Order : (Sanjay K. Agrawal, J.) Question of law involved:- 1. The short question of law involved in this batch of two Writ Petitions is as under:- “ Whether the Petitioners herein, whose lands were acquired on 22.9.2012 under the provisions of the National Highways Act, 1956 are entitled for the amount of ‘solatium’ and ‘interest’ as provided in Section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 which was interdicted by legislative bar created in shape of Section 3J of the National Highways Act, 1956, which stood declared unconstitutional being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India and Another v . Tarsem Singh and Others, (2019) 9 SCC 304 and further clarified in Union of India and Another v . Tarsem Singh and Others , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 235. Relevant facts, in brief:- 2. In W.P.(C) No.316/2020, lands bearing Survey Nos.1460/2 & 1460/4, area 4,890 sq. mtrs., were acquired by the National Highways Authority of India (for brevity, NHAI) for widening of NH-200. Similarly, in W.P.(C) No.328/2020, land bearing Survey Nos.1460/1, area 1,670 sq. mtrs., was acquired by the NHAI for widening of NH-200. In both the cases, acquisition commenced on 31-5- 2011 and final awards were passed on 22-9-2012 vide Annexures P-9 & P-11. In Award dated 22-9- 2012 (Annexure P-9), in respect of W.P.(C) No.316/2020, market value of land was determined as Rs.5,53,62,816/- and in award dated 22-9-2012 (Annexure P-11), in respect of W.P.(C) No.328/2020, market value of land was determined as Rs.79,56,864/-. However, there is no dispute between the parties regarding market value as determined in the awards. Although the petitioners in both the cases claimed solatium @ 30% of the market value under Section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for brevity, Act of 1894) along with additional amount @ 12% of the market value under Section 23(1A) of the Act of 1894 with statutory interest under Section 28 of the said Act of 1894, the awards are silent and the Competent Authority for Land Acquisition (for brevity, CALA), Simga did not consider the claims of the Petitioners. However, on 19-9-2019, Section 3J of the National Highways Act, 1956 (for brevity, Act of 1956) was struck down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Tarsem Singh 1 and immediately thereafter the Petitioners submitted representation on 22-10-2019 followed by demand of justice notice dated 13-12-2019. Since there was total inaction in case of the Petitioners and since the Respondent/NHAI did not take any action, the Petitioners herein filed Writ Petitions on 13-1-2020 stating inter alia that on account of the fact that Section 3J of the Act of 1956 interdicting the payment of solatium and interest was struck down by the Supreme Court, the Petitioners are entitled for the amount of solatium and interest. It has been pleaded that non-payment of solatium and interest and denial of aforesaid claim would directly amount to defying the judgment and authority of the Supreme Court and thus, the Petitioners have claimed such amount. Total claim made by the Petitioner in W.P.(C) No.316/2020 is Rs.5,28,28,061/- and total claim made by the Petitioners in W.P.(C) No.328/2020 is Rs.75,90,870/-. It has been prayed that appropriate direction be issued to the authorities to release the amount of solatium and interest payable to the Petitioners as per claim mentioned in paragraph 9.6 of the Writ Petitions with costs along with future interest till the date of payment. 3. Return has been filed on behalf of the Respondent/NHAI stating inter alia that the Petitioners’ writ petitions seeking solatium and interest in their awarded compensation amount in view of Sections 23(1A), 23(2) & 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is not maintainable in law, as alternative and efficacious statutory remedy for the purpose of speedy redressal of their grievances relating to compensation amount has been incorporated in the Act of 1956 in shape of Section 3G(5). It has been further stated that the Act of 1956 being a complete Code in itself provides for a grievance redressal mechanism and the dispute relating to compensation is subject to adjudication in the process of arbitration only. 4. Additional reply has also been filed on behalf of the Respondent/NHAI on 15-9-2022 taking the plea of delay and laches in filing the writ petition, as the award has been passed on 22-9-2012 and writ petition has been filed on 13-1-2020 and thus, the writ petition suffers from inordinate delay and laches which has not been explained by the Petitioner. Additional reply has also been filed on behalf of the Respondent/NHAI on 15-9-2022 taking the plea of delay and laches in filing the writ petition, as the award has been passed on 22-9-2012 and writ petition has been filed on 13-1-2020 and thus, the writ petition suffers from inordinate delay and laches which has not been explained by the Petitioner. It has also been stated in paragraph 2 of the additional reply that Section 3J of the Act of 1956 was struck down by the Supreme Court only on 19-9-2019 and thereafter the provisions of the Act of 1956 relating to solatium and interest were made applicable to acquisitions made under the said Act. The NHAI had already filed rectification application before the Supreme Court in respect of the said Order dated 19.9.2019 by way of Miscellaneous Application No.1773/2021 in Civil Appeal No.7064/2019. As such, the Petitioners are not entitled for any relief. 