ORDER : Venkata Jyothirmai Pratapa, J. Heard Sri Akula Sri Krishna Sai Bhargav, learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner and learned Additional Advocate General for Respondents. 2. The detenue in the present case is said to have been arrayed as an accused in the following cases:- 1. Cr.No.52/2018, U/s.341, 323, 363 and 506 IPC of Hindupur Rural Upgrade Police Station. 2. Cr.No.10/2019, U/s. 393 IPC of Chilamathur PS, Anantapur District. 3. Cr.No.108/2019, U/s 452, 323, 324 and 506 read with 34 IPC of Hindupur Rural PS, Anantapur District. 4. Cr.No.236/2022, U/s 147, 148, 120(b), 109 and 302 read with149 IPC of Hindupur Rural Upgrade PS. 5. Cr.No.239/2022, U/s 305 IPC of Hindupur Rural PS. 6. Cr.No.180/2023, U/s 506 IPC of Hindupur Rural Upgrade Police Station. 7. Cr.No.59 of 2023, U/s 20(b)(ii)(c) and 8(c) of NDPS, Act of Anandapuram PS, Visakhapatnam. 8. Cr.No.104 of 2023, U/s 328 & 284 r/w 34 IPC, Sec 20(b)(ii)(c) & 22(c) of NDPS, Act and Section 18(c) DCA-1940 of II town PS, Visakhapatnam. 3. The detenue is also said to have been arrayed as an accused in the following cases in the State of Karnataka:- 1. Cr.No.55/2017, U/s. 395 IPC of Goribidanur Rural PS, Karnataka State. 2. Cr.No.167/2021, U/s 392 IPC of Uppinangadi PS, Karnataka State. 3. Cr.No.268/2021, U/s 392 & 394 IPC of Koratageri PS, Karnataka State. 4. Cr.No.21/2022, U/s 395 IPC of Midigesi PS, Karnataka State. 5. Cr.No.51/2022, U/s 394 IPC of Koratageri PS, Karnataka State. 6. Cr.No.72/2022, U/s 392 IPC of Koratageri PS, Karnataka State. 7. Cr.No.83/2022, U/s 392 IPC of Gudibanda PS, Karnataka State. 8. Cr.No.100/2022, U/s 392 IPC of Koratageri PS, Karnataka State. 4. The detenue had been granted bail in one of the above six (06) cases registered in the State of Andhra Pradesh and no bail has been granted in the remaining five cases registered in Andhra Pradesh and eight cases registered in Karnataka State. At that stage, the 2 nd Respondent had issued an order of detention dated 02.02.2024 detaining the detenue in Central Jail, Kadapa. The same was approved vide G.O.Rt.No.643, dated 26.03.2024 issued by the 1 st Respondent. 5. At that stage, the 2 nd Respondent had issued an order of detention dated 02.02.2024 detaining the detenue in Central Jail, Kadapa. The same was approved vide G.O.Rt.No.643, dated 26.03.2024 issued by the 1 st Respondent. 5. The grounds on which the order of detention and subsequent proceedings had been issued was that the detenue was habituated in the commission of Goonda activities in violation of law, which comes under the category of GOONDA as defined under Section 2(g) of Section 2 of A.P.Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 due to which public order was being affected and there was every possibility of the detenue continuing to indulge in these kind of acts which would pose danger to the community as well as affect public order. 6. The petitioner who is the father of the detenue moved the present Writ Petition for issuance of a Writ of Habeas- Corpus on the ground that the original detention order as well as the confirmation order were vitiated on the following grounds:- 1. The order of preventive detention could not have been issued as the sponsoring authority deliberately suppressed the factum of grant of bails to the detenue by the concerned Courts before the detaining authority. 2. The detenue was granted bails in almost of all the six cases registered in Andhra Pradesh, but he was not supplied the bail orders which were granted in his favour and the failure on the part of the detaining authority in supplying the bail orders vitiates the order of preventive detention. 3. The detenue was not furnished with the copies of the bail orders to enable him to make an effective representation before the concerned authorities and this procedural irregularity is sufficient to vitiate the entire order. 4. The copy of the order of detention as well as grounds of detention along with the material relied on by the detaining authority have not been served on the detenue and most of the documents are illegible and without proper pagination and without supply of copies of FIR. 5. As held by the Hon’ble Apex Court time and again that grant of bails to the detenue in the cases which were taken as grounds is a very vital fact and that not having knowledge about the said aspect clearly vitiates the entire order of preventive detention. 5. As held by the Hon’ble Apex Court time and again that grant of bails to the detenue in the cases which were taken as grounds is a very vital fact and that not having knowledge about the said aspect clearly vitiates the entire order of preventive detention. 