JUDGMENT : HANCHATE SANJEEVKUMAR, J. 1. This appeal is filed by the claimant Nos.3(a) to 3(e) challenging the judgment and award dated 30.03.2013 passed in Land Acquisition Case No.108/1992 by the Court of XLIX Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge and holding concurrent charge of Court of II Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bangalore (CCH-17) [hereinafter referred to as ‘the Trial Court’ for short] whereby, the reference filed under Sections 30 and 31(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as 'LAC Act' for short) is partly allowed by holding that claimant No.1(a) and claimant No.2(e) are entitled to receive the corresponding compensation amount and rejected the claim of claimant Nos.3(a) to 3(e). 2. For the sake of convenience and easy reference, the parties are referred to as per their rankings before the Trial Court. 3. The respondent Nos.20 and 21 in this appeal, who are defendant Nos.1 and 2 before the Trial Court i.e., the Special LAO for Defence and the Estate Officer, Defence have acquired the land measuring 3 acres 24 guntas of land in survey No.162/1 and 2 acres 09 guntas of land in survey No.163/2, totally measuring 5 acres 33 guntas of land situated at Mahadevapura Village, K.R. Puram Hobli, Bangalore East Taluk, Bangalore for the purpose of formation of High Tech park vide preliminary Notification dated 28.07.1988 and Final Notification dated 19.04.1989. It is submitted that possession of the said property in respect of survey No.162/1 was taken on 02.08.1989 and in respect of survey No.163/2, possession was taken on 24.03.1990 and the SLAO has determined the market value of the property at Rs.1,30,000/- per acre and deposited the total compensation amount of Rs.14,57,161/- before the Court below through transfer voucher bearing No.3176 dated 06.04.1992. 4. It is further submitted that originally there are six claimants and there is dispute with regard to entitlement of compensation. Therefore, the SLAO has referred the matter to the reference Court under Section 30 and 31(2) of the Act, as there is internal dispute between the claimants regarding entitlement of compensation. 5. Upon the reference made under aforesaid provision, the witnesses are examined as PW.1 to PW.15 and got marked documents as Exs.P1 to P128. 6. It is further submitted that the entire enquiry before the reference Court is in respect of deciding who are entitled to receive compensation. 5. Upon the reference made under aforesaid provision, the witnesses are examined as PW.1 to PW.15 and got marked documents as Exs.P1 to P128. 6. It is further submitted that the entire enquiry before the reference Court is in respect of deciding who are entitled to receive compensation. As such, the SLAO and the Estate Officer do not have any dispute about the same and the entire enquiry rests on deciding the rival claim of claimants and the reference Court after perusing the material on record has determined that claimant No.1(a) and claimant No.2(e) are entitled for compensation and rejected the claim of other claimants. During the pendency of LAC proceedings before the reference Court, the claimant Nos.1 and 3 died and their respective legal representatives are brought on record and now the dispute is between the legal representatives of deceased claimants No.1 and 3. 7. Further, the reference Court has assigned reasons that claimant No.1(a) to 1(f) have proved that they are in acquired possession over acquired lands and have perfected their title by way of adverse possession and determined that claimant No.1(a) to 1(f) are entitled for compensation. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgment of reference Court in rejecting the claim of claimants 3(a) to 3(e), they have preferred this appeal by urging various grounds and in consonance with the grounds raised in the memorandum of appeal, the learned counsel for the appellants argued the appeal. 9. It is submitted that claimant No.3 namely Veerappa Reddy has purchased the schedule properties through one Nagappa and Ramaiah under registered sale deed dated 16.10.1965, which are marked as Exs.P30 and P32. Further, it is submitted that PW.1 Muniyappa has sold half portion of his half share in the acquired property to one Ramaiah and remaining share to one Nagappa under registered sale deeds dated 12.12.1960 and 13.09.1962 and they are marked as Exs.P29 and P31 respectively. As such, claimant No.1 had lost his title over the schedule properties in the year 1962 only. Thereafter, the claimant No.3 had purchased the said schedule properties in the year 1965 and thus, become owner and acquired his title over the schedule properties and subsequently, the Special LAO has acquired the lands in the year 1989 and as such, claimant No.3 and his legal heirs are entitled to receive compensation but not by claimant No.1 and his legal heirs. Therefore, the learned counsel by taking this Court to both oral and documentary evidence on record wherein it is stated that claimant No.3 and his legal heirs are owners as per the purchase made in the year 1965. Therefore, they are entitled to receive the compensation. 10. Learned counsel for appellant/claimant Nos.3(a) to 3(e) places reliance on the following judgments: i. PREM NATH KHANNA AND OTHERS VS. NARINDER NATH KAPOOR (DEAD) THROUGH LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES AND OTHERS , (2016) 12 SCC 235 ii. SMT. PUTTAGANGAMMA DEAD BY LRS VS. RANGARAJU DEAD BY LRS , RSA No. 506/2007 dated 06.01.2023 iii. MADHAVKRISHNA AND ANOTHER VS. CHANDRA BHAGA AND OTHERS, (1997) 2 SCC 203 iv. D.N. VENKATARAYAPPA AND ANOTHER VS. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND OTHERS, (1997) 7 SCC 567 v. DEVA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. VS. SAJJAN KUMAR (DEAD) BY LRS. (2003) 7 SCC 481 vi. MD. MOHAMMAD ALI (DEAD) BY LRS. VS. JAGADISH KALITA AND OTHERS , (2004) 1 SCC 271 vii. T. ANJANAPPA AND OTHERS VS. SOMALINGAPPA AND ANOTHER , ILR 2006 KAR 4147 viii. P.T. MUNICHIKKANNA REDDY AND OTHERS VS. REVAMMA AND OTHERS , (2007) 6 SCC 59 ix. ANNAKILI VS. A. VEDANAYAGAM AND OTHERS , 2007 AIR SCW 6892 x. KURELLA NAGA DRUVA VIDYA BHASKARA RAO VS. GALLA JANI KAMMA ALIAS NACHARAMMA , 2008 AIR SCW 5682 xi. MOHAMMED SAB WALLAD GAFAR SAB VS. ABDUL GANI WALLAD MOHAMMAD HAYATH , ILR 1985 KAR 1615 xii. FRANCIS M.V. VS. LINGAMMA AND ANOTHER , (1987) 1 Kar. L.J. 94 xiii. DANAPPA REVAPPA KOLLI VS. GURUPADAPPA MALLAPPA PATTANASHETTI , ILR 1990 KAR 610 xiv. D.N. VENKATARAYAPPA AND OTHERS VS. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND OTHERS , ILR 1997 KAR 850 xv. NALLAN ALIAS KEERIMUTHAN VS. VELLAIYANKUDUMBAN AND OTHERS , AIR 2001 MADRAS 6 xvi. SURJIT KAUR VS. GARJA SINGH AND OTHERS , (1994) 1 SCC 407 xvii. PAM SINGH VS. R. SUSILA BAI AND ANOTHER , AIR 1970 Mysore 201 (V 57 C 51) 11. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent Nos.1(a) to 1(f) submitted that claimant Nos.1(a) to 1(e) have perfected the title by adverse possession by placing reliance under Article 65 read with Section 27 of Limitation Act, 1963. 12. PAM SINGH VS. R. SUSILA BAI AND ANOTHER , AIR 1970 Mysore 201 (V 57 C 51) 11. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent Nos.1(a) to 1(f) submitted that claimant Nos.1(a) to 1(e) have perfected the title by adverse possession by placing reliance under Article 65 read with Section 27 of Limitation Act, 1963. 12. It is submitted that the claimant No.1 is the owner of the suit schedule property and as per the knowledge of claimant Nos.1 and 3 and their legal heirs have continued in possession and the Special Land Acquisition Officer has taken possession. To prove this, documents such as Record of Rights Ex.P3 to P11 i.e., 1968 to 1990, land revenue receipts at Exs.P12 to P.18, patta book at Ex.P19 and the mahazar drawn by the SLAO for taking possession from claimant No.1 at Exs.P21 to P24 and khata ledger extract at Ex.P25 are produced. Therefore, the claimant No.1 and his legal heirs were in possession of the property. Therefore, they have perfected the title over the suit schedule property by adverse possession with knowledge of claimant Nos.3 and his legal heirs. As such, claimant Nos.1 and his legal heirs have perfected their title by adverse possession over the suit schedule property and it is rightly considered by the reference Court and there is no need for interference by this Court and prays to dismiss the appeal. 13. In support of the arguments, learned counsel for the respondents’ places reliance on the following decisions: i. PARSINNI (DEAD) BY LRS. AND OTHERS VS. SUKHI AND OTHERS , 1993 (4) SCC 376 ii. VISHWA VIJAY BHARATI VS. FAKHRUL HASSAN AND OTHERS , (1976) 3 SCC 642 iii. STATE OF WEST BENGAL VS. THE DALHOSIE INSTITUTE SOCIETY , AIR 1970 SC 1778 iv. SRIBHAGWAN SINGH AND OTHERS VS. RAMBASI KUER AND OTHERS , AIR 1957 Patna 157 : AIR 1957 1960 v. GOVIND YADAV AND OTHERS VS. DEOKI DEVI AND OTHERS , AIR 1980 Patna 113 14. Upon hearing arguments on both sides and on perusal of material on record, the following points arise for my consideration: i. Whether, under the facts and circumstances involved in the case, the claimant No.1 and his legal heirs prove the fact that they have perfected their title by adverse possession over the suit schedule property and thus, entitled to receive compensation? ii. ii. Whether, under facts and circumstances involved in the case, the claimant No.3 and his legal heirs prove the fact that they are the owners of schedule land and the claimant No.1 and his legal heirs have not perfected their title by adverse possession? iii. Whether, the impugned judgment and award passed by the Reference Court requires interference by this Court? 