JUDGMENT : S.V. Pinto, J. 1. This appeal has been filed by the appellant – original complainant under Section 378(1)(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Code’) against the judgment and the order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Mehsana (hereinafter referred to as ‘the learned Trial Court), in Criminal Case No. 2185 of 1997 on 24.08.2009, whereby, the learned Trial Court acquitted the respondent no.1 - the original accused for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the N.I.Act’). 1.1. The parties are hereinafter referred to as ‘the complainant’ and ‘the accused’ as they stood in the original case, for the sake of convenience, clarity and brevity. 2. The relevant facts leading to filing of the present appeal are as under: 2.1. The complainant is a consultant of shares and securities and is doing the business in the name of “Sun Consultancy”. The husband of the accused Bhagwandas J. Patel, son of the accused Lalitkumar Bhagwandas Patel and daughter.in.law Priyavandaben Lalitkumar Patel are engaged in the business of running “Shayona Petrochem Public Limited” and Bhagwandas J. Patel is the Chairman and Lalitkumar Bhagwandas Patel is the Managing Director of “Shayona Petrochem Public Limited”. The complainant had to recover a sum of Rs.42,75,720/. from one Kishorbhai Visha, the proprietor of Vinayak Investments and in turn, Kishorebhai Visha had to recover a sum of Rs.87,29,600/. from “Shayona Petrochem Public Limited.”. A settlement was arrived at between “Vinayak Investment” and “Shayona Petrochem Public Limited” and it was agreed that the complainant will recover a sum of Rs.25,00,000/. from “Shayona Petrochem Public Limited” with interest at the rate of 30%. A Pledge Deed was executed on 21.08.1996 and the shares of “Shayona Petrochem Public Limited” were transferred in the name of the complainant. In connection with the above outstanding amount, the following five cheques were issued to the complainant. Cheque No. Date Name of Bank Amount of cheque 045084 23.02.1997 Allahabad Bank, Mumbai Rs.4,00,000/. 174305 23.02.1997 Mangal Co.op. Bank Ltd., Mumbai Rs.4,00,000/. 174306 23.02.1997 Mangal Co.op. Bank Ltd., Mumbai Rs.4,00,000/. 174308 23.02.1997 Mangal Co.op. Bank Ltd., Mumbai Rs.4,00,000/. 137726 23.02.1997 Mangal Co.op. Bank Ltd., Mumbai Rs.5,00,000/. Out of the above mentioned cheques, cheque no. 137426 dated 23.02.1997 for Rs.6,00,000/. Cheque No. Date Name of Bank Amount of cheque 045084 23.02.1997 Allahabad Bank, Mumbai Rs.4,00,000/. 174305 23.02.1997 Mangal Co.op. Bank Ltd., Mumbai Rs.4,00,000/. 174306 23.02.1997 Mangal Co.op. Bank Ltd., Mumbai Rs.4,00,000/. 174308 23.02.1997 Mangal Co.op. Bank Ltd., Mumbai Rs.4,00,000/. 137726 23.02.1997 Mangal Co.op. Bank Ltd., Mumbai Rs.5,00,000/. Out of the above mentioned cheques, cheque no. 137426 dated 23.02.1997 for Rs.6,00,000/. from the account of the accused with “Mangal Cooperative Bank Limited”, Goregaon, Bombay Branch was deposited by the complainant in his account with Dena Bank, Rajmahal Road, Mehsana and the cheque returned unpaid with the endorsement funds insufficient. The demand statutory notice was given, which was duly served to the accused but the accused did not send any reply to the notice and did not repay the amount within the stipulated period, and hence, the complainant filed a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act before the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mehsana which came to be registered as Criminal Case No.2185 of 1997. 2.2 The accused was duly served with the summons and appeared before the learned Trial Court and his plea was recorded at Exh.12 and the evidence of the complainant was taken on record. The complainant was examined on oath at Exh.61. The complainant produced 07 documentary evidence in support of the case. The complainant examined Himmatlal Govindbhai Hingoo, the accountant of the Mangal Cooperative Bank Ltd., Goregaon, Mumbai Branch at Exh. 152 and the witness produced the form for opening the account no.6465 at Exh.149, the specimen signature card at Exh.150 and statement of account no. 6465 at Exh.151. 2.3. After the closing pursis was filed by the complainant at Exh.74, the further statement of the accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was recorded, wherein the accused stated that the facts in examination.in.chief and in the complaint are false and a false complaint has been filed. The accused stepped into the witness box and deposed on oath at Exh.94 and examined two witnesses at Exhs. 120 and 124 respectively, but produced no documentary evidences. After the arguments of the learned advocates for both the parties were heard, by the impugned judgment and order, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused from the offence under Section 138 of the Act. 3. 120 and 124 respectively, but produced no documentary evidences. After the arguments of the learned advocates for both the parties were heard, by the impugned judgment and order, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused from the offence under Section 138 of the Act. 3. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the same, the appellant has preferred the appeal mainly stating that the learned Trial Court has not properly interpreted the evidence and has misread the evidence and the impugned judgment and order is perverse, erroneous and contrary to law. 4. Heard learned advocate Ms. Divya Rawal for learned advocate Ms. Tejal Vashi appearing for the appellant and learned APP Mr. Aditya Jadeja for the respondent No.2 – State. Though served, the respondent no.1 has not appeared either in person or through an advocate. Perused the impugned judgment and order of acquittal and have re.appreciated the entire evidence of the prosecution on record of the case. 5. Learned advocate Ms. Divya Rawal for the appellant has taken this Court through the entire evidence produced by the prosecution and has vehemently argued that the learned Trial Court has not appreciated the evidence properly and the appellant has produced cogent evidence to prove the case and has successfully proved the case against the respondent No.1 but the learned Trial Court has not considered the same and has acquitted the respondent No.1. The judgment and order of acquittal passed by the learned Trial Court is contrary to law, evidence on record and principles of justice. The judgment and order of acquittal passed by the learned Trial Court is based on inferences, not warranted by facts of the case and also on presumption, not permitted by law. Learned advocate has urged this Court to quash and set aside the impugned judgment and order of acquittal and find the respondent No.1 guilty for the said offence. Learned Advocate has urged this Court to allow the present appeal and impose proper sentence on the respondent No.1. 6. Learned APP Mr. Aditya Jadeja for the respondent No.2 – State has submitted that the learned Trial Court has appreciated all the evidence in true perspective and has not committed any error in acquitting the respondent No.1. Therefore, no interference of this Court is required in the impugned judgement and the order of acquittal passed by the learned Trial Court and have urged this Court to reject the appeal. 7. Therefore, no interference of this Court is required in the impugned judgement and the order of acquittal passed by the learned Trial Court and have urged this Court to reject the appeal. 7. At the outset, before discussing the facts of the present case, it would be appropriate to refer to the observations of the Apex Court in the case of Chandrappa & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka reported in 2007 (4) SCC 415 , the Apex Court has observed as under: Recently, in Kallu Vs. State of M.P. (2006) 10 SCC 313 : AIR 2006 SC 831 , this Court stated; "While deciding an appeal against acquittal, the power of the Appellate Court is no less than the power exercised while hearing appeals against conviction. In both types of appeals, the power exists to review the entire evidence. However, one significant difference is that an order of acquittal will not be interfered with, by an appellate court, where the judgment of the trial court is based on evidence and the view taken is reasonable and plausible. It will not reverse the decision of the trial court merely because a different view is possible. The appellate court will also bear in mind that there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and the accused is entitled to get the benefit of any doubt. Further if it decides to interfere, it should assign reasons for differing with the decision of the trial court". (emphasis supplied) …….. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge;] (1) An appellate Court has full power to review, reappreci- ate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded; (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law; (3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against ac- quittal. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against ac- quittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be pre- sumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court. 8. In light of the above it is a settled principle of law that in an appeal against acquittal, the Appellate Court is circumscribed by limitation that no interference has to be made in the order of acquittal unless after appreciation of the evidence produced before the learned Trial Court, it appears that there are some manifest illegality or perversity which could not have been possibly arrived at by the Court. It is also a settled principle that there is no embargo on the Appellate Court to review the evidence but, generally the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with as the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by the order of acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case of the prosecution i.e. (i) guilt of the accused and (ii) his innocence, the view, which is in favour of the accused, should be adopted, and if the trial Court has taken the view in favour of the accused, the Appellate Court