5. Rejoinder has also been filed controverting the statement made by the Respondents. It has been stated that no award was passed by the CALA with regard to payment of solatium and interest in light of Section 3J of the Act of 1956 which clearly says that the provisions of the Act of 1956 did not apply, ex consequenti, neither the CALA nor the statutory authority had any jurisdiction to pass award regarding solatium and interest. It has further been stated that if the CALA and the statutory arbitrator did not have inherent jurisdiction to decide such a claim, the stereophonic plea of NHAI of remedy under Section 3G(5) of the Act of 1956 falls to the ground being wholly misconceived. As such, delay and laches would also be of no use to the NHAI and therefore the Writ Petitions deserve to be allowed. 6. On 20-8-2024, a submission was made on behalf of the NHAI that a clarification application is pending before the Supreme Court for clarification of order dated 19-9-2019 passed in Tarsem Singh 1 with regard to the fact, as to whether the principles laid down therein would have ‘prospective effect’ or ‘retrospective effect’ and in light of that prayer three weeks’ time was sought for, which was granted to the Respondent/NHAI, and ultimately, order dated 20-8-2024 was challenged before the Supreme Court and finally, on 27-11-2024, their Lordships passed the following order:- “ List on 03.12.2024. No further adjournment shall be granted on the next date of hearing. SLP(C) Nos.19808-19809/2024 2. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 3. The only effective relief that can be granted in this case is to request the High Court to take up the matter and decide the same on merits, without awaiting for the orders that may be passed by this Court in a Miscellaneous Application pending in C.A.No.7064/2019 (Union of India and another vs. Tarsem Singh and others, (2019) 9 SCC 304 ) decided on 19.09.2019. Ordered accordingly. 4. We request the High Court to decide the writ petition preferably within two months. 5. The special leave petitioners are, accordingly, disposed of. 6. All pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.” 7. In that view of the matter, both these Writ Petitions came up for final hearing and after hearing the submissions put forth on behalf of learned Counsels appearing for the parties at length, the case was reserved for orders on 15.1.2025. Meanwhile, it was brought to my notice that Hon’ble Supreme Court on 4.2.2025 has decided Tarsem Singh 2 in Miscellaneous Application No.1773/2021 in Civil Appeal No.7064/2019 and other connected Civil Appeals. Therefore, in light of the said Order dated 4.2.2025 passed in Tarsem Singh 2 , learned Counsels for the parties again put forth their arguments on 7.2.2025 and the matter was reserved for orders, which is now being decided by this common Order. Submissions on behalf of the Petitioners:- 8. Mr. Amit S. Agrawal, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioners, would submit that the Respondent/NHAI’s application for clarification of the Order dated 19.9.2019 has been rejected by their Lordships of the Supreme Court on 4.2.2025 in Tarsem Singh 2 and it has been categorically held that the Respondent/NHAI is liable to pay the amount of ‘solatium’ and ‘interest’. He would further submit that despite clinching observation of the Supreme Court in the clarification proceeding in Tarsem Singh 2 , the NHAI is undaunted by unsuccess and is still raising the stereotype plea that the present petition tends to reopen a concluded case without realizing the fact that CALA has not touched the issue of ‘solatium’ and ‘interest’ as at that point of time, the issue of constitutional validity of Section 3J of the Act of 1956 was pending before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Therefore, both the Writ Petitions deserve to be allowed and the Petitioners are entiteld for the amount of ‘solatium’ and ‘interest’ accordingly. Submissions on behalf of Respondent/NHAI:- 9. Mr. J.K. Gilda, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent/NHAI, would submit that after passing of the Award dated 22.9.2012, the Petitioners did not chose to file application under Section 3G(5) of the Act of 1956 seeking the benefits and directly filed writ petitions after almost 8 years of passing of the said Award, i.e., in the year 2020, and during that period, no reference or appeal was filed or pending in any Court on behalf of the Petitioners. He would further submit that the Petitioners have accepted the compensation amount declared in the subject matter by Award dated 22.9.2012 and they have not disputed the same though preferred representation and legal notice to the NHAI seeking ‘solatium’ and ‘interest’ later on, prior to filing of writ petitions, but multiple representations will not extend the period of limitation for filing the case. Since the constitutional validity of Section 3J of the Act of 1956 has been upheld by two or three High Courts, the Petitioners ought not to have waited for 8 years to claim solatium by