7. Learned counsel for the Petitioner has placed reliance on the judgment of a Coordinate Bench of the Composite High Court of A.P., in Vasnthu Sumalatha Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Others , [MANU/AP/0602/2015] , wherein it was held as follows: “93. Documents, statements or other material relied upon in the grounds of detention, must be communicated to the detenu, because they form part of the grounds, and the grounds furnished to the detenu cannot be said to be complete without them. It would not, therefore, be sufficient to communicate to the detenu a bare recital of the grounds of detention. (Lallubhai Jogibhai Patel; Icchu Devi Choraria). If the documents, which formed the basis of the order of detention, are not served on the detenu along with the grounds of detention, there would be no service of the grounds of detention in the eye of law; and that circumstance would vitiate the detention, and would make it void ab initio. (M. Ahamedkutty; S. Gurdip Singh v. Union of India ; Ichhu Devi Choraria v. Union of India and Shalini Soni v. Union of India). The documents relied on, and referred to in the order of detention, should be furnished at the earliest so that the detenu can make an effective representation immediately, instead of waiting for the documents to be supplied later. The question of demanding the documents is wholly irrelevant. (M. Ahamedkutty;Mohd. Zakir v. Delhi Administration ). 94. The right is to make an effective representation and when some documents are referred to or relied on in the grounds of detention, without copies of such documents, the grounds of detention would not be complete. If there is failure or even delay in furnishing those documents it would amount to denial of the right to make an effective representation. (M. Ahamedkutty; Ramachandra A. Kamat v. Union of India ; Francies Coralie Mullin; Ichhu Devi Choraria; Pritam Nath Hoon v. Union of India ; Tushar Thakker v. Union of India ; Lallubhai Jogibhai Patel; Kirit Kumar Chaman Lal Kundaliya v. Union of India ; and Ana Carolina DSouza v. Union of India). (M. Ahamedkutty; Ramachandra A. Kamat v. Union of India ; Francies Coralie Mullin; Ichhu Devi Choraria; Pritam Nath Hoon v. Union of India ; Tushar Thakker v. Union of India ; Lallubhai Jogibhai Patel; Kirit Kumar Chaman Lal Kundaliya v. Union of India ; and Ana Carolina DSouza v. Union of India). The material and documents, which influence the mind of the detaining authority in passing the order of detention, are part of the basic facts and material, and should be supplied to the detenu. (Lallubhai Jogibhai Patel; Icchu Devi Choraria). 95. If the documents, relating to the grant of bail, had been given to the detenu, he could have made an effective representation explaining the circumstances relevant to the grant of bail. The denial of an effective opportunity, by not giving the detenu the relevant documents while he was in custody, would result in failure of justice. (P.U. Abdul Rahiman v. Union of India ; M. Ahamedkutty). It is immaterial whether the detenu already knew about the contents of the documents or not. Non-furnishing of the copy of the document is fatal as the detenu, who is in jail, would have no access to his own documents. (M. Ahamedkutty; Mehrunisa v. State of Maharashtra). It is hardly an answer to the submission made on behalf of the detenu that copies of material documents referred to in the grounds of detention, were not supplied to the him, and he was thus prevented from making an effective representation, to contend that copies of the documents were not supplied as the detenu was already aware of the contents of the documents. The detenu is entitled to be supplied with copies of all the material documents, instead of having to rely upon his memory in regard to the contents of the documents. Failure of the detaining authority to supply copies of such documents vitiates the detention, and the detenu is entitled to be released. (Mehrunisa; Icchu Devi Choraria; Shalini Soni). 96. To enable the detenu to exercise his right to make an effective representation against his detention, it is imperative that all relevant material, including copies of the bail orders, are furnished to him. (Mehrunisa; Icchu Devi Choraria; Shalini Soni). 96. To enable the detenu to exercise his right to make an effective representation against his detention, it is imperative that all relevant material, including copies of the bail orders, are furnished to him. The contention that the detenu was aware of the bail order, even if accepted as true, would not justify failure of the detaining authority to furnish these copies to the detenu when he has no access to these documents when he is in preventive custody. Failure to furnish copies of the orders granting bail to the detenu vitiates the order of detention”. 8. Sri Vishnu Teja, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the learned Advocate General would submit that, the original order of detention, at page No.48 of the compilation filed along with the counter affidavit specifically states that “ I am satisfied from the material placed before me that you fall under the category of “GOONDA” as defined Section 2(g) of Section 2 of A.P.Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 and you are a fit person to be detained u/s 3 of the said Act…………..” 