should not disturb the findings of the acquittal. The Appellate Court can interfere with the judgment and order of acquittal only when there are compelling and substantial reasons and the order is clearly unreasonable and where the Appellate Court comes to conclusion that based on the evidence, conviction is a must. 9. In light of the above settled principles of law in acquittal appeals the evidence of the complainant on record is appreciated and the examination.in.chief of the complainant is produced at Exh.61. The complainant has narrated all the facts as stated in the complaint, and during the cross-examination, he has stated that his business transactions were with Kishorebhai Visha of “Vinayak Investments”, but he has not produced any documentary evidence regarding his transaction with “Vinayak Investments”. He does not have any written evidence about the transactions with “Vinayak Investments” and the document produced at Exh.72, which is a Pledge Deed executed on a stamp paper of Rs.100/. has been purchased by him, but his signature is not affixed on the stamp paper. The document at Exh.72 does not bear the signature of the accused and it bears the signature of Lalitkumar Patel, the Managing Director of “Shayana Petrochem Public Limited”. The document also does not bear the signature of Kishorebhai, the proprietor of “Vinayak Investments” and the complainant was not ready to examine Kishorebhai as a witness before the learned Trial Court. At the time of execution of the Pledge Deed at Exh.73, the accused was not present and if the accused was present her signature would have been taken on the same. He has no documentary evidence to show that an amount of Rs.42,75,720/. was due from “Vinayak Investments”. The complainant has produced the cheque at Exh.62, the Intimation Memo at Exh.63, the Cheque Return Memo from the bank of the accused at Exh.64, the copy of the Demand Notice at Exh.65, the Acknowledgement Slip at Exh.66, the R.P.A.D. Receipt at Exh.67 and the Pledge Deed at Exh.73. 9.1 . The complainant has examined witness Himmatlal Govindbhai Hingu at Exh.152 and the witness is the accountant of Mangal Co.operative Bank Limited and has produced the account opening form of the accused at Exh.149, the Specimen Signature Card at Exh.150 and the Statement of Account of the accused from 10.12.2000 to 17.01.2009 at Exh.151. 9.2. After the closing pursis was filed the accused stepped into the witness box and deposed an oath at Exh.94. 9.2. After the closing pursis was filed the accused stepped into the witness box and deposed an oath at Exh.94. After the closing pursis was filed, in the further statement of the accused recorded under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the accused denied all the evidence and stated that the cheque in question does not bear her signature and she wanted to get the cheque examined by a handwriting expert. She has not committed any offence and she does not reside at Mumbai but resides at Sujalpur village and the notice was never served to her and the R.P.A.D. slip does not bear her signature. The accused stepped into the witness box and deposed an oath at Exh.94 wherein she stated that she is not known to the complainant and she does not have any interest in “Shayona Petrochem Public Limited”. She does not know Kishorebhai Visha of “Vinayak Investments” and she resides at Sujalpur and her sons reside separately from her. She does not know whether Kishorebhai has to be given any amount and she did not execute any document to pay the amount to the complainant on behalf of Kishorebhai. The accused has denied her signature on the cheque as well as the R.P.A.D. slip. During the cross-examination, the accused has reiterated that she is residing at Sujalpur and has never gone to Mumbai, but has admitted that her younger son is named Lalitkumar but she has not gone to the house of her son at Mumbai. The accused has also examined witness C.K. Rajan at Exh.120 and the witness has stated that Kishore Visha of “Vinayak Investments” has not filed any income tax return and he does not have any income tax number, and hence, he could not produce any statement balance sheet of income or profit and loss of “Vinayak Investments”. The accused has also examined Defense Witness No.2 Dineshbhai Valjibhai Parmar at Exh.124 and the witness was called to produce the Income Tax Returns of the complainant Vipulbhai Rashmikant Patel of Sun Consultancy and the witness has stated that till date, no Income Tax Returns were filed by Vipul Rashmikant Patel or “Sun Consultancy”, and hence, no such document is produced on record. 10. 