JUDGMENT : KALYAN RAI SURANA, J. 1. Heard Mr. M.K. Choudhury, learned senior counsel, assisted by Mr. B. Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. S. Dutta, learned senior counsel, assisted by Mr. S. Dihingia, learned counsel for the private respondent no. 1. None appeared on call for the respondent nos. 2, 3 and 4. 2. The respondent no. 1 in this intra-court appeal is the writ petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 6015/2023. The Union of India, represented by the Secretary, Govt. of India, Department of Fertilizers, the proforma respondent no. 2herein was arrayed as respondent no. 1 in the writ petition. The Union of India, represented by the Secretary, Govt. of India, Ministry of Human Resource, the proforma respondent no. 3 herein was arrayed as respondent no. 8 in the writ petition. The proforma respondent no. 4 herein was arrayed as respondent no. 9 in the writ petition. The appellant in this appeal was arrayed as respondent no. 2 in the writ petition. The officials of the appellant, who were arrayed as respondent nos. 3 to 7 in the writ petition are not arrayed as respondents and/or proforma respondents in this appeal. 3. At the outset, the pleadings in paragraph 1 of the writ petition is factually incorrect because while the petitioner claims that Brahmaputra Valley Fertilizer Corporation Limited (BVFCL for brevity) was incorporated in 2002, she was engaged as Graduate Teacher-cum- Demonstrator (Biology) by BVFCL on 20.01.1994 on ad hoc basis, which is ex facie unbelievable, and found to have been denied by the appellant in paragraph 4 of the appellant’s affidavit-in-opposition, filed in the writ proceeding. 4. Be that as it may, from the pleadings and documents available in the memo of appeal, it appears that the case of the respondent no.1 in the writ petition is that Hindustan Fertilizer Corporation Higher Secondary School, Namrup (hereinafter referred to as HFCHS School for brevity) was established by the Namrup Unit of the erstwhile Hindustan Fertilizer Corporation Ltd. (HFCL for brevity), a public sector undertaking under the Department of Fertilizer, Govt. of India. The said HFCL was declared sick. However, the Central Government wanted to revive the Namrup Unit of HFCL and thus, BVFCL was incorporated in the year 2002, which took over the assets of the erstwhile HFCL. 5. of India. The said HFCL was declared sick. However, the Central Government wanted to revive the Namrup Unit of HFCL and thus, BVFCL was incorporated in the year 2002, which took over the assets of the erstwhile HFCL. 5. As per contents of the letter dated 12.11.1993 (Annexure-4 to the writ petition), it appears that the Chief Personnel Officer, HFCL, Namrup Unit informed the petitioner that for framing a panel for the post of ad hoc Teacher- cum- Demonstrator (Biology), her name was sponsored by the Employment Exchange, Namrup and as such, she was requested to appear for interview on 01.12.1993 and 02.12.1993. Accordingly, vide appointment letter dated 03.01.1994, the petitioner was appointed as Demonstrator on ad hoc basis for 40 days with effect from 27.01.1994 and posted to HFCHS School and her allotted employment number was 5949. Thus, the statement made by the petitioner in paragraph 1 of the writ petition that she joined the said school on 20.01.1994, is contrary to the contents of the aforesaid appointment letter dated 03.01.1994 and pleadings made in paragraph 6 of the writ petition. 6. It has been further projected that the engagement of the respondent no.1 was extended from time to time at regular intervals with artificial breaks and she is working in the said school, renamed as BVFCL Higher Secondary School (hereinafter referred to as BVFCLHS School for brevity) till date. However, no document regarding extension of service is annexed to the writ petition. Thus, it appears that the respondent no.1 had continued to serve in the said school since their appointment without any protest. 7. Seeking regularisation of their services, the respondent No.1 had approached this court by filing a writ petition, which was registered and numbered as W.P.(C) 6015/2023. The learned Single Judge, by referring to the decision in the case of Pranjal Dutta v. Union of India & Ors. W.P. (C) No. 7253/2019 decided on 23.04.2024, allowed the writ petition by directing that the cases of the respondent nos. 1 to 12 are to be taken up for regularisation as teachers in BVFCLHS School by following the parameters in said earlier judgment dated 23.04.2024. 8. W.P. (C) No. 7253/2019 decided on 23.04.2024, allowed the writ petition by directing that the cases of the respondent nos. 1 to 12 are to be taken up for regularisation as teachers in BVFCLHS School by following the parameters in said earlier judgment dated 23.04.2024. 