9. Sri Vishnu Teja, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the learned Advocate General would further submit that the said statement is sufficient recording of the satisfaction of the authority that the detenue was likely to be released and would continue his activities which are detrimental to the public order. He would submit that in such circumstances, there is enough material and recording of satisfaction of the imminent release of the detenue from jail due to which an order of detention came to be passed. He would further submit that non furnishing of the bail orders would not in any manner detract from the case of the detenue in as much as the burden of demonstrating that there was a likelihood of release of the detenue is on the authority passing the detention order and the same has already been discharged by the authority by virtue of the above statement which has been extracted in this order. Reliance is placed upon the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of K. Varadharaj vs. State of Tamil Nadu and another, AIR 2002 SUPREME COURT 2953. 10. Reliance is placed upon the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of K. Varadharaj vs. State of Tamil Nadu and another, AIR 2002 SUPREME COURT 2953. 10. This Court had also, perused the Judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the cases of Rameshwar Shaw Vs. District Magistrate , [ AIR 1964 SC 334 ] Makhan Singh Tarsikka Vs. State of Punjab , [ AIR 1964 SC 1120 ] and Rekha Vs. State of T.N. , [ (2011) 5 SCC 244 ]. Consideration of the Court 11. A Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Rameshwar Shaw vs. District Magistrate, Burdwan , had held, on the question of whether a detention order could be passed against a person in judicial custody, in the following manner: “ 12. As abstract proposition of law, there may not be any doubt that Section 3(1)(a) does not preclude the authority from passing an order of detention against a person whilst he is in detention or in jail; but the relevant facts in connection with the making of the order may differ and that may make a difference in the application of the principle that adetention order can be passed against a person in jail. Take for instance, a case where a person has been sentenced to rigorous imprisonment, for ten years. It cannot be seriously suggested that soon after the sentence of imprisonment is pronounced on the person, the detaining authority can make an order directing the detention of the said person after he is released from jail at the end of the period of the sentence imposed on him. In dealing with this question, again the considerations of proximity of time will not be irrelevant. On the other hand, if a person who is undergoing imprisonment, for a very short period, say for a month or two or so, and it is known that he would soon be released from jail, it may be possible for the authority to consider the antecedent history of the said person and decide whether the detention of the said person would be necessary after he is released from jail, and if the authority is bona fide satisfied that such detention is necessary, he can make a valid order of detention a few days before the person is likely be released. The antecedent history and the past conduct on which the order of detention would be based would, in such a case, be proximate in point of time and would have a rational connection with the conclusion drawn by the authority that the detention of the person after his release is necessary. It may not be easy to discover such rational connection between the antecedent history of the person who has been sentenced to ten years' rigorous imprisonment and the view that his detention should be ordered after he is released after running the whole of his sentence. Therefore, we are satisfied that the question as to whether an order of detention can be passed against a person who is in detention or in jail, will always have to be determined in the circumstances of each case.” 12. This principle was followed by another Constitution Bench in Makhan Singh Tarsikka vs. State of Punjab. 13. Another Constitution bench judgement of the hon’ble Supreme Court has to be noticed. In Haradhan Saha v. State of W.B., (1975) 3 SCC 198 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 816 at page 209 the bench had held as follows: “ 34. The recent decisions of this Court on this subject are many.The decisions in Borjahan Gorey v. State of W.B. [ (1972) 2 SCC 550 : 1972 SCC (Cri) 888] , Ashim Kumar Ray v. State of W.B. [ (1973) 4 SCC 76 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 723] ; Abdul Aziz v. District Magistrate, Burdwan [ (1973) 1 SCC 301 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 321] and Debu Mahato v. State of W.B. [ (1974) 4 SCC 135 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 274] correctly lay down the principles to be followed as to whether a detention order is valid or not. The decision in Biram Chand v. State of U.P. [ (1974) 4 SCC 573 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 609] which is a Division Bench decision of two learned Judges is contrary to the other Bench decisions consisting in each case of three learned Judges. Theprinciples which can be broadly stated are these. The decision in Biram Chand v. State of U.P. [ (1974) 4 SCC 573 