10. On appreciation of the entire evidence of the complainant, it has emerged on record that as per the say of the complainant, he was having transactions with Kishorebhai Visha of “Vinayak Investments” and he had to take an amount of Rs.42,75,720/. from Kishorebhai Visha of Vinayak Investments, and who, in turn, had to recover an amount of Rs.87,29,600/. from “Shayona Petrochem Public Limited”, and towards that amount, the cheque was issued by the accused. There is nothing on record to suggest that the complainant and the accused had any kind of business or financial transactions between them and there is no document produced by the complainant on record to show that he had any transaction with Kishorebhai Visha of “Vinayak Investments”. There is no document on record to show that Kishorebhai Visha and “Shayona Petrochem Private Limited” had any business transactions and Kishorebhai Visha had to take some amount from “Shayona Petrochem Public Limited”. The only document on record is the Pledge Deed produced at Exh.73, which is the pledge of shares by Lalitbhai B. Patel, the Managing Director of “Shayona Petrochem Public Limited”, who has pledged his shares and the shares of his family members to the complainant. But this document bears the signature of Lalitbhai Patel and does not bear the signature of the accused. There is no iota of evidence on record to suggest that there was any transaction between the complainant and the accused and that the accused had any liability or debt in favour of the complainant or that there was any legally enforceable amount due from the accused towards which the cheque in question was issued. The accused has rebutted the presumption and has put up a defence and has also proved that “Vinayak Investments” or “Sun Consultancy” did not file any Income Tax Returns as the complainant has not produced any documentary evidence to show that he was the proprietor of “Sun Consultancy” and he was doing any business or that he had a license and was paying his Income Tax Returns. There is no evidence on record to suggest that any kind of business transactions had taken place between the complainant and the accused and that the cheque was issued for any legally enforceable debt due from the accused. 10. The Apex Court, in the case of ING Vyasa Bank Ltd and Ors. Vs. There is no evidence on record to suggest that any kind of business transactions had taken place between the complainant and the accused and that the cheque was issued for any legally enforceable debt due from the accused. 10. The Apex Court, in the case of ING Vyasa Bank Ltd and Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in (2015) 0 Supreme(SC) 553 has observed in para.6, as under: “ 6. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and perusing the material available on record, we came to the conclusion that it is an undisputed fact that the cheque was issued by the Appellant bank in favour of the Citi Bank account of Respondent no.2. It is also not disputed that there is no transaction between the Appellant bank and Respondent no.2. The payment covered in the said instrument was stopped on the instructions received from the Citi Bank, New York, at whose instance the said pay order was issued in the name of Respondent no.2 and the Appellant bank has acted on the basis of the instructions received as aforesaid. Therefore, there is no transaction between the Appellant bank and Respondent no.2 and, hence, the question of liability and debt in favour of Respondent no.2 does not survive for sustaining the functional position narrated supra which are undisputed, is a clear case of abuse of the process of power of the Court in dragging the Appellant – Bank to the criminal court as the facts of the instant case do not attract the rigors of proviso of Section 138 read with Section 142 of the Act.” 10.1. The Apex Court, in the case of Krishna Janardhan Bhat Vs. Dattatraya G. Hegde reported in (2008) 0 Supreme(SC) 54 has observed in para. 20 to 27, as under: “ 20. Indisputably, a mandatory presumption is required to be raised in terms of Section 118(b) and Section 139 of the Act. Section 13(1) of the Act defines negotiable instrument to mean a promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque payable either to order or to bearer. Section 138 of the Act has three ingredients, viz.: (i) that there is a legally enforceable debt; (ii) that the cheque was drawn from the account of bank for discharge in whole or in part of any debt or other liability which pre. Section 138 of the Act has three ingredients, viz.: (i) that there is a legally enforceable debt; (ii) that the cheque was drawn from the account of bank for discharge in whole or in part of any debt or other liability which pre. supposes a legally enforceable debt; and (iii) that the cheque so issued had been returned due to insufficiency of funds. 21. The proviso appended to the said section provides for compliance of legal requirements before a complaint petition can be acted upon by a court of law. Section 139 of the Act merely raises a presumption in regard to the second aspect of the matter. Existence of legally recoverable debt is not a matter of presumption under Section 139 of the Act. It merely raises a presumption in favour of a holder of the cheque that the same has been issued for discharge of any debt or other liability. 