filing the captioned writ petitions and in the present case, since the Petitioners have also accepted the compensation amount of the Award dated 22.9.2012, the present case has to be encompassed as a “concluded case” and, as such, the Petitioners’ case has to be rejected on the ground of a “concluded case”. It has also been submitted that since there is ‘change in law’ pursuant to the decision of the Supreme Court in Tarsem Singh 1 by which Section 3J of the Act of 1956 has been declared unconstitutional, the Petitioners would not be entitled for solatium and interest, in light of the decision of the Madras High Court delivered in the matter of T. Chakrapani v . Union of India , 2011 SCC OnLine Mad 2881 . In this regard, the objection of the Petitioners is recorded in order-sheet dated 1.6.2012 passed by CALA. 10. Mr. Gilda, learned Senior Counsel, relying upon the recent decision dated 4.2.2025 of the Supreme Court in Tarsem Singh 2 , would further submit that their Lordships of the Supreme Court have clearly held that the cases that have already attained finality should not be reopened. 10. Mr. Gilda, learned Senior Counsel, relying upon the recent decision dated 4.2.2025 of the Supreme Court in Tarsem Singh 2 , would further submit that their Lordships of the Supreme Court have clearly held that the cases that have already attained finality should not be reopened. He would rely upon the decision of the Supreme Court rendered in the matter of Raja Harishchandra Raj Singh v . The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer and Another , [ 1962 SCR 676 ] to submit that in the instant case by passing of the Award dated 22.9.2012 the issue of ‘solatium’ and ‘interest’ stands concluded, as the Petitioners had the remedy under Section 3G(5) of the Act of 1956 and the Petitioners have not questioned the Award dated 22.9.2012. As such, the Award dated 22.9.2012 has attained finality and it would come under ‘concluded case’. Therefore, both the Writ Petitions are liable to be dismissed. 11. However, replying to the rejoinder submission, Mr. Agrawal, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitoners, would submit that the argument raised by Respondent/NHAI that it is a ‘concluded case’ as the Petitioners did not challenge the Award dated 22.9.2012 under Section 3G(5) of the Act of 1956 before the statutory arbitrator, is not made out and the decision of the Supreme Court in Raja Harishchandra Raj Singh (supra) is also not applicable to the facts of the present case, as the said decision negated the plea of the NHAI that the Award dated 22.9.2012 passed by CALA in the instant case amounts to a ‘concluded case’ and it has been held therein that the award of the Land Acquisition Officer cannot be treated as decision and it amounts to be determined judicially that the acquisition proceeding would be completed. As such, the principles of law laid down in the Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (supra) would not be applicable to the facts of the present case, as in the instant case by the Award dated 22.9.2012, the CALA has only determined the amount of compensation less the market value of the land without touching the issue of ‘solatium’ and ‘interest’ and thereby vide Award dated 22.9.2012 only the issue with regard to amount of compensation stands concluded and grant of ‘solatium’ and ‘interest’ was neither considered nor adjudicated leaving the matter open, as the constitutional validity of Section 3J of the Act of 1956 was pending consideration before the Supreme Court. Therefore, in light of the Order dated 4.2.2025 passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in in Tarsem Singh 2 , the Petitioners are entitled only for ‘solatium’ and ‘interest’ excluding additional amount under Section 23 (1A) of the Act of 1894 as per paragraph 26 of the Order dated 4.2.2025. As such, both the Writ Petitions deserve to be allowed and necessary directions be issued to CALA, Simga to:- (i) calculate solatium @ 30% on the determined market value; (ii) award interest @ 9% for a period of one year from the date of dispossession and then award interest @ 15% from such date of expiry of one year till date of actual payment on the amount of solatium determined on the market value; and (iii) grant liberty to the Petitioners to submit representation giving particulars about the date of dispossession, market value as determined in the award and amount of solatium followed by interest, in the interest of justice. 