8. The learned senior counsel for the appellant has referred to the grounds of appeal and amongst others, emphasis was given on the point that the judgment dated 23.04.2024 in W.P.(C) 7253/2019 was passed as the writ petitioners therein were found to have rendered more than 30 years of service. Moreover, it was also submitted that the appointment of the respondent no.1 was purely temporary and therefore, she was rendering service with full knowledge of her status and had accepted her temporary status without any objection whatsoever. It has further been submitted that the BVFCL was a loss making and sick corporation and therefore, when the survival of the appellant is at stake, the impugned order, directing regularisation of the service of the respondent no.1requires interference. It has also been submitted that the respondent no.1 has not produced any document to show that the posts in which she was engaged were duly sanctioned posts. By citing the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Uma Devi, (2006) 4 SCC 1 , it was submitted that the said judgment was rendered by the Supreme Court of India on 10.04.2006, it was submitted that as per the ratio laid down in paragraph 53 of the case of Uma Devi (supra), an embargo is created on any order for regularisation of service of the private respondents without existence of permanent posts. Moreover, by referring to the decision of the Supreme Court of India in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava, (2015) 1 SCC 347 , it was submitted that the respondent no.1had not challenged the non- regularising her service and thus, had acquiesced to the same. Therefore, it was submitted that the respondent no.1 is a fence-sitter and only after her counterparts had got a favourable order in W.P.(C) 7253/2019, the respondent no.1 has belatedly approached this Court. Accordingly, it has been submitted that the respondent no.1 is not entitled to any relief in their writ petition, which was liable to be dismissed. 9. Therefore, it was submitted that the respondent no.1 is a fence-sitter and only after her counterparts had got a favourable order in W.P.(C) 7253/2019, the respondent no.1 has belatedly approached this Court. Accordingly, it has been submitted that the respondent no.1 is not entitled to any relief in their writ petition, which was liable to be dismissed. 9. It has further been submitted that the BVFCLHS School did not form a part of assets that was taken over by the appellant in the proceedings before the Board of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR or short) and/or Appellate Authority for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (AAIFR for short) proceeding, because neither the name of the respondent no.1, nor the name of the HFCLHS/BVFCLHS School figured in the list of employees and assets taken over by the appellant in the demerger order passed by the AAIFR. Hence, it has been submitted that the impugned order was liable to be interfered with. 10. It has further been submitted that the liability of the BVFCLHS School was not fastened upon the appellant vide the demerger order dated 26.04.2002, passed by the AAIFR. It has also been submitted that by the said order, specific properties and assets, including industrial units and officers whose service was made available to the BVFCL. It was also submitted that at the time of demerger, the erstwhile HFCL was operating multiple educational Institutions including Kendriya Vidyalay School, Model School and BVFCLHS School, which is not mentioned in the demerger order. Thus, it has been submitted that the running of the operation of the said BVFCLHS School is only one of the steps taken by the BVFCL towards discharge of its corporate social responsibility (CSR for short). Moreover, it has been submitted that no children of any BVFCL employees are studying in the said school, but the said school caters to the children of in and around Namrup. However, on a pointed query of the Court, it has been submitted that the land of the BVFCJHS School, including constructions standing thereon is owned by the appellant, however, it has been submitted that the said BVFCLHS School is not an integral part of the assets handed over to the appellant by virtue of order dated 26.04.2002, passed by the AAIFR. 11. 