JUDGMENT : E.S. INDIRESH, J. 1. RSA No.2358 of 2017 is filed by the defendant No.1, assailing the judgment and decree dated 13.09.2017 in R.A.No.76 of 2012 on the file of Senior Civil Judge at Somawarapete, dismissing the appeal and confirming the judgment and decree dated 25.09.2012 in O.S.No.28 of 2003 on the file of Additional Civil Judge at Somawarapete, decreeing the suit of the plaintiff. 2. RSA No.2359 of 2017 is filed by the defendant No.1, assailing the judgment and decree dated 13.09.2017 in R.A.No.16 of 2013 on the file of Senior Civil Judge at Somawarapete, dismissing the appeal and confirming the judgment and decree dated 25.09.2012 in O.S.No.29 of 2003 on the file of Additional Civil Judge at Somawarapete, decreeing the suit of the plaintiff. 3. For the sake of convenience, parties are referred with reference to their rank before the Trial Court. 4. Facts in both the original suits are almost identical in nature. Facts in nutshell as averred in the plaint are that, the plaintiff along with her brother - Basappa had purchased the land bearing Sy.No.76, measuring 4.94 acres at Gummanacolly Village, as per the registered Sale Deed dated 31.05.2000. Thereafter, registered partition was effected between the plaintiff and her brother - Basappa in which, 01 acre of the land was allotted to the share of the plaintiff and remaining land to an extent of 3.94 acres of land was allotted to the share of her brother-Basappa. It is stated that, the plaintiff is a widow and had five sons and two daughters. Defendant No.2 is one of the sons of the plaintiff. It is further averred in the plaint that, the plaintiff was residing with her sons - Chandrashekar and Manjunatha. It is also stated that, the defendant No.2 and other children were residing separately, however, the children of the plaintiff were visiting their mother regularly. It is further stated that, the defendant No.2 had sand business and in this connection, the plaintiff with an intention to help the defendant No.2 to raise loan from the bank, and further, the defendant No.2 had approached the plaintiff to mortgage the suit schedule property to an extent of 01 acre as mentioned above, the plaintiff decided to mortgage the suit land. It is the case of the plaintiff that, in the guise of execution of the Mortgage Deed, so as to avail loan from the bank, defendant No.2 took the plaintiff to the Office of the Sub-Registrar, Somawarapet, and in the presence of defendant Nos.1 and 3, fraudulently got executed the registered Sale Deed dated 16.04.2001. It is the case of the plaintiff that, believing the version of the defendants as to the execution of the Mortgage Deed, plaintiff has put her left thumb impression on the documents furnished by the defendants. It is further stated that, the defendant No.1 tried to put up fence around 01 acre of the land of the suit schedule property and at that juncture, it came to the knowledge of the plaintiff and her elder son - Chandrashekar that the registered Sale Deed dated 16.04.2001 has been executed in favour of defendant No.1, illegally. It is the case of the plaintiff that, the plaintiff had no intention to sell the suit schedule property in favour of the defendant No.1 and the plaintiff has been deceived by the defendants and as such, the plaintiff has filed O.S. Nos.28 of 2003 and 29 of 2003, seeking cancellation of the registered Sale Deeds dated 16.04.2001. 5. After service of summons, the defendants entered appearance and filed written statement. It is the defence of defendant Nos.1 and 3 that, the suit schedule property has been sold in favour of the defendant No.1 for a valuable consideration of Rs.5,65,000/-. It is also stated that, the defendant No.1-Karibasappa (in OS No. 29 of 2003) along with his cousin-Shambulingappa, had paid Rs.65,000/- as advance sale consideration and thereafter, on 24.03.2001, the plaintiff had received Rs.2,00,000/- from the defendant No.1- Karibasappa (in OS No. 29 of 2003) as further advance amount and again on 02.04.2001, the plaintiff received Rs.2,30,000/- as part of sale consideration, in terms of the Agreement of Sale entered into between the plaintiff and defendant No.1. It is further averred in the written statement that, the plaintiff had acknowledged the receipt of entire sale consideration amount. The Sale Agreement was entered into with the defendant No.1-Karibasappa and his cousin brother - Shambulingappa. Thereafter, the said Shambulingappa did not show interest in purchasing the suit schedule property and therefore, the plaintiff and defendant Nos.1 and 2 in both the suits approached the Deed Writer - Sri. The Sale Agreement was entered into with the defendant No.1-Karibasappa and his cousin brother - Shambulingappa. Thereafter, the said Shambulingappa did not show interest in purchasing the suit schedule property and therefore, the plaintiff and defendant Nos.1 and 2 in both the suits approached