12. I have heard learned Senior Counsels appearing for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also perused the record of the case with utmost care and circumspection. Discussion and Legal Analysis:- 13. In Tarsem Singh 1 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court, while declaring Section 3J of the Act of 1956 as unconstitutional, have held in paragraph-52 as under:- “52. There is no doubt that the learned Solicitor General, in the aforesaid two orders, has conceded the issue raised in these cases. Discussion and Legal Analysis:- 13. In Tarsem Singh 1 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court, while declaring Section 3J of the Act of 1956 as unconstitutional, have held in paragraph-52 as under:- “52. There is no doubt that the learned Solicitor General, in the aforesaid two orders, has conceded the issue raised in these cases. This assumes importance in view of the plea of Shri Divan that the impugned judgments should be set aside on the ground that when the arbitral awards did not provide for solatium or interest, no Section 34 petition having been filed by the landowners on this score, the Division Bench judgments that are impugned before us ought not to have allowed solatium and/or interest. Ordinarily, we would have acceded to this plea, but given the fact that the Government itself is of the view that solatium and interest should be granted even in cases that arise between 1997 and 2015, in the interest of justice we decline to interfere with such orders, given our discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. We therefore declare that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act relating to solatium and interest contained in Section 23(1A) and (2) and interest payable in terms of section 28 proviso will apply to acquisitions made under the National Highways Act. Consequently, the provision of Section 3J is, to this extent, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, declared to be unconstitutional. Accordingly, Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 9599/2019 is dismissed.” 14. Respondent/NHAI filed Miscellaneous Application No.1773/2021 in Civil Appeal No.7064/2019 seeking clarification that Tarsem Singh 1 is applicable prospectively from the date of its pronouncement, i.e., 19.9.2019, and not retrospectively from the date of enforcement of the National Highways Laws (Amendment) Act, 1997 and granting relief in the cases that have already been concluded is inconsistent with the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench in Gurpreet Singh v . Union of India , (2006) 8 SCC 457 . Union of India , (2006) 8 SCC 457 . Respondent/NHAI also raised contentions, applying the principles of law laid down in Tarsem Singh 1 , that if the judgment in Tarsem Singh 1 is applied retrospectively it would necessitate reopening all acquisitions made by the NHAI between 1997 and 2015 and the Government would be obligated to compensate every claimant whose land was acquired by the NHAI during that period and that permitting the decision to operate retrospectively would lead to an influx of mass litigation, requiring the reopening of closed cases. 15. However, their Lordships of the Supreme Court by Order dated 4.2.2025 passed in Tarsem Singh 2 rejected the Miscellaneous Application filed by the Respondent/NHAI and held in paragraphs 17 to 23 therein as under:- 17. “ Regardless, the prayer in the instant Application expressly seeks clarification that the decision in Tarsem Singh (supra) should be deemed to operate prospectively only. However, in our considered view, granting such a clarification would effectively nullify the very relief that Tarsem Singh (supra) intended to provide, as the prospective operation of it would restore the state of affairs to the same position as it was before the decision was rendered. 18. We say so for the reason that the broader purpose behind Tarsem Singh (supra) was to resolve and put quietus upon the quagmire created by Section 3J of the NHAI Act, which led to the unequal treatment of similarly situated individuals. The impact of Section 3J was short-lived, owing to the applicability of the 2013 Act upon the NHAI Act from the date of 01.01.2015. As a result, two classes of landowners emerged, devoid of any intelligible differentia: those whose lands were acquired by the NHAI between 1997 and 2015, and those whose lands were acquired otherwise. 19. This must be viewed in the light of the principle that when a provision is declared unconstitutional, any continued disparity strikes at the core of Article 14 and must be rectified, particularly when such disparity affects only a select group. 19. This must be viewed in the light of the principle that when a provision is declared unconstitutional, any continued disparity strikes at the core of Article 14 and must be rectified, particularly when such disparity affects only a select group. To illustrate, rendering the decision in Tarsem Singh (supra) as prospective would create a situation where a landowner whose land was acquired on 31.12.2014 would be denied the benefit of ‘solatium’ and ‘interest’, whereas a landowner whose land was acquired the very next day, 01.01.2015 —the date on which the Ordinance was promulgated, to read the 2013 Act into the NHAI Act, would be entitled to these statutory benefits. 20. Be that as it may, even if we were to assume that the decision in Tarsem Singh (supra) suffers from the vice of vagueness, the absence of a judicial directive or an explicit legislative mandate should not result in the creation of an artificial classification among a homogeneous group by the same State exercising powers under the same Statute. In this specific instance, the landowners have no discretion or choice regarding the date of land acquisition or the surrender of possession. Thus, both equity and equality demand that no such discrimination be permitted, as allowing it would be unjust. 