ORDER : 1. Grievance of the petitioner herein arises out of an order/communication dated 07.06.2024 (Annex.14), vide which, petitioner’s candidature on the post of Primary School Teacher (General/Special Education) (Level-I, Class I to V) pursuant to an advertisement dated 16.12.2022 (Annex.3), was rejected. 2. Succinctly speaking, relevant facts first. 2.1 Advertisement dated 16.12.2022 (Annex.3) was issued for the post of Primary School Teacher (General/Special Education) (Level-I, Class I to V). The petitioner applied for the post and cleared the written examination and his name finds place in the list of provisionally selected candidates. Thereafter, the petitioner was permitted to participate in the document verification. The respondents issued an order dated 31.07.2023 (Annex.7) containing the list of finally selected candidates in which name of petitioner finds mention at S.No.5339. Thereafter, the respondents issued a list of candidates for counseling in which the petitioner's name appears at S.No.295. 2.2 However, his appointment was withheld due to a pending criminal case under Sections 199, 200, 466, 467, 468, 471 and420 IPC. 2.3. After trial, the petitioner was acquitted of all charges, vide order dated 07.07.2023, passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, No.2, Jalore which was affirmed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jalore in appeal. The petitioner thereafter approached the respondents but vide impugned order/communication, dated 07.06.2024 (Annex.14), his candidature has been rejected. Hence this petition. 3. Stand taken by the respondents in their reply, inter alia, is that matter was examined by the competent committee constituted under directions issued by the Department of Personnel vide Circulars dated 04.12.2019 and 26.10.2021 in its meeting dated 27.02.2024 and candidature of the petitioner was rejected. 3.1 It is also submitted inter-alia that the Committee opined that the allegations leveled against the petitioner are serious in nature. The post of teacher is very important as the teacher will construct the nation by giving moral education to the students. 3.2 It is further submitted in the reply that acquittal on the basis of compromise or by giving benefit of doubt cannot be treated as equivalent to honorable acquittal and looking to the FIR lodged against the petitioner the character of the petitioner is treated to be doubtful and as per settled legal proposition the employer is the best judge to examine the suitability of a candidate to be appointed as a Teacher. Therefore, petition deserves to be dismissed as it is devoid of merit. 4. Therefore, petition deserves to be dismissed as it is devoid of merit. 4. In the aforesaid backdrop, I have heard rival contention addressed on the lines of the respective pleadings of the parties and perused the case file. 5. In sum and substance, what boils down for adjudication lies in a very narrow compass i.e. whether the petitioner is dis-entitled to seek benefit of his performance in selection process, despite his acquittal in the criminal proceedings? 6. I am of the opinion that the offences under sections 199, 200, 466, 467, 468, 471 and 420 IPC neither involve moral turpitude or nor can they be termed as heinous/serious in nature. None of the circulars dated 04.12.2019 and 26.10.2021 issued by the Department of Personnel, State Government referred to and relied upon by the respondents in their written reply have been produced on record. 6.1 Be that as it may, even otherwise, the petitioner has been acquitted of all charges by a competent court of law. Trite it may sound, but on the principle of presumption of innocence, an acquittal restores the petitioner's status as a law-abiding citizen. The respondents' stand that the acquittal was not "honorable" is merely speculative. The acquittal remains valid unless set aside in appeal. No such appeal against acquittal was filed by the State. Denying the petitioner an appointment solely due to an FIR/trial, in which he has been acquitted by the competent Court, amounts to punishing him by the respondents. 6.2 An individual acquitted after trial cannot be stigmatized merely for having been an accused in a criminal trial in past. Moreover, denying an employment opportunity to an accused who has been acquitted is against the principle of reintegration of such individuals into society against the basic tenets of principles of addressing recidivism. Being so I see no reason on what grounds the respondents are pleading that the petitioner is not entitled to any benefit of the acquittal. 7. In this context reference may be had to judgment dated 27.03.2025 rendered by this very Bench in case titled Avinash Kumar Dhillan Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors., 2025 RJ-JD 13304 [S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1011/2024 ] Relevant thereof is reproduced as under:- "12. 7. In this context reference may be had to judgment dated 27.03.2025 rendered by this very Bench in case titled Avinash Kumar Dhillan Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors., 2025 RJ-JD 13304 [S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1011/2024 ] Relevant thereof is reproduced as under:- "12. Having regard to the aforesaid, there is no quibble about the proposition that a person who wishes to join the Education Department must be having an impeccable character and integrity and if the offence committed involves moral turpitude, then the employer is entitled to reject the candidature given the sensitive nature of job which the disciplinary forces are meant for. 13. At the same time, there is no denying the fact that the mere registration of an FIR does not diminish a citizen's status or impugn his/her character. Every individual is presumed innocent until proven guilty. In the present case, it is important to highlight that the petitioner has been acquitted in all pending criminal cases. This acquittal indicates that the petitioner has not been found guilty of any criminal conduct. Furthermore, thealleged role attributed to the petitioner does not hold any significant weight or impact on the nature of the duties he is to perform. There is also no indication of any moral turpitude or misconduct that would undermine the petitioner’s suitability for the role in question. Thus, the acquittal reflect the petitioner’s innocence, and there is no valid reason to question their integrity or capacity to fulfill their responsibilities. 