11. It has been submitted that the respondent no.1 has heavily relied on the Inter-Office Memo dated 27.09.1991, to project that the sanctioned strength of employees of the said BVFCLHS School is 134, with 117 teachers, but the same is an unsigned document and the office of the BVFCL has no record of any such document. Accordingly, it has been submitted that the appellants cannot vouch for authenticity of the said document or in respect of its contents. Moreover, it has been submitted that the said document is prior to BVFCL’s existence. Accordingly, it is submitted that without any specific provision in the demerger scheme, by which the teachers and other staff of BVFCLHS School were made employees of BVFCL, the respondent no.1 cannot be treated as an employee of BVFCL so as to fasten any financial liability for regularising the service of the respondent no. 1 or for paying the salary or other emoluments to her. 12. The learned senior counsel for the appellants had extensively referred to the materials available in the memo of appeal, including the writ petition, affidavit-in-opposition and on the additional affidavit filed by the appellants. Moreover, in support of his submissions, the learned senior counsel for the appellants has cited the following cases: (1) Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. v. Uma Devi & Ors., (2006) 4 SCC 1 (2) Kismat Singh v. Piariya Devi & Ors., 2018 SCC Online Del 11551 (3) Jaggo v. Union of India, SLP(C) No. 5580/2024 (4) Nihal Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors., (2013) 14 SCC 65 (5) Vinod Kr. & Ors. v. Union of India, SLP(C) Nos. 22241-22242/2016 (6) National Fertilizers Ltd. & Ors. v. Somvir Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 493 (7) State of Karnataka & Ors. v. M.L. Kesari & Ors., (2010) 9 SCC 247 (8) Surinder Prasad Tiwari v. U.P. Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad & Ors., (2006) 7 SCC 684 (9) State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. Daya Lal & Ors., (2011) 2 SCC 429 (10) Mohinder Singh Gill & Anr. v. Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi & Ors., (1978) 1 SCC 405 (11) Masauddin Ahmed v. The State of Assam, Crl. v. Daya Lal & Ors., (2011) 2 SCC 429 (10) Mohinder Singh Gill & Anr. v. Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi & Ors., (1978) 1 SCC 405 (11) Masauddin Ahmed v. The State of Assam, Crl. Appeal No. 879/2004 (12) Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar v. Mohammed Haji Latif & Ors., AIR 1968 SC 1413 (13) Srinivas Raghavendrarao Desai (Dead) v. V. Kumar Vamanrao @ Alok & Ors., 2024 INSC 165 : (2024) 0 Supreme(SC) 184 (14) D.S. Parvathamma v. A. Srinivasan, (2003) 4 SCC 705 (15) Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. V. Smt. Taramai Borah & Ors., MAC Appeal No. 252/2017 (16) Greater Mohali Area Development Authority &Anr. v. Manju Jain & Ors., (2010) 9 SCC 157 13. Per contra of the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent no.1 has submitted that all throughout the BVFCL has been paying fixed salary to the private respondents, treating them as a contractual teacher without giving them status of a permanent and/or regular teacher only to deprive the private respondents of their rightful service benefit. It has also been submitted that in paragraph-4 of the writ petition, the private respondents had specifically pleaded that as per record, in the year 1991, the total sanctions strength of the school was 134, out of which 117 numbers of sanctioned post were for teachers (H.S.) and 17 numbers were for teachers (P.S.). in this regard, it has been submitted that while responding to statements made in paragraph no. 4 of the writ petition, the appellant had not specifically denied about the existence of sanctioned strength of 117 teachers (H.S.) in the BVFCLHS School. Rather, the appellants had stated that as per the report submitted by the National Productivity Counsel 2022, there are only 2 regular post, being the Principal (Grade E-3) and Vice-Principal (Grade E-2) and a total number of 28 senior teachers on ad-hoc /contractual basis in the BVFCLHS School. Accordingly, it has been submitted that the alleged absence of record of list of sanctioned strength of school teachers of BVFCLHS School cannot mean as if the appellant has denied the existence of any such documents. Accordingly, it was submitted that the appeal is without any merit and is liable to be dismissed. 14. Accordingly, it has been submitted that the alleged absence of record of list of sanctioned strength of school teachers of BVFCLHS School cannot mean as if the appellant has denied the existence of any such documents. Accordingly, it was submitted that the appeal is without any merit and is liable to be dismissed. 14. In support of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant has cited the following cases, viz., (i) Uma Devi (supra); (ii) State of J&K v. District Bar Association, Bandipora, (2017) 3 SCC 410 , (iii) Shripal & Anr., Nagar Nigam, Ghaziabad, 2025 INSC 144 : (2025) 0 Supreme(SC) 265. 