the Deed Writer - Sri. Radhakrishna to prepare the registered Sale Deed and on the instructions of the defendant Nos.1 and 2, the registered Sale Deeds dated 16.04.2001 came to be registered before the Sub-Registrar, Somawarapete. It is the case of the defendant No.1- Karibasappa (in OS No. 29 of 2003) that, pursuant to the purchase of the land, the defendant No.1- Karibasappa (in OS No. 29 of 2003) invested huge amount for improving the suit land, hence, it is the defence of the defendant No.1 that, the plaintiff has initiated the aforementioned suits at the instance of other family members to extract additional extra money from defendant No.1 and as such, the plaintiff has committed a fraud by filing the suits. It is further stated that, the suits filed by the plaintiff are not maintainable and accordingly, sought for dismissal of the suits. The defendant No.1 in OS No. 28 of 2003 is the wife of the defendant No. 1 in OS No. 29 of 2003. 6. Based on the pleadings on record, the Trial Court framed issues in both the suits. In order to establish their case, plaintiff has examined two witnesses as P.W.1 and P.W.2 and marked 37 documents as Exs.P1 to P37. The defendants have examined three witnesses as D.W.1 to D.W.3 and produced 13 documents as Exs.D1 to D13. The Trial Court, after considering the material on record, by its judgment and decree dated 25.09.2012, decreed the suits holding that the registered Sale Deeds dated 16.04.2001 in both the suits are invalid and not binding on the plaintiff. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court, the defendants have preferred R.A.No.76 of 2012 and R.A.16 of 2013 before the First Appellate Court and the said appeals came to be dismissed by confirming the judgment and decree in O.S.No.28 of 2003 and 29 of 2003. Feeling aggrieved by the same, the defendant No.1 in both suits have filed these Regular Second Appeals. 7. Feeling aggrieved by the same, the defendant No.1 in both suits have filed these Regular Second Appeals. 7. This Court, vide order dated 18.08.2025 has formulated the following substantial question of law: In RSA No.2359 of 2017 i) Whether the both the Courts below have committed an error in misconstruing Exs.P1 and P2 vis-à-vis cancellation of Sale Deed dated 16.04.2001 (Ex.D1) ? ii) Whether the First Appellate Court committed an error in rejecting the application filed by the appellant under Order 41 Rule 1 of CPC, without considering the said application on merits ? In RSA No.2358 of 2017 i) Whether the both the Courts below have committed an error in misconstruing Exs.P1 and P2 vis-à-vis cancellation of Sale Deed dated 16.04.2001 (Ex.D4) ? ii) Whether the First Appellate Court committed an error in rejecting the application filed by the appellant under Order 41 Rule 1 of CPC, without considering the said application on merits ? 8. I have heard Sri. Rajaram Sooryambail, along with learned counsel Sri. H.D. Somesh, for the appellants; Sri. Pundikai Ishwara Bhat, learned counsel for the respondent No.1(a to d) (f to k); Sri. S Narendra, learned counsel for the respondent No.1(e) and Sri. Y.V. Prakash, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 2 and 3. 9. Sri. Rajaram Sooryambail, learned counsel for the appellants contended that, both the Courts below have committed an error in appreciating the material on record, wherein, the defendant No.1 has paid the entire sale consideration of Rs.5,65,000/- to the plaintiff and further the defendants have examined the witnesses to the Sale Deeds and son of the scribe is DW-3 has proved the due execution of the registered Sale Deed and therefore, sought for interference of this Court. It is further argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that, D.W.2-son of the plaintiff being a witness to the registered Sale Deeds, deposed about the due execution of the registered Sale Deeds and further, son of the Deed Writer has been examined as D.W.3 and that apart, the plaintiff is having worldly knowledge about the execution of the deeds before the Sub-Registrar Office at Somawarapete and therefore, contended that, the finding recorded by both the Courts below requires to be interfered with in these appeals. It is further argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that, the Trial Court has not properly appreciated the evidence on record in the right perspective and therefore, sought for interference of this court. 10. In order to substantiate his arguments, learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on the Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajaram vs. Jai Prakash Singh, AIR 2019 SC 4374 ; in the case of Prem Singh and Others vs. Birbal and Others, ( 2006) 5 SCC 353 and in the case of Afsar Sheikh and another vs. Soleman Bibi and others, (1976) 2 SCC 142 and argued that, the finding recorded by both the Courts below requires to be set aside in these appeals as the evidence on record has been misconstrued by both the Courts below. 