- JUDGMENT : VENUTHURUMALLI GOPALA KRISHNA RAO, J. This second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is filed aggrieved against the judgment and decree, dated 24-3-2006 in A.S.No.6 of 2001, on the file of the learned District Judge, Vizianagaram, confirming the judgment and decree, dated 14-11-2000 in O.S.No.304 of 1994, on the file of the learned Principal Junior Civil Judge, Vizianagaram. - 2. The appellants herein are defendants 1 and 2 and the respondents are plaintiffs 1 to 7 in O.S.No.304 of 1994 on the file of the learned Principal Junior Civil Judge, Vizianagaram. 3. During the pendency of the second appeal -- the 3 rd respondent died and her legal representatives were brought on record as respondents 8 to 10; the 4 th respondent died and her legal representatives were brought on record as respondents 11 to 16; the 5 th respondent died and her legal representatives were brought on record as respondents 17 to 20; the 6 th respondent died and her legal representatives were brought on record as respondents 8 to 10; and as per Court order dated 22-12-2021 in I.A.No.2 of 2021, respondents 24 to 27 were brought on record as legal representatives of the deceased respondents 1, 2, 8, 9, 13, 21 and 22. 4. The plaintiffs initiated action in O.S.No.304 of 1994 on the file of the learned Principal Junior Civil Judge, Vizianagaram, with a prayer for granting permanent injunction restraining the defendants 1 and 2 and their men and followers, trespassing into the plaint schedule lands or in any portion and put up any constructions or permit any of the defendants or their agents or their men to lay out any roads or put or in any way interfere with the possession and enjoyment of the plaintiffs in the plaint schedule property and for costs of the suit. 5. The trial Court decreed the suit in O.S.No.304 of 1994 on the file of the learned Principal Junior Civil Judge, Vizianagaram. Felt aggrieved of the same, the defendants in the above said suit filed A.S.No.6 of 2001 on the file of the learned District Judge, Vizianagaram. The learned District Judge, Vizianagaram, dismissed the appeal suit by confirming the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. Aggrieved thereby, the defendants 1 and 2 in the suit approached this Court by way of second appeal. 6. The learned District Judge, Vizianagaram, dismissed the appeal suit by confirming the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. Aggrieved thereby, the defendants 1 and 2 in the suit approached this Court by way of second appeal. 6. For the sake of convenience, both parties in the second appeal will be referred to as they are arrayed in the original suit. - 7. The case of the plaintiffs, in brief, as set out in the plaint averments in O.S.No.304 of 1994, is as follows: (a) It is pleaded that the plaintiffs 1 and 2 are sons of one late Vakatipudi Tamma Rao and the 3 rd plaintiff is the widow of late Tamma Rao and plaintiffs 4 to 7 are daughters of late Tamma Rao and during the life time of Tamma Rao, he purchased the plaint schedule property with trees thereon from one Dr. Chodimella Syamala Rao through a registered sale deed, dated 19-9-1962, measuring approximately Ac.15-00 situated in Vizianagaram 2 nd bit bearing old Assessment Nos.14/1/A, 2, 3, 4 and 5 and since then, late Tamma Rao and the plaintiffs are in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property till the death of Tamma Rao on 27-4-1976 and subsequently, the 1 st plaintiff himself is managing the plaint schedule property and that the plaint schedule property is pre-settlement minor inam lands covered by T.D.No.957 in Jaggucheruvu Istuva in Vizianagaram 2 nd bit and that the vendor of late Tamma Rao, in turn, purchased the plaint schedule lands and the remaining part of land in T.D.No.957 from Thota Narasimhulu. (b) It is further pleaded that late Tamma Rao, during his life time, applied for grant of ryotwari patta in his favour to the Tahsildar, Vizianagaram in R.C.C.No.6802/1974 and the Tahsildar issued a certificate to late Tamma Rao certifying that the plaint schedule lands are covered by old Survey No.14/1A under T.D.No.957 of Vizianagaram, which is a minor T.D. Inam as declared by the Director of Settlement, Hyderabad in R.P.No.267/1975, dated 22-12-1965 and ryotwari patta has to be granted under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1956 and that late Tamma Rao applied for grant of ryotwari patta before the Special Deputy Tahsildar under the Inams Act, in 1975 and that was not enquired into as Tamma Rao died in 1976 and that the 1 st plaintiff filed another petition under the Inams Act on 21-8-1982 before the Inam Tahsildar for grant of patta and the same was returned by the Special Deputy Tahsildar. - (c) It is further pleaded that the defendants 1 and 2 proclaiming that they would occupy the plaint schedule land. The 1 st plaintiff, who is residing in the plaint schedule land and who constructed his house and raised a jami garden, jeedithota, neelagirithota, teak trees and other plants in the plaint schedule lands, resisted them showing all relevant documents including judgments of Civil