15. At this juncture, it would be apposite to quote hereinbelow paragraph nos. 43 and 53 of the case of Uma Devi (3) (supra):- 43 . Thus, it is clear that adherence to the rule of equality in public employment is a basic feature of our Constitution and since the rule of law is the core of our Constitution, a Court would certainly be disabled from passing an order upholding a violation of Article 14 or in ordering the overlooking of the need to comply with the requirements of Article 14 read with Article 16 of the Constitution. Therefore, consistent with the scheme for public employment, this Court while laying down the law, has necessarily to hold that unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee. If it is a contractual appointment, the appointment comes to an end at the end of the contract, if it were an engagement or appointment on daily wages or casual basis, the same would come to an end when it is discontinued. Similarly, a temporary employee could not claim to be made permanent on the expiry of his term of appointment. It has also to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent, merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by the relevant rules. It is not open to the court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right. High Courts acting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, should not ordinarily issue directions for absorption, regularisation, or permanent continuance unless the recruitment itself was made regularly and in terms of the constellational scheme. Merely because, an employee had continued under cover of an order of Court, which we have described as ‘litigious employment’ in the earlier part of the judgment, he would not be entitled to any right to be absorbed or made permanent in the service. In fact, in such cases, the High Court may not be justified in issuing interim directions, since, after all, if ultimately the employee approaching it is found entitled to relief, it may be possible for it to mould the relief in such a manner that ultimately no prejudice will be caused to him, whereas an interim direction to continue his employment would hold up the regular procedure for selection or impose on the State the burden of paying an employee who is really not required. The courts must be careful in ensuring that they do not interfere unduly with the economic arrangement of its affairs by the State or its instrumentalities or lend themselves the instruments to facilitate the bypassing of the constitutional and statutory mandates. 53 . One aspect needs to be clarified. There may be cases where irregular appointments (not illegal appointments) as explained in State of Mysore v. S.V. Narayanappa, (1967) 1 SCR 128 : AIR 1967 SC 1071 , R.N. Nanjundappa v. T. Thimmaiah & Anr. (1972) 1 SCC 409 : (1972) 2 SCR 799 and B.N. Nagarajan & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors., (1988) 1 SCC 122 : (1988) 1 SCR 598 and referred to in paragraph 15 above, of duly qualified persons in duly sanctioned vacant posts might have been made and the employees have continued to work for ten years or more but without the intervention of orders of courts or of tribunals. v. State of Karnataka & Ors., (1988) 1 SCC 122 : (1988) 1 SCR 598 and referred to in paragraph 15 above, of duly qualified persons in duly sanctioned vacant posts might have been made and the employees have continued to work for ten years or more but without the intervention of orders of courts or of tribunals. The question of regularisation of the services of such employees may have to be considered on merits in the light of the principles settled by this Court in the cases above referred to and in the light of this judgment. In that context, the Union of India, the State Governments and their instrumentalities should take steps to regularise as a one-time measure, the services of such irregularly appointed, who have worked for ten years or more in duly sanctioned posts but not under cover of orders of courts or of tribunals and should further ensure that regular recruitments are undertaken to fill those vacant sanctioned posts that require to be filled up, in cases where temporary employees or daily wagers are being now employed. The process must be set in motion within six months from this date. We also clarify that regularization, if any already made, but not subjudice, need not be reopened based on this judgment, but there should be no further by-passing of the constitutional requirement and regularising or making permanent, those not duly appointed as per the constitutional scheme. 16. In light of the decision in the case of Uma Devi (supra), the records available in the present appeal has been examined to see as to how many years of service the respondent no. 1 has rendered without intervention of the Court i.e. as on 09.10.2023, when W.P.(C) 6015/2023 was filed, as well as to find out the manner in which appointment orders/ letters were issued to engage her in BVFCLHS School as ad hoc Teacher-cum Demonstrator. 17. As per materials available on record, as the respondent was required to join HFCHS School on 27.01.1994, the respondent no. 1 has rendered approximately 28 year 11 months service in BVFCLHS School, Namrup, as on 09.10.2023, the date when W.P.