11. Per contra, Sri. Y.V. Prakash, learned counsel representing the respondent Nos.2 and 3, supported the contention of the appellants and submitted that, there is a presumption regarding registered document and it is the duty of the plaintiff to disprove the due execution of the registered Sale Deeds and in this regard, it is contended by the learned counsel for respondent Nos.2 and 3 that, the Trial Court has committed an error in shifting the burden on defendants to prove the due execution of the registered Sale Deeds and therefore sought for dismissal of the suits filed by the plaintiff. It is further argued by the learned counsel for respondent Nos.2 and 3 that, the plaintiff admits that, she had visited the Sub-Registrar's Office on several occasions and she is having knowledge of the execution of the registered Sale Deeds and therefore, as the suit has been filed by the plaintiff at the instance of P.W.2 with whom the plaintiff is residing and therefore sought for dismissal of the suits. It is also argued that, there is no proper pleading to substantiate the fraud as alleged by the plaintiff and the said aspect is ignored by both the Courts below and accordingly argued in favour of the appellants herein. 12. Sri. It is also argued that, there is no proper pleading to substantiate the fraud as alleged by the plaintiff and the said aspect is ignored by both the Courts below and accordingly argued in favour of the appellants herein. 12. Sri. Narendra, learned counsel representing the respondent No.1(e) argued that, the plaintiff is the owner of the schedule property having acquired the same on 31.05.2000 and the plaintiff died on 16.10.2020, leaving behind a Will dated 11.12.2017 and bequeaths the schedule property in favour of respondent No.1(e) and therefore, submitted that, the legatee had interest over the suit schedule property. It is further contended by the learned counsel Sri. Narendra that, the defendant No.2, being a son of the plaintiff, committed fraud by taking the plaintiff to the Sub-Registrar office, by misrepresenting, that, he is availing the loan from the Bank, for Sand Business, and in this regard, learned counsel refers to the finding recorded by the Trial Court at paragraph 9, and contended that, the Trial Court after appreciating the material on record, rightly, decreed the suit, which came to be confirmed by the First Appellate Court and same is required to be confirmed in these appeals. It is also argued by the learned counsel that, the entire sale consideration is paid through cash, and the defendant No.2, did not dispute about availing loan, for his business, and therefore, the burden is rightly casted upon the defendants to prove due execution of the Sale Deeds. Referring to issue Nos.1 to 4, it is argued that these issues are properly proved by the plaintiff and documents have been appreciated by both the courts below and accordingly, sought for dismissal of the appeals. In this regard, learned counsel places on the reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mst. Kharbuja Kuer vs. Jangbahadur Rai and Others, AIR 1963 SC 1203 . It is also argued by the learned counsel that, finding recorded by the First Appellate Court, by inviting the attention of the Court to paragraph 49 of the judgment and contended that impugned judgment and decree passed by the court below requires to be confirmed. Kharbuja Kuer vs. Jangbahadur Rai and Others, AIR 1963 SC 1203 . It is also argued by the learned counsel that, finding recorded by the First Appellate Court, by inviting the attention of the Court to paragraph 49 of the judgment and contended that impugned judgment and decree passed by the court below requires to be confirmed. It is further argued by the learned counsel by referring to the judgment of this Court in the case of H. Muthunanjaiah vs. C.G. Indiramma and Others, ILR 2004 KAR 5073 that, if the pleadings are amended, by an order passed under Order VI Rule 17 CPC, even the deleted facts to be looked into to resolve the dispute between the parties and therefore, sought for dismissal of the appeals. 13. Sri. Pundikai Iswhara Bhat, learned counsel for the respondent No.1 (a to d and f to k) adopts the arguments advanced by the learned counsel Sri. Narendra and submitted that no interference is called for in these appeals. 