15. The lands measuring 3 acres 24 guntas in survey No.162/1 and 2 acres 09 guntas of land in survey No.163/2, totally measuring 5 acres 33 guntas of land, situated at Mahadevapura Village, K.R. Puram Hobli, Bangalore East Taluk, have been acquired for the purpose of formation of High Tech park. These facts are not in dispute and the Special Land Acquisition Officer had determined compensation. Since there is internal dispute between the claimants, the compensation was deposited and the matter was referred to the reference Court as per Section 30 and 31(2) of the Act. 16. Now the question that has to be determined is that who are entitled to receive compensation? The claimant No.3 and his legal heirs contends that the claimant No.3 had purchased the schedule property through one Nagappa and Ramaiah under registered sale deed dated 16.10.1965. Further, it is submitted that PW.1 Muniyappa has sold half portion of his half share in the acquired property to one Ramaiah and remaining share to one Nagappa under registered sale deeds dated 12.12.1960 and 13.09.1962 respectively. Earlier to that, the claimant No.1 and 2 have purchased the schedule property through registered sale deed dated 13.06.1960 pertaining to Survey No.162/1 measuring 3 acres 24 guntas of land and in respect of survey No.163 measuring 2 acres 12 guntas through registered sale deed dated 17.06.1960 respectively. 17. Thereafter, partition occurs between the claimant Nos.1 and 2 through registered partition deed dated 10.07.1962. Subsequently, the claimant No.1 had sold half of his share of schedule property to one Ramaiah and remaining share to one Nagappa under registered sale deeds dated 12.12.1960 and 13.09.1962 respectively and claimant No.3 has purchased the said suit schedule property under registered sale deed dated 16.10.1965 from Ramaiah and Nagappa. These facts are not in dispute. To prove this fact, claimant No.3 namely Veerappa Reddy had purchased the suit schedule property through sale deed dated 16.10.1965. These facts are not in dispute. To prove this fact, claimant No.3 namely Veerappa Reddy had purchased the suit schedule property through sale deed dated 16.10.1965. But the legal heirs of claimant No.1 claimed that inspite of selling the schedule lands to one Ramaiah and Nagappa in the year 1962, they had continued in possession over the suit schedule property till the Special Land Acquisition Officer took possession of the schedule property. Therefore, it is the contention of the claimant No.1 that he has perfected the title by adverse possession. 18. By claiming so, claimant No.1 and the legal representatives of claimant No.1, namely claimant No.1(a) to 1(e) have admitted that claimant No.3 and his legal heirs are the owners and having title over the suit schedule properties. The issue regarding dealing with acquisition of title by adverse possession and the Hon’ble Supreme Court in catena of decisions has laid down principles of law regarding adverse possession. The governing laws of principles as per statute regarding claiming adverse possession are Article 65 and Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 19. Whoever is making claim that he is in adverse possession over the land and perfected the title by way of adverse possession, it is mandatory on part of him to plead and to prove the date on and from which he claims to be in exclusive, continuous and uninterrupted possession and that such possession was actual and to the knowledge of the real owner. Also, it is mandatory on part of the person who claims to have perfected the title by adverse possession, the hostility of title and to communicate it to the real owner. Hence, it is worthwhile to refer the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in MADHAVAKRISHNA AND ANOTHER’S case (supra) at Paragraph No.5, it is observed as follows: “5. No doubt there is an issue raised on the plea of adverse possession and findings recorded by the courts below was that the respondents had not perfected their title by adverse possession. The High Court has reversed that finding on the ground that the respondents remained in possession for more than 12 years and thereby they perfected their title by adverse possession. The question is whether the view of the High Court is correct in law? The High Court has reversed that finding on the ground that the respondents remained in possession for more than 12 years and thereby they perfected their title by adverse possession. The question is whether the view of the High Court is correct in law? A reading of the pleadings would clearly indicate that they set up their own title to the property and they have remained in possession for more than 12 years and, therefore, they sought for the suit to be dismissed on that ground. In view of the fact that Mansaram was found to be the owner in the earlier suit and he died on 12- 12.1968 until then the question of adverse possession did not arise. The plea of adverse possession as against Mansaram was not pleaded. In this case, except repeating the title already set up but which was negatived in the earlier suit, namely, that they had constructed the house jointly with Mansaram, there is no specific plea of disclaiming the title of the appellants from a particular date, the hostile assertion thereof and then of setting up adverse possession from a particular date to the knowledge of the appellants and of their acquiescence. Under these circumstances, unless the title is disclaimed and adverse possession with hostile title to that of Mansaram and subsequently as against the appellants is pleaded and proved, the plea of adverse possession cannot be held proved. In this case, such a plea was not averred nor evidence has been adduced. The doctrine of adverse possession would arise only when the party has set up his own adverse title disclaiming the title of the plaintiff and established that he remained exclusively in possession to the knowledge of the appellant’s title hostile to their title and that the appellants had acquiesced to the same. Since there is no plea that he had claimed any hostile title against Mansaram, the owner of the property, the earlier decree operates as res judicata. The present suit was filed within 12 years from the date of demise of Mansaram; hence, it was obvious that no adverse possession has been perfected against the appellant. Moreover, as against Mansaram, the predecessor-in- title of the appellant, the earlier decree operates as constructive res judicata on the principle of might and ought. The present suit was filed within 12 years from the date of demise of Mansaram; hence, it was obvious that no adverse possession has been perfected against the appellant. Moreover, as against Mansaram, the predecessor-in- title of the appellant, the earlier decree operates as constructive res judicata on the principle of might and ought. The High Court, obviously, was in correct in its finding that the respondents had perfected their title by adverse possession.” 20. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of D.N. VENKATARAYAPPA AND ANOTHER (supra) at Paragraph No.3, it is held as under: “3. The petitioners ……… …. What requires to be pleaded and proved is that the purchaser disclaimed his title under which he came into possession, set up adverse possession with necessary animus of asserting open and hostile title to the knowledge of the true owner and the latter allowed the former, without any let of hindrance, to remain in possession and enjoyment of the property adverse to the interest of the true owner until the expiry of the prescribed period. The classical requirement of adverse possession is that it should be nec vi, nec clam, nec precario. After considering the entire case-law in that behalf, the learned Single Judge has held thus: “The contention raised by the petitioners that they have perfected their title in respect of the lands in question by adverse possession, has to fail on two counts. Firstly, the crucial facts, which constitute adverse possession have not been pleaded. The pleadings extracted above, in my view, will not constitute the crucial facts necessary to claim title by adverse possession. It is not stated by the petitioners in their pleadings that the petitioners yet any point of time claimed or asserted their title, hostile or adverse to the title of the original grantees/their vendors. In my view, mere uninterrupted and continuous possession without the animus to continue with the possession hostile to the rights of the real owner will not constitute adverse possession in law.” 21. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of DEVA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. (supra) at Paragraph Nos. 11, 12 and 13, it is held as follows: “11. The deposition extracted above, in any case, negatives the defendant’s case of having prescribed title by adverse possession from the year 1940. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of DEVA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. (supra) at Paragraph Nos. 11, 12 and 13, it is held as follows: “11. The deposition extracted above, in any case, negatives the defendant’s case of having prescribed title by adverse possession from the year 1940. The animus to hold the land adversely to the title of the true owner can be said to have started only when the defendant derived knowledge that his possession over the suit land had been alleged to be an act of encroachment - on the plaintiff’s survey number. 12. The abovequoted admission contained in the defendant’s deposition, does not make out a case in his favour of having acquired title by adverse possession. Mere long possession of the defendant for a period of more than 12 years without intention to possess the suit land adversely to the title of the plaintiff and to the latter’s knowledge cannot result in acquisition of title by the defendant to the encroached suit land. 13. The plaintiff’s suit is not merely based on his prior possession and subsequent dispossession but also on the basis of his title to Survey No. 452. The limitation for such a suit is governed by Article 65 of the Limitation Act of 1963. The plaintiff’s title over the encroached land could not get extinguished unless the defendant had prescribed title by remaining in adverse possession for a continuous period of 12 years.” 22. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of MD. MOHAMMAD ALI (DEAD) BY LRS. (supra), at Paragraph No.20, which reads thus: “20. By reason of the Limitation Act, 1963 the legal position as was obtaining under the old Act underwent a change. In a suit governed by Article 65 of the 1963 Limitation Act, the plaintiff will succeed it he proves his title and it would no longer be necessary for him to prove, unlike in a suit governed by Articles 142 and 144 of the Limitation Act, 1908, that he was in possession within 12 years preceding the filing of the suit. On the contrary, it would be for the defendant so to prove if he wants to defeat the plaintiff’s claim to establish his title by adverse possession.” 23. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of T. ANJANAPPA AND OTHERS (supra) at Paragraph Nos.20 and 21, it is observed as follows: “20. On the contrary, it would be for the defendant so to prove if he wants to defeat the plaintiff’s claim to establish his title by adverse possession.” 23. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of T. ANJANAPPA AND OTHERS (supra) at Paragraph Nos.20 and 21, it is observed as follows: “20. It is well-recognised proposition in law that mere possession however long does not necessarily mean that it is adverse to the true owner. Adverse possession really means the hostile possession which is expressly or impliedly in denial of title of the true owner and in order to constitute adverse possession the possession proved must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent so as to show that it is adverse to the true owner. The claissical requirements of acquisition of title by adverse possession are that such possession in denial of the true owner’s title must be peaceful, open and continuous. The possession must be open and hostile enough to be capable of being known by the parties interested in the property, though it is not necessary that there should be evidence of the adverse possessor actually informing the real owner of the former’s hostile action. 21. The High Court has erred in holding that even if the defendants claim adverse possession, they do not have to prove who is the true owner and even if they had believed that the Government was the true owner and not the plaintiffs, the same was inconsequential. Obviously, the requirements of proving adverse possession have not been established. If the defendants are not sure who is the true owner the question of their being in hostile possession and the question of denying title of the true owner do not arise. Above being the position the High Court’s judgment is clearly unsustainable. Therefore, the appeal which relates to OS No.168 of 1985 is allowed by setting aside the impugned judgment of the High Court to that extent. Equally, the High Court has proceeded on the basis that the plaintiff in OS No. 286 of 1988 had established his plea of possession. The factual position does not appear to have been analysed by the High Court in the proper perspective. Equally, the High Court has proceeded on the basis that the plaintiff in OS No. 286 of 1988 had established his plea of possession. The factual position does not appear to have been analysed by the High Court in the proper perspective. When the High Court was upsetting the finding recorded by the Court below i.e. first appellate Court it would have been proper for the High Court to analyse the factual position in detail which has not been done. No reason has been indicated to show as to why it was differing from the factual findings recorded by it. The first appellate had proved possession three years prior to filing of the suit. This finding has not been upset. Therefore, the High Court was not justified in setting aside the first appellate Court’s order. The appeal before this Court relating to OS No. 286 of 1988 also deserves to be allowed. Therefore, both the appeals are allowed but without any order as to costs.” 24. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of P.T. MUNICHIKKANNA REDDY AND OTHERS (supra) at Paragraph Nos. 12, 14, 22, 23, 29, 30 and 31, it reads as follows: 12. The aspect of positive intention is weakened in this case by the sale deeds dated 11-4- 1934 and 5-7-1936. Intention is a mental element which is proved and disproved through positive acts. Existence of some events can go a long way to weaken the presumption of intention to dispossess which might have painstakingly grown out of long possession which otherwise would have sufficed in a standard adverse possession case. The fact of possession is important in more than one ways: firstly, due compliance on this count attracts the Limitation Act and it also assists the court to unearth as the intention to dispossess. 14. Importantly, intention to possess cannot be substituted for intention to dispossess which is essential to prove adverse possession. The factum of possession in the instant case only goes on to objectively indicate intention to possess the land. As also has been noted by the High Court, if the appellant has purchased the land without the knowledge of earlier sale, then in that case the intention element is not of the variety and degree which is required for adverse possession to materialise. 22. As also has been noted by the High Court, if the appellant has purchased the land without the knowledge of earlier sale, then in that case the intention element is not of the variety and degree which is required for adverse possession to materialise. 22. A peaceful, open and continuous possession as engraved in the maxim nee vi, nec clam, nec precario has been noticed by this Court in Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Govt. of India in the following terms: “Physical fact of exclusive possession and the animus possedendi to hod as owner in exclasion to the actual owner are the most important factors that are to be accounted in cases of this nature. Plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a plended one of fact and law. Therefore, a person who claims adverse possession should show: (a) on what date he came into possession, (b) what was the nature of possession, (c) whether the factum of possession was known to the other party, (d) how long his possession has continued, and (e) his possession was open and undisturbed. A person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour. Since he is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner, it is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish his adverse possession. 23. It is important to appreciate the question of intention as it would have appeared to the paper- owner. The issue in that intention of the adverse user gets communicated to the paper-owner of the property. This is where the law gives importance to hostility and openness as pertinent qualities of manner of possession. If follows that the possession of the adverse possessor must be hostile enough to (2004) 10 SCC 779 give rise to a reasonable notice and opportunity to the paper-owner. 29. Thus the test of nec vi, nec clam, nec precario i.e. “not by force, nor stealth, nor the licence of the owner” has been an established notion in law relating to the whole range of similarly situated concepts such as easement, prescription, public dedication, limitation and adverse possession. 30. In Karnataka Wakf Board the law was stated, thus: “11. In the eye of the law, an owner would be deemed to be in possession of a property so long as there is no intrusion. 