16. Youth deserve a reformative approach to the indiscretions committed in heat of the moment, which may or may not be intentional. Societal and so should the legal perspective be, of course depending upon the nature of delinquency, that youthful indiscretions should not permanently tarnish an individual’s future. A compassionate and reformative approach ought to be adopted when dealing with young individuals who may have committed minor transgressions. Young people, particularly in their late teens and early twenties, are still in the process of emotional and intellectual development. At this stage, they often act impulsively, sometimes making decisions that are not well thought out. A rigid punitive approach that permanently brands young individuals as criminals for relatively minor mistakes is against the principles of justice/fairness, recidivism and reformation and their reintegration into society. 17. Furthermore, the principle of proportionality must be kept in mind by the administrative authority. At this stage, they often act impulsively, sometimes making decisions that are not well thought out. A rigid punitive approach that permanently brands young individuals as criminals for relatively minor mistakes is against the principles of justice/fairness, recidivism and reformation and their reintegration into society. 17. Furthermore, the principle of proportionality must be kept in mind by the administrative authority. Not all offences are of the same gravity, and minor indiscretions should not be equated with serious crimes. In the present case, the rejection of the petitioner's candidature appears to be solely based on the fact that, despite the petitioner having been acquitted in criminal cases, the nature of those criminal cases is considered to be of a serious and grave character. 18. Similar controversy was involved in a case titled Sukhjit Singh vs. State of Punjab, CWP No. 9808/2003 decided on 13.08.2019 [Punjab & Haryana High Court]. Vide a judgment rendered therein incidentally by me, while as a Judge of Punjab and Haryana High Court, which in turn is based on Division Bench judgments of two different High Court, Shashi Kumar Vs. Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) SCT 576 & Union of India Vs. Jayaram, AIR 1860 Madras 325. For ready reference, relevant thereof is reproduced hereinbelow:- “12. Every acquittal is honourable acquittal. There is nothing in the Criminal Procedure Code nor is there any rule of criminal jurisprudence for treating the effects and consequences of an honourable acquittal from an acquittal on failure of the prosecution to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. 13. A Division Bench of this Court in a case titled as Shashi Kumar Vs. Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam and another, 2005 (1) SCT 576 relying in turn on another Division Bench of Madras High Court has held that the terms honourable acquittal or fully exonerated unknown in the Criminal Jurisprudence. His Lordship S.S.Nijjar, J. (as he then was ofthis Court) speaking for the Division Bench observed as below:- 7. In any event, the terms "honourable acquittal" or "fully exonerated" are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Jayaram, AIR 1960 Madras 325. In any event, the terms "honourable acquittal" or "fully exonerated" are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Jayaram, AIR 1960 Madras 325. Rajammannar, C.J. Delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under:- There is no conception like "honourable acquittal"in Criminal Procedure Code The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental Inquiry. Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of his suspension. To such a case Article 193(b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal Vs. State of Punjab through Secy, to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and others, AIR 1967 (54) P&H 422 (Punjab). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3,7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows:- (2) XXX XXX XXX The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being given a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate honourable acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted'. The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted is the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this" the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either honourable acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal. The reason is obvious; the criminal courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused." 8. Reference may also be had to another judgment dated 13.05.2024 rendered in somewhat similar circumstances in case titled Rajendra Meena Vs. State of Rajasthan, 2024 RJ-JD 21389 [S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 15957/2021] . Relevant thereof are paras 12 to 20 which are not being reproduced for sake of brevity. 9. Same view was subsequently taken in Shankar Lal vs. State of Rajasthan and others, 2024 RJ-JD 46615 [SB Civil Writ Petition No. 756/2022) decided on 18.11.2024] 10. In the light of above discussion, the question framed in para 5 is answered in the negative. 9. Same view was subsequently taken in Shankar Lal vs. State of Rajasthan and others, 2024 RJ-JD 46615 [SB Civil Writ Petition No. 756/2022) decided on 18.11.2024] 10. In the light of above discussion, the question framed in para 5 is answered in the negative. It is held that following the acquittal in the criminal proceedings, owing to which the petitioner’s candidature was rejected, he is entitled to seek benefit of his performance. 11. As regards the availability of the post, a Coordinate Bench of this Court, earlier seized of the matter, vide order dated 02.07.2024 had directed the respondents to keep one post vacant in the category in which the petitioner had applied. 12. As an upshot, the instant petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 07.06.2024 (Annex.14) is quashed and set-aside. The respondents are directed to issue appointment letter to the petitioner on the post of Primary School Teacher (General/Special Education)(Level-I, Class I to V) within a period of 30 days of his approaching the respondents with a web-print of the instant order. 13. For the period he remained out of service, he shall not be entitled to any financial benefits on the principal of ‘No Work No Pay’ however, the petitioner shall be accorded all the notional benefits including seniority with effect from the same date his counterparts were appointed pursuant to the selection process wherein petition also competed along with them. 14. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.