. In the context the word “control” must, in our judgment, include disciplinary jurisdiction. Indeed, the word may be said to be used as a term of art because the Civil Services (Classification Control and Appeal) Rules used the word “control” and the only rules which can legitimately come under the word “control” are the Disciplinary Rules. Further, as we have already shown, the history which lies behind the enactment of these Articles indicate that “control” was vested in the High Court to effectuate a purpose, namely, the securing of the independence of the subordinate judiciary and unless it included disciplinary control as well the very object would be frustrated. Further, as we have already shown, the history which lies behind the enactment of these Articles indicate that “control” was vested in the High Court to effectuate a purpose, namely, the securing of the independence of the subordinate judiciary and unless it included disciplinary control as well the very object would be frustrated. This aid to construction is admissible because to find out the meaning of a law, recourse may legitimately be had to the prior state of the law, the evil sought to be removed and the process by which the law was evolved. The word “control”, as we have seen, was used for the first time in the Constitution and it is accompanied by the word “vest” which is a strong word. It shows that the High Court is made the sole custodian of the control over the judiciary. Control, therefore, is not merely the power to arrange the day to day working of the court but contemplates disciplinary jurisdiction over the presiding Judge. Article 227 gives to the High Court superintendence over these courts and enables the High Court to call for returns etc. The word “control” in Article 235 must have a different content. It includes something in addition to mere superintendence. It is control over the conduct and discipline of the judges. This conclusion is further strengthened by two other indications pointing clearly in the same direction. The first is that the order of the High Court is made subject to an appeal if so provided in the law regulating the conditions of service and this necessarily indicates an order passed in disciplinary jurisdiction. Secondly, the words are that the High Court shall “deal” with the judge in accordance with his rules of service and the word “deal” also points to disciplinary and not mere administrative jurisdiction. 16. Articles 233 and 235 make a mention of two distinct powers. The first is power of appointments of persons, their postings and promotion and the other is power of control. In the case of the District Judges, appointments of persons to be and posting and promotion are to be made by the Governor but the control over the District Judge is of the High Court. The first is power of appointments of persons, their postings and promotion and the other is power of control. In the case of the District Judges, appointments of persons to be and posting and promotion are to be made by the Governor but the control over the District Judge is of the High Court. We are not impressed by the argument that the term used is “District Court” because the rest of the Article clearly indicates that the word “court” is used compendiously to denote not only the court proper but also the presiding Judge. The latter part of Article 235 talks of the man who holds the office. In the case of the judicial service subordinate to the District judge the appointment has to be made by the Governor in accordance with the rules to be framed after consultation with the State Public Service Commission and the High Court but the power of posting, promotion and grant of leave and the control of the courts are vested in the High Court. What is vested includes disciplinary jurisdiction. Control is useless if it is not accompanied by disciplinary powers. It is not to be expected that the High Court would run to the Government or the Governor in every case of indiscipline however small and which may not even require the punishment of dismissal or removal. These Articles go to show that by vesting “control” in the High Court the independence of the subordinate judiciary was in view. This was partly achieved in the Government of India Act, 1935 but it was given effect to fully by the drafters of the present Constitution. This construction is also in accord with the Directive Principles in Article 50 of the Constitution which reads: “50. The State shall take steps to separate the judiciary from the executive in the public services of the State”.” 44. The Supreme Court in the said judgment further observed that the control which is vested in the High Court is a complete control subject only to the power of the Governor in the matter of appointment (including dismissal and removal) and posting and promotion of the District Judges. The Supreme Court in the said judgment further observed that the control which is vested in the High Court is a complete control subject only to the power of the Governor in the matter of appointment (including dismissal and removal) and posting and promotion of the District Judges. It was observed that within this power of control vested, the High Court can hold inquiries, impose punishments other than dismissal or removal subject, however, to the conditions of service and right of appeal, if granted by the conditions of service. 45. This Court further taking into account the issues specifically involved, finds it relevant to take note of another Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of the State of Orissa Vs. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra & Others, AIR 1968 SC 647 . The issue involved therein was, as to whether, while sparing the services of any Judicial Officer to the Government, it was open to the High Court to fix the period during which the said Judicial Officer may hold any Executive post. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court observed that when the High Court spares the services of a Judicial Officer to the Government, it was open to the High Court to fix the period during which he may hold any Executive post and at the end of the period, the Government was bound to allow him to go back to his Parent Department. The Supreme Court further categorically observed that there has to be an agreement between the High Court and the Government and if there was no such agreement, it was open to the Government to send back the said Officer to the Parent Department and it was equally open to the High Court to recall him. Paragraph No. 14 of the said judgment being relevant, is reproduced herein under: “ 14. While sparing the service of any judicial officer to the government it is open to the High Court to fix the period during which he may hold any executive post. At the end of that period, the government is bound to allow him to go back to his parent department unless the High Court agrees to spare his services for some more time. In other words, the period during which a judicial officer should serve in an executive post must be settled by agreement between the High Court and the government. In other words, the period during which a judicial officer should serve in an executive post must be settled by agreement between the High Court and the government. If there is no such agreement it is open to the government to send him back to his parent department at any time it pleases. It is equally open to the High Court to recall him whenever it thinks fit. If only there is mutual understanding and appreciation of the difficulties of the one by the other, there will be harmony. There is no reason why there should be any conflict between the High Court and the government. Except for very good reasons we think the High Court should always be willing to spare for an agreed period the services of any of the officers under its control for filling up such executive posts as may require the services of judicial officers. The government, in its turn should appreciate the anxiety of the High Court that judicial officers should not be allowed to acquire vested interest in the secretariat. Both the High Court and the government should not forget the fact that powers are conferred on them for the good of the public and they should act in such a way as to advance public interest. If they act with that purpose in view as they should, then there is no room for conflict and no question of one dominating the other arises. Each of the organs of the State has a special role of its own. But our Constitution expects all of them to work in harmony in a spirit of service.” 46. The above observations of the Supreme Court are important to be taken note of in the context of Article 235 of the Constitution of India and, more particularly, in respect to the present case inasmuch as, it is the High Court who has the power to send a Judicial Officer working in the District or the Court Subordinate thereto, to the State Government on deputation or to any other Autonomous Body. The said power having been conferred upon the High Court, sans any delegation made by the Full Court of the High Court, no authority can exercise the same. The said power having been conferred upon the High Court, sans any delegation made by the Full Court of the High Court, no authority can exercise the same. The said aspect of the matter can also be discerned from the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Registrar General, High Court of Judicature of Madras Vs. R. Perachi & Others, (2011) 12 SCC 137 wherein inter alia one of the issues involved was whether the Chief Justice could have transferred the respondent No. 1 who was working as a Sheristadar category I in the Court of the Principal District Judge, Thoothukudi outside the district inasmuch as that the power under Article 235 of the Constitution of India was conferred upon the High Court and not the Chief Justice. The contention therein was that in terms with Article 216 of the Constitution of India, the High Court means “the Chief Justice and his companion Judges” and therefore the matter of transfer ought to have been placed before the Full Court. The Supreme Court held that in terms with Article 235 of the Constitution of India, the control of the High Court over the Subordinate Courts included general superintendence of the working of the Subordinate Courts and their staff. The Supreme Court further held that the Chief Justice of the High Court of the Judicature of Madras was empowered by a resolution of the Full Court to retain the subject of vigilance cell with the Chief Justice and as such, it was deemed that the Full Court had authorized the Chief Justice. Paragraph Nos. 28 and 29 of the said judgment, being relevant are reproduced herein under: “ 28. The control of the High Court over the subordinate courts under Article 235 of the Constitution includes general superintendence of the working of the subordinate courts and their staff, since their appeals against the orders of the District Judges lie to the High Court. 28 and 29 of the said judgment, being relevant are reproduced herein under: “ 28. The control of the High Court over the subordinate courts under Article 235 of the Constitution includes general superintendence of the working of the subordinate courts and their staff, since their appeals against the orders of the District Judges lie to the High Court. (See R.M. Gurjar v. High Court of Gujarat.) “The word ‘control’ referred to in Article 235 of the Constitution has been used in the comprehensive sense and includes the control and superintendence of the High Court over the subordinate courts and the persons manning them, both on the judicial and the administrative side.” (See p. 533, para 14 of Gauhati High Court v. Kuladhar Phukan.) This control over the subordinate courts vests in the High Court as a whole. “However, the same does not mean that a Full Court cannot authorise the Chief Justice in respect of any matter whatsoever.” (See pp. 250-51, paras 18 and 19 of High Court of Judicature of Rajasthan v. P.P. Singh.) 29. The Full Court of the Madras High Court had passed a resolution way back in the year 1993 to retain the subject of “Vigilance Cell” with the Chief Justice. Therefore, it was fully within the authority of the then Chief Justice to take the decision to transfer the appellant outside District Thoothukudi. The transfer was particularly necessary in view of the complaint that was pending against him. The Division Bench has observed that the complaint was an anonymous one. Even so, the same had been looked into by the Vigilance Cell, and the District Judge had reported that departmental enquiries were pending against the appellant and the other employees against whom the complaint had been made. The District Judge had also opined that it was undesirable to retain the appellant in his district from the point of view of the administration of that district. In view of all these factors, the Chief Justice had to take the necessary decision. It is, therefore, difficult to accept the view of the Division Bench that the Chief Justice unilaterally transferred the appellant outside the district, and the decision ought to have been taken either by the Full Court or a committee appointed by the Full Court. In view of all these factors, the Chief Justice had to take the necessary decision. It is, therefore, difficult to accept the view of the Division Bench that the Chief Justice unilaterally transferred the appellant outside the district, and the decision ought to have been taken either by the Full Court or a committee appointed by the Full Court. In view of what is pointed out above, there was no reason for the Division Bench to take such a view in the facts of the present matter.” 