Court and delivery receipts in O.S.Nos.259 of 1964 and 608 of 1968 and that the plaint schedule land is wrongly noted in fair adangal as „banjar land? and that the 1 st defendant in the 1 st week of October, 1994 was trying to place stones with intent to take the plaint schedule land to divide into house sites to give to poor people and tried to place stones in the plaint schedule land and when the plaintiffs obstructed, they went away. Hence, the plaintiffs constrained to file the suit. 8. Hence, the plaintiffs constrained to file the suit. 8. The defendants 1 and 2 filed a written statement before the trial Court denying material averments in the plaint and contended as follows: (a) It is contended that the suit is not maintainable against the defendants without issuance of notice under Section 80 of C.P.C and that the Government is not a party in O.S.Nos.259 of 1964 and 608 of 1968 and the judgment and decree in both the suits are not binding on the Government and that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction under the Inams Act, 1956 and the Revenue Court alone is competent to decide and that the survey settlement of Vizianagaram 2 nd bit was completed in 1959. (b) It is further contended that the delivery receipt was signed by V.M., who was not connected with the land and that by 1970, the Survey Settlement records were in force and new Survey numbers have been conveniently omitted in the certificate and that old Survey Nos.2 to 5 have no relation to the present Survey Nos.28 and 29 and old Survey Nos.2 to 5 are zeroythi lands and old Survey No.14A is the inam land and that extent was not tallied, Survey number was not tallied and Survey Land Register was prepared in 1954-55 and the land in Survey Nos.28 and 29 was noted as „banzar? and that the plaintiffs approached the Settlement Officer, Visakhapatnam, for ryotwari patta in respect of R.S.Nos.28/1 and 29/2 and the same was rejected. - (c) It is further pleaded that the plaintiffs are trying to grab the Government land as market value of which is very high and the suit is bad for misjoinder of parties. They prayed for dismissal of the suit with exemplary costs. 9. On the basis of the above pleadings, the learned trial Judge framed the following issues for trial: (1) Whether the plaintiffs are in lawful possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property at the time of filing of the suit ? If so, entitled for permanent injunction ? and (2) To what relief? 10. During the course of trial in the trial Court, on behalf of the plaintiffs, P.Ws.1 to 5 were examined and Exs.A-1 to A-31 were marked. On behalf of the defendants, D.W.1 was examined and Exs.B-1 to B-4 were marked. 11. If so, entitled for permanent injunction ? and (2) To what relief? 10. During the course of trial in the trial Court, on behalf of the plaintiffs, P.Ws.1 to 5 were examined and Exs.A-1 to A-31 were marked. On behalf of the defendants, D.W.1 was examined and Exs.B-1 to B-4 were marked. 11. The learned Principal Junior Civil Judge, Vizianagaram, after conclusion of trial, on hearing the arguments of both sides and on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, decreed the suit. Felt aggrieved thereby, the defendants filed the appeal suit in A.S.No.6 of 2001 on the file of the learned District Judge, Vizianagaram, wherein, the following point came up for consideration: Whether there are valid and sufficient grounds to interfere with the judgment and decree dated 14-11-2000 passed by the Principal Junior Civil Judge, Vizianagaram, in O.S.No.304 of 1994 ? 12. The learned District Judge, Vizianagaram i.e., the first appellate Judge, after hearing the arguments, answered the point, as above, against the defendants and dismissed the appeal suit filed by them. Felt aggrieved of the same, the defendants 1 and 2 in O.S.No.304 of 1994 filed the present second appeal before this Court. - 13. On hearing both sides? counsel at the time of admission of the appeal, on 13.04.2022 , this Court framed the following substantial questions of law: (1) Whether suit for injunction simplicitor is maintainable when the defendant disputed the title of the plaintiff (respondent Nos.1 to 7 herein) in view of the judgment reported in Ananthula Sudhakar v. P. Butchi Reddy (dead) by LRs [ 2008 (4) SCC 594 ] ? (2) Whether the earlier judgments marked as Exs.A2, A3 and A4 bind the appellants since the appellants are not parties to those judgments ? and (3) Whether Civil Court is having jurisdiction to entertain the suit ? 14. Heard the learned Government Pleader for Arbitration appearing for the appellants and Sri A. P. Reddy, learned counsel for the respondents. 15. In a second appeal under Section 100 of CPC, the High Court cannot substantiate its own opinion for that of first appellate Court unless the Court finds that the conclusions drawn by both the Courts are erroneous being, (i) contrary to the mandatory provisions of the applicable law or (ii) contrary to the law as pronounced by the Apex Court or (iii) based on inadmissible or no evidence. 16. 