30. In Karnataka Wakf Board the law was stated, thus: “11. In the eye of the law, an owner would be deemed to be in possession of a property so long as there is no intrusion. Non-use of the property by the owner even for a long time won’t affect his title. But the position will be altered when another person takes possession of the property and asserts a right over it. Adverse possession is a hostile possession by clearly asserting hostile title in denial of the title of the true owner. It is a well-settled principle that a party claiming adverse possession must prove that his possession is ‘nec vi, nec clam, nec precario’, that is, peaceful, open and continuous. The possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that their possession is adverse to the true owner. It must start with a wrongful disposition of the rightful owner and be actual, visible, exclusive, hostile and continued over the statutory period. (See S.M. Karim v. Bibi Sakina, (1993) 4 SCC 375 and D.N. Venkatarayappa v. State of Karnataka) Physical fact of exclusive possession and the animus possidendi to hold as owner in exclusion to the actual owner are the most important factors that are to be accounted in cases of this nature. Plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a blended one of fact and law. Therefore, a person who claims adverse  possession should show: (a) on what date he came into possession, (b) what was the nature of his possession, (c) whether the factum of possession was known to the other party, (d) how long his possession has continued, and (e) his possession was open and undisturbed. A person pleading adverse possession has not equities in his favour. Since he is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner, it is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish his adverse possession. 2. Inquiry into the particulars of adverse possession. 31. Inquiry into the starting point of adverse possession i.e. dates as to when the paper-owner got dispossessed is an important aspect to be considered. In the instant case the starting point of adverse possession and other facts such as the manner in which the possession operationalised, nature of possession: whether open, continuous, uninterrupted or hostile possession, have not been disclosed. Inquiry into the starting point of adverse possession i.e. dates as to when the paper-owner got dispossessed is an important aspect to be considered. In the instant case the starting point of adverse possession and other facts such as the manner in which the possession operationalised, nature of possession: whether open, continuous, uninterrupted or hostile possession, have not been disclosed. An observation has been made in this regard in S.M. Karim v. Bibi Sakina. “Adverse possession must be adequate in continuity in publicity and extent and a plea is required at the least to show when possession becomes adverse so that the starting point of limitation against the party affected can be found. There is no evidence here when possession became adverse, if it at all did, and a mere suggestion in the relief clause that there was an uninterrupted possession for ‘several 12 years’ or that the plaintiff had acquired ‘an absolute title’ was not enough to raise such a plea. Long possession is not necessarily adverse possession and the prayer clause is not a substitute for a plea”. 25. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of ANNAKILI (supra) at Paragraph No.22, it reads as follows: “22. Claim by adverse possession has two elements: (1) the possession of the defendant should become adverse to the plaintiff and (2) the defendant must continue to remain in possession for a period of 12 years thereafter. Animus possidendi as is well known is a requisite ingredient of adverse possession. It is now a well settled principle of law that mere possession of the land would not ripen into possessory title for the said purpose. Possessor must have animus possidendi and hold the land adverse to the title pf the true owner. For the said purpose, not only animus possidendi must be shown to exist, but the same must be shown to exist at the commencement of the possession. He must continue in said capacity for the period prescribed under the Limitation Act. Mere long possession, it is trite, for a period of 12 years without anything more do not ripen into a title.” 26. Further, this Court in the case of MOHAMMED SAB WALLAD GAFAR SAB (supra) at Paragraph No.16, which reads as follows: “16. He must continue in said capacity for the period prescribed under the Limitation Act. Mere long possession, it is trite, for a period of 12 years without anything more do not ripen into a title.” 26. Further, this Court in the case of MOHAMMED SAB WALLAD GAFAR SAB (supra) at Paragraph No.16, which reads as follows: “16. It is well settled that the law of limitation is a procedural law and the provisions existing on the date of a suit apply to it and therefore, Article 65 of Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable, under which if a suit is brought on the basis of title and if the plaintiff proves his title, it is incumbent upon the defendant to show that his possession has become adverse to the real owner in order to maintain plea of adverse possession. In S.M. Karim vs. Bibi Sakina, Hidayathulla, J. as he then was, has observed: “Adverse possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and extent and a plea is required at the least when possession becomes adverse so that the staring point of limitation against the party affected can be formed.” A specific averment as to the point of time at which, the possession, which was otherwise for the benefit of the object of the trust, turn hostile and adverse is an essential ingredient of a plea of adverse possession. Neither in the pleading nor in the course of evidence of defendant-1 was there any assertion regarding the point of time at which his possession became adverse. No adverse possession could be set up against Khatijabi as the Mutawalli under the Waqf deed, who, as the evidence indicates, was in possession of the properties till her death.” 27. Learned counsel for the respondents/claimant No.1 places reliance on the various judgments and it is worthwhile to refer the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of PARSINNI (DEAD) BY LRS (supra), at Paragraph Nos.4 and 5, it is held as under: 4. The sole question that emerges is whether the appellants have perfected their title by prescription. By Article 65 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 for short ‘the Act’ for possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title, 12 years’ period begins to run when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. The sole question that emerges is whether the appellants have perfected their title by prescription. By Article 65 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 for short ‘the Act’ for possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title, 12 years’ period begins to run when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. As stated earlier, on the demise of Wazira Singh, mutation was effected and sanctioned by the authorities that Parsinni and Chinto, daughters of Wazira Singh came into possession of 53 kanals 12 marlas of the suit property. They, being unmarried minor daughters, under law they are entitled to maintenance till they are married and in lieu thereof the property was given and they remained in possession and enjoyment of the lands. They were married in 1991-92 and 1994-95 B.K. Thereafter, the respondents as per the entries in revenue records, had right to claim possession from the appellants but they did not do so. On the other hand, the appellants remain in possession and enjoyment without any let or hindrance; the continuous entries in revenue records show them as owners. They are in enjoyment by leasing the lands to the tenants as evidenced by the judgment and the decree of the Revenue Court to the exclusion of the respondents. It would show their open assertion of their own right. There was no attempt to take possession of the land by the respondents. Even after consolidation also the lands remain in their possession and enjoyment and they continued to be recorded as owners. 5. The appellants claimed adverse possession. The burden undoubtedly lies on them to plead and prove that they remained in possession in their own right adverse to the respondents. In fact, they have pleaded and succeeded and the trial court accepted the plea finding thus: “The defendants 1 to 5 were accepted as owners to the extent of 1/3 rd share in the estate of Wazira and they continued to hold their shares as such owners till the present day. There is absolutely no material on record to show that the plaintiffs were the owners or shared with the ownership of defendants 1 to 5. The oral deposition of Surjan Singh carried little weight, evidence is contradicted by Mahla Singh, DW 1 who had an interest in the suit land to the same extent as the plaintiffs…. There is absolutely no material on record to show that the plaintiffs were the owners or shared with the ownership of defendants 1 to 5. The oral deposition of Surjan Singh carried little weight, evidence is contradicted by Mahla Singh, DW 1 who had an interest in the suit land to the same extent as the plaintiffs…. Even if it be assumed that the ownership of the daughters of Wazira was valid till their marriages and even then the ownership of both Parsinni and Chinto or her heirs continued till the present day and on their marriage the rights of the daughters, if were extinguished, they still continued to hold as owners of the suit land and after as many as 30 years certainly have become full owners by prescription. The entries Exs. P-3, P-4 are sufficient to show that the plaintiffs were excluded from the right of ownership by the daughters and since no steps were taken for a number of years the right is time-barred.” The District Judge proceeded on the premise that the respondents continued as co-owners and that, therefore, they were not excluded. The possession of the appellants were not adverse to the right of the