47. The analogy which can be drawn from the above judgment is that it is the High Court who has the jurisdiction and the High Court means in terms with Article 216 of the Constitution of India, the Chief Justice and his companion Justices. It can further be discerned that unless and until the High Court has authorized, the District Judge to release the petitioner, the District Judge did not have the authority or jurisdiction to release the petitioner without the approval and prior information of the High Court. 48. Before proceeding further, this Court finds it relevant to take note of Article 236 of the Constitution of India which defines the terms “district judge” and “judicial service”. At this stage, it is relevant to observe that in the case of R.M. Gurjar (supra), the issue involved pertained to the challenge to the decision of the Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court wherein amongst others it was decided by the learned Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court that the Ministerial Officers and Servants of the Subordinate Judiciary would come within the purview of Article 235 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court is the case of R.M. Gurjar (supra) upheld the findings of the learned Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court that the Ministerial Officers and servants of the Subordinate Judiciary would come within the purview of the control of the High Court as vested by Article 235 of the Constitution of India. Paragraph Nos. 3 and 7 of the said judgment are reproduced herein under: “ 3. The Full Bench of the High Court speaking through the Acting Chief Justice primarily dealt with question No. 2 and came to the conclusion that the “control” under Article 235 of the Constitution of India extends to the ministerial officers and servants on the establishment of the subordinate courts also. The Full Bench of the High Court speaking through the Acting Chief Justice primarily dealt with question No. 2 and came to the conclusion that the “control” under Article 235 of the Constitution of India extends to the ministerial officers and servants on the establishment of the subordinate courts also. The second question was, accordingly, answered against the petitioners. On the interpretation of Article 235 and the Rules the first question was also decided against the petitioners. This appeal by way of special leave is against the judgment of the Full Bench of the High Court. 7. On the interpretation placed by us on the Rules, the answer to the first question has to be in the affirmative. We are also of the opinion that the answer to the second question as rendered by the Full Bench of the High Court is unexceptionable and does not call for any interference. The appeal consequently fails and is dismissed but with no order as to cost.” 49. Article 237 of the Constitution of India enables the Governor to apply the provisions of Chapter VI of Part VI of the Constitution of India and any Rules made thereunder to certain class or classes of Magistrate and not only to any other class or classes of Officers. For the purpose of the present dispute, the said Article would not be relevant. 50. In the backdrop of the above, the materials on record would show that there was no information given by the CJM, Aalo who was the Controlling Authority of the petitioner as well as by the District and Sessions Judge as regards an application submitted by the petitioner to go on deputation to the respondent No. 5. The release order issued on 18.09.2024, was casually marked by the District and Sessions Judge to the Registrar, Itanagar Permanent Bench for information. By that time, the petitioner was already released. The release order issued on 18.09.2024, was casually marked by the District and Sessions Judge to the Registrar, Itanagar Permanent Bench for information. By that time, the petitioner was already released. This, in the opinion of this Court, could not have been done so, as it is the Gauhati High Court in its Administrative side who could have granted the permission for allowing the petitioner to go on deputation, more so, when there is nothing on record to show that there was any agreement between the Gauhati High Court in the Administrative side with that of with the respondent No. 5, whereby the staff of the Subordinate Courts can be lent to the respondent No. 5 on deputation. 51. Before concluding, on this point for consideration, this Court finds it relevant to take note of the submissions so made by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner to the effect that the concerned District and Sessions Judge had the authority to release the petitioner. This Court finds it relevant to take note of the Rules of 2013, which were made by the Governor of Arunachal Pradesh. These Rules of 2013 were in respect to regulating the Ministerial Officers and Staff to the District Courts and Courts Subordinate thereto. Rule 3(3) of the Rules of 2013 stipulates that the Appointing Authority for the category of post of Administrative Officers and such other category of posts as may be specified by the High Court, be the High Court and for other category of posts, in other places, the District And Session Judge of the District. 52. At this stage, it is relevant to take note of that from a perusal of the writ petition itself and, more particularly, at Paragraph No. 3, the petitioner was appointed to the post of Peshkar through a Direct Recruitment process, initiated by the Recruitment Cell of the Gauhati High Court, vide an advertisement dated 18.07.2013. Though, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that the District and Sessions Judge is the Appointing Authority of the petitioner, but there is nothing brought on record that the petitioner was appointed by the District and Sessions Judge. Though, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that the District and Sessions Judge is the Appointing Authority of the petitioner, but there is nothing brought on record that the petitioner was appointed by the District and Sessions Judge. Even assuming that the petitioner was appointed by the District and Sessions Judge then also Gauhati High Court continue to retain control upon the services of the petitioner by virtue of Article 235 and Article 236 of the Constitution of India. 