22. The courts below, as noticed herein before, proceeded on the basis that Section 139 raises a presumption in regard to existence of a debt also. The courts below, in our opinion, committed a serious error in proceeding on the basis that for proving the defence the accused is required to step into the witness box and unless he does so he would not be discharging his burden. Such an approach on the part of the courts, we feel, is not correct. 23. An accused for discharging the burden of proof placed upon him under a statute need not examine himself. He may discharge his burden on the basis of the materials already brought on records. An accused has a constitutional right to maintain silence. Standard of proof on the part of an accused and that of the prosecution in a criminal case is different. 24. In Bharat Barrel & Drum Manufacturing Company v. Amin Chand Payrelal [ (1999) 3 SCC 35 ] interpreting Section 118(a) of the Act, this Court opined: “Upon consideration of various judgments as noted hereinabove, the position of law which emerges is that once execution of the promissory note is admitted, the presumption under Section 118(a) would arise that it is supported by a consideration. Such a presumption is rebuttable. The defendant can prove the non.existence of a consideration by raising a probable defence. Such a presumption is rebuttable. The defendant can prove the non.existence of a consideration by raising a probable defence. If the defendant is proved to have discharged the initial onus of proof showing that the existence of consideration was improbable or doubtful or the same was illegal, the onus would shift to the plaintiff who will be obliged to prove it as a matter of fact and upon its failure to prove would disentitle him to the grant of relief on the basis of the negotiable instrument. The burden upon the defendant of proving the non. existence of the consideration can be either direct or by bringing on record the preponderance of probabilities by reference to the circumstances upon which he relies. In such an event, the plaintiff is entitled under law to rely upon all the evidence led in the case including that of the plaintiff as well. In case, where the defendant fails to discharge the initial onus of proof by showing the non.existence of the consideration, the plaintiff would invariably be held entitled to the benefit of presumption arising under Section 118(a) in his favour. The court may not insist upon the defendant to disprove the existence of consideration by leading direct evidence as the existence of negative evidence is neither possible nor contemplated and even if led, is to be seen with a doubt [Emphasis supplied] 25. Furthermore, whereas prosecution must prove the guilt of an accused beyond all reasonable doubt, the standard of proof so as to prove a defence on the part of an accused is preponderance of probabilities. Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only from the materials brought on records by the parties but also by reference to the circumstances upon which he relies. 26. A statutory presumption has an evidentiary value. The question as to whether the presumption whether stood rebutted or not, must, therefore, be determined keeping in view the other evidences on record. For the said purpose, stepping into the witness box by the appellant is not imperative. In a case of this nature, where the chances of false implication cannot be ruled out, the background fact and the conduct of the parties together with their legal requirements are required to be taken into consideration. 27. For the said purpose, stepping into the witness box by the appellant is not imperative. In a case of this nature, where the chances of false implication cannot be ruled out, the background fact and the conduct of the parties together with their legal requirements are required to be taken into consideration. 27. In M.S. Narayana Menon Alias Mani v. State of Kerala and Another [ (2006) 6 SCC 39 ], it was held that once the accused is found to discharge his initial burden, it shifts to the complainant.” 11. The learned Trial Court has appreciated the entire evidence in proper perspective and there does not appear to be any infirmity and illegality in the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. The learned Trial Court has appreciated all the evidence and this Court is of the considered opinion that the learned Trial Court was completely justified in acquitting the accused of the offence leveled against him. The findings recorded by the learned Trial Court are absolutely just and proper and no illegality or infirmity has been committed by the learned trial Court and this Court is in complete agreement with the findings, ultimate conclusion and the resultant order of acquittal recorded by the learned Trial Court. This Court finds no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and order and the present appeal is devoid of merits and resultantly, the same is dismissed. 12. The impugned judgment and the order dated learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Mehsana, in Criminal Case No. 2185 of 1997 on 24.08.2009 is hereby confirmed. 13. Bail bond stands cancelled. Record and proceedings be sent back to the concerned Trial Court forthwith.