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 609] which is a Division Bench decision of two learned Judges is contrary to the other Bench decisions consisting in each case of three learned Judges. Theprinciples which can be broadly stated are these. First, merely because a detenu is liable to be tried in a criminal court for the commission of a criminal offence or to be proceeded against for preventing him from committing offences dealt with in Chapter VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure would not by itself debar the Government from taking action for his detention under the Act. Second, the fact that the Police arrests a person and later on enlarges him on bail and initiates steps to prosecute him under the Code of Criminal Procedure and even lodges a first information report may be no bar against the District Magistrate issuing an order under the preventive detention. Third, where the concerned person is actually in jail custody at the time when an order of detention is passed against him and is not likely to be released for a fair length of time, it may be possible to contend that there could be no satisfaction on the part of the detaining authority as to the likelihood of such a person indulging in activities which would jeopardise the security of the State or the public order. Fourth, the mere circumstance that a detention order is passed during the pendency of the prosecution will not violate the order. Fifth, the order of detention is a precautionary measure. It is based on a reasonable prognosis of the future behaviour of a person based on his past conduct in the light of the surrounding circumstances.” 14. It has been argued that this judgement is an authority for the principle that an order of preventive detention cannot be passed against a person who is already in prison. A reading of the above passage would show that no such absolute bar has been placed. The observations made above are merely reiterating the principle laid down in Rameshwar Shaw vs. District Magistrate, Burdwan. 15. Subsequent judgements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court had followed this line of reasoning. However, there has been some variation in the manner in which this principle had been followed. The observations made above are merely reiterating the principle laid down in Rameshwar Shaw vs. District Magistrate, Burdwan. 15. Subsequent judgements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court had followed this line of reasoning. However, there has been some variation in the manner in which this principle had been followed. There have also been submissions made, at various points of time, that the Hon’ble Supreme court had taken the view that orders of detention cannot be passed when a person is in judicial custody or otherwise in jail. A three judge bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Rekha v. State of T.N., at page 250, after noticing both trends had held as follows: “ 8. It has been held in T.V. Sravanan v. State [ (2006) 2 SCC 664 :(2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 593] , A. Shanthi v. Govt. of T.N. [ (2006) 9 SCC 711 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 371] , Rajesh Gulati v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi [ (2002) 7 SCC 129 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1627] , etc. that if no bail application was pending and the detenu was already, in fact, in jail in a criminal case, the detention order under the preventive detention law is illegal. These decisions appear to have followed the Constitution Bench decision in Haradhan Saha v. State of W.B. [ (1975) 3 SCC 198 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 816] wherein it has been observed: (SCC p. 209, para 34): “34. … where the person concerned is actually in jail custody at the time when an order of detention is passed against him and is not likely to be released for a fair length of time, it may be possible to contend that there could be no satisfaction on the part of the detaining authority as to the likelihood of such a person indulging in activities which would jeopardise the security of the State or public order.” 9. On the other hand, Mr Altaf Ahmed, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the State of Tamil Nadu, has relied on the judgments of this Court in A. Geetha v. State of T.N. [ (2006) 7 SCC 603 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 324] and Ibrahim Nazeer v. State of T.N. [ (2006) 6 SCC 64 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 17] wherein it has been held that even if no bail application of the petitioner is pending but if in similar cases bail has been granted, then this is a good ground for the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority to pass the detention order. 