14. In the light of the submission made by the learned counsel appearing for the parties, I have carefully examined the finding recorded by both the courts below and perused the original records. It is not in dispute that, the plaintiff had acquired the suit schedule property, along with, her brother as per the registered Sale Deed dated 31.05.2000 to an extent of 4.94 acres, in Sy.No.76. Thereafter, as per the registered Partition Deed entered into between the plaintiff and her brother, an extent of 01 acre, of the land was allotted in favour of plaintiff and remaining area was allotted to the share of her brother. The plaintiff had five sons and two daughters. It is the case of the plaintiff that, the plaintiff was residing with her elder son-Chandrashekar as well as her youngest son- Manjunatha. It is stated that, children of the plaintiff, are residing separately, and have, different occupation, however, they are in good terms and taking care of the plaintiff. It is also not in dispute as to the execution of the registered Sale Deed dated 16.04.2001 in favour of defendant No.1, for a valuable consideration of Rs.5,65,000/-. It is stated that, children of the plaintiff, are residing separately, and have, different occupation, however, they are in good terms and taking care of the plaintiff. It is also not in dispute as to the execution of the registered Sale Deed dated 16.04.2001 in favour of defendant No.1, for a valuable consideration of Rs.5,65,000/-. It is the case of the plaintiff that, the plaintiff was not intend to sell the suit schedule property, however went to Sub-Registrar office at the instance of her son-defendant No.2, to execute the Mortgage Deed, to facilitate her son-defendant No.2, to avail loan, from the Bank for his sand business. It is the case of the plaintiff that the transfer of suit schedule property as per registered Sale Deeds is fraud and concoction the documents. In the said aspect of the matter, it is relevant to assess the oral evidence of the parties and to ascertain as to plaintiff is having the worldly knowledge to sell the suit schedule property. In this regard, perusal of evidence of PW1, dated 06.03.2008, would indicate that, the plaintiff in unequivocal terms admits about, the sale transaction and partition, said to have been happened, at the time of purchasing the suit schedule property, along with her brother, as per registered Sale Deed dated 31.05.2000. It is also deposed by PW1 that, the partition between the plaintiff and her brother, was prepared by one Radhakrishna- Deed writer, (father of the defendant No.3). It is also admitted by the PW1, that, at the time of execution of registered Sale Deed dated 16.04.2001, the said Deed Writer has not read over the contents of the Sale Deed. However, she deposed that she intends to financially assist his son- defendant No.2 for sand business and PW-1 deposed as follows: 15. On 26.06.2008, PW1 in the cross-examination deposed as follows: 16. PW1 further deposed, about the judgment and decree at Ex.P18 and P19 in respect of subject land, and she had succeeded in the said proceedings. She further SSdeposed that, she has entered witness box in the Civil Suit filed against Shambulingappa, and stated that, she has aware about, the entire proceedings of the case. 17. Nextly, PW2-B.V. Chandrasekhar, (son of the plaintiff) denied about the execution of registered Sale Deed in favour of defendant No.1. She further SSdeposed that, she has entered witness box in the Civil Suit filed against Shambulingappa, and stated that, she has aware about, the entire proceedings of the case. 17. Nextly, PW2-B.V. Chandrasekhar, (son of the plaintiff) denied about the execution of registered Sale Deed in favour of defendant No.1. It is pertinent to mention here that, no independent witness has been examined by the plaintiff with regard to alleged fraudulent in execution of the registered Sale Deed made in favour of defendant No.1. On the other hand, DW2,-Suresh, son of the plaintiff, deposed about the due execution of the registered Sale Deed in favour of defendant No.1. It is also deposed by DW2, as to the execution of the registered Sale Deed made in favour of defendant No.1 in the presence of the father of defendant No.3. Perusal of the evidence of DW3-R. Rajiv (son of Radhakrishna), scribe to the execution of the registered Sale Deed, has deposed that, the plaintiff was, actively participated in the, civil suit, filed against the Shambulingappa, and further deposed that, the agreement, as well as at the time of execution of the registered Sale Deed, PW1-plaintiff along with her son DW2, visited their office and aware of the entire sale transaction. 18. Perusal of the aforementioned aspects makes it clear the plaintiff had worldly knowledge and aware about the earlier proceedings in OS No.66 of 2003, and therefore, the plaintiff has failed to prove that, there is fraud committed against her at the time of execution of registered Sale Deed by the defendants, particularly, defendant No.2 is her son only. It is further noted that, Sale consideration amount has been received by the plaintiff much before the marriage of her daughters. 