JUDGMENT : The petitioners are the plaintiffs and the respondents are the defendants in O.S.No.310 of 2017 on the files of the Munsiff court, Thiruvalla. The suit was filed for mandatory as well as prohibitory injunction. The respondents were made ex parte on 29.6.2019 and posted to 22.7.2019 for ex parte evidence. On 16.8.2019, since the plaintiff was absent and there was no representation, the suit was dismissed for default. On coming to know that the suit was dismissed for default, R.P.No.39 of 2022 was filed under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC to set aside the dismissal for default. Since there was a delay in filing the application, I.A.No.1 of 2022 was also filed to condone the delay of 1048 days in preferring the application to restore the suit. The court below, by a common order dated 30.1.2024, dismissed both the applications by Ext.P7 order. The petitioners have approached this Court, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, to call for records leading to Ext.P7 and to set aside the same. 2. The counsel for the petitioners, Shri.Arjun S, argued that when an application under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC is filed to set aside the dismissal for default and if sufficient cause is shown, the trial court ought to have taken a pragmatic justice-oriented approach and allowed the same. The application to restore the suit was filed with a petition to condone the delay and the petitioners have shown sufficient cause in not approaching the court within the time prescribed. The court below should have condoned the delay and restored the suit. The suit was posted for ex parte evidence on 16.8.2019. The petitioners were stationed in Rajasthan, and because of floods in August 2018, they could not appear before the Court, so the suit was dismissed for default. By then, COVID- 19 had spread throughout the country, and the petitioners could not travel to Kerala and were not informed about the dismissal of the suit for default. suo motu 3. The apex court in Writ Petition © No.3 of 2020, excluded the period from 15.3.2020 till 28.2.2022 for the purpose of limitation. Therefore, the abovementioned period should have been excluded while calculating the delay. 4. suo motu 3. The apex court in Writ Petition © No.3 of 2020, excluded the period from 15.3.2020 till 28.2.2022 for the purpose of limitation. Therefore, the abovementioned period should have been excluded while calculating the delay. 4. The counsel for the respondents countered the argument of the petitioners, stating that when an application is filed under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC, with a petition to condone delay and a common order is passed, the remedy available to the petitioner is to file an appeal under Order 43 Rule 1(c) CPC and not an Original Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He submitted that the jurisdiction available to this court under Article 227 is very limited, and it is not to correct every error and mistake passed by the trial court. When an appellate remedy is prescribed in the Code itself, the said remedy has to be invoked by the petitioners. Therefore, this Original Petition itself is not maintainable. 5. The question to be decided is whether an Original Petition is maintainable under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against an order dismissing the application to condone delay and dismissal of application filed under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC. Order 43 Rule 1(c) CPC indeed prescribes that an appeal is maintainable against an order under Order 9 Rule 9, rejecting an application or an order to set aside the dismissal of a suit. Nowhere in Order 43, an appellate provision is given against an application dismissing the petition to condone delay. But Order 43 Rule 1-A gives the right to challenge any non-appealable orders in an appeal against any decree. 6. In Kunhiraman v. Rossy ( 1979 KLT 718 ), a learned Single Judge of this court has held that when a petition to excuse delay is dismissed on the ground that it is barred, the remedy of the person aggrieved is to file an appeal against a decree, if that is allowed by law, and take a ground in appeal that the lower court was wrong in not excusing the delay in filing the appeal. In John. In John. v. Mammukutty ( 1983 KLT 1115 ), it was held that when the petition to excuse the delay in filing the appeal, or an application to set aside ex-parte decree is dismissed, and the consequent decision of the latter appeal or application is appealable, the proper remedy is to prefer an appeal and take ground regarding the incorrectness of the order in the delay petition. 7. In Joshy v. Pradeep [ 2022 (7) KHC 369 ] , this court, relying on the judgment of the apex court in Virudhunagar Hindu Nadargal Dharma Paribalana Sabhai and others v. Tuticorin Educational Society and others ( 2019 KHC 7006), held that whenever the proceedings are under the CPC and the forum is the Civil Court, the available remedy under CPC will deter the High Court, not merely as a measure of self imposed restriction, but as a matter of discipline and prudence from exercising its power of superintendence under the Constitution. The availability of the remedy under CPC is to be construed as near to proper total bar for the remedy under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 8. The counsel for the petitioners relied on a judgment of this court in K.Jayakumari and others v. Ismail Rawther ( 2001 (2) KLT 551 ) and contended that this court had invoked the revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC and allowed the petition, which was dismissed for delay by the trial court in setting aside the application under Order 9 Rule 13. Taking note of the fact that when substantial justice and technical considerations are against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. In Mohamed Ashraf v. Mazeeth [2004 1 KLJ (NOC) 15], this court invoked jurisdiction under section 115 of CPC and condoned the delay in filing the petition under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC. In Mohamed Ashraf v. Mazeeth [2004 1 KLJ (NOC) 15], this court invoked jurisdiction under section 115 of CPC and condoned the delay in filing the petition under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC. The counsel for the petitioner, relying on the above-mentioned two decisions, argued that in the case on hand, when an application for condoning the delay in filing the application under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC is dismissed, there is no appeal provided under Order 43 CPC and therefore, the said order dismissing the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act can be challenged, only before this court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The second part of the order dismissing the application to restore the suit is a consequence of not condoning the delay; the same can also be challenged in the Original Petition. 9. Coming to the facts of this case, it is seen that the application filed as R.P.No.39 of 2022 is to restore the suit, which was dismissed for default. I.A.No.1 of 2022 is filed under section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay of 1048 days in preferring the R.P. It is not in dispute that an appeal is provided against an order dismissing the application under Order 9 Rule 9, under Order 43 Rule 1(c). It prescribes that an appeal is maintainable against an order rejecting such an application. It does not prescribe that the said orders should be passed on merits. So, any order that is passed rejecting the application to set aside the dismissal of a suit consequent to the dismissal of an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is appealable under Order 43 Rule 1(c) CPC. In the decision relied on by the counsel for the petitioners in Mohamed Ashraf (supra) as well as K.Jayakumari (supra), the jurisdiction of this court under Section 115 CPC, was invoked. While challenging the application dismissing to set aside the ex-parte decree with the petition to condone delay, Section 115 gives power to this court to call for records of any case which has been decided by any court subordinate to the High Court in which no appeal lies thereto, if such subordinate courts appear to have jurisdiction not vested by law or have failed to exercise jurisdiction or to have acted in the exercise of jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. 10. 10. It is to be noted that this Original Petition is filed under Article 227 of the Constitution and not as a Revision under Section 115 CPC. Article 227 gives the power of superintendence over all courts and Tribunals through the direction in relation to it in exercising jurisdiction. The said power is very limited and cannot be compared with the jurisdiction exercised by this court under section 115 CPC. Though the revisional jurisdiction of Section 115 is also very limited, the jurisdiction under Article 227 is much more stringent and narrow. As held earlier, the remedy of the petitioners is to approach the appellate court under Order 43 Rule 1(c) CPC, challenging the dismissal of the application filed under Order 9 Rule 9 and to challenge the dismissal of the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act as a ground in the appeal. 11. The apex court in Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd. [ (2001) 8 SCC 97 ] held as follows: “6. The scope and ambit of exercise of power and jurisdic- tion by a High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of In- dia is examined and explained in a number of decisions of this Court. The exercise of power under this article involves a duty on the High Court to keep inferior courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do the duty expected or required of them in a legal manner. The High Court is not vested with any unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of hard- ship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the subordinate courts or tribunals. Exercise of this power and interfering with the orders of the courts or tribunals is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where if the High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice remains uncorrected. It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this Article, cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the face of the record. It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this Article, cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the face of the record. The High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of facts of an inferior court or tribunal, if there is no evidence at all to justify or the finding is so perverse, that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion, which the court or tribunal has come to." Therefore, I am of the opinion that the petition dismissing an application under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC on the ground that it is barred by limitation has to be challenged in an appeal under Order 43 Rule 1( c ) of CPC. This Original Petition stands dismissed as above.