respondents. We find it difficult to accept the said finding. Female heirs in pre-existing law were not co-owners. Possession is prima facie evidence of title. Party claiming adverse possession must prove that his possession must be ‘nec vi, nec calm, nec precario’ i.e. peaceful, open and continuous. The possession must be adequate, in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that their possession is adverse to the true owner. When the appellants claim title to the suit lands it is sufficient for them to show that their possession is overt and without any attempt at concealment so that the respondents against whom time is running, or, if to exercise due vigilance would be aware of what is happening. The possession of the appellants was adverse to the respondents inasmuch as the respondents (sic appellants) ever since the marriage of the first appellant and her sister Chinto continued to remain in possession and enjoyment of the property in derivation of the right, title and interest hitherto held by the respondents. The possession of the appellants was adverse to the respondents inasmuch as the respondents (sic appellants) ever since the marriage of the first appellant and her sister Chinto continued to remain in possession and enjoyment of the property in derivation of the right, title and interest hitherto held by the respondents. When they openly and to the knowledge of the respondents continuously remined in possession and enjoyment and the entries in the revenue records establish that their possession and enjoyment is as owners, the consent of the respondents initially even to remain in possession till their marriage or death whichever is earlier does not prevent possession being adverse after their marriage. Without any let or hindrance they remained in possession enjoyment excluding the respondents from sharing the usufruct from those lands. The test is whether the appellants are able to show that they held lands for themselves and if they did so the mere fact that there was acquiescence or consent at the inception on the part of the respondents make no difference. Since possession and enjoyment of the first appellant and her sister Chinto was to the exclusion of the respondents- brothers, for well over 30 years it is proved that the appellants were in possession and enjoyment openly and continuously in assertion of their right as owners. The entries in the revenue recorded continuously for 30 years would corroborate their plea of adverse possession militates against the claim of the title of the respondents. The plea that the appellants were never in possession and enjoyment is belied by the entries in the revenue records. The suit was filed in 1963 asserting their right as owners for the first time by which date the appellants have perfected their titles by prescription. The High Court did not advert to this aspect of the matter. Therefore, we have no hesitation to hold that the appellants have perfected their title to the 53 kanals 12 marlas by prescription and the suit is barred by limitation under Article 65 of the Schedule to the Act. The appeal is accordingly allowed, the decree of the High Court and that of the first appellate Court are set aside and that of the trial court is restored. No costs. 28. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of DALHOUSI INSTITUTE SOCIETY (supra), at Paragraph Nos.15, 16 and 17, it is held as under: 15. The appeal is accordingly allowed, the decree of the High Court and that of the first appellate Court are set aside and that of the trial court is restored. No costs. 28. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of DALHOUSI INSTITUTE SOCIETY (supra), at Paragraph Nos.15, 16 and 17, it is held as under: 15. Exhibit 2 dated December 20, 1864, a letter from the Secretary to the Government of Bengal in the Public Works Department, to the Secretary, to the Government of India of the same Department, again states that ‘the site is one which might be given at once…… which would be more suitable for the particular building it is proposed to construct than any other site in Calcutta.' The reference to the site in this letter is to No. 34 Dalhousie Square. Again the reply by the Government of India to this letter clearly states that "His Excellency in Council has approved the proposition of the Chief Engineer to appropriate a portion of the Tank Square Garden to the Institute." A similar expression of appropriation of the site is to be found in Ext. 4 dated January 12, 1865, which is a letter from the Government of Bengal to the Institute. In Ext. 13 dated August 30, 1907, the respondent writes to the Assessor, Calcutta Corporation that under Ext. 3 the land in question has been granted as a gift in favour of the Institute and its boundaries have also been settled as early as 1868 and iron railings dividing the Institute land from the Public Square have also been erected by the Institute at the request of the Justices of the Corporation. The Institute also claims that it has vested interest in the land and the building put up by it on the same. Exhibit 15 dated April 11, 1930 is a very crucial and important document which conclusively establishes the case of grant set up by the respondent. That is a letter addressed by the Surveyor and Valuer. Corporation of Calcutta to the respondent. The Surveyor enclosed a copy of the letter No. 297 C dated March 19, 1930 from the Secretary Bengal, Public Words Department and requested the Institute to let him know the area of the land transferred unconditionally by the Government in 1865. The letter dated March 19, 1930 of the Government of Bengal enclosed with Ext. The Surveyor enclosed a copy of the letter No. 297 C dated March 19, 1930 from the Secretary Bengal, Public Words Department and requested the Institute to let him know the area of the land transferred unconditionally by the Government in 1865. The letter dated March 19, 1930 of the Government of Bengal enclosed with Ext. 15 is itself a letter to the Chief Executive Officer, Corporation of Calcutta. The Secretary of the Government of Bengal, categorically states ‘I am directed to say that from the papers available it appears that in January 1865 a portion of the Dalhousie Square Gardens including the building which covered Lord Hastings' Statue was made to the Council of the Dalhousie Institute as a site for Memorial Hall and Institute. How much land was transferred and what the boundaries of land so transferred were, is not known. From the records. however, it appears that the land was made over unconditionally and this Department receives no rent for it... This letter of the Government concludes the case against the appellant. The Government itself has admitted that there are papers available in their office and that the site in question has been made over to the respondent and it has been so made over unconditionally without receiving any rent for the same. This document completely destroys the claim made on behalf of the appellant that though originally there was an intention to make a grant of land, that intention was abandoned later on. On the other hand, the original intention to make a grant was present at all times; and that there was a grant of this identical site is amply established by the documents referred to above and in particular the letter of the Government of Bengal just now referred to. Therefore, we are in agreement with the finding of the High Court that there was a grant of the site by the Government in favour of the Institute as early as 1865. 16. There is no material placed before us to show that the grant has been made in the manner required by law though as a fact a grant of the site has been made in favour of the Institute. 16. There is no material placed before us to show that the grant has been made in the manner required by law though as a fact a grant of the site has been made in favour of the Institute. The evidence relied on by the Special Land Acquisition Judge and the High Court also clearly establishes that the respondent has been in open, continuous and uninterrupted possession and enjoyment of the site for over 60 years. In this respect the material documentary evidence referred to by the High Court clearly establishes that the respondent has been treated as owner of the site not only by the Corporation, but also by the Government. The possession of the respondent must have been on the basis of the grant made by the Government, which no doubt, is invalid in law. As to what exactly is the legal effect of such possession has been considered by this Court in Collector of Bombay v. Municipal Corpn. of the City of Bombay, 1952 SCR 43 : AIR 1951 SC 469 as follows : “… the position of the respondent Corporation and its predecessor in title was that of a person having no legal title but nevertheless holding possession of the land under colour of an invalid grant of the land in perpetuity and free from rent for the purpose of a market. Such possession not being referable to any legal title it was prima facie adverse to the legal title of the Government as owner of the land from the very moment the predecessor in title of the respondent Corporation took possession of the land under the invalid grant. This possession has continued openly, as of right and uninterruptedly for over 70 years and the respondent Corporation has acquired the limited title to it and its predecessor in title had been prescribing for during all this period, that is to say, the right to hold the land in perpetuity free from rent but only for the purposes of a market in terms of the Government Resolution of 1865..." 