(C) 6015/2023 was filed. On examination of the materials available on record, it is seen that the respondent no. 1 has pleaded that she was selected and appointed after issuing advertisement and after calling candidates from employment exchange. 18. 1 has rendered approximately 28 year 11 months service in BVFCLHS School, Namrup, as on 09.10.2023, the date when W.P.(C) 6015/2023 was filed. On examination of the materials available on record, it is seen that the respondent no. 1 has pleaded that she was selected and appointed after issuing advertisement and after calling candidates from employment exchange. 18. Thus, as the name of respondent no. 1 is found to have been sponsored by Employment Exchange, Namrup, and she has rendered approximately 28 years 11 months of continuous service as on 09.10.2023, the date when W.P.(C) 6015/2023 was filed, her appointment order is found to be in accordance with law laid down in the case of Uma Devi (supra). 19. It is not the case of the appellant that the ad hoc appointment in respect of the respondent no. 1 was not extended by the officials of the BVFCL. It is not the case of the appellants that (i) the appointment of respondent no. 1 was illegal, and (ii) that the officials who had issued orders/letters for extension of her service had acted illegally. Therefore, the stand of the appellant that the BVFCLHS School was not taken over by the appellant, has been referred to only to be rejected. If the appellant corporation had not taken over the ownership and management of the BVFCLHS School, their officials had no business to issue appointment orders in favour of the respondent no. 1, thereby extending her appointment as ad hoc Teacher-cum- Demonstrator (Biology) from time to time after making some days of artificial break in her service in the said BVFCLHS School. By paying the salary of the respondent no. 1, the appellant and its officials had acquiesced to such appointment. Thus, by necessary implication, the appellants are found to be acting as the owner, who is in the management of the said BVFCLHS School. The submissions made by the learned senior counsel for the appellant that the BVFCL was paying salary of the contractual teachers under Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR for short), has to be outrightly rejected because it is neither the pleaded case of the appellants either in their affidavit-in-opposition filed in the writ petition, nor there is any statement in the Memo of this appeal that the appellant corporation is giving financial grant to the School Management Committee for paying salary to contractual teachers. Moreover, no document has been filed by the appellant to show that the payment of salary was by way of CSR activity of the appellant. The appellant has not specifically denied that it was paying consolidated salary directly to the contractual teachers. 20. The learned senior counsel for the appellant had submitted that the private respondent was appointed on contractual basis for a period of 6 (six) months and/or for more shorter period and they were re-appointed after giving a break-in-service for about 2 to 3 days. Thus, it was submitted that the nature of appointment made signifies that the appointment of the respondent no.1 was on ad hoc basis and therefore, the respondent no.1 has no right for regularization of her service. The said contention deserves to be and is accordingly, rejected because of the fact that although a specific statement was made in paragraph-4 of the writ petition that the sanctioned strength of teachers in the BVFCLHS School was 117 (H.S.), but the said statement has not been specifically denied by the appellant and thus, amounts to admission by virtue of the doctrine of non-traverse. 21. The other submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant is that having accepted the contractual appointment and extension thereto from time to time without seeking regularization, the inaction on part of the respondent no.1 would act as an estoppel against her. In the said context, it has been discussed hereinbefore that the name of respondent no. 1was sponsored by the Employment Exchange, Namrup. Thus, the respondent no. 1 has been able to establish that her appointment was made after following the due process of law. In this regard, the learned Single Judge, while dealing with the contention on behalf of the appellant had held that mode of recruitment on the strength of forwarding of names by the concerned employment exchange is a recognized mode in law for holding a selection process. In this intra-court appeal, the Court finds no reason to disagree with the said well- considered finding of the learned Single Judge. The respondent no. 1 had entered into service while the erstwhile HFCL was in existence and she is found to have found to have rendered 29 years 11 months of service. 