21. That being so, the decision in Tarsem Singh (supra) also cannot be assailed on the grounds that it opens a Pandora’s Box or contravenes the doctrine of immutability, as it merely allows for the grant of ‘solatium’ or ‘interest’, which are inherently embedded as compensatory benefits under an expropriating legislation. This exercise cannot be equated to reopening of cases or revisiting the decisions that have already attained finality. Similarly, the restoration of these twin benefits does not invite reconsideration of the merits of a decided case, re-evaluation of the compensation amount, or potentially declaring the acquisition process itself to be unlawful. Instead, the ultimate outcome of Tarsem Singh (supra) is limited to granting ‘solatium’ and ‘interest’ to aggrieved landowners whose lands were acquired by NHAI between 1997 and 2015. It does not, in any manner, direct the reopening of cases that have already attained finality. 22. On the contrary, modifying or clarifying the judgment in Tarsem Singh (supra) would lend itself to violating the doctrine of immutability, undermining the finality of the decision. It does not, in any manner, direct the reopening of cases that have already attained finality. 22. On the contrary, modifying or clarifying the judgment in Tarsem Singh (supra) would lend itself to violating the doctrine of immutability, undermining the finality of the decision. In fact, what the Applicant seeks to achieve, indirectly, is to evade responsibility and further delay the resolution of a settled issue where the directions given are unequivocal—Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per obliquum i.e. ‘what cannot be done directly should also not be done indirectly’. This Court has, on several occasions, disapproved of the practice of filing Miscellaneous Applications as a strategic litigation tactic aimed at neutralising judicial decisions and seeking a second opportunity for relief. 23. In all fairness, the only defense that may perhaps seem appealing is the claim of a financial burden amounting to Rupees 100 crores. However, this argument does not persuade us for several reasons: First, if this burden has been borne by the NHAI in the case of thousands of other landowners, it stands to reason that it should also be shared by the NHAI in this instance, in order to eliminate discrimination. Second, the financial burden of acquiring land cannot be justified in the light of the Constitutional mandate of Article 300A. Third, since most National Highways are being developed under the Public Private Partnership model, the financial burden will ultimately be passed on to the relevant Project Proponent. Fourth, even the Project Proponent would not have to bear the compensation costs out of pocket, as it is the commuters who will bear the actual brunt of this cost. Ultimately, the burden is likely to be saddled onto the middle or upper-middle-class segment of society, particularly those who can afford private vehicles or operate commercial ventures. We are thus not inclined to entertain the plea for prospectivity on this limited tenet.” Further, finally, reaffirming the principles established in Tarsem Singh 1 regarding the beneficial nature of granting ‘solatium’ and ‘interest’ and directing the Competent Authority to calculate the amount of ‘solatium’ and ‘interest’ in accordance with the directions issued in Tarsem Singh 1 , their Lordships have held in paragraphs 25 & 26 thus:- “25. In view of the foregoing analysis, we find no merit in the contentions raised by the Applicant, NHAI. In view of the foregoing analysis, we find no merit in the contentions raised by the Applicant, NHAI. We reaffirm the principles established in Tarsem Singh (supra) regarding the beneficial nature of granting ‘solatium’ and ‘interest’ while emphasising the need to avoid creating unjust classifications lacking intelligible differentia. Consequently, we deem it appropriate to dismiss the present Miscellaneous Application. 26. Leave is granted in the other connected matters, and all the appeals are disposed of with a direction to the Competent Authority to calculate the amount of ‘solatium’ and ‘interest’ in accordance with the directions issued in Tarsem Singh (supra). In this context, the appeal arising out of SLP (C) Diary No. 52538/2023 is dismissed, as the challenge therein pertains to the High Court’s refusal to award Additional Market Value as another component of the compensation, while ‘solatium’ and ‘interest’ have already been granted.” 16. As such, the argument so raised on behalf of Respondent/NHAI that the judgment in Tarsem Singh 1 would apply prospectively has been rejected by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Tarsem Singh 2 . However, learned Senior Counsel for Respondent/NHAI, relying upon paragraph 21 of Tarsem Singh 2 , has contended that it would amount to reopening of cases that have already attained finality and the decision in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (supra) has been relied upon. 17. The award passed in W.P.