17. The above extract establishes that a person in such possession clearly acquires title by adverse possession. In the case before us there are concurrent findings recorded by the High Court and the Special Land Acquisition Judge in favour of the respondent on this point and we agree with those findings. 29. The above extract establishes that a person in such possession clearly acquires title by adverse possession. In the case before us there are concurrent findings recorded by the High Court and the Special Land Acquisition Judge in favour of the respondent on this point and we agree with those findings. 29. Further, the Patna High Court in the case of SRIBHAGAWAN SINGH AND OTHERS (supra), at Paragraph Nos. 13, 14 and 15, which reads as under: 13. In reply, Mr. G.P. Das, appearing for the plaintiffs-respondents, has argued that where a suit is based on title extended over more, than twelve years, plea of adverse possession need not be specifically pleaded as it is included in the plea of title. In support of his contention, he has relied on Vasudeva Padhi Khadanga Garu v. Maguni Dovan Bankhi Mahapatrul Garu ILR 24 Mad 387 : 28 Ind App 81 (PC) (A), and Municipal Board, Etawah v. Mt. Ram Sri, AIR 1931 All 670 (B) which has followed this Privy Council case. The contention of Mr. Das is well founded, and must be accepted. As observed by Lord Davey in the above Privy Council case: "It is immaterial for the present purpose which article it comes under. That being so, the appellant could not have brought an action after the expiration of three years after he attained his majority (Say) 1873. Then comes in section 28, by which his right to the property is extinguished at the determination of the period limited for bringing a suit for possession of it. The point does not require to be expressly pleaded, as it is only evidence of the respondent's title.....” In the present case, the plaintiffs throughout pleaded that they were put into possession by defendant no. 14 with the consent of defendants 1 to 3 in 1927, and, they continued in possession till the adverse order passed against them in the criminal proceeding, after they got the registered sale deed in 1940. These facts clearly establish that the plaintiffs claimed to be in exclusive possession for more than the statutory period of limitation, and, as such, the defendants’ title was extinguished by virtue of section 28 of the Indian Limitation Act. Plaintiffs by completing adverse possession extending over twenty years completed that title in themselves against the defendants appellants. These facts clearly establish that the plaintiffs claimed to be in exclusive possession for more than the statutory period of limitation, and, as such, the defendants’ title was extinguished by virtue of section 28 of the Indian Limitation Act. Plaintiffs by completing adverse possession extending over twenty years completed that title in themselves against the defendants appellants. But that question in my opinion, does not arise in this case it undoubtedly was a matter of controversy courts below, and, in fact it forms the sub-of the three issues stated above. (14) The position is well established that a transferee having acquired title under an invalid transaction, and continuing in possession for more than twelve years, would be deemed to have acquired a perfectly good title to the property. In the present case, although the oral sale by defendant no. 14 to the plaintiffs in 1927 for Rs. 300/- was an invalid sale, as it was not under a registered document, and, therefore, it did not amount to a legal sale of the land to the plaintiffs, it could nevertheless be referred to as explaining the nature and character of the possession of the plaintiffs thenceforth from 1927 right up to till at least the 26th June, 1947, when an adverse order was passed against the plaintiffs in the proceeding under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code. The above view is supported by the decision of the Privy Council in the case of N. Varada Pillai v. Jeevarathnammal, 46 Ind App 285 : AIR 1919 P.C. 44 (C). In my opinion, therefore, the plaintiffs' possession from 1927 for upwards of twelve years. amounted in law to their adverse possession against the defendants. The two courts of appeal below found that the plaintiffs were put in possession in 1927, by defendant no. 14 with the knowledge and consent of defendants 1 to 3, who represented their family consisting of themselves and defendants 4 to 13. (15) The next branch of the argument of the learned Advocate General is that no evidence was adduced on the question of adverse possession by the parties as it was a new case which was made out at the appellate stage. In my opinion, there is no substance in this contention also, because after consideration of the evidence on the record, oral and documentary, the first Court of appeal came to conclusion that in 1927 defendant no. In my opinion, there is no substance in this contention also, because after consideration of the evidence on the record, oral and documentary, the first Court of appeal came to conclusion that in 1927 defendant no. 14 received Rs. 300/- from the plaintiff and allowed them to cultivate the suit land with the knowledge and consent of defendants 1 to 3. In my opinion, therefore, Mr. Justice Misra correctly held that in the present case adverse possession was pleaded, and the finding of the court of appeal below on possession was based on a consideration of the oral and documentary evidence on the record and the circumstances and the probability of the case, and that that finding of possession is correct. 30. Further, the Patna High Court in the case of GOVIND YADAV AND OTHERS (supra) at Paragraph Nos. 15, 16 and 17, which reads as under: “15. It is true that in specific terms the plea that the plaintiffs had acquired title to Sch. III lands by adverse possession had not been raised before. But as pointed out by Lord Watson in Connecticut Fire Insurance Co. v. Kavanagh, (1892 AC 473) in a passage which was quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in Yeshwant Deorao v. Walchand Ramchand ( AIR 1951 SC 16 ). "When a question of law is raised for the first time in a court of last resort upon the construction of a document or upon facts either admitted or proved beyond controversy, it is not only competent but expedient in the interests of justice to entertain the plea." The plea that the plaintiffs had acquired title to the suit land by adverse possession arises upon facts proved beyond controversy because it arises upon the facts found by the appellate court which is the final court of fact. 16. It remains now to consider the last submission of Sri Ghosh, namely, that the plea of adverse possession cannot be raised because it was not pleaded and no issue was raised regarding this plea. In my opinion, though the plea of title by adverse possession had not been raised in the plaint in specific terms, a case of acquisition of title by adverse possession arose upon the facts stated in the plaint as all the facts relevant for raising a issue of title by adverse possession were stated in the plaint. In para. In my opinion, though the plea of title by adverse possession had not been raised in the plaint in specific terms, a case of acquisition of title by adverse possession arose upon the facts stated in the plaint as all the facts relevant for raising a issue of title by adverse possession were stated in the plaint. In para. 6 of the plaint it was stated that the plaintiffs were ordered to be restored to possession over 8 bighas and odd lands by the Collector by his order dated 21-6-1940 and that plaintiff No. 1, the karta of the plaintiffs obtained delivery of possession 18-12-1940 and came in possession. In para 8 of the plaint it was recited that the plaintiffs were in possession of the lands specified in Schedule Ill to the plaint as of right by virtue of the order dated 21-6-1940 passed in the proceeding under the Act and the delivery of possession and that since the date of delivery of possession on 28-12-1940 they continued to be in possession thereof exclusively (Bela Sarakat Ahde) and peaceably (bamokaflat digre). Thereafter, in para 11 of the plaint it was recited that the plaintiffs were in possession since the date of delivery of possession i.e. 28-12-1940 continuously till the date of dispossession. The plaint therefore, contained a clear averment that the plaintiffs were continously in possession for more than 12 years peaceably and as of right in assertion of their independent title. All the facts necessary to constitute a plea of adverse possession are, therefore, clearly and unambiguously set out the plaint. It must, therefore, be held that the plea of title by adverse possession was implicit in the case made out by the plaintiffs in their plaint. It is also manifest that if the plaintiffs (permitted to raise the plea of title by adverse possession, the defendants would not be taken by surprise. It must, therefore, be held that the plea of title by adverse possession was implicit in the case made out by the plaintiffs in their plaint. It is also manifest that if the plaintiffs (permitted to raise the plea of title by adverse possession, the defendants would not be taken by surprise. The question whether there was an order of the Collector under the Act whether the plaintiffs came in possession of the land by virtue of order, whether the plaintiffs were in possession since then till the date of dispossession, that is for more that 12 years, were controverted by the defendants and evidence regarding these facts was led on both sides and clear and specific findings regarding possession, the date on which the possession of the plaintiffs commenced and the date till which it continued were recorded. 