19. Nextly after examining the pleadings on record, particularly, reading of the plaint would indicate that, the plaintiff has failed to substantiate the element of fraud and circumstances in which the execution of the registered Sale Deed took place. Further it is settled principle of law that, if the party to the proceedings alleges fraud against other party, then it is the duty of the such party to narrate entire circumstances in pleadings and to prove the same in oral evidence. Further it is settled principle of law that, if the party to the proceedings alleges fraud against other party, then it is the duty of the such party to narrate entire circumstances in pleadings and to prove the same in oral evidence. The plaintiff has utterly failed to prove the same as required under Order VI Rule 4 of CPC and therefore, I am of the opinion that, Trial Court has committed an error in decreeing the suit of the plaintiff. It is pertinent to mention here that the Trial Court, while appreciating the material on record, entirely discussed about the evidence of the defendants, knowing fully well that issue Nos. 1 to 5, were casted on the plaintiff to prove the due execution of the registered Sale Deeds in OS Nos. 28 of 2003, and 29 of 2003. It is pertinent to mention here that, weakness of the defendant cannot be basis for decreeing the suit unless the plaintiff proves the case through oral and documentary evidence on record. 20. I have also noticed from the finding recorded by the Trial Court from paragraph 10 onwards, wherein the Trial Court appreciate the pleadings and evidence of the defendant, though it is the duty of the plaintiff to prove the issues framed by the Trial Court in a manner known to law. It is the case of the plaintiff that, she went to the Sub-Registrar office and admits her left thumb impression on the Sale Deeds and that apart, she did not deny the fact that, she had faith with the Radhakrishna - Deed Writer and his son-R. Rajiv (DW3) who adduced the document for execution before the Sub-Registrar. That apart, it is the finding recorded by the Trial Court at paragraph 12, that the said Radhakrishna, was in good terms with the defendants and said finding is wrong by looking into the deposition of the plaintiff, who herself admits that she is personally known to the said Radhakrisha and had faith with him. Therefore, finding recorded by the Trial Court requires to be set aside. Therefore, finding recorded by the Trial Court requires to be set aside. It is pertinent to mention here that, the finding recorded by the Trial Court that, the father of DW3- Radhakrishna, had taken active role in preparation of document and execution of the documents, could not benefit to the case of the plaintiff as, the perusal of the cross-examination dated 06.03.2008 of the PW1, makes it clear that, even at the time of purchasing the suit schedule property, by the plaintiff along with her brother- Basappa, Puttaswamy, the document was prepared by said Radhakrishna and Father of DW-3-Radhakrishna, accompanied along with her brother-Basappa, Puttaswamy to the Sub-Registrar office. The said fact makes it clear that the said Radhakrishna is more close to the family of the plaintiff, her brother-Basappa, Puttaswamy than the defendant No.2. The plaintiff further admits about the execution of the registered Sale Deed dated 16.04.2001 as per the cross-examination dated 26.06.2008. In that view of the matter, finding recorded by the Trial Court requires interference in these appeals on the ground of misreading the evidence of the parties. The entire appreciation of the material by the Trial Court based on surmises and conjectures and the reasons assigned by the Trial Court is based on no evidence on record and that apart, the evidence of the plaintiff was misconstrued by the Trial Court as to entire onus to prove the case cast on the defendants to prove the issues on record and therefore, the finding recorded by the Trial Court requires to be set aside. 21. Insofar as finding recorded by the First Appellate Court is concerned, I have carefully examined the impugned judgment wherein, the First Appellate Court, plainly, looking into the appreciation of the evidence by the Trial Court, and re-iterating the finding recorded by the Trial Court in toto and further, while appreciating the Ex. 21. Insofar as finding recorded by the First Appellate Court is concerned, I have carefully examined the impugned judgment wherein, the First Appellate Court, plainly, looking into the appreciation of the evidence by the Trial Court, and re-iterating the finding recorded by the Trial Court in toto and further, while appreciating the Ex. P18, judgment and decree dated 19.04.2008 in OS No.66 of 2003 filed before the Civil Judge, Senior Division at Madikeri, wherein the said suit was filed by the Shambulingappa against the plaintiff and her sons, and in the said case, Shambulingappa had pleaded that the plaintiff had agreed to sell 01 acre of the land in Sy.No.76 which is the subject matter in the present suit and having taken note of the said aspect of the matter, the First Appellate Court erred in confirming the judgment and decree of the Trial Court, without