53. The learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that though the Rules of 2013, do not specifically mention that deputation to be a condition of service, but in view of Rule 29 of the Rules of 2013, the laws, rules and orders for the time being applicable to members of the State Civil Services in the State holding equivalent Grade Posts would be applicable. On that basis, the learned Senior Counsel had therefore referred to Section V of Appendix 5 of the F.R. and S.R. which relates to the Standard Terms of Deputation and, more particularly, Clause 6 therein which stipulates that in respect of Non-Gazetted Government servants, the power of deputation may be exercised by the Heads of the Department and as such, the learned Senior Counsel submitted that the District and Sessions Judge being the Head of the Department, he had the authority to send the petitioner on deputation. The said submission made on behalf of the learned Senior Counsel is completely misconceived and appears to be a desperate attempt to justify that the District and Sessions Judge had the authority to release the petitioner and send on deputation to the respondent No. 5. 54. The reference to the Standard Terms of Deputation as contained in Section V of Appendix 5 of the F.R. & S.R., were issued sometime in the year 1968. 54. The reference to the Standard Terms of Deputation as contained in Section V of Appendix 5 of the F.R. & S.R., were issued sometime in the year 1968. It is relevant to take note of that though Clause 6 of the said Standard Terms of Deputation refer that in respect of Non- Gazetted Government Servants, the power of deputation may be exercised by the Head of the Department, it is difficult to comprehend, as to how, the District and Sessions Judge would come within the ambit of the Head of the Department unless the Rules of 2013 or the High Court by any Administrative instructions had given the District and Sessions Judge, the status of the Head of the Department. 55. It is also relevant to take note of that even assuming for argument's sake, the laws, rules and orders insofar as deputation applicable to members of the Arunachal State Civil Services are applicable then at that relevant point of time, for the Central Government employees, the Office Memorandum dated 28.03.2024 issued by the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pension, Department of Personnel and Training was holding the field. In terms with Clause 9.2, a Central Government employee shall be eligible for deputation/foreign service to posts in the State Government/State Government Organization/UT Administration/Government of the UT’s Organization /Autonomous Bodies, etc., not controlled by the Central Government only after he had completed 9 (nine) years of service and is clear from vigilance angle that too with the approval of the Minister- in-charge of the Ministry/Department/Organization. Clauses 9.2 and 9.2.1 and its sub-clauses, being relevant are reproduced herein under: “9.2 A Central Government employee shall be eligible for deputation/foreign service to posts in State Government/State Government Organization/ UT Administration / Government of UT's Organization/Autonomous Bodies. Trusts, Societies, PSUs etc. not controlled by the Central Government only after he has completed 9 years of service and is clear from the vigilance angle. 9.2.1 However, with the approval of the Minister-in-charge of the Ministry/Department/ Organization: i. Central Government employee after completion of 7 years of service in his/her cadre, may be allowed to go on deputation to any State of North-Eastern Region and Union Territories of Jammu & Kashmir, Ladakh, Andaman & Nicobar and Lakshadweep or on foreign service to any entity controlled by and located in the afore said States/ Union Territories; ii. Central Government employees may be allowed to go on deputation to State Governments /Union Territories or on foreign service to any entity controlled by and located in the States/Union Territories on spouse ground after completion of 6 years of service in the cadre.” 56. In the instant case, it would be seen that the petitioner had not yet completed 9 (nine) years of service and the approval further, if so required, could not have been from the District and Sessions Judge. It is further seen that this Office Memorandum dated 28.03.2024 was modified vide another Office Memorandum dated 24.09.2024, which specifically related to the deputation of Group C employees and therein also, deputation shall be available to employees only after completion of 9 (nine) years of service in the parent cadre. As per the said Office Memorandum, all cases shall be submitted for consideration and approval of the Competent Authority in the Ministry/Department of the organization concerned. Clause 3, (i) and (ii) of the said Office Memorandum dated 24.09.2024, being relevant are reproduced herein under: “3. Further to the instructions referred above, it has been decided that the deputation of the employees belonging to Group ‘C’ Cadres/Posts in the ministries/Departments/Organisations under the Central Government to the State Governments/UTs Adms. Including PSUs/Autonomous bodies/Statutory Bodies/Universities/Local Bodies under the State Governments/UTs Admn. Shall be regulated by the following instructions/guidelines: (i) All such cases shall be submitted for consideration and approval of the Competent Authority in the Ministry/Department/ Organisation concerned; (ii) Such deputation will be available to the employees only after completion of nine years of service in parent Cadre (iii) …………..” 57. Therefore, the submission of the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner that the District and Sessions Judge had the authority to permit the petitioner to go on deputation as well as also issue the release order without the approval from and prior information to the Gauhati High Court cannot be accepted. 