22. In this intra-court appeal, the Court finds no reason to disagree with the said well- considered finding of the learned Single Judge. The respondent no. 1 had entered into service while the erstwhile HFCL was in existence and she is found to have found to have rendered 29 years 11 months of service. 22. It is also not the case of the appellant that at the time of entry into service, the respondent no.1 was not qualified to hold the post of teachers. It is also not the case of the appellant that they have not been re-engaging the respondent as contractual Teacher-cum- Demonstrator for BVFCLHS School. Therefore, the engagement of the private respondent no. 1 cannot be said to be an illegal appointment. Moreover, the respondent no. 1 has rendered approximately 29 years 11 months of service as on 09.10.2023, without intervention of the Court. 23. In order to bring home the point that there were only 2 (two) sanctioned post for the school, being the Principal and Vice-Principal, the learned senior counsel for the appellant had placed heavy reliance on the Manpower Assessment Report of BVFCLHS School, prepared by the National Productivity Council. It is noted that the entire report is not appended to the affidavit-in-opposition filed on behalf of respondent nos.2 to 8 in the writ petition i.e. the appellant herein and its various authorities. However, on a perusal of the said report, it is seen that paragraph 9.0 and sub-paragraphs thereto relate to BVFCLHS School. The inclusion of the BVFCLHS School in the said report stands as a testimony of fact that the said school is an integral asset of BVFCL, i.e. the appellant. Assuming that the said school was not an asset of an Govt. of India undertaking, then there is no explanation by the appellant why the said school, leaving out a large number of schools in the State of Assam, had been included in the report prepared by the National Productivity Council, which is established under DPIIT, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Govt. of India. Thus, the stand of the appellant that BVFCL is not the owner of BVFCLHS School deserves rejection. In the said report, amongst others, reference is made to the pupil-teacher ratio and the said report states that the pupil-teacher ratio in BVFCLHS School is nearly 32:1 for 28 teachers. of India. Thus, the stand of the appellant that BVFCL is not the owner of BVFCLHS School deserves rejection. In the said report, amongst others, reference is made to the pupil-teacher ratio and the said report states that the pupil-teacher ratio in BVFCLHS School is nearly 32:1 for 28 teachers. Therefore, when the erstwhile HFCL and thereafter, the BVFCL has been continuously running the BVFCLHS School by appointing teachers temporarily and/or on ad hoc basis from time to time by paying their fixed-pay, the Court is inclined to reject the stand of the appellant that it has no manpower requirement for running BVFCLHS School. 24. Under such circumstances, the Court is unable to take a view contrary to the observations made by the learned Single Judge that in the present scenario regarding the scarcity of employment, the bargaining power of an incumbent who has been offered a particular post cannot be held to be at par with the employer and therefore, the question of any estoppel coming in the way of such claim would not arise. 25. On the unique facts of this case, the cases cited by the learned senior counsel for the appellants are not found to help the appellants in any manner. Therefore, no purpose would be served to burden this judgment and order with discussion on those cases. 26. In light of the discussions above, the respondent no. 1 is held to have been appointed after following the due process of law. Her name is found to have been sponsored by the employment exchange. She was appointed after holding interview. Moreover, the respondent no.1 has rendered approximately 28 years 11 month of service as on 09.10.2023, the date of filing of W.P.(C) 6015/2023, which is without the intervention of the Court. Thus, the appointment of the respondent no. 1 is held to be not illegal. Thus, this appeal fails in respect of the respondent no. 1. 27. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed in respect of the respondent no. 1. Resultantly, the consequences of the order dated 19.06.2024, passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No. 6015/2023, shall follow. 28. In light of the discussions above, the Court is inclined to pass the following – ORDER : 29. In respect of respondent no. 1, this appeal is dismissed. The decision of the learned Single Judge would apply propio vigore in respect of the said respondent. 30. 28. In light of the discussions above, the Court is inclined to pass the following – ORDER : 29. In respect of respondent no. 1, this appeal is dismissed. The decision of the learned Single Judge would apply propio vigore in respect of the said respondent. 30. The parties are left to bear their own cost.