re-appreciating the material on record, except, explaining each of the documents, and therefore, I am of the opinion that, the entire finding recorded by the First Appellate Court, is contrary to Order 41 Rule 31 of CPC and the declaration of the law made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari, AIR 2001 SC 965 Therefore, the substantial question of law framed above, favours the appellants/defendants and as such, the finding recorded by the both courts below requires to be set aside on the sole ground that both the courts below have misconstrued the evidence on record and arrived at a wrong conclusion. Further the finding recorded by the both the courts below while re-appreciating the evidence would indicate that the Trial Court ignored the admissions made by PW1, wherein, the entire case rests on the plaintiff to prove the facts on merits, and therefore, I find perversity in the judgment and decree passed by both the courts below as the same requires interference under Section 100 of CPC. 22. At this juncture, it is relevant to refer to the judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court with regard to the interference on the concurrent findings of the courts below. In the case of Kashmir Singh v. Harnam Singh and Another, AIR 2008 SC 1749 , it is observed as under: “The general rule is that High Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the Courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. In the case of Kashmir Singh v. Harnam Singh and Another, AIR 2008 SC 1749 , it is observed as under: “The general rule is that High Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the Courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well recognized exceptions are where (i) the Courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the Courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the Courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. ‘Decision based on no evidence’, not only means cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding.” 23. In the case of S. Subramanian v. S. Ramasamy and Ors. AIR 2019 SC 3056 , while observing that question of law cannot be considered to be as substantial question of law, at paragraph-8.2 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed thus: “8.2. Even otherwise, it is required to be noted that as per catena of decisions of this Court and even as provided under Section 100 of the CPC, the Second Appeal would be maintainable only on substantial question of law. The Second Appeal does not lie on question of facts or of law. The existence of ‘a substantial question of law’ is a sine qua non for the exercise of the jurisdiction under Section 100 of the CPC. As observed and held by this Court in the case of Kondiba Dagadu Kadam ( AIR 1999 SC 2213 ) (Supra), in a second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, the High Court cannot substitute its own opinion for that of the First Appellate Court, unless it finds that the conclusions drawn by the lower Court were erroneous being: (i) Contrary to the mandatory provisions of the applicable law; (ii) Contrary to the law as pronounced by the Apex Court; (iii) Based on in-admissible evidence or no evidence. It is further observed by this Court in the aforesaid decision that if the First Appellate Court has exercised its discretion in a judicial manner, its decision cannot be recorded as suffering from an error either of law or of procedure requiring interference in Second Appeal. It is further observed by this Court in the aforesaid decision that if the First Appellate Court has exercised its discretion in a judicial manner, its decision cannot be recorded as suffering from an error either of law or of procedure requiring interference in Second Appeal. It is further observed that the Trial Court could have decided differently is not a question of law justifying interference in second Appeal.” 24. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ishwar Dass Jain (Dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (Dead) by LRs. (2000) 1 SCC 434 has held that, even if there is a concurrent finding of fact by the Courts below, the findings be interfered with by the High Court under Section 100 of CPC, if the Courts below have omitted to consider the vital evidence which could have led to a different conclusion or when inadmissible evidence was relied upon which resulted in arriving at a different conclusion. The observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court reads as follows: “Under Section 100 CPC, after the 1976 Amendment, it is essential for the High Court to formulate a substantial question of law and it is not permissible to reverse the judgment of the first appellate Court without doing so. There are two situations in which interference with findings of fact is permissible. The first one is when material or relevant evidence is not considered which, if considered, would have led to an opposite conclusion. The second situation in which interference with findings of fact is permissible is where a finding has been arrived at by the appellate Court by placing reliance on inadmissible evidence which if it was omitted, an opposite conclusion was possible. In either of the above situations, a substantial question of law can arise.” 25. Recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Divyagnakumari Harisinh Parmar and Others vs. Union of India and Others, 2025 SCC Online SC 2064 at paragraph 41 to 44 held as follows: "41. The legislative intent underlying Section 100 of the CPC is therefore unambiguous. It demarcates the jurisdiction of the High Court in second appeal to instances where a substantial question of law is involved, thereby precluding interference with concurrent findings of fact recorded by the courts below. This Court has, through a consistent line of authority, clarified that such a restriction is not absolute. It demarcates the jurisdiction of the High Court in second appeal to instances where a substantial question of law is involved, thereby precluding interference with concurrent findings of fact recorded by the courts below. This Court has, through a consistent line of authority, clarified that such a restriction is not absolute. The High Court may justifiably exercise its jurisdiction in a second appeal where the findings of the subordinate courts are vitiated by perversity, misreading of evidence, or a manifest disregard of settled legal principles. 42. In Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal, this Court has eruditely delineated the contours of interference with concurrent findings of fact in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC. It was expounded that where findings of fact are arrived at by ignoring material evidence, by taking into account inadmissible evidence, or where the conclusions are so perverse that no reasonable or prudent person could have reached them, a substantial question of law would arise, thereby warranting interference. This Court held thus: “19. It is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds on which the findings were arrived at, by the last court of fact, being the first appellate court. It is true that the lower appellate court should not ordinarily reject witnesses accepted by the trial court in respect of credibility but even where it has rejected the witnesses accepted by the trial court, the same is no ground for interference in second appeal when it is found that the appellate court has given satisfactory reasons for doing so. In a case where from a given set of circumstances two inferences of fact are possible, the one drawn by the lower appellate court will not be interfered by the High Court in second appeal. Adopting any other approach is not permissible. The High Court will, however, interfere where it is found that the conclusions drawn by the lower appellate court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable or its settled position on the basis of pronouncements made by the Apex Court, or was based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at by ignoring material evidence. xxxx xxxx xxxx 24. The principles relating to Section 100 CPC relevant for this case may be summarised thus: (i) An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a document is a question of fact. xxxx xxxx xxxx 24. The principles relating to Section 100 CPC relevant for this case may be summarised thus: (i) An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a document is a question of fact. But the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question of law. Construction of a document involving the application of any principle of law, is also a question of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law. (ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. A question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a question, answer to which affects the rights of parties to the suit) will be a substantial question of law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from binding precedents, and, involves a debatable legal issue. A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal position is clear, either on account of express provisions of law or binding precedents, but the court below has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of cases, the substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable, but because the decision rendered on a material question, violates the settled position of law. (iii) The general rule is that High Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well-recognised exceptions are where (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. When we refer to “decision based on no evidence”, it not only refers to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding.” [Emphasis Supplied] 43. When we refer to “decision based on no evidence”, it not only refers to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding.” [Emphasis Supplied] 43. What thus emerges from the above extracted case law is that, as a general rule, the High Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC, would not be justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the courts below in a civil suit. Such interference is permissible, however, in the exceptional circumstances carved out in Hero Vinoth (supra), including where the findings on material aspects suffer from perversity, are founded on no evidence, or are vitiated by reliance on considerations wholly irrelevant to the matter in issue. 