58. This Court at this stage finds it relevant to take note of the concept of deputation. The Supreme Court in the case of Umapati Choudhary Vs. State of Bihar & Another, (1999) 4 SCC 659 had described the concept of deputation as an assignment of an employee of one department or cadre or even an organization to another department or cadre or organization. The Supreme Court in the case of Umapati Choudhary Vs. State of Bihar & Another, (1999) 4 SCC 659 had described the concept of deputation as an assignment of an employee of one department or cadre or even an organization to another department or cadre or organization. The Supreme Court observed that the very concept of deputation is consensual and involves a voluntary decision of the employer to lend the services of his employee and a corresponding acceptance of such service by the borrowing employer. The relevant portion of paragraph No. 8 of the said judgment is reproduced herein under: “ 8. Deputation can be aptly described as an assignment of an employee (commonly referred to as the deputationist) of one department or cadre or even an organisation (commonly referred to as the parent department or lending authority) to another department or cadre or organisation (commonly referred to as the borrowing authority). The necessity for sending on deputation arises in public interest to meet the exigencies of public service. The concept of deputation is consensual and involves a voluntary decision of the employer to lend the services of his employee and a corresponding acceptance of such services by the borrowing employer. It also involves the consent of the employee to go on deputation or not. In the case at hand all the three conditions were fulfilled.” 59. It is the opinion of this Court that taking into account the judgment of the Constitution Bench in the case of Sudhansu Sekhar Misra (supra) and applying the concept of deputation, as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Umapati Choudhary (supra) , and with specific emphasis to Article 235 and Article 236 of the Constitution of India, as the control over the Ministerial staff of the Subordinate Court is vested upon the High Court, it is the Gauhati High Court on the Administrative side who would be the Lending Authority/the Parent Authority and as such, without the approval from and prior information to the Gauhati High Court, the question of allowing the petitioner to go on deputation is completely foreign to the very concept of this deputation. 60. In view of the above findings and determination, the next question which arises is what is the effect of the release order dated 18.09.2024 by which the concerned District and Sessions Judge had released the petitioner. 60. In view of the above findings and determination, the next question which arises is what is the effect of the release order dated 18.09.2024 by which the concerned District and Sessions Judge had released the petitioner. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that even assuming that it is the Gauhati High Court whose approval ought to have been taken, but this approval having not been taken, the release order at best can be said to be irregular and not illegal. In that regard, the learned Senior Counsel had referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Siraj Ahmad (supra). The said submission in the opinion of this Court is misconceived and the reliance placed to the judgment in the case of Siraj Ahmad (supra) is misplaced. 61. Before dealing with said aspect, let this Court deal with the conduct and the manner in which the District and Sessions Judge acted. In the instant case, the concerned District and Sessions Judge, West Siang District had acted in a manner which in the opinion of this Court was not only unauthorized but also in clear disregard to the Constitutional Scheme of Article 235 and Article 236 of the Constitution of India. The communication dated 27.09.2024 issued by the concerned District and Sessions Judge clearly undermined the authority of the Gauhati High Court, in respect to the control vested under Article 235 of the Constitution of India. Moreover, a perusal of the said reply would show that the concerned Officer mentioned that the staff strength of Aalo Sessions Division was full without taking into consideration that posts in the said Establishment were for the purpose of manning the Establishment. There was no surplusage. Rather, the staff was inadequate in view of long duration leave sought for and given to various staff on account of Maternity leave, etc. The reference made to the OM dated 30.08.2024 had no relevance as it was in relation to Group A and Group B posts. The Officer concerned admits that there was no staff sent on deputation from the District Courts of Arunachal Pradesh but still did not find it necessary for seeking an opinion from the Gauhati High Court before issuing the release order dated 18.09.2024. The Officer concerned admits that there was no staff sent on deputation from the District Courts of Arunachal Pradesh but still did not find it necessary for seeking an opinion from the Gauhati High Court before issuing the release order dated 18.09.2024. It is also noteworthy to observe that when the Gauhati High Court asked the concerned Officer to revoke/recall the release order, he refused to do so. It was only when the post of the District and Sessions Judge, West Siang District was filled up by a regular incumbent, the impugned revocation order dated 28.11.2024 was issued. 62. Therefore, from the above analysis it is clear that the District and Sessions Judge did not have the authority to release the petitioner and permit the petitioner to go on deputation. Let this Court now deal with the judgment of the Supreme court rendered in the case of Siraj Ahmad (supra) to which the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner referred to and submitted that the release order being irregular, it can be made good by way of post-facto approval by the Gauhati High Court in the Administrative side. The said judgment in the case of Siraj Ahmad (supra) was rendered in the case of a person who was temporarily appointed pursuant to an advertisement by way of a selection process, but while regularizing his services, there was no concurrence taken from the U.P. Public Service Commission, which was otherwise required as per the applicable rules. The dispute arose on account of the Appellant therein not being considered for promotion on the ground that the appointment of the Appellant was held to be illegal by the Authorities. The Supreme Court held that the appointment of the Appellant therein could not be said to be an illegal appointment, but was an irregular appointment and as such, the same would not debar the Appellant therein from being promoted. The Supreme Court held that the appointment of the Appellant therein could not be said to be an illegal appointment, but was an irregular appointment and as such, the same would not debar the Appellant therein from being promoted. The said judgment in the opinion of this Court had no application to the present case inasmuch as this is not a case where a process of consultation is envisaged between the District and Sessions Judge with the Gauhati High Court as per the Constitutional mandate as well as per the Rules of 2013, rather it is only the Gauhati High Court or such authorized authority as the Full Court of the High Court may authorize, who would have the authority to consider the application as well as permit the petitioner to go on deputation. 