(C) No.316/2020 would show that the Petitioners herein, as recorded by CALA in order-sheet dated 1.6.2012, have raised objection before the CALA seeking 30% solatium in view of the judgment passed by the Madras High Court in T. Chakrapani (supra). A careful perusal of the said order-sheet dated 1.6.2012 would show that the question of grant of 30% solatium was not decided and it was only stated that the claimants were given to understand about their objections and in the order-sheet dated 13.9.2012 also all the objections were treated as disposed of and ‘solatium’ and ‘interest’ part was not decided. The matter was not assailed preferably in view of the legislative bar contained in Section 3J of the Act of 1956, as the constitutional validity of Section 3J was in question. It was first declared unconstitutional by the Karnataka High Court in the matter of Lalita and Others v . The matter was not assailed preferably in view of the legislative bar contained in Section 3J of the Act of 1956, as the constitutional validity of Section 3J was in question. It was first declared unconstitutional by the Karnataka High Court in the matter of Lalita and Others v . Union of India and Others , ILR 2003 Kar 259 on 11.10.2002 and subsequently it was also struck down by the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Golden Iron and Steel Forging v . Union of India and Others, 2008 SCC OnLine P&H 498 on 28.3.2008 and thereafter by the Madras High Court also in T. Chakrapani (supra) on 4.3.2011. However, the decision in T. Chakrapani (supra) was stayed by the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the month of April, 2011 and the NHAI challenged the judgments in T. Chakrapani (supra) and Golden Iron and Steel Forging (supra) before the Supreme Court. Ultimately, on 21.7.2016, the Supreme Court disposed of the batch of the batch of appeals challenging the decision in T. Chakrapani (supra), following a statement made by the learned Solicitor General of India that ‘solatium’ and ‘interest’ would be paid on acquisitions made under the Act of 1956. However, the batch of appeals challenging the decision in Golden Iron and Steel Forging (supra) remained pending for consideration. Subsequently, in two other appeals brought before the Supreme Court, one from the Delhi High Court and another from the Punjab & Haryana High Court following Golden Iron and Steel Forging (supra), the Supreme Court in the matter of Sunita Mehra and Another v . Union of India and Others , (2019) 17 SCC 672 , disposed of both the appeals holding that ‘solatium’ and ‘interest’ would be awardable to cases pending as on 28.3.2008. Consequently, on 3.8.2017, the appeals challenging the decision in Golden Iron and Steel Forging (supra) were withdrawn by the NHAI. Eventually, on 19.9.2019, the Supreme Court delivered its decision in Tarsem Singh 1 giving quietus to the dispute declaring Section 3J of the Act of 1956 as unconstitutional being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and it has been held that the provisions of the Act of 1894 relating to ‘solatium’ and ‘interest’ as contained in Sections 23(1A) and (2) and interest payable under Section 28 will apply to the acquisitions made under the Act of 1956. 18. 18. Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners has placed his strong reliance in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (supra) in which it has been held that award cannot be treated as a decision; it is in law an offer or tender of the compensation determined by the Collector to the owner of the property under acquisition. It has been further held that if the owner does not accept the offer, Section 18 gives him the statutory right of having the question determined by Court, and it is the amount of compensation which the Court may determine that would bind both the owner and the Collector, and it is on the amount thus determined judicially that the acquisition proceedings would be concluded. 19. Here, though the amount of ‘solatium’ and ‘interest’ is claimed, but it was not expressly decided by the CALA preferably on the view that it was pending consideration before the constitutional Court. Ultimately, on 19.9.2019, it was decided by their Lordships of the Supreme Court making clear the legal position on the grant of ‘solatium’ and ‘interest’ vis-à-vis the Act of 1956. Immediately thereafter, the Petitioners filed representations, dated 22.10.2019, 20.11.2019, 26.11.2019 and 23.12.2019 and eventually filed Writ Petitions on 13.1.2020 before this Court. As such, it cannot be held that a concluded case is being reopened by the Petitioners by claiming ‘solatium’ and ‘interest’ on the amount of award, as the Petitioners are not claiming reconsideration of the market value/revaluation of the compensation amount. As such, the objection raised by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent/NHAI that grant of ‘solatium’ and ‘interest’ would amount to reopening of a concluded case/reopening of the case which has attained finality, does not stand in light of Tarsem Singh 2 20. Consequently, in the view of the discussion and legal analysis made herein-above, the CALA i.e. Respondent No.5 is directed to calculate the amount of ‘solatium’ and ‘interest’ expeditiously in accordance with the directions issued in Tarsem Singh 1 and Tarsem Singh 2 . However, in view of the decision in Tarsem Singh 2 , the Petitioners would not be entitled to Additional Market Value under Section 23(1A) of the Act of 1956. 21. Accordingly, both the Writs Petitions are allowed to the extent indicated herein-above, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.