16. The specific contention of the plaintiffs is that their father was in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property during his life time and along with their father, they are also in possession of the plaint schedule property and subsequent to the death of their father Tamma Rao, being legal representatives, the plaintiffs are in possession and enjoyment over the plaint schedule property. The specific case of the plaintiffs is that Tamma Rao purchased the plaint schedule property under a registered sale deed, dated 19-9-1962 and since the date of purchase, their father along with the plaintiffs are in possession and enjoyment of the same without any interruption from anybody. - 17. In order to prove the possession of the plaintiffs over the plaint schedule property, the plaintiffs relied on the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 5. P.W.1 is none other than the 1 st plaintiff. P.W.2 is one of the attestors in Ex.A-1 sale deed. Apart from the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2, the plaintiffs also relied on the evidence of P.Ws.3 to 5. The evidence of P.Ws.3 and 5 clinchingly establishes the possession of the plaintiffs over the plaint schedule property. The evidence of P.W.1 is well corroborated by the evidence of P.Ws.3 and 5. 18. The plaintiffs also relied on Ex.A-6 certificate issued by the Tahsildar, in which the Tahsildar asserted the possession of the plaintiffs in the plaint schedule property. The plaintiffs also relied on Exs.A-19 to A-29 receipts, which show that the plaintiffs? father Tamma Rao was in possession over the plaint schedule property during his life time. It is the specific case of the appellants that the plaintiffs? father is not having any title in the plaint schedule property and the defendants are the owners of the plaint schedule property and they are trying to distribute the plaint schedule property to poor people by allotting house sites in the plaint schedule property. The contention of the defendants is that the plaint schedule property is a vacant site and there are no standing trees. During the pendency of the suit, an Advocate Commissioner was appointed. The report of the Advocate Commissioner goes to show that there are standing trees in the plaint schedule property. The defendants relied on the evidence of D.W.1. D.W.1 is the then Mandal Revenue Officer, Vizianagaram. During the pendency of the suit, an Advocate Commissioner was appointed. The report of the Advocate Commissioner goes to show that there are standing trees in the plaint schedule property. The defendants relied on the evidence of D.W.1. D.W.1 is the then Mandal Revenue Officer, Vizianagaram. His sole testimony is of no avail because as per the own admission of D.W.1, there are no standing trees in the plaint schedule property, but the report of Advocate Commissioner clearly proves that there are standing trees in the plaint schedule property. 19. The contention of the plaintiffs is that the defendants are trying to interfere with the possession and enjoyment over the plaint schedule property. It is the specific case of the defendants that the plaint schedule property belongs to the defendants and they are ready to give house plots in the plaint schedule property to the poor and needy people. - 20. The learned Government Pleader for Arbitration on behalf of the appellants would contend that the suit for injunction simplicitor is not maintainable, when the defendants disputed the title of the plaintiffs. Admittedly, in the case on hand, a suit for injunction simplicitor is filed by the plaintiffs to protect their possession in the plaint schedule property. As the suit for injunction simplicitor is concerned only with possession, normally the issue of title will not be directly and substantially in issue. The prayer for grant of injunction will be decided with reference to the finding of possession. Moreover, the oral and documentary evidence produced by the plaintiffs proves that the plaintiffs? father was in possession and enjoyment over the plaint schedule property and subsequent to the death of the plaintiffs? father Tamma Rao, the plaintiffs are in possession and enjoyment over the plaint schedule property. The law is well settled that a person, who is in a long settled possession of a property, shall not be evicted by force except under due process of law. 21. In the case of Karthiyayani Amma v. Govindan , [1980 SCC Online Ker 278] , the High Court of Kerala held as follows: “16. Even the rightful owner cannot eject him with force. If he cannot be evicted with force, he continues to be in possession and he can resist invasion of his possession by everyone including the rightful owner. In the case of Karthiyayani Amma v. Govindan , [1980 SCC Online Ker 278] , the High Court of Kerala held as follows: “16. Even the rightful owner cannot eject him with force. If he cannot be evicted with force, he continues to be in possession and he can resist invasion of his possession by everyone including the rightful owner. If the rightful owner threatens his peaceful he can approach Courts of Law and pray for the equitable relief of injunction to protect his possession.” Admittedly, in the