63. This Court therefore is of the opinion that the release order dated 18.09.2024 issued by the concerned District and Sessions Judge is nonest and void ab initio as being issued by an authority having no authority or jurisdiction. The question of post-facto approval do not arise in the present facts of the case. 64. Another judgment was referred to by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner being Prasar Bharati & Ors (supra) to support his submission that the District and Sessions Judge had the authority to permit the petitioner to go on deputation. The said judgment was rendered on the issue, as to whether, Prasar Bharati Corporation had the authority to transfer the employees of Doordarshan and Akashvani who were Central Government employees. The Supreme Court held that as the Central Government permitted the employees of Akashvani and Doordarshan to continue to render service in the Prasar Bharati Corporation, it was presumed that these employees were on deemed deputation to Prasar Bharati Corporation and therefore the said Corporation had a right to transfer as transfer is an incidence of service. The said judgment in the opinion of this Court is misplaced and has no relevance to the present facts as the Gauhati High Court did not permit the petitioner to go on deputation or had authorized the release of the petitioner. 65. The said judgment in the opinion of this Court is misplaced and has no relevance to the present facts as the Gauhati High Court did not permit the petitioner to go on deputation or had authorized the release of the petitioner. 65. Before proceeding to the second point for consideration, this Court also finds it relevant to observe that the submission of the learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 5 to the effect that there was a requirement of a 3 (three) months notice to be given before recalling the petitioner from the respondent No. 5, also do not hold any water taking into account that the very release of the petitioner vide the order dated 18.09.2024 by the concerned District and Sessions Judge was without any authority and jurisdiction. The release order dated 18.09.2024 being nonest and void ab initio. SECOND POINT FOR CONSIDERATION 66. Taking into account the determination made in respect to the first point for consideration, it is the opinion of this Court that the order of revocation dated 28.11.2024 impugned in the present proceedings was in accordance with law and do not call for any interference. THIRD POINT FOR CONSIDERATION 67. The third point for consideration arises on the question, as whether, the petitioner was entitled to a notice prior to revocation of the release order dated 18.09.2024. At the outset, it is relevant to take note of that though this submission has been advanced, but this is not supported by any pleadings in the writ petition. Be that as it may, as submissions have been made, this Court would consider, as to whether, the petitioner was entitled to a notice prior to the order of revocation. While deciding the first and the second point for consideration, this Court had categorically opined that the order of release dated 18.09.2024 was nonest and void ab initio, as the District and Sessions Judge had no authority and jurisdiction to permit the petitioner to go on deputation as well as release the petitioner. 68. It is further relevant to take note of that the principles of natural justice, on which, the petitioner now has fallen back upon at the time of arguments are flexible principles. They cannot be applied in any straitjacket formula. 68. It is further relevant to take note of that the principles of natural justice, on which, the petitioner now has fallen back upon at the time of arguments are flexible principles. They cannot be applied in any straitjacket formula. It all depends upon the kinds of functions performed and to the extent to which a person is likely to be affected. For these reasons, there are certain exceptions to the principles of natural justice which have been invoked by the Courts time and again. In the case of Aligarh Muslim University (supra) , the Supreme Court opined that there are two exceptions to the principles of natural justice. The first being, if upon admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion was possible, then in such a case, the breach of natural justice was in itself prejudice would not apply. The second exception is based upon prejudice which is required to be proved. Paragraph Nos. 22 to 25 of the judgment in the case of Aligarh Muslim University (supra) are reproduced herein under: “ 22. In M.C. Mehta it was pointed out that at one time, it was held in Ridge v. Baldwin that breach of principles of natural justice was in itself treated as prejudice and that no other “de facto” prejudice needed to be proved. But, since then the rigour of the rule has been relaxed not only in England but also in our country. In S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan Chinnappa Reddy, J. followed Ridge v. Baldwin and set aside the order of supersession of the New Delhi Metropolitan Committee rejecting the argument that there was no prejudice though notice was not given. The proceedings were quashed on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice. But even in that case certain exceptions were laid down to which we shall presently refer. 23. Chinnappa Reddy, J. in S.L. Kapoor case laid down two exceptions (at SCC p. 395) namely, if upon admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion was possible, then in such a case, the principle that breach of natural justice was in itself prejudice, would not apply. In other words if no other conclusion was possible on admitted or indisputable facts, it is not necessary to quash the order which was passed in violation of natural justice. Of course, this being an exception, great care must be taken in applying this exception. 24. In other words if no other conclusion was possible on admitted or indisputable facts, it is not necessary to quash the order which was passed in violation of natural justice. Of course, this being an exception, great care must be taken in applying this exception. 