10. In our opinion, if details are given by the respondent authority about the alleged bail orders in similar cases mentioning the date of the orders, the bail application number, whether the bail order was passed in respect of the co-accused in the same case, and whether the case of the co-accused was on the same footing as the case of the petitioner, then, of course, it could be argued that there is likelihood of the accused being released on bail, because it is the normal practice of most courts that if a co-accused has been granted bail and his case is on the same footing as that of the petitioner, then the petitioner is ordinarily granted bail. However, the respondent authority should have given details about the alleged bail order in similar cases, which has not been done in the present case. A mere ipse dixit statement in the grounds of detention cannot sustain the detention order and has to be ignored.” 16. These principles were reiterated in the case of Champion R. Sangma vs. State of Meghalaya and Anr ., (2015) 16 SCC 253 “ 9. Coming to the ground on which we intend to allow this appeal, we may point out that even if the appellant is in jail in connection with some criminal case(s) there is no prohibition in law to pass the detention order. Law on this aspect is well settled and stands crystallised by aplethora of judgments of this Court. However, a reading of those very judgments also clarifies that there are certain aspects which have to be borne in mind by the detaining authority and satisfaction on those aspects is to be arrived at while passing the detention order. 10. Law on this aspect is well settled and stands crystallised by aplethora of judgments of this Court. However, a reading of those very judgments also clarifies that there are certain aspects which have to be borne in mind by the detaining authority and satisfaction on those aspects is to be arrived at while passing the detention order. 10. There are three such factors which were restated in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India [Kamarunnissa v. Union of India, (1991) 1 SCC 128 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 88] : (SCC pp. 140-41, para 13) “13. From the catena of decisions referred to above it seems clear to us that even in the case of a person in custody a detention order can validly be passed (1) if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody; (2) if he has reason to believe on the basis of reliable material placed before him (a) that there is a real possibility of his being released on bail, and (b) that on being so released he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activity; and (3) if it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him from so doing. If the authority passes an order after recording his satisfaction in this behalf, such an order cannot be struck down on the ground that the proper course for the authority was to oppose the bail and if bail is granted notwithstanding such opposition, to question it before a higher court. What this Court stated in Ramesh Yadav [Ramesh Yadav v. District Magistrate, Etah, (1985) 4 SCC 232 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 514] was that ordinarily a detention order should not be passed merely to pre-empt or circumvent enlargement on bail in cases which are essentially criminal in nature and can be dealt with under the ordinary law. It seems to us well settled that even in a case where a person is in custody, if the facts and circumstances of the case so demand, resort can be had to the law of preventive detention. This seems to be quite clear from the case law discussed above and there is no need to refer to the High Court decisions to which our attention was drawn since they do not hold otherwise. This seems to be quite clear from the case law discussed above and there is no need to refer to the High Court decisions to which our attention was drawn since they do not hold otherwise. We, therefore, find it difficult to accept the contention of the counsel for the petitioners that there was no valid and compelling reason for passing the impugned orders of detention because the detenus were in custody.” 17. The law, as can be seen from the above, can be summarised in the following manner. There is no bar against passing an order of preventive detention merely on the ground that the detenue is already in prison. However, the question of whether such an order can be passed, would be dependent on the facts of each case. The detaining authority, before passing an order of detention should find that there was a possibility of the proposed detenue being released from jail. This possibility can be gleaned from various sources and factors. A non exhaustive list would be where the detaining authority finds that, the proposed detenue has applied for bail; the proposed detenue has obtained bail in similar cases and consequently bail, if applied for in future could be granted on this ground; a co accused of the detenue, who is placed in a situation similar to the proposed detenue, has obtained bail, and there is a possibility of the proposed detenue getting bail if he applied, etc. The said finding would have to be given on the basis of cogent factors and a mere statement to that effect, without explaining and enumerating the factors which gave rise to such a finding, would not be sufficient discharge of that duty by the detaining officer. 