case on hand, the plaintiffs are in a long settled possession of the plaint schedule property. Therefore, the plaintiffs shall not be evicted by forcibly except under due process of law. 22. In the case of Jharkhand State Housing Board v. Didar Singh , [(2019) 17 SCC 692] the Apex Court held as follows: - “11. It is well settled by catena of judgments of this Court that in each and every case where the defendant disputes the title of the plaintiff it is not necessary that in all those cases plaintiff has to seek the relief of declaration. A suit for mere injunction does not lie only when the defendant raises a genuine dispute with regard to title and when he raises a cloud over the title of the plaintiff, then necessarily in those circumstances, plaintiff cannot maintain a suit for bare injunction.” For the aforesaid reasons and also settled legal position, this Court finds that the present suit for injunction simplicitor is maintainable and there is no substance in the contention taken by the learned Government Pleader for Arbitration that suit for injunction simplicitor is not maintainable 23. The learned Government Pleader for Arbitration would contend that the earlier judgments under Exs.A-2 and A-3 do not bind the appellants since the appellants are not parties to those suit proceedings. No doubt, the appellants herein are not parties to the earlier suit proceedings i.e. in O.S.Nos.259 of 1964 and 608 of 1968 in which suit proceedings, the plaintiffs? father Vakatipudi Tamma Rao was declared as having title over the plaint schedule property and in fact, Ex.A-6 certificate issued by the then Mandal Revenue Officer also proves that the plaintiffs? father Tamma Rao was in the possession over the plaint schedule property and ryotwari patta has to be granted in favour of Tamma Rao. father Vakatipudi Tamma Rao was declared as having title over the plaint schedule property and in fact, Ex.A-6 certificate issued by the then Mandal Revenue Officer also proves that the plaintiffs? father Tamma Rao was in the possession over the plaint schedule property and ryotwari patta has to be granted in favour of Tamma Rao. The law is well settled that a previous judgment not inter partes can be admissible in evidence under Section 13 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, as a transaction in which the right to property was asserted and recognized. 24. As noticed supra, in the case on hand, the plaintiffs are not claiming declaratory rights over the plaint schedule property. The plaintiffs are seeking only the relief of permanent injunction in respect of the plaint schedule property. The evidence on record clinchingly establishes that the plaintiffs are in long possession over the plaint schedule property. The material on record clearly proves that the defendants are trying to interfere with the possession and enjoyment of the plaintiffs over the plaint schedule property. If the defendants intend to evict the plaintiffs from out of the plaint schedule property, they have to proceed as per law by following due procedure and the defendants are not supposed to evict the plaintiffs forcibly without following the proper procedure as per law. - 25. The learned Government Pleader for Arbitration appearing for the appellants would contend that the Civil Court is not having jurisdiction to try the suit. In the case of K. Krishnan v. Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanams , [1995 SCC Online AP 166] the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad held as follows: “28. It is a well accepted principle of law that ouster of jurisdiction of Civil Courts cannot be presumed lightly; any provision of law which divests the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts must be interpreted strictly. Abdul v. Bhawani; (8) AIR 1966 SC 1718 . If the relief sought in a civil suit is outside the purview of the authorities constituted under the special enactment, the legal position is not in doubt that the Civil Courts can be approached for necessary relief. Kankaiyalal v. Dr. D.R. Banaji, (9) AIR 1958 SC 725 . Abdul v. Bhawani; (8) AIR 1966 SC 1718 . If the relief sought in a civil suit is outside the purview of the authorities constituted under the special enactment, the legal position is not in doubt that the Civil Courts can be approached for necessary relief. Kankaiyalal v. Dr. D.R. Banaji, (9) AIR 1958 SC 725 . In Dhulabhai v. State of M.P. (10) AIR 1969 SC 78 , a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court speaking through the learned Chief Justice Hidyatullah, laid down the following propositions as to under what circumstances the jurisdiction of the civil Courts is divested; “1. Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special tribunals, the civil Court's jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the Civil Courts would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. 2. Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Where there is no express exclusion, the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in Civil Courts are prescribed by the said statute or not. - 3. Challenge to the provisions of the particular Act as ultra vires cannot be brought before Tribunals constituted under that Act. Even the High Court cannot go into that question on a revision or reference from the decision of the Tribunals. 