24. The principle that in addition to breach of natural justice, prejudice must also be proved has been developed in several cases. In K.L. Tripathi v. State Bank of India Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. (as he then was) also laid down the principle that not mere violation of natural justice but de facto prejudice (other than non-issue of notice) had to be proved. It was observed, quoting Wade’s Administrative Law (5th Edn., pp. 472-475), as follows: (SCC p. 58, para 31) “It is not possible to lay down rigid rules as to when the principles of natural justice are to apply, nor as to their scope and extent. … There must also have been some real prejudice to the complainant; there is no such thing as a merely technical infringement of natural justice. The requirements of natural justice must depend on the facts and circumstances of the case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject-matter to be dealt with, and so forth.” Since then, this Court has consistently applied the principle of prejudice in several cases. The above ruling and various other rulings taking the same view have been exhaustively referred to in State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma. In that case, the principle of “prejudice” has been further elaborated. The same principle has been reiterated again in Rajendra Singh v. State of M.P. 25. The “useless formality” theory, it must be noted, is an exception. Apart from the class of cases of “admitted or indisputable facts leading only to one conclusion” referred to above, there has been considerable debate on the application of that theory in other cases. The divergent views expressed in regard to this theory have been elaborately considered by this Court in M.C. Mehta referred to above. This Court surveyed the views expressed in various judgments in England by Lord Reid, Lord Wilberforce, Lord Woolf, Lord Bingham, Megarry, J. and Straughton, L.J. etc. in various cases and also views expressed by leading writers like Profs. Garner, Craig, de Smith, Wade, D.H. Clark etc. This Court surveyed the views expressed in various judgments in England by Lord Reid, Lord Wilberforce, Lord Woolf, Lord Bingham, Megarry, J. and Straughton, L.J. etc. in various cases and also views expressed by leading writers like Profs. Garner, Craig, de Smith, Wade, D.H. Clark etc. Some of them have said that orders passed in violation must always be quashed for otherwise the court will be prejudging the issue. Some others have said that there is no such absolute rule and prejudice must be shown. Yet, some others have applied via media rules. We do not think it necessary in this case to go deeper into these issues. In the ultimate analysis, it may depend on the facts of a particular case.” 69. This Court further finds it relevant to take note of another judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Dharampal Satyapal Limited Vs. Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise, Gauhati & Others, (2015) 8 SCC 519 wherein it was held that it may not be necessary to strike down the action and refer the matter back to the authorities to take a fresh decision after complying with the procedural requirement in those cases where non-granting of hearing has not caused any prejudice to the person against whom the action is taken. Paragraph Nos. 38 and 40 of the said judgment being relevant, are reproduced herein under. “ 38. But that is not the end of the matter. While the law on the principle of audi alteram partem has progressed in the manner mentioned above, at the same time, the courts have also repeatedly remarked that the principles of natural justice are very flexible principles. They cannot be applied in any straitjacket formula. It all depends upon the kind of functions performed and to the extent to which a person is likely to be affected. For this reason, certain exceptions to the aforesaid principles have been invoked under certain circumstances. For example, the courts have held that it would be sufficient to allow a person to make a representation and oral hearing may not be necessary in all cases, though in some matters, depending upon the nature of the case, not only full-fledged oral hearing but even cross-examination of witnesses is treated as a necessary concomitant of the principles of natural justice. Likewise, in service matters relating to major punishment by way of disciplinary action, the requirement is very strict and full-fledged opportunity is envisaged under the statutory rules as well. On the other hand, in those cases where there is an admission of charge, even when no such formal inquiry is held, the punishment based on such admission is upheld. It is for this reason, in certain circumstances, even post-decisional hearing is held to be permissible. Further, the courts have held that under certain circumstances principles of natural justice may even be excluded by reason of diverse factors like time, place, the apprehended danger and so on. 40. In this behalf, we need to notice one other exception which has been carved out to the aforesaid principle by the courts. Even if it is found by the court that there is a violation of principles of natural justice, the courts have held that it may not be necessary to strike down the action and refer the matter back to the authorities to take fresh decision after complying with the procedural requirement in those cases where non-grant of hearing has not caused any prejudice to the person against whom the action is taken. Therefore, every violation of a facet of natural justice may not lead to the conclusion that the order passed is always null and void. The validity of the order has to be decided on the touchstone of “prejudice”. The ultimate test is always the same viz. the test of prejudice or the test of fair hearing.” 70. In the backdrop of the above propositions, so settled by the Supreme Court and applying the same to the facts of the instant case, it would be seen the petitioner had no right to be allowed to go on deputation without the approval of the High Court or such authority as authorized by the High Court. Therefore, there was no creation of any right at the outset in favour of the petitioner on the basis of an action which was completely unauthorized and illegal. Further to that, the doctrine of useless formality duly applies to the present case inasmuch as when the release order dated 18.09.2024 being nonest and void ab initio, an opportunity if granted would not change the illegality committed by the District and Sessions Judge in illegally and unauthorisedly releasing the petitioner and allowing to go on deputation. Further to that, the doctrine of useless formality duly applies to the present case inasmuch as when the release order dated 18.09.2024 being nonest and void ab initio, an opportunity if granted would not change the illegality committed by the District and Sessions Judge in illegally and unauthorisedly releasing the petitioner and allowing to go on deputation. It is also relevant to observe that no action was taken against the petitioner except recalling the petitioner to return to her post of Peshkar. The records further reveal that various opportunities were afforded, but the petitioner did not join. Even thereafter petitioner was asked to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken, then also the petitioner did not care to return. Resultantly, the disciplinary proceedings have been initiated against the petitioner wherein due opportunity have been granted. 