18. In the circumstances, this Court would have to look at the question of whether the detention order had been passed after considering the likelihood of the release of the detenue from judicial custody or whether it has been passed without taking this factor into account. 19. The order of detention dealt with the question of the likelihood of the release of detenue from judicial custody in the following manner. 19. The order of detention dealt with the question of the likelihood of the release of detenue from judicial custody in the following manner. “In the circumstances PREVENTIVE DETENTION is only the precautionary measure to avert the situation and this preventive detention is always the precautionary measure and it is based on reasonable prognosis of your future behavior based on your past conduct found in the light of the above circumstances. From the nature of these incidents inference can reasonably be drawn that you would be likely to repeat such acts unless detained under preventive detention. Thus I am satisfied from the material placed before me that you fall under the category of "GOONDA" as defined U/S 2 (g) of Sec.2 of A.P. Prevention of Dangerous activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic offenders and Land Grabbers act, 1986, and you are a fit person to be detained u/s 3 of the said act and accordingly orders I will be issued with a view to preventing you from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order. You are hereby informed that you have a right to make a representation to the Govt. to the Advisory Board and also to the detaining authority. You have a right to appear before the Advisory board and to avail assistance of a person, other than advocate in the proceedings before the advisory board.” 20. A perusal of the order does not reveal any details of the cases in which the detenue has been granted bail or the details of any pending bail applications. The statement relating to the likelihood of release of the detenue, extracted above, is a statement made without any supporting material. 21. The 2 nd Respondent, in paragraph 35 of his counter affidavit, had submitted as follows: “It is further submitted that the detenue is a habitual criminal and dangerous and desperate person and he is so hardened and became incorrigible that the ordinary provisions of penal code will not have deterrent effect over her acts and she is likely to repeat such acts in future. It is submitted that even though many cases were registered against him but no change in him attitude and day to day increasing him criminal activities. It is submitted that even though many cases were registered against him but no change in him attitude and day to day increasing him criminal activities. And the detenue is acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of Public Order and it is necessary to prevent him from further indulging in such dangerous activities prejudicial to the maintenance of Public Order and safety of the general public in keeping the normal peace in the society by directing him to be detained under the provisions of the Act.” 22. The aforesaid statement, in the counter affidavit, is not reflected anywhere in the order of detention. It is settled law that subsequent pleadings cannot supplement reasons given in an order. 23. The law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on this aspect, requires the detaining authority to set out the grounds on which the detaining authority has arrived at a subjective satisfaction that there is a possibility of the detenue being released from jail, on bail or otherwise. A mere sentence in the order of detention that there is a possibility of the detenue being enlarged on bail is not sufficient. The Hon’ble Supreme court in Rekha vs. State of T.N., had specifically dealt with this aspect and had held as follows: “However, the respondent authority should have given details about the alleged bail order in similar cases, which has not been done in the present case. A mere ipse dixit statement in the grounds of detention cannot sustain the detention order and has to be ignored.” 24. In the present case, the detention order, except containing a ipse dixit statement of the possibility of the detenue being released, does not contain any details about the bail orders in similar cases or the reasons why there was a possibility for the detenue to be granted statutory bail. In the absence of these details, the order of detention cannot be sustained. 25. In the absence of these details, the order of detention cannot be sustained. 25. Accordingly, this writ petition is allowed and the order of detention in Rc.No.MAGL1/1883/2023, dated 02.02.2024 passed by the 2 nd respondent, and the proceedings of confirmation by the 1 st respondent in G.O.Rt.No.643, dated 26.03.2024 are set aside and consequently the detenue, viz., Badannagari Manjunath @ Manju @ Varu, S/o.B.Nanjundappa, aged 25 years, Caste:Boya (BC-A), Chowluru Village, Hindupur Mandal, Sri Sathya Sai District, shall be, forthwith, set at liberty, if he is not required in any other case.There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.