17. It is well settled that where the relevant facts for raising an issue title by adverse possession are raised in the pleading by a party and the facts were dealt with by the trial court and the question of adverse possession was implicit in the case made out by the party, the party can succeed on title by adverse possession even though d it is not specifically pleaded at the trial stage and no issue had been raised on it and the plea is raised at the first appellate stage: Mir Mohammad Siddique v. Keshwar Singh, (1967) ILR 46 Pat 1103. In Sribhakwan Singh v. Rambasi Kuer, AIR 1957 Pat 157 also relied upon in the case reported in (1967) ILR 46 Pat 1103, it was observed that in a suit based on title extending for more than 12 years plea of adverse possession need not be specifically pleaded as it is included in the plea of title. It is true that in those cases the plea was raised for the first time in the first appellate court but in the absence of express plea, the point can be raised in the second appellate court also subject only to this condition that the plea can be determined on the basis on the facts admitted or found to be proved by the appellate court.” 31. Based on the principles of law laid down above, the oral and documentary evidence is to be considered. Based on the principles of law laid down above, the oral and documentary evidence is to be considered. Claimant No.1 is examined as PW-1 and deposed that he had sold the suit schedule property in the year 1962 to Ramaiah and Nagappa, but his name is continued in the record of rights; therefore, his possession over the suit schedule land is hostile to claimant No.3, continuously and without interruption. 32. At this stage, it is pertinent to discuss here that claimant No.1 is none other than husband of the sister of claimant No.3, who is brother in law. Therefore, claimant Nos.1 and 3 are related to each other; hence, this mere relationship is also one of the main factors in deciding the nature of possession over the suit schedule property. Claimant No.1 is not outsider of claimant No.3’s family nor a stranger to claimant No.3. Consequently, the submission made by the learned counsel for claimant No.3 is also considered at this stage because, despite such mere relationship, the possession of claimant No.1 is at the most is permissive in nature. Hence, the permissive possession cannot prove adverse to the title of claimant No.3. 33. Admittedly, claimant No.3 purchased the suit schedule properties on 06.02.1965, which is not disputed by claimant No.1. Claimant No.1 admitted that claimant No.3 and his legal heirs are the owners of the suit schedule properties and having title; hence, it is incumbent upon claimant No.1 to plead and prove that his title is adverse to claimant No.3 and that he has perfected the title. 34. Upon considering the documentary evidence, Exs.P-3 to P-11, the record of rights shows that the name of claimant No.1 and Ramaiah were entered in the revenue records in both column Nos.9 and 12 from the year 1968-69. It is pertinent to note that Ramaiah and Nagappa purchased the suit schedule lands from claimant No.1 through registered sale deeds dated 12.02.1962 and 13.02.1962; therefore, claimant No.1 lost his title in the year 1962 itself. Even after, the sale deed, the names of claimant No.1 and the purchaser Ramaiah continued to be entered in the revenue records. Both names continued up to the period 1991. The name of claimant No.3 - Veerappa Reddy was entered in the record of rights in the year 1985-86 by deleting the names of Muniyappa and Ramaiah. Even after, the sale deed, the names of claimant No.1 and the purchaser Ramaiah continued to be entered in the revenue records. Both names continued up to the period 1991. The name of claimant No.3 - Veerappa Reddy was entered in the record of rights in the year 1985-86 by deleting the names of Muniyappa and Ramaiah. Hence, when claimant No.1 sold the suit schedule property to Ramaiah, Ramaiah’s name was shown as the possessor of the suit schedule land. Thereafter, claimant No.3 - Veerappa Reddy purchased the suit schedule land from Ramaiah; consequently, claimant No.3 acquired the title and possession and Ramaiah’s name continued to be shown as possessor at column No.12, proving that possession continued and flowed to Veerappa Reddy - claimant No.3. 35. In the record of rights, from the year 1988-89, the name of claimant No.3 is shown in the cultivator's column as the possessor. Therefore, at the time of acquisition of the lands, claimant No.3’s name is appeared as the cultivator, which is proved from the revenue records as above discussed. Claimant No.1, while filing an application for reference to the SLAO praying that the matter be referred to the Reference Court, but at the first instance claimant No.1 has not made any pleading that he had perfected title by adverse possession, but subsequently he amended his pleading to include adverse possession. 36. Just because in Krishi Patta and the tax paid receipts - Exs.P-12 to P-19, the name of claimant No.1 is continued, that alone cannot prove that he is in adverse possession and has perfected the title by adverse possession. There should be animus on part of claimant No.1 and hostility with knowledge of claimant No.3 that claimant No.1 is in adverse possession, but this has not been pleaded in the reference application filed at first instance. Therefore, there is no substance in the arguments canvassed by the counsel for respondent No.1 that pleadings and proof regarding adverse possession are not necessary. 37. Therefore, there is no substance in the arguments canvassed by the counsel for respondent No.1 that pleadings and proof regarding adverse possession are not necessary. 37. As per the principle of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court above discussed, the person who claims to be in adverse possession and to have perfected the title by adverse possession must plead and prove his hostility, bringing knowledge to the real owner and an adverse to the interest to the real owner, continuous, uninterrupted and without any obstruction, but all these ingredients have not been proved by claimant No.1 in the evidence by placing cogent evidence. 38. There cannot be found fault with non-examination of two witnesses namely, Ramaiah and Nagappa by the time of commencement of recording evidence, they died. Hence, claimant No.3 cannot be found fault with by non-examination of these two witnesses. 39. Further, in the notifications issued by the SLAO, the name of claimant No.3 is entered. This proves the fact that claimant No.1 is not in possession over the suit schedule lands. Further, in Exs.P-20 and P-21, which are certified copies of the order sheet maintained by the SLAO, the name of the holder of the land is shown as M. Veerappa Reddy, who is claimant No.3. Also, in Ex.P-24, the handing over of the possession record, the name of Ramaiah Reddy is also mentioned, but by that time Ramaiah Reddy had already parted with his ownership and when his name is shown as he is in possession, as above discussed, title follows the possession and therefore claimant No.3 is proved to be in possession. Ex.P-25 is Form No.25 and the Khatha/RTC Extract; it shows both the names of claimant No.1 and Ramaiah Reddy. Therefore, when the vendor of claimant No.3 is stated as having paid tax and being in possession, but because claimant No.3 had purchased the suit schedule property in the year 1965, the title follows possession and since Ramaiah was shown as in possession, the possession was deemed to have been handed over to claimant No.3, because claimant No.1 alone is not shown as tax paid and he is in possession over the suit schedule properties. 40. 40. Further, upon appreciating the documentary evidence Exs.P-33, P-34 and P-35, the name of claimant No.3-M. Veerappa Reddy is entered in the revenue records as owner and Kabjedar of the suit schedule properties, which proves the fact that claimant No.3 was in possession over the suit schedule property. Ex.P-35 is the tax paid receipts, which prove the fact that claimant No.3 had paid tax and he is in possession over the suit schedule properties. 