44. In the instant case, while adjudicating upon the plea of waiver advanced by the Appellants, the High Court in the Impugned Judgment noted the submission of the learned counsel that, in view of the concurrent findings rendered by the courts below, the High Court was proscribed from interfering therewith by reason of the limited jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code. Having considered the submission, the High Court nonetheless proceeded to observe as follows: “24. There is no absolute prohibition against interfering with the findings of fact in a the Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. As held by the Apex Court in a Judgment reported in D.S. Thimmappa v. Siddaramakka, (1996) 8 SCC 365 where the first Appellate Court failed to draw the proper inference and to apply law in proper perspective to the proved facts, the High Court in Second Appeal was justified in drawing proper inference from the such proved facts and the said course adopted will not amount to appreciation of evidence in Second Appeal.” 26. Applying the principles to the case on hand, wherein, the plaintiff, had received the part of the sale consideration amount of Rs.65,000/- on 14.03.2001, Rs. 2,00,000/- on 24.03.2001, and Rs.2,30,000/- on 02.04.2001 and further, the remaining Rs.70,000/- was received on the date of the execution of the registered Sale Deed on 16.04.2001. Applying the principles to the case on hand, wherein, the plaintiff, had received the part of the sale consideration amount of Rs.65,000/- on 14.03.2001, Rs. 2,00,000/- on 24.03.2001, and Rs.2,30,000/- on 02.04.2001 and further, the remaining Rs.70,000/- was received on the date of the execution of the registered Sale Deed on 16.04.2001. It is also to be noted that upon the consent given by the Shambulingappa, plaintiff had executed, two registered Sale Deed in favour of defendant No.1, (H.L. Karibasappa,) to an extent of 40 cents and and registered Sale Deed in favour of Smt. Jayanthi, wife of H.L. Karibasappa for sum of Rs.42,000/-. It is also to be noted that khata in favour of the defendant No.1 was changed at the instance of the plaintiff in M.R.No.67/2001-02 in favour of H.L. Karibasappa and M.R. No. 68/2001-02 in favour of Smt. Jayanthi. Even at the time of change of revenue records, plaintiff has consented for the same and has not raised any objections. Therefore, same would indicate that the plaintiff has validly executed the registered Sale Deeds dated 16.04.2001 in favour of defendant No.1. It is pertinent to mention here that the deed writer - Radhakrishna was known to the entire family of the plaintiff and she has not stated in the pleadings nor in the evidence that the said Radhakrishna-Deed writer, has committed fraud at the time of execution of registered Sale Deeds on 16.04.2001. That apart, both the courts below have ignored admission made by the plaintiff as to the execution of the Release Deed in favour of defendant No.2, after the filing of the suit, and the said fact would indicate that, the plaintiff and defendant No.2 were, in good terms during pendency of the suit and therefore, the allegation made in the plaint is without any basis. It is, thus, clear that, both the courts below have failed to appreciate the admission of the PW1, and ignored the evidence of DW2 and DW3, and therefore, such findings by both the courts below were erroneous being contrary to law and the entire findings is based on inadmissible evidence or without evidence and as such, following the declaration of law made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Divyagnakumar (supra), the substantial question of law framed above is answered in favour of the defendants. 27. 27. In the result, I pass the following: ORDER: i) RSA No.2358 of 2017 and RSA No.2359 of 2017 are, hereby allowed. ii) Judgment and decree dated 13.09.2017 in R.A.No.76 of 2012 and in R.A.No.16 of 2013 on the file of Senior Civil Judge at Somawarapete, are hereby set aside. iii) Judgment and decree dated 25.09.2012 passed in OS No.28 of 2003 and OS No.29 of 2003 on the file of Additional Civil Judge at Somawarpete, are hereby set aside. iv) Suit in OS No. 28 of 2003 and in OS No. 29 of 2003 are hereby dismissed.