4. When a provision is already declared unconstitutional or the constitutionality of any provision is to be challenged, a suit is open. Even the High Court cannot go into that question on a revision or reference from the decision of the Tribunals. 4. When a provision is already declared unconstitutional or the constitutionality of any provision is to be challenged, a suit is open. A writ of Certiorari may include a direction for refund if the claim is clearly within the time prescribed by the Limitation Act but it is not a compulsory remedy to replace a suit. 5. Where the particular Act contains no machinery for refund of tax collected in excess of constitutional limits or illegally collected a suit lies. 6. Questions of the correctness of the assessment apart from its constitutionality are for the decision of the authorities and a civil suit does not he if the orders of the authorities are declared to be final or there is an express prohibition in the particular Act. In either case, the Scheme of the particular Act must be examined because it is a relevant enquiry. 7. An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply.” 26. Admittedly, in the case on hand, the apprehension of the plaintiffs is that during the life time of their father, their father Tamma Rao purchased the plaint schedule property under Ex.A-1 registered sale deed and along with their father, they are in possession and enjoyment over the plaint schedule property and subsequent to the death of their father Tamma Rao, they are in the possession and enjoyment over the plaint schedule property. The further apprehension of the plaintiffs is that the defendants are trying to interfere with their possession and enjoyment over the plaint schedule property. In such a case, the Civil Court is having competent jurisdiction to grant the relief of permanent injunction in respect of the plaint schedule property. Therefore, there is no force in the contention of the defendants that the Civil Court is not having jurisdiction to try the suit. - 27. The learned Government Pleader for Arbitration would contend that the suit is bad for non-issuance of notice under Section 80 of CPC. Therefore, there is no force in the contention of the defendants that the Civil Court is not having jurisdiction to try the suit. - 27. The learned Government Pleader for Arbitration would contend that the suit is bad for non-issuance of notice under Section 80 of CPC. He would further contend that without issuing a notice under Section 80 of CPC to the defendants, the plaintiffs have filed the suit for perpetual injunction directly before the Civil Court and that the civil suit is bad for non-issuance of notice under Section 80 of CPC to the defendants. The material on record clearly proves that at the time of institution of the suit, the plaintiffs filed the application in I.A.No.3092 of 1994 and the trial Court allowed the said application by granting permission to the plaintiffs to dispense with notice under Section 80 of CPC. Therefore, there is no force in the contention of the defendants that the suit is bad for non-issuance of notice under Section 80 of CPC to the defendants. 28. The material on record clearly proves that during the life time of their father Tamma Rao, the plaintiffs along with their father are in possession and enjoyment over the plaint schedule property and subsequent to the death of their father Tamma Rao, the plaintiffs are in possession and enjoyment over the same and the plaintiffs are in a long settled possession over the plaint schedule property. The material on record also amply proves that the defendants are trying to interfere with the possession and enjoyment of the plaintiffs over the plaint schedule property. As stated supra, the law is well settled that a person, who is in long settled possession of the property, shall not be evicted by forcibly except under due process of law. 29. For the aforesaid reasons, the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief of permanent injunction. The learned trial Judge as well as the learned first appellate Judge, on appreciation of the entire evidence on record, both oral and documentary, came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief of permanent injunction as prayed for. Therefore, there is no need to interfere with the said findings given by both the Courts below. - 30. In the result, the second appeal is dismissed, confirming the judgment and decree of both the trial Court as well as the first appellate Court. Therefore, there is no need to interfere with the said findings given by both the Courts below. - 30. In the result, the second appeal is dismissed, confirming the judgment and decree of both the trial Court as well as the first appellate Court. Pending applications, if any, shall stand closed. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, each party do bear their own costs in the second appeal.