41. As discussed above, claimant No.1, while filing an application before the SLAO, has not stated that he was in possession and that he has perfected title by adverse possession. This assumes importance that though strict rules of pleadings are not applicable in the reference application, but shows the animus in the mind of claimant No.1 as to whether he is having intention to claim adverse possession or not. Hence, as per the principle of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, pleadings at very initial point of time are necessary regarding claiming adverse possession, but claimant No.1 has not made any pleadings in the reference application at very initial point of time. Though, the claimant No.1 has made an amendment to the application subsequently, that is to be construed as an afterthought to fill up lacuna in the averments in the application. PW-1-claimant No.1 in the evidence has deposed that although he sold the suit schedule properties to Ramaiah in the year 1962, he continued in possession and the possession was handed over to him; however, in the same cross-examination, it was stated that the KEB Authorities had cut and removed the trees and claimant No.3 had put his left thumb impression (LTM) on blank papers stating that certain applications had to be filed before the LAO to obtain compensation and accordingly he gave a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- as final compensation; therefore, this fact prove that claimant No.3 is in possession over the suit schedule properties. Hence, claimant No.1 has failed to prove that he is in adverse possession over the suit schedule properties. 42. It is incumbent upon claimant No.1, apart from actual and continued possession, to prove the ingredients of adverse possession; there should be necessary animus on the part of claimant No.1, who intended to perfect title by way of adverse possession. Hence, claimant No.1 has failed to prove that he is in adverse possession over the suit schedule properties. 42. It is incumbent upon claimant No.1, apart from actual and continued possession, to prove the ingredients of adverse possession; there should be necessary animus on the part of claimant No.1, who intended to perfect title by way of adverse possession. Claimant No.1 is none other than brother in law of claimant No.3 and because of this mere relationship there was bona fide impression and belief that claimant No.1 was in possession in the nature of permissive possession. Hence, it cannot be said that the possession of claimant No.1 is adverse to the knowledge of claimant No.3 and such possession as contended by claimant No.1 cannot be said to be adverse possession at all because it lacks the necessary animus to perfect title by way of adverse possession. 43. There is no statutory definition for adverse possession, but the adverse possession must be pleaded and proved by the person who claims it. In the instant case, upon perusal of the evidence on record as discussed above, much particularly in the reference application filed at first instance, there is no pleading regarding claimant No.1 having perfected title by way of adverse possession. When claimant No.1 contends that he has perfected the title by way of adverse possession, then, when dealing with claiming ownership and title over the suit schedule property, it is mandatory on the part of claimant No.1 to plead and prove at what point of time he was in possession adverse to the knowledge of claimant No.3 and in continuous and uninterrupted possession with knowledge of claimant No.3, but in this regard, there are no ingredients found in the evidence. 44. Admittedly, claimant No.3 purchased the suit schedule properties in the year 1965 from Ramaiah and Nagaiah as per Exs.P-30 and P-32; therefore, as per the provisions of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964, there is no need to make an application by the purchaser to mutate his name in the revenue records. It is the mandatory duty of the revenue authorities to mutate the name of the purchaser of the suit schedule properties in the revenue records, failing which, the purchaser cannot be blamed. At the most, there might have been some laxity (carelessness) on part of the revenue authorities, which cannot benefit the claimant No.1. 45. It is the mandatory duty of the revenue authorities to mutate the name of the purchaser of the suit schedule properties in the revenue records, failing which, the purchaser cannot be blamed. At the most, there might have been some laxity (carelessness) on part of the revenue authorities, which cannot benefit the claimant No.1. 45. Upon considering the sale transactions, claimant No.1 had become the owner of the suit schedule property in the year 1960 by virtue of the registered sale deed and subsequently, in the year 1962, claimant No.1 and another brother, claimant No.2 have sold the suit schedule properties to Ramaiah and Nagappa respectively. Thereafter, in the year 1965, claimant No.3 had purchased the suit schedule properties from Ramaiah and Nagaiah. Upon considering the period of sale transactions and the legislation has passed an enactment namely the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964, coming into force with effect from 01.02.1964, there might have been some inaction in implementing the statutory provisions on the part of the revenue officials; therefore, the names of claimant Nos.1 and 3 would not be updated in the revenue records immediately because of these transitions were before coming into enactment namely Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964. Claimant No.1 cannot take advantage or benefit of omissions on the part of the revenue officials in entering the name of claimant No.3 in the revenue records. 46. Mere uninterrupted and continuous possession without any hostile intent to the rights of real owner will not constitute adverse possession in law. Therefore, claimant No.1 has failed to prove his possession as adverse possession and he has perfected title by way of adverse possession. 47. Also, it is necessary to observe the observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of P.T. MUNICHIKKANNA REDDY AND OTHERS (supra) at paragraph Nos.40, 41 42, 43 and 44, has observed property rights as human rights as follows: “Right to property as human right 40. There is another aspect of the matter, which cannot be lost sight of. The right of property is now considered to be not only a constitutional or statutory right but also a human right. 41. There is another aspect of the matter, which cannot be lost sight of. The right of property is now considered to be not only a constitutional or statutory right but also a human right. 41. Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, 1789 enunciates right to property under Article 17: "since the right to property is inviolable and sacred, no-one may be deprived thereof, unless public necessity, legally ascertained, obviously requires it and just and prior indemnity has been paid". 42. Moreover, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 under section 17(i) and 17(ii) also recognizes right to property: "17 (i) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others. (ii) No-one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property." 43. Human rights have been historically considered in the realm of individual rights such as, right to health, right to livelihood, right to shelter and employment etc. but now human rights are gaining a multifaceted dimension. Right to property is also considered very much a part of the new dimension. Therefore, even claim of adverse possession has to be read in that context. The activist approach of the English Courts is quite visible from the judgment of Beaulane Properties Ltd. v. Palmer, (2005) 3 WLR 554 and JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. United Kingdom,  (2005) 49 ERG 90. The court herein tried to read the Human Rights position in the context of adverse possession. But what is commendable is that the dimensions of human rights has widened so much that now property dispute issues are also being raised within the contours of human rights. 44. With the expanding jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, the Court has taken an unkind view to the concept of adverse possession in the recent judgment of J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd v. the United Kingdom, which concerned the loss of ownership of land by virtue of adverse possession. 48. Admittedly, claimant No.3 had purchased the suit schedule lands and had acquired the title and ownership over the suit schedule land and the right over the suit schedule property is also to be considered as a human right, then claimant No.3, would not be deprived of getting the fruits of his acquisition of land through registered sale deed as per law. Hence, the Reference Court has committed error in not appreciating the evidence on record properly and made application of the relevant laws in this regard, thus resulting into erroneous findings. Hence, it is liable to be interfered with. Accordingly, I answer point No.(i) in the Negative and point Nos. (ii) and (iii) in the Affirmative Thus, the appeal is liable to be allowed. 49. In the result, I proceed to pass the following: ORDER: i. The appeal is allowed ii. The judgment and award dated 30.03.2013 passed in Land Acquisition Case No.108/1992 on the file of XLIX Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, holding concurrent charge of the Court of II Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru (CCH-17), determining that claimant Nos.1(a) is entitled to receive compensation, is hereby set aside. iii. Claimant No.3 and his legal heirs are entitled to receive compensation as determined by the SLAO with interest and other statutory benefits as per law. iv. The Registry is directed to transmit the Trial Court Records along with a certified copy of this judgment. v. Draw award accordingly. vi. No order as to costs. In view of disposal of the appeal, pending IAs’ if any, shall stand disposed of.