71. At this stage, it is very pertinent also to observe that the petitioner claims that the respondent No. 5 have not released the petitioner. The respondent No. 5 in turn claims that without the approval of the State of Arunachal Pradesh, the respondent No. 5 cannot release the petitioner. This stand of the respondent No. 5 is belied by the stand taken by the respondent No. 1 that the respondent No. 1’s approval is not necessary as would appear from the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondent No. 1. It appears from the conduct of the petitioner and the respondent No. 5 that the respondent No. 5 is not agreeable for sending the petitioner back for reasons other than bona fide that too when the Gauhati High Court had no agreement with the respondent No. 5 to lend the Ministerial Staff of the District Judiciary to the respondent No. 5. 72. This Court at this stage also finds it relevant to take note of the stand of the respondent No. 5 in respect to the Office Memorandum dated 17.06.2010 which stipulates that when an officer is sent on deputation, the Parent department cannot recall without 3 months notice. The said stand is totally misconceived in the present facts inasmuch as when the deputation of the petitioner so allowed by the District and Sessions Judge was completely unauthorized and illegal, the question of three months notice does not arise. The said stand is totally misconceived in the present facts inasmuch as when the deputation of the petitioner so allowed by the District and Sessions Judge was completely unauthorized and illegal, the question of three months notice does not arise. Apart from that it is also unfortunate to note that the respondent No. 5 even as on date have not released the petitioner after being duly informed that the release order dated 18.09.2024 was revoked on 28.11.2024 and the representation submitted on 03.12.2024 by the respondent No. 5 for re-consideration was rejected. 73. Consequently, as no right accrued upon the petitioner on the basis of the illegal and unauthorized release order dated 18.09.2024, the question of notice to the petitioner prior to revocation of the release order dated 18.09.2024 by the impugned revocation order dated 28.11.2024 do not arise. The above analysis answers the third point for consideration. FOURTH POINT FOR CONSIDERATION 74. It is relevant to take note of that the disciplinary action has been initiated against the petitioner on the ground that the petitioner has not reported back to her work in spite of various opportunities being granted. It has been informed to this Court that the disciplinary proceedings are presently pending, wherein the petitioner is duly participating. Considering the above, this Court would not like to comment on the merits of the disciplinary proceedings so initiated, as it may impact the decision in the said disciplinary proceedings. However, the initiation of the disciplinary proceedings do not call for any interference on the present facts and circumstances. 75. This Court, at this stage, finds it relevant to consider the submission of the respondent No. 5 made to the effect that as the petitioner was sent on deputation, it is the respondent No. 5 who would only have the authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings and not the petitioner’s Parent Authority. In the opinion of this Court, the said submission is misconceived taking into account that permitting the petitioner to go on deputation and releasing the petitioner by the concerned District and Sessions Judge being unauthorized and illegal, the question of there being a right created upon the Borrowing Department, i.e., the respondent No. 5, only to initiate disciplinary proceedings do not arise. As the very deputation of the petitioner to the respondent No. 5 is illegal and unauthorized, there is no right of the respondent No. 5 over the petitioner. CONCLUSION 76. The instant writ petition stands disposed of with the following observations and directions: i) The District and Sessions Judge, West Siang District, Aalo had no authority to permit the petitioner to go on deputation as well as issue the release order dated 18.09.2024 without the approval and prior information to the Gauhati High Court. ii) The permission given to the petitioner to go on deputation to the respondent No. 5 as well as the release order dated 18.09.2024 is illegal and unauthorized. iii) The revocation of the release order dated 18.09.2024 vide the order dated 28.11.2024 do not call for any interference. iv) The initiation of the disciplinary proceedings by the concerned Respondent Authorities upon the petitioner do not call for any interference. Be that as it may, the said observation should not be construed as a decision of this Court on the merits of the said disciplinary proceedings and the said disciplinary proceedings, be proceeded with in accordance with law, without being influenced by the observations made in the present judgment. v) The writ petition stands dismissed. vi) There shall be no order as to costs. 77. Before parting with the record, this Court is compelled to make certain observations. This Court while hearing the present writ petition from time to time enquired with the Gauhati High Court, as to whether, any action have been taken against the concerned Officer namely Mr. Tageng Padoh, the District and Sessions Judge who permitted the petitioner to go on deputation that too without any approval and prior information to the Gauhati High Court. The Standing Counsels for the Gauhati High Court duly informed this Court that no actions have been taken. It surprises this Court that even after coming to learn about the illegalities committed, the Gauhati High Court on the Administrative side has not taken any action. This Court in the instant judgment had referred to the reply submitted by the said Officer dated 27.09.2024 and the said officer without any remorse, had questioned the authority of the High Court under Article 235 and Article 236 of the Constitution of India. This Court in the instant judgment had referred to the reply submitted by the said Officer dated 27.09.2024 and the said officer without any remorse, had questioned the authority of the High Court under Article 235 and Article 236 of the Constitution of India. This Court would not